An International System for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts

An International System for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts
Mariano Aguirre
Política Exterior (Foreign Affairs), September 1998

The impact of wars on fragile states has led the principal foreign protagonists involved - states, multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGO´s) - to debate prevention and its possible political application. Internal wars which take place on the periphery of the world system will continue, carrying serious regional and global effects. Therefore, prevention of conflicts is a necessity, especially within the framework of the Foreign Policy and Common Security of the European Union.

A series of wars over the last decade have produced complex emergencies which have led to various combinations of genocide, famine, destruction of infrastructure, enforced displacement of populations and regional destabilisations. These conflicts have broken out within states which are generally fragile and which lack state institutions almost in their entirety. The difference between the civil population and military forces is unclear, and state and non-state protogonists wage war with no regard for humanitarian law. From Somalia to the former Congo, via the Balkans, Chechnya, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Sri Lanka, the phenomenon of armed conflicts in fragile states will be one of the twenty first century's crucial problems. (1)

Foreign reaction varies according to the protagonists involved and their standing in the international system. The powerful states with global interests have wavered between empowering the United Nations with managing these conflicts or directly tackling them themselves either unilaterally or joining with other states with common interests. For strong states, especially the five members of the UN Security Council, granting power upwards to the UN's Secretary-General or the Organisation for European Cooperation and Security (OECS) goes against the traditional and pragmatic concept of the nation state and, from their perspective, would imperil their capacity to act in defence of their interests.

Over the current decade multilateral organisations have fought for political space (delegated by powerful states), economic support and even for the military power of coercion. The proposal by both the former and the current Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan respectively, to avail of a peace force which can act for prevention has not been adopted by states because it would grant the Secretary-General power over them and enable him to act coercively. (2)

For their part, NGO's have the prestige, social support and the political and economic backing which states and institutions such as the EU have invested in them to manage the most dramatic consequences of humanitarian crises. But in the current decade, NGO's face complex emergencies which in some cases are beyond them while on the ground provide proof of the states' unwillingness to defend their causes.

The three groups referred to have debated - together with academics, institutions studying peace and security, and journalists - the responses to complex emergencies, paying particular attention to interventionism and so-called "humanitarian interference". (3) Some key questions have been the who, the when and the how of intervention; whether the use of force to guarantee humanitarian aid is useful or produces destabilisation; and the differences between humanitarian intervention or imposition of peace. The answer is that there is no single answer. Every crisis requires special treatment.

The problem of wars within states and their humanitarian impact, in reality, lies in the battle between the concept of the singular interest of the nation-state promulgated by the pragmatic school and the cooperative ideal which maximises the common good, furthered in the last decade by institutionalists and through regulations. This tension between two concepts - the pragmatic and the institutionalist /regulations - will define the international system in the next century.

Conflict prevention, in part, implies a compromise between the two concepts and all the protagonists, given that some want to do more, and others less, and the majority demand different responses (including the victims). But all agree that peace operations conducted since the late eighties up to now have been found wanting: they either failed, they were not able to halt the conflict, they left the situation little better than before or they did not take place as in the crisis of the Great Lakes in October 1997. States do not wish to fund peace operations in the long term nor risk their armed forces, and multilateral organisations and NGO's criticise states and believe that mechanisms for avoiding crises do exist.

As well as criticism aimed at states and by connection at the UN over humanitarian operations, there is further criticism of humanitarian action and cooperation with development from within and beyond NGO's themselves. (4) These organisations - private and multilateral, such as the United Nations' High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) - often see themselves caught between reluctant states who cannot take on tasks that they are allotted and state and non-state forces which steal their food, medicines and fuel for their causes or take them as hostages. (5)

The first institutional initiative in favour of prevention came in 1995: the European Parliament accepted a proposal by the President of the Commission for Development, Michel Rocard, to form a group for the analysis of conflicts. In 1996 the European Commission created the Conflict Prevention Network and at the Amsterdam summit in 1997 the Council of Europe decided to form planning and early warning groups within the framework of Foreign Policy and Common Security. (6) In addition, the Committee for Development Aid of the OECD drew up an important document which contained an analysis of prevention, development and post-war reconstruction. And the Humanitarian Affairs Department of the UN created the Humanitarian Early Warning System. Similarly, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention was created, grouping European institutes and NGO's. An example of the importance of the question is provided by the fact that in the current renegotations between the EU and the 71 member states of the Lomé Convention on commerce and aid the theme of conflict prevention has been introduced.

What is conflict prevention?

