Iraq's Interim Government and the UN Resolution

Iraq's Interim Government and the UN Resolution
United for Peace and Justice Talking Points No. 19
Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies, 4 June 2004

• Iraq remains an occupied country. Whether the new "interim government"
  stands or falls, whether or not the United Nations passes a new resolution,
  whether or not the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's hints constitute
  real approval of the "government," the occupation remains.
  Neither the existence of the interim government nor the likely new Security
  Council resolution change the reality of 138,000 US occupying the
  country and US economic and political forces maintaining control of
  Iraq's economic and political life.
• The new interim government reflects US control of Iraq. It was created
  through negotiations (somewhat more vigorous than anticipated) between
  the US occupation forces and the creature of those occupation forces,
  the Iraq Governing Council that was itself selected and put in power
  by the US So whatever the tactical disagreements between US proconsul
  Paul Bremer and the Governing Council over the assignment of specific
  individuals to specific positions, the final choice reflects the needs
  of the US occupation.
• The individual and collective identities of the interim government
  members are less significant than the illegitimacy of the process in
  determining the credibility of the government. But positioning Iyad
  Allawi as prime minister represents a particularly non-credible choice.
  Known throughout Iraq for his longstanding role as a British MI6 and
  US CIA asset as well as earlier links to the intelligence services
  of the Baathist regime in Iraq, Allawi is widely viewed as responsible
  for the false "45-minutes-to-launch" claim regarding Iraq's
  purported WMD in the run-up to the war.
• The process of choosing the ministers was not democratic and does
  not reflect the breadth of Iraqi public opinion. United Nations special
  envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, after the interim government put itself into
  office, stated that there should be negotiations with the armed opposition,
  which he said includes "people who are not terrorists, who are
  respectable, genuine Iraqi patriots."
• The US had agreed to the UN and specifically Brahimi playing the
  central role in choosing an interim government, deliberately not to
  reflect the widely discredited Governing Council. But in the last weeks
  before the May 31st deadline for identifying government ministers Brahimi
  was forced to the sidelines. As a result, the interim government, like
  the Governing Council before it, is a creature of the United States,
  not the United Nations. Brahimi himself acknowledged that "Mr.
  Bremer is the dictator of Iraq. He has the money. He has the signature.
  Nothing happens without his agreement in this country." When asked
  whether the US was prepared to give real independence to Iraq, Brahimi
  said, "I must be careful here what I say. ...I wwould like to know
  in which part of the world the United States does not have at least
  some influence? How they use that influence is sometimes welcome, sometimes
  a source of resentment."
• Brahimi's statement came too late to protect the credibility and legitimacy
  of the United Nations. The decision of Brahimi and Secretary General
  Kofi Annan to acquiesce quietly to the US pressure has severely undermined
  the global organization. Faced with insurmountable US pressure, Brahimi
  could have acknowledged his resulting inability to implement the UN's
  decision (to appoint non-political technocrats to run the country and
  prepare for elections in 2005), and withdrawn from his post. The result
  would almost certainly have been a US "transfer of power"
  to the Governing Council itself, a move which would have been widely
  recognized as undemocratic, illegal, and illegitimate. Instead, there
  are Governing Council members and their chosen minions in all the top
  positions of the interim government, but a United Nations imprimatur
  and "bluewashing" of the process provides the illusion of
  international credibility. Whatever decisions the Security Council finally
  takes regarding the interim government, UN credibility and legitimacy
  have been shredded, and will be difficult to reclaim after such submission
  to US power.
• The Bush administration's decision to return to the UN and beg for
  assistance reflects the strategic failures facing the US occupation
  of Iraq and the broader drive towards empire of which it is a part.
  The US military is stretched very thin. Recent decisions to replace
  top US military officer in Iraq General Ricardo Sanchez and forcibly
  extend active duty tours in Iraq and Afghanistan beyond the end of contracts
  signed by the "volunteer" Army, growing reliance on insufficiently
  trained reservists, the lowered visibility of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul
  Wolfowitz, and the increasing discussion of resumption of the legal
  draft to bolster the now-insufficient poverty draft, all reflect challenges
  to US military power. The torture scandal spreading rapidly from Abu
  Ghraib prison to the entire archipelago of US detention centers in
  Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere remains the emerging
  symbol of the US war. And unrelenting casualties among US troops
  continue to erode already dwindling public support for the war.
• International military participation in the "coalition"
  in Iraq is diminishing quickly. After the withdrawal of Spanish troops
  following the defeat of Bush ally Jose Maria Aznar weeks ago, other
  countries are considering withdrawing their troops as well. Bush is
  meeting a series of top leaders from countries with troops in Iraq,
  urging them to stay to provide credibility; he told Australian prime
  minister that a withdrawal of coalition troops would be "disastrous."
• With the election dominating Bush administration planning, the neo-cons
  are no longer clearly ascendant. Divisions within the administration,
  particularly between the Pentagon-based ideologues and those mostly
  concerned with winning the election, are playing out publicly. Visible
  fissures include the recent about-face on White House support for the
  Pentagon's favorite Ahmad Chalabi; National Security Adviser Condoleezza
  Rice refused to back down when confronted by former Pentagon official
  Richard Perle and other top neo-cons demanding an end to the anti-Chalabi
  moves. George Tenet's fall-on-his-sword resignation from the CIA may
  be only the first of many more to fall victim to the bitter internal
  fighting within the administration.
• The growing military problems reflect the strategic failure of the
  neo-cons within the administration to make good on their claims of a
  golden pacified Iraq as the centerpiece of a democratic, privatized,
  US-embracing Middle East. With war in Iraq far from "mission
  accomplished" and Palