The Meaning of Doha

The Meaning of Doha
Walden Bello
with Anuradha Mittal
Focus on the Global South, December 2001

Over two weeks after the controversial Fourth Ministerial of the World Trade Organization in Doha, Qatar, the world is still confused about what exactly was agreed by the 140 plus member countries. Given the critical importance of the WTO to the future of developing countries, it is essential to clarify things. Was a new trade round launched at Doha? Was Doha a victory, and for whom?

A New Round?

Something was launched at Doha, but to call it a "round" of trade negotiations might be stretching the concept of a round. A round means negotiations on a broad range of issues directed at trade liberalization. What was agreed at Doha were: a) negotiations to clarify or revise some existing agreements, e.g., anti-dumping; and b) eventual negotiations for new agreements, e.g., on the so-called "new issues" of transparency in government procurement, investment, competition policy, and trade facilitation.

Getting immediate negotiations going to bring investment, government procurement, competition policy, and trade facilitation under the jurisdiction of the WTO was at the top of the agenda of the trading powers in Doha. They fell short of this objective, being able to secure a commitment for negotiations on these issues only after the fifth ministerial in 2003-and only with an "explicit consensus" from member countries, a condition that India insisted on.

But though they fell short of immediately launching new negotiations, the big powers nevertheless forced a significant step towards that goal, something that had been stymied in Seattle owing to the collapse of the Third Ministerial in December 1999. Taking a historical view, C. Ramanohar Reddy of The Hindu places the Doha agreement on the new issues in perspective:

In 1996, at Singapore, it was merely a question of agreeing to 'study' these four issues. In 1999, at Seattle, the EU tried but failed to go from a study to negotiations. However, in 2001, the EU and the US have been successful in taking the first steps toward negotiated agreements. It is now just a question of time-maybe not before 2005, but it will be done-before three non-trade issues...are brought within the ambit of the WTO.

Doha and the Developing Countries

What is clear is that, contrary to the claims of European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, Doha did not launch a "development round". The key points of the Doha Declaration, in fact, contradict the interests of the developing countries. For example,

• There is only a perfunctory acknowledgement of the need to review implementation issues, which was the key agenda of the developing countries coming into Doha;
• The language on the phasing out of agricultural export subsidies is watered down owing to the strong objections of the European Union;
• There is no commitment to an early phase-out of textile and garment quotas because of the strong resistance of the United States;
• The demand for a "development box" to promote food security and development which was being pushed by a number of developing countries was completely ignored;
• There is no commitment to change the wording of the TRIPs (Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement to accommodate developing countries' overriding of patents for public health purposes;
• There is no commitment to change the TRIPs agreement to outlaw biopiracy and patents on life, which was a key developing country concern coming into Doha;
• The declaration eliminates the reference in the draft to the International Labor Organization (ILO) being the appropriate forum for addressing labor and trade issues, which leaves the door open for the WTO to assert its jurisdiction in an area where it has no authority or competence.

The resolution of the TRIPs and public health issue is being trumpeted as a victory for developing countries. This is exaggerated. Even Martin Wolf of the Financial Times, who is always the first to proclaim his view that the WTO is good for the poor, is skeptical: "In Doha, agreement was reached that 'the TRIPs agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health.' How far this will stretch is not clear".

Wolf is right to express doubt. While an attachment to the declaration does recognize that there is nothing in TRIPs that would prevent countries from taking measures to promote public health, there is no commitment to change the wording of the TRIPs agreement. In other words, the statement is purely political and, as the Economist, another pro-WTO advocate concedes, "not legally binding". This is a serious flaw since TRIPs as it is currently written can serve as the basis for future legal challenges for countries that override patents in the interest of public health.

A Defeat for Democracy and Development

In fact, Doha was a defeat for the developing countries, notwithstanding the resistance they-and in particular, India-put up against arm-twisting, blackmail, and intimidation from the big trading powers. Those of us in Doha were witness, as Collective Statement of NGO's present in Qatar put it, "to the highhanded unethical negotiating practices of the developed countries like linking aid budgets and trade preferences to the trade positions of developing countries, and targetting individual developing country negotiators".

Doha was a victory for the forces with a strong interest in subverting the interests of the developing countries that form the majority of the membership of the World Trade Organization by keeping the decision-making process non-transparent and undemocratic.

Why Doha will Backfire

This is why this victory may well be a Pyrrhic one for the big trading powers. For the combination of developing country resentments inflamed by the Doha process and a deep global recession brought about precisely by the indiscriminate locking together of economies by accelerated trade and financial liberalization will likely lead to the erosion of the credibility and legitimacy of the institutional pillars of free trade like the WTO.

And without credibility and legitimacy, institutions, no matter how seemingly solid they may seem, eventually unravel.

At the conclusion of the Fourth Ministerial, Director General Mike Moore thanked the delegates for "saving the WTO". The end result may well be, instead, the acceleration of the decline of the WTO.

Copyright 2001 Focus on the Global South