The first step is to define current armed conflicts: these are violent situations in around 30 countries where more than a thousand victims die a year and in which one or more protagonists battle over political power or land. One of these protagonists is the state which participates by means of its security forces. There are usually several non-state armed protagonists and connections with violent groups such as drug traffickers, paramilitary organisations and mercenaries. These conflicts usually have a strong regional impact which manifests itself in refugees, illegal arms sales and environmental destruction. (9)

Modern wars have their origins in diverse internal causes. As they take place in countries on the periphery of the global system there is a strong link between the economic policies which are directed at them and their internal reality. Rapid modernisation, for example, linked with integration into the global market can increase inequalities and social tensions. Therefore decisions taken in central countries or international financial institutions on prices of raw materials, arms sales or credit policies affect these countries owing to their dependency and weakness. This weakness can be a trump card in prevention.

Discussions take place between politicians, diplomats, NGO's and the armed forces about how to define the prevention of these conflicts. For some, prevention is about the application of long-term policies to tackle the problems which cause armed conflicts (for example, poverty). For others, it is about gaining respect for democratic standards and human rights through the strengthening of institutions. A third group attempts to take measures which are diplomatic, political, economic, commercial and eventually military in order to avoid a crisis turning into violence.

The definition varies according to the position of whoever proposes it, both in order to put it into practice and with the aim, paradoxically, of not carrying it out. Therefore, government civil servants may prefer the diplomacy of rapid response in order to avoid having to tackle the roots or commercial relationships, because this would affect their country's interests. But an NGO involved in development understands that prevention means getting to the roots.

Conflict prevention aims to stop tensions escalating to violence by means of short, medium and long-term measures. Theoretically, the more effective the preventive action the less tensions there will be and the greater the distancing of violence. No single measure excludes the others. Nicolaïdis presents a reference framework for prevention which comprises coercive diplomacy (e.g. arms embargo); institutional incentives (e.g. aid in exchange for peace); co-operative management (e.g. easing mediation); and systematic transformations (e.g.constructing a legal system). (10) The wider the perspective the more dynamic the response will be. That is, given an imminent conflict in a country, a state or the EU can, at the same time, send a research or mediation commission, demand that human rights are not violated, and initiate a study on the structural problems of that country.

Just as there is no mechanical relationship between factors which generate conflicts, nor can there be a mathematical summation of action which will halt violent escalation. Conflicts are in the hands of people and the results are always unpredictable. Furthermore, prevention should be carried out cautiously (in order to avoid producing the opposite effect) but without trusting in its results.

Lund says that prevention should signify immediate diplomatic or military interventions so as to bring about an immediate halt to violence and towards political and socio-economic structural changes which improve people's standard of living .

Therefore prevention includes:

1. action, policies or institutions which are used in order to avoid a significant and constant escalation to violence of internal or international disputes at times or places which are particularly vulnerable ("vertical escalation");
2. the promotion of activities which bring about non-violent reconciliation of the interests in dispute;
3. this reconciliation includes helping to prevent the conflict from starting up again once attention is turned to avoiding other conflicts ("horizontal escalation"). (11)

Operational and Structural Operations

The American Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflicts studied the question for three years and has come up with an important final study.(12) Its definition is based on avoiding violence, vertical and horizontal escalation and avoiding violence from breaking out in conflicts which have ended. The strategies for prevention are set down in three principles:

• act rapidly at the earliest signs of the problem (this implies possessing prior analysis of ethnic, linguistic and socio-economic, national and religious roots.); (13)
• act from the outside using political, economic, social and military measures to relieve the pressure which has sparked the violence;
• activate policies which resolve the underlying problems which lie at the roots of the violence.

The Commission groups the strategies for prevention under operational prevention and structural prevention. In the former, an external protagonist (state, multilateral organisations, a prestigious personality) sets in motion a political-military and humanitarian strategy aimed at halting the escalation of violence and restoring the internal politics of the state affected.

Operational prevention includes having the capacity to anticipate and analyse potential conflicts (early warning), acting on opportunities which arise unexpectedly, putting the problem in the hands of the UN Security Council and the relevant regional organisation and encouraging preventive diplomacy, both public and secret. It also involves utilising economic measures such as sanctions, the exchange of specific measures for commercial profits, and making aid and investment conditional. (14)

The degree of force employed has to be in proportion with the goals to be achieved and should be utilised within the framework of the UN Charter. It is curious that force will not be used as a last resort but that governments who commit genocide should realise that certain behaviour is unacceptable to the international community. Force can be applied also for preventive deployment (such as in Macedonia since 1992) or to prevent the outbreak of violence.

