Nuclear Weapon-free Zones
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Nuclear Weapon-free Zones Introduction An international seminar, attended by more than 50 scholars, experts, activists and diplomats from six continents, was held between 1 and 4 September 2000 in Uppsala. It was inaugurated by the United Nations Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, who delivered the keynote address. It deliberated on the moral, political, legal and security imperative of nuclear weapons abolition, highlighting the need for both comprehensive and incremental measures of disarmament. The participants dedicated themselves to campaigning for NWFZs in different forums - global, regional, and national. In the Uppsala Declaration they adopted a programme of future activities was outlined, including regional-level campaigns, publications and the creation of a common website. A press statement was subsequently released. The Uppsala Declaration on Nuclear Weapon-free Zones A decade after the end of the Cold War, the world faces a stark choice: achieve the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, or face a second Nuclear Age with new generations of even more horrifying nuclear and other high-tech weapons. We believe there is an urgent moral, political, legal and security imperative to abolish these weapons, and build a strong momentum towards complete global nuclear disarmament. This is a precondition for human and environmental security. Therefore, more than 50 scholars, peace activists, diplomats and experts from six continents met on 1-4 September 2000, at Uppsala in Sweden. The conference, convened by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the Transnational Institute, Peace Depot, Gensuikin (Japan Congress Against A- & H-Bombs) and INESAP (International Network of Engineers & Scientists Against Proliferation), discussed the feasibility of establishing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) across the world. The dramatic threat of a new Nuclear Age highlights the urgent need for comprehensive nuclear disarmament and rapid destruction of the arsenals of all nuclear weapons-states. It also calls for incremental measures towards these goals. These include a nuclear test ban, a missile flight test ban, separation of warheads from missiles, a ban on the production of fissile materials used for making nuclear weapons and appropriate disposal or safeguarding of the accumulated stockpiles of such material. Crucial among these transitional measures are Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. These would ban the manufacture, deployment and transit of nuclear weapons in specific regions, and demand of nuclear armed states that the zones not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. This would help make it possible to permanently fold the nuclear umbrella, the so-called nuclear protection that nuclear weapon states offer non-nuclear allies. Such zones already exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, and Southeast Asia. They have prevented nuclear proliferation in those areas. A new zone is currently being negotiated in Central Asia. Several regions continue to face severe nuclear dangers, a challenge exacerbated by menacing attempts to build both National and Theatre Missile Defence systems. These regions include Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Europe. The creation of NWFZs here would not only limit proliferation, but support active nuclear disarmament with the dismantling of overt and clandestine nuclear weapons and fissile stocks and rolling back existing nuclear programmes. Such extension of NWFZs to the Northern hemisphere will enhance collective security and strengthen efforts to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. An NWFZ treaty in Northeast Asia would effectively address security concerns in Japan and the Korean peninsula. A South Asian NWFZ would prevent India and Pakistan from making or deploying nuclear weapons in this volatile region, where the danger of a nuclear exchange is today the greatest anywhere in the world. In the Middle East, the establishment of a zone free of Israel's nuclear weapons, and all other weapons of mass destruction in the region, represents a key component of regional security. In Central and Eastern Europe an NWFZ would defend the post-Cold War peace gains now threatened by NATO expansion as well as facilitate withdrawal of remaining tactical nuclear weapons. There are no technological obstacles to effective verification of NWFZ agreements. Establishing such zones requires political will, organisation and mobilisation. We hereby commit ourselves to:
Peoples and governments everywhere, as well as the United Nations, have a contribution to make to the creation and expansion of nuclear weapon-free zones. We urge others to join us in mobilising energies and resources towards achieving the noble goal of global nuclear disarmament. This document represents the broad consensus of the participants, although they or their organisations may not agree with every point in the analysis or recommendations PRESS RELEASE 14 September 2000 Conference calls for Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones with Emphasis on South Asia, Northeast Asia, the Middle East and Central Europe An international seminar, attended by more than 50 scholars, experts, activists and diplomats from six continents, has called for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs) to be established all over the world as transitional steps towards complete nuclear abolition. It underscored the urgency of such zones particularly in South Asia, Northeast Asia, the Middle East and Central Europe. The seminar, held between September 1 and 4 at Uppsala, was inaugurated by United Nations Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, who delivered the keynote address. It deliberated on the moral, political, legal and security imperative of nuclear weapons abolition, highlighting the need for both comprehensive and incremental measures of disarmament. 