Talking Points:

July 2005

  Phyllis Bennis

Talking Points:
The US Begs for UN Backing in Iraq
Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies, 29 January 2004

The US is eager for the UN to return to Iraq to provide political cover for
its occupation. The quagmire on the ground in Iraq plus recognition that the
rest of the world, and most Iraqis themselves, reject Washington's claim of
legitimacy is the basis for the Bush administration reversing its earlier
anti-UN positions to beg the international organization for help.
Kofi Annan's decision to send a technical investigative team to Iraq is
partly in response to mounting pressure from the US, but also a response to
shifting sentiments among Iraqis, particularly the call from Ayatollah al-Sistani
for a UN assessment of political conditions. While Annan's announcement
indicated he was responding to the request of the US occupation authorities and
its hand-picked "governing council" to determine whether elections could be held
by Washington's June 30th deadline, he left open the possibility of a broader
definition of "what alternative arrangement would be acceptable" if not.

Why Is The Bush Administration So Set On A June 30th "Handover Of Power To
Iraqis"?

1) The deadline is driven far more by US desperation - electoral and
economic/corporate - than by any concern about "returning sovereignty" to Iraq. The
Bush administration is lying about the deadline, claiming that it will lead
to a "transfer of sovereignty" and the "end of US occupation" in Iraq. A
real "end to occupation" requires the withdrawal of US troops. Transferring
nominal authority from one US-selected Iraqi agency to another US-vetted
Iraqi organization does not equal an end to occupation.

2) Bush needs to be able to claim "the occupation is over" and "troops are
being withdrawn" as he enters summer campaigning for November. The reality will
be the military occupation continuing, with a US-backed "sovereign"
government "requesting" that US troops remain. The US will withdraw 20,000-25,000
troops with great fanfare, ignoring and hoping the voters will forget about
the 100,000 or so US troops that will remain, and the likely continuation of
significant casualties among US troops. (Just today Rumsfeld authorized
30,000 additional troops for the Army.)

3) US plans for massive privatization in Iraq have faltered because of a
lack of potential buyers. Profiteers are concerned that without something
resembling an official government in Iraq, US efforts to sell of Iraqi assets
will be recognized as illegal under international law and could be overturned
when something closer to a truly legitimate and representative government takes
over. So the US has every interest in insuring that a transitional phase
includes something that can be called a "sovereign Iraqi government", but which
in fact remains under US control, to insure that the privatization plan goes
ahead before a real end to the occupation.

Why Did The Bush Administration Change Their Line On The Un?

1) The utter and all-too-public failure of the US occupation (especially
the continuing deaths of US soldiers) in Iraq seems to have led to an
internal power shift within the Bush administration, with the Pentagon ideologues
tactically [and almost certainly temporarily] giving way to electorally-focused
considerations. In the battle between Rumsfeld/Cheney and Karl Rove,
Rumsfeld/Cheney seem to have blinked first.

2) There is no doubt that unilateralist, anti-UN sentiments continue to
dominate the Bush White House. But hypocrisy aside, changes are afoot. One piece
of evidence is Dick Cheney's unexpected European foray. While arrogantly
refusing to even hint at an apology for launching Washington's war in the face of UN
and broad international opposition, the fact that he left his undisclosed
location at all to travel to European capitals urging greater international
support for the US in Iraq, even calling (once - not repeated) on the UN to
respond to the request of the Iraqis, indicates a significant level of pressure on
Cheney's longstanding antagonism to multilateralism and the UN.

What Did Kofi Annan Agree To?

1) The secretary-general agreed to "send a technical mission to Iraq to
establish whether elections for a transitional national assembly can be held
before the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June, and if not, what alternative
arrangement would be acceptable".

2) The language is significant, since "alternative arrangements" could refer
to a wide range of possible alternatives, essentially broadening the
US-defined mandate. Those alternatives could include not only the nature of the
elections but also a challenge to the validity of the US-imposed deadline
itself. That is, the UN mission could conclude that elections are possible at a
time beyond June 30th. An internal UN study in Iraq from last August determined
that it would take six months to organize elections.

3) It is clear that Annan's decision was partly based on the call from
Iraqis beyond the US-appointed Governing Council. Specifically, it is clear that
al-Sistani's call for the UN to determine the feasibility of elections played
a part in his decision.

Why Is Ayatollah Al-Sistani so Committed to Elections &Why Did He Ask for UN
Help?

1) While al-Sistani represents a Shi'a current that does not call for
complete clerical control of government, he is eager to realize the likely political
potential inherent in the 60% Shi'a majority in Iraq.

2) The US-proposed selection system (a longstanding Bush preference over
elections…) for choosing an Iraqi parliament would not only privilege the
US-selected Iraqi Governing Council who would choose most of the assembly
members, but would give a functional veto to the US occupation officials
themselves. (In each of the 18 regions the Coalition Provisional Authority - Bremer and
company - would appoint five of the fifteen members. Since eleven votes would
be needed to approve candidates, the CPA would be able to veto anyone they
didn't like.)

What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Refuses to Return to Iraq
Under US Terms? If it Agrees to US Terms?

1) If the UN completely rejects the US proposal that it return to Iraq
under the auspices of the US occupation, it faces the possibility of escalating
marginalization by the Bush administration, further threats to its
independence, and the likelihood of being deemed "irrelevant" by the world's sole
super-power. Washington might make additional cuts in dues to the world organization
and the humanitarian agencies, reduce its already insufficient political
support, and increase its threats and punishments of UN member states who stand
defiant.

2) If the UN agrees to return to Iraq under terms set by the US
occupation, the dangers are even higher. The global organization risks a serious loss of
international credibility, and the danger of being deemed an agent or
facilitator of occupation. Aside from the credibility factor itself, UN staff in Iraq
would again face the likely possibility of physical attack, based on the
opposition's view that the UN was acting as an agent of an illegitimate
occupation. Passed under extreme US pressure, Security Council resolution 1483
arguably provides a kind of forced legality to the US occupation of Iraq; it does
not provide any legitimacy.

So, What Do We Call For?

1) We call for an end to US occupation, and withdrawal of American troops.
Because the US invasion destroyed the governing capacity in Baghdad and
undermined security for civilians throughout much of the country, the withdrawal
of the US forces should be followed by a temporary combined mandate for the
United Nations, Arab League, and OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)
to provide direct support for Iraq's reclaiming of sovereignty. That would
include election assistance, humanitarian and reconstruction aid (including
control over all international funds, including those coming from the US
Congress, designated for Iraqi rebuilding), and peacekeeping/security deployment.

2) The UN investigation team should reject the artificial US-imposed June
30th deadline, and broaden its mandate to examine what conditions would have
to change before an election could be organized, assess what time frame would
be required to accomplish those changes, and determine whether any election
conducted under foreign military occupation could be free and fair.

What About The Weapons Of Mass Destruction That Weren't?

We were right. They lied.
No gloating - too many people have died.
More later.

 

Director of the New Internationalism Project at the Institute for Policy Studies

Phyllis Bennis is a fellow of both TNI and the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington DC where she directs IPS's New Internationalism Project. Phyllis specialises in U.S. foreign policy issues, particularly involving the Middle East and United Nations. She worked as a journalist at the UN for ten years and currently serves as a special adviser to several top-level UN officials on Middle East and UN democratization issues. A frequent contributor to U.S. and global media, Phyllis is also the author of numerous articles and books, particularly on Palestine, Iraq, the UN, and U.S. foreign policy.