Structural prevention includes the application of international law and mechanisms for resolving disputes as well as strategies for satisfying the economic, social, political, cultural and humanitarian needs of those affected by conflicts and post-war reconstruction. The Carnegie Commission believes whatever the type of society is, the pillars of peace are security, social welfare and justice. (15)

With regard to security, the Commission includes non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the control of conventional ones, with attention to small arms which are most often used in today's wars. Another dimension is the security within a state which comes from having laws, a legitimate police force and impartial judicial and penal systems.

Welfare implies access to basic personal needs: drinking water, health service, education, home and equal employment opportunities. To reach these goals a redefinition of the concept of development is required with aid and foreign investment which favour sustainable development, as well as a revaluation of the role of the state which must be openly and efficiently run. In addition the OECD puts emphasis on long-term development and sees a single continuous process in conflict prevention, humanitarian emergency operations, institutionalisation and reconciliation in peace processes. (16)

The State: Stabilising Tool

An interesting aspect in prevention is the role of the state. As the economy has become globalised, the state has lost weight, particularly in those countries which are peripheral and fragile institutionally. Neo-liberalism promotes a global market with little state participation. Bodies such as the World Bank, the NGO's and aid and co-operation agencies share a distrust of dictatorial and corrupt states. Some trust in private enterprise and others in civilian society.

However, there is today a revaluation of the role which the state should undertake in development. This is important because all prevention policy should be strategically orientated to a reconstruction of the state and society affected. Without the state there can be no process of institutional and social post-war reconstruction and the cycle of conflict will start again. The European Commissioner for relations with the countries of the Lomé Agreement, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, believes that EU preventive policies should be orientated to "the Africans taking control of the situation" but that the principal problem with Africa is the fragile state, corruption, repression, inefficient management and the control of resources by an elite. (17)

A recent White Paper of the British Department for International Development proposes "a coherent global system" for conflict prevention which goes from preventive diplomacy to balanced economic development, the promotion of human rights and social cohesion as well as donors, development agencies and strong governments which are open to public scrutiny and honest. (18)

Priority Areas

Early attempts at conflict prevention were directed at those areas which most interest the EU and the USA. For the EU's Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) the priorities are in sub-Saharan Africa, eastern Europe, the Balkans, the former USSR and the Mediterranean zone. The Centre for Preventive Action (of the Council of Foreign Relations, in New York) is interested in the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa.

The structural instability in the area of the Great Lakes, with around 800,000 deaths during the current decade has been the spark which has drawn attention to Africa. From 1955 to 1995 armed conflicts have affected 53 countries in the African continent.

There are 23 million refugees and 66 ethnic minorities under threat. Solely between 1994 and 1995 it is calculated that around one million died in Africa.(19)

Various pieces of research point out that the most important causes of conflicts in Africa are the violation of basic freedoms and of human rights, the lack of democratic systems, and the lack of economic development. (20) The relationship is not automatic: very poor societies exist where there is no armed conflict yet there is criminal violence. At the same time, co-operation in development can help to prevent conflicts or help to worsen them as the processes of rapid modernisation generate tensions among both those affected and those unaffected by socio-economic changes. Development creates subjective expectations which modernisation does not satisfy and this can generate aggressiveness and violence. (21)

The obstacles

Reports such as those of the Carnegie Commission, the Aspen Institute (22) and the OECD are programmes for social construction of the state in countries in potential conflict, and a working agenda for the international system. All the studies propose either the full or partial setting up of a system - i.e., a collection of rules, implicit or explicit norms and procedures - for the exercise of internal conflict prevention. Despite the good news that the question is receiving support from several quarters, this raises many difficulties of which the principal ones are:

• the pre-eminence of the national interests of global and regional powers over common interests. Multilateralism is losing ground and the idea of regional hegemonic leaders is returning. Powers such as the USA and France have interests in some African states, for example, and compete with the collaboration of local governors in order to gain access to natural resources and regional prestige. Local powers, such as South Africa and Nigeria, intervene for their own ends;
• the general trend in the global economy is low-risk investment with high gains in the short term. Structural prevention implies investment which carries a risk with a possible indirect gain in the long term. Analysis is needed which investigates if it is more profitable to prevent than manage crises and collaborate in reconstruction;
• immediate prevention can be capitalised on politically by those governments or institutions which propose it (if it proves efficient). But public opinion and the media comprehend better a war or a breakdown in negotiations than the process which avoids it. The media bear a responsibility in giving sufficient airing to the preventive and diplomatic processes (such as the OECD and Felipe Gonzalez in Kosovo and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland);

Conflict prevention is a concept to be developed. It is receives its nourishment from Human Rights, International Law, economic development, the theories of the state and democracy, and the verification that modern armed conflicts carry consequences to be avoided because, in the end, very often prevention can be simpler, cheaper and less brutal than cure.