'At a time when some 30,000 nuclear weapons remain, NWFZs offer one of the few activities open to non-nuclear-weapon States not just to quarantine themselves from the nuclear contagion, but to pool their efforts to resist it,' said Mr Dhanapala. The Seminar participants were unanimous that a decade after the Cold War, the world faces a stark choice: achieve complete nuclear abolition, or face a second Nuclear Age with new generations of even more horrifying nuclear and other high-tech weapons. NWFZs, which ban the manufacture, deployment and transit of nuclear weapons in specific regions, and make them safe from nuclear attacks and threats from the nuclear weapons-states, are an important step towards nuclear abolition. Treaties to establish NWFZs have so far been reached in respect of Latin America (1967), South Pacific (1985), Africa (1996) and Southeast Asia (1997). 'It is imperative that the treaties come into force fully and that the Nuclear Powers strictly adhere to their protocols,' said Olle Nordberg, Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, the Seminar host and one of its five international co-sponsors. 'But it is even more crucial that the concept of NWFZs is itself radically transformed: from a measure of non-proliferation to a pro-active means of nuclear disarmament, i.e. thinning out, removal and actual dismantling of nuclear weapons where they already exist', Mr Nordberg said. After reviewing recent developments in disarmament negotiations, as well as the working of the existing NWFZs, the Seminar discussed at length the possibilities of such a transformation at a conceptual and practical level, especially as regards five specific zones. In Central Asia, the emergence of a zone treaty, which seemed imminent, now faces some political obstacles. These need to be overcome. In Northeast Asia, with Japan and the two Koreas at its centre, an NWFZ would offer the best guarantee of security without nuclear weapons while ensuring that no country crosses the nuclear threshold. 'This is an eminently sensible proposal,' said Hiro Umebayashi of Japanese civil society group, Peace Depot. In volatile South Asia, which witnessed a nuclear breakout with the Indian and Pakistani tests of 1998, an NWFZ could prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons. 'The demand for such a zone has been made for over 20 years in UN resolutions,' said Achin Vanaik and Praful Bidwai, Indian anti-nuclear campaigners and initiators of the seminar. 'Today a South Asian NWFZ is more relevant than ever.' In the Middle East, the establishment of a zone free of Israel's nuclear weapons, and all other weapons of mass destruction would be a key component of regional security. Said Fawzy H. Hammad, former chairman of Egypt's atomic energy commission: 'All the participants from our region agree that a zone free of all mass-destruction weapons is a realistic step forward.' In Central and Eastern Europe, an NWFZ would defend the post-Cold War peace gains now threatened by NATO expansion and facilitate withdrawal of remaining tactical nuclear weapons. Fiona Dove, director of the Amsterdam-based Transnational Institute, another Seminar co-sponsor, said: 'A Central European NWFZ would greatly enhance security and impel NATO de-nuclearisation in Europe'. NWFZs have an advantage over other transitional measures towards disarmament. They involve a concerted effort by a whole region towards a common security structure. They carry the potential to include non-signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They do not suffer from the infirmities of the NPT, which does not impose effective disarmament obligations upon the nuclear states. The Seminar participants emphasised the tremendous public education as well as disarmament potential of NWFZs. They welcomed declarations of nuclear weapons-free cities and local authorities. 'Such nuclear-free areas have great moral and political value although lacking legal force', said Masa Takubo of Gensuikin (Japan Congress against A-and H-Bombs). The Seminar also discussed the issue of verification of NWFZ agreements and concluded on the basis of expert opinion that fairly reliable and accessible technological means exist to verify that all concerned states comply with their obligations. Seminar participants, who included a variety of civil society groups and campaigning organisations, underscored the relevance of the long-standing demand for a Nordic NWFZ and the concept of 'single-state' NWFZs being advocated for countries as varied as Austria, Mongolia and Sweden. The participants dedicated themselves to campaigning for NWFZs in different forums, global, regional and national. In the Uppsala Declaration they adopted, they outlined a programme of future activities, including regional-level campaigns, publications and creation of a Website. The seminar was a part of the NWFZ project, which was launched by Five civil society organizations - Transnational Institute (TNI), Dag Hammarskjold Foundation (Sweden), Japanese Congress Against A and H-bombs (Gensuikin- Japan), Peace Depot (Japan), and International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation (INESAP). According to the background analysis outlined in the concept paper the project calls for NWFZs to be established all over the world as a step towards complete nuclear abolition. Background The world stands at a historic crossroads today. A decade after the end of the Cold War, there is a real and growing danger that the momentum in favour of nuclear restraint and disarmament will be lost and reversed. This momentum has been weak, hesitant and uneven, although it is real, new and significant. But it has suffered major setbacks in the past two years. Unless it is defended and strengthened, the world could yet again drift into a new, high technology-driven, ruinous arms race. Put starkly, the choice today may be between the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a Second Nuclear Age. Positive Developments The enormous nuclear arms build-up that characterised the first four decades of the Nuclear Age has shown a downward trend, especially since 1987. Since the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed that year, thousands of nuclear weapons have been decommissioned or de-alerted, although too many still remain in the global arsenal. Apart from unilateral arms cuts by four of the recognised five nuclear weapons-states (NWSs), the most important contribution to the reduction process has come from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) between the US and the USSR/Russia. When fully implemented, START-I and -II will have reduced the number of deployed strategic warheads in the US and Russia from over 20,000 in total to around 3,500 each. Sub-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons held by the US and Russia have been effectively withdrawn. Three states that inherited nuclear weapons. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. have given up their nuclear arsenals. Three countries. South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. have renounced their threshold status by retrenching their nuclear weapons programmes. Two new nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs) have emerged since the end of the Cold War. the Southeast Asian nuclear weapons-free zone (Bangkok Treaty) and the African nuclear weapons-free zone (Treaty of Pelindaba). A third zone seems imminent in Central Asia. In 1996, the Conference on Disarmament finally concluded the long delayed and repeatedly aborted negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which will significantly restrain further nuclear weapons refinement. A majority of the world. s states have since signed (although not ratified) the CTBT. A series of initiatives by non-nuclear weapons-states and civil society actors and organisations have emerged in the post-Cold War era, particularly in the 1990s. These support or articulate the demand for rapid step-by-step nuclear disarmament as a goal that is both feasible and desirable. They include initiatives by the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), the Canberra Commission Report, the Statement of 61 Generals and Admirals, the July 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the illegality of nuclear weapons, the statements of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and the Middle Powers Initiative (both 1998), and so on. The NAC, comprised of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, has emerged as an influential state-level grouping which persistently advocates nuclear restraint and arms reduction. The common thread in all these initiatives is the powerful argument that nuclear weapons create insecurity, not security, and must be abolished. Nuclear deterrence is deeply flawed, being unreliable, highly fallible, and strategically irrational. It makes no sense to seek security through the use or threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, according to the ICJ, nuclear weapons abolition is a moral imperative as well as a legal obligation imposed upon all states without exception. Furthermore, there is now an evident shift in international public opinion in favour of nuclear weapons abolition, including several states closely allied with the United States. For the first time, serious differences have emerged within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance over its nuclear policy and strategic doctrine. In many countries, and in many international fora, there is growing pressure to institutionalise a multilateral The prolonged uncertainly over START. II has ended with its ratification by the Russian Duma. Russia. s offer to reduce its nuclear arsenal further to 1,000. 1,500 warheads under START. III if the US also does so is a welcome development as well. Last but not least, the first full review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), five years after it was indefinitely extended, has produced (May 2000) a unanimous resolution which underscores the vital importance of an unequivocal commitment on the part of the nuclear weapons-states to total nuclear weapons abolition, without ifs or buts, and not only as an ultimate goal. The resolution represents a victory for voices of restraint such as the NAC and a gain for the cause of nuclear disarmament. Significant Setbacks The generally positive pro-disarmament momentum has however recently suffered some major setbacks. Indeed, it may be in jeopardy. In 1998, India and Pakistan jolted the world by conducting nuclear tests and declaring themselves nuclear powers. The damage done by these tests to global disarmament efforts is basically two-fold. First, it has increased the likelihood that other nuclear-capable states might become de facto or declared nuclear weapons-states. Second, and more important, it has strengthened the tendencies in the existing NWSs in favour of the continued retention and further development of nuclear weapons. This has debilitating consequences on the prospect of capping arms development, rapidly reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons everywhere and eventually achieving a nuclear weapons-free world. There have been other disturbing recent developments since 1998. The most notable of these are: the US Senate. s rejection of the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the expansion and enlargement of NATO; the adoption of an offensive nuclear doctrine despite the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact; and the US attempt to weaken, if not scuttle, the treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM Treaty) of 1972 . Perhaps the most menacing development is the United States. move towards a National Missile Defence system (NMD), as well as Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in East Asia. If this comes to pass under the pressure of strong lobbies in the Military-Industrial Complex and both major political parties, it is liable to wreck existing arms control arrangements, create profound