References

1. See José M.Tortosa, "Orígenes y contextos de los nuevos conflictos bélicos" (the origins and contexts of new armed conflicts) and Mariano Aguirre, "Los factores de la guerra moderna" (the factors of the modern war) in Centro Pignatelli (Ed.), Los conflictos armados. Génesis, víctimas and terapias, (Armed conflicts. Genesis, victims and therapy) Peace Research Seminar/ Aragon Regional Government, Zaragoza, 1997.
2. Kofi A. Annan, Transition and Renovation. Annual report on the work of the Organisation 1997, United Nations, New York, 1997, p.57.
3. See in Adam Roberts' extensive bibliography "Humanitarian Action in War", Adelphi Paper, Nº 305, IISS/Oxford University Press, December 1996.
4. See Alex de Waal, "Democratising the Aid Encounter in Africa", International Affairs, vol.73, Nº 4, pp.623-639 and
David Sogge (ed.), Compassion and Calculation. The Business of Private Foreign Aid, Pluto Press/ Transnational Institute, London, 1996 (Spanish translation in Icaria, Barcelona, 1998).
5. John Pomfret, "Charities get caught up as tools of war", The Guardian Weekly, 5 October 1997, p.17.
6. See Peter Cross (Ed.) Contributing to Preventive Action. Conflict Preventive Action Yearbook 1997/1998, Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Brussels, 1998.
7. DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development and Co-operation, OECD, Paris, 1997.
8. Resolution on the Commission's Green Paper in Relations between the EU and the ACP countries on the eve of the
21st Century, European Parliament, Brussels, 1997.
9. Michael E. Brown, "Introduction" in M.E. Brown, The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p.1; and Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (Eds.), New Wars, Pinter, London, 1997.
10. Kalypso Nicolaïdes, "International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework", in Robert Y. Rotberg,
Vigilance and Vengeance, Brookings Institution Press and the World Peace Foundation, Washington D.C., 1996. p.56.
11. Michael Lund, "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall", in Cross (ed.) Contributing to Preventing
Action, p.21.
12. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, Carnegie
Corporation of New York, Washington D.C., 1997. Presided by David A. Hamburg (distinguished scientist and member of
the US Presidential Assessors Committee on Science and Technology) and the ex-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The
Commission comprised, among others, of the former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, the ex-Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Gareth Evans, the British diplomat, David Owen, the former Under-Secretary of the UN,
Sir Brian Urquhart, and John Steinbuner, analyst for the Brookings Institution.
13. Michel Rocard, "Pistes pour une meilleure prévention", Le Courier, Nº 168, March-April, 1998, p.69.
14. A manual containing definitions and the array of institutions involved in this field in SIPRI-UNESCO, Peace,
Security and Conflict Prevention. Handbook, SIPRI/Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
15. Preventing Deadly Conflicts, p. XXVIII.
16. OECD, DAC Guidelines, p.10.
17. Joao de Deus Pinheiro "La réponse de l'Europe aux conflits de l'Afrique", Le Courier, Nº 168, March-April 1998,
p.66.
18. Secretary of State for International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century.
White Paper on International Development, London, 1997, p.68+
19. Luc Reychler, "Conflicts in Africa: the Issues of Control and Prevention", in Conflicts in Africa. An analysis of Crises
and Crisis Prevention Measures, European Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security/Médecins sans
Frontiers/King Baudouin Foundation, Brussels, 1997, p. 19-22.
20. Possibilities of African-European Cooperation in Prevention of Conflicts and Humanitarian Disaters in Africa. A
study commissioned by the European Commission DGIA, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague,
1996, p.5.
21. Essays on the violent effects of development in Espen Barth Eide and Carsten Ronnfeldt, "Development Aid as
Conflict Prevention? Reflections on the Possible Use of Development Aid in Comprehensive Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding Efforts", in CPN Yearbook, p 150-151.; Henk W. Houweling, "Destabilising Consequences of Sequential
Development", in Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, Paul Sciarone (Eds.), Between Development and Destruction. An
enquiry into the causes of conflict in post-colonial states, Macmillan, London, 1996, p. 143-172.
<22. Conflict Prevention: strategies to sustain peace in the post-Cold War world, The Aspen Institute, Washington D.C.,
1997. Praiseworthy study containing essays by George Soros, Richard Goldstone and Alvaro de Soto, among others.

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