suspicions, imbalances and uncertainties, and probably ignite an entirely new arms race at the global level. This spells the real danger that the post-Cold War momentum in favour of nuclear restraint and disarmament will be reversed. The world could witness a Second Nuclear Age just when there are compelling reasons, and a historic opportunity, to eradicate the scourge of nuclear weapons altogether. Strengthening the Momentum Defending, preserving, nurturing and strengthening the post-Cold War disarmament momentum in the face of these negative trends has now become vitally important. This can only be done through the pursuit of comprehensive agendas for total disarmament as well as incremental/transitional measures. Without a comprehensive agenda, step-by-step approaches risk inordinately delaying the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, advocating schemes for total disarmament risks being seen as a utopian effort which, in the absence of the visible successes associated with step-by-step efforts, may lead to frustration, disillusionment, declining interest and weakened capacity to mobilise public concerns about nuclear disarmament. Clearly, both strategies need to be pursued simultaneously. Nuclear Weapons-free Zones In regard to crucial transitional steps towards global disarmament, the time has assuredly come for one particular initiative, which corresponds to a deeply felt need by the peoples and governments of many countries, including the peoples of some NWSs and some nuclear-capable states. This is the implementation of new nuclear weapons-free zones in regions where nuclear weapons currently play a role as a security concept, to be progressively extended from the Southern to the Northern Hemisphere eventually to cover the entire world. Indeed, NWFZs already cover almost the entire Southern Hemisphere, and serious discussions are in progress on several prospective zones. NWFZs effectively ban the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons throughout a specific region and prohibit the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by the NWSs against countries in the zone. With the establishment of each zone, the concept of NWFZs has itself continuously evolved. Each NWFZ treaty has been a little stricter and more effective than the preceding one. Future nuclear weapons-free zones would thus be likely to also prevent the transit of nuclear weapons through their territorial waters via legally binding agreements and protocols to be signed by the NWSs. NWFZs have the advantage of offering a concerted effort by a whole region towards a common security structure. Through this, they carry the potential to include both NPT and CTBT hold-out states as well as recognised NWSs. In many ways, NWFZs would create a region-specific thrust towards nuclear weapons withdrawal and abolition, to supplement the vertical thrust that the extensive cuts in nuclear arms and prevention of their future refinement has developed so far. This latter thrust is most clearly reflected in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1996. the first significant multilateral nuclear arms control measure in 30 years since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Now that the CTBT has already been signed by 155 states, establishing new NWFZs would be among the most important measures to promote nuclear restraint and disarmament. Such a step would be on a par with step-by-step, class-by-class weapons reductions, de-alerting, separating nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, and elimination of tactical weapons, etc. This is not an exaggeration. In regions where all states are parties to the NPT, NWFZs can strengthen and go beyond the NPT. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapons signatories promised not to produce or possess nuclear weapons in exchange for the commitment made by the NWSs under Article VI to eliminate all of their nuclear weapons. In effect, the NPT represented a bargain: non-proliferation in return for a commitment by the NWSs to negotiate total global disarmament in good faith. In regions where not all states are parties to the NPT, an NWFZ could be seen as a first step towards integrating additional countries within the global non-proliferation regime, as demonstrated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The failure of the NWSs to abide by the spirit and letter of Article VI of the NPT has created a gap or hiatus between non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. NWFZs are one of the most important ways of consolidating non-proliferation (indeed, the NPT encourages the establishment of NWFZs) and, at the same time, of bridging this gap. Existing Zones: Consolidating Non-Proliferation As a non-proliferation measure, NWFZs supplement the NPT by banning the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear weapons-states. They can also bring territorial waters under such a ban. Furthermore, such independent zonal treaties have the flexibility to incorporate other restrictions and bans not envisaged in the NPT. For example, the Treaty of Pelindaba bans nuclear weapons-related research. The existing NWFZs have all in their own ways reflected this reinforcement and consolidation of the global non-proliferation regime. So far, five agreements have been signed to bring about NWFZs in different parts of the world: Antarctica, Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa, in that order. In 1957, the Antarctic Treaty effectively made Antarctica a nuclear free zone. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibited testing, manufacture, storage and direct or indirect acquisition of nuclear weapons or vehicles for launching them. Argentina, Brazil and finally Cuba have now joined the treaty, making Latin America the first continent to be fully nuclear-free. In 1985, the Treaty of Rarotonga creating a South Pacific NWFZ was signed. The impetus behind this was provided not merely by Australia and New Zealand, but by many South Pacific island states and . territories. , where human lives and ecological systems were adversely affected by nuclear testing. The Treaty is seen by peoples of this region as a major political and moral gain. The Southeast Asian NWFZ, including all ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states, entered into force on 27 March, 1997, while the Treaty of Pelindaba, comprising the whole of the African continent, was agreed in 1996 but awaits full ratification and entry into force. Furthermore, a Central Asian NWFZ is close to being established. Negotiations for its treaty-level formulation have reached a critical stage. And there is strong domestic political support for the proposal in the states of the region. While it took almost twenty years for the South Pacific NWFZ to emerge after the zone created by the Tlatelolco Treaty, the lag between the former treaty and successive treaties has diminished significantly. Even more encouraging, each NWFZ treaty has been a little stricter and a little more effective as a restraint measure than the preceding one. The Latin American NWFZ did not ban . peaceful. nuclear explosions, but the South Pacific NWFZ did that, as well as banning the dumping of radioactive wastes. The African NWFZ has banned nuclear weapons-related research as well. And the Southeast Asian NWFZ is the first to touch upon the issue of . freedom of transit. for ships and submarines bearing nuclear weapons through Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelf waters. In addition to the existing five NWFZs, there exist numerous cities and municipalities which have declared themselves nuclear weapons-free or nuclear-free. These are not examples of formally acknowledged Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones as they lack international legal status. They are, however, important as expressions of public sympathy and committed support for disarmament in general and the establishment of NWFZs in particular. Thousands of cities, towns and municipalities in different parts of the world have declared themselves nuclear weapons-free. In Japan, for instance, 2,300 municipalities are nuclear weapons-free, and three-fourths of New Zealand has also been declared themselves free of nuclear weapons. Even in the US, such nuclear-free areas cover some 10 million people. The significant public opinion generated through this process played an important role in impelling successive governments in the South Pacific to promote the Treaty of Rarotonga and ensure that US ships carrying nuclear weapons are not to come into their territorial waters. Prospective Zones: Bridging the Gap between Non-Proliferation and Disarmament At least four prospective NWFZs. Northeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East and Central Europe. are currently being proposed. All these prospective zones differ from existing zones in certain crucial ways. First, they either include or border de facto or declared NWSs. In one important case, namely South Asia, there have been two recent breakouts from the non-proliferation regime. Second, in two of the mentioned four regions, non-nuclear countries still believe that sharing a nuclear umbrella plays an essential role in their security. Undoubtedly, all this adds a new quality to NWFZs, though it poses serious obstacles to the establishment of such zones. However, the urgency and seriousness of the security situation in these regions require precisely these efforts. Establishing these prospective NWFZs would represent a historic shift in the concept, scope and function of NWFZs because they would require pro-active, even radical measures, as distinct from passive steps, including the actual withdrawal, dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. It is hard to conceive of a practical transitional alternative to such a transformed and radicalised notion of NWFZs as an active measure of nuclear arms reduction and abolition (and not just of non-proliferation) in many regions of the world which are menaced by nuclear weapons. There remain no further significant geographical regions (as distinct from single states) anywhere, which are not NWFZs, but in which nuclear weapons do not play a major role in security policy. Such prospective NWFZs have a transformed function. They must challenge the concept of a . . nuclear umbrella". And they must bridge the gap between non-proliferation and disarmament in ways that the NWFZs set up hitherto did not do. [We have to acknowledge that a decision to withdraw/dismantle has to come first. However, it should be facilitated by integrating national steps into a regional security concept Northeast Asian zone
South Asian zone
Middle Eastern zone
Central European zone
Conclusion Today, the demand for NWFZs in the Northern Hemisphere involving states with close affinity to nuclear weapons is no longer abstract and cannot be dismissed as mere propaganda. There have been serious, well-conceived proposals for NWFZs in the Nordic states, in the Iberian peninsula, in the Mediterranean region, in the Baltic states, etc. Some of these have a long history and enjoy a measure of popular support. These proposals need to be pursued. Two NWFZs have come into existence since the end of the Cold War, and a third, the Central Asian NWFZ, is starting to take practical shape. Every new NWFZ has been stricter than the preceding one and this tendency is believed to continue. Today, more than half of the world. s landmass and 99% of the Southern Hemisphere land areas are under the coverage of NWFZs. Apart from their direct contribution to non-proliferation and disarmament, existing and prospective NWFZs could play an important symbolic role by continuously expanding the nuclear weapons-free areas of the world and gradually isolating the nuclear weapons-states. The moral and political impact of more and more parts of the world becoming nuclear-free will significantly strengthen the existing momentum towards complete global nuclear disarmament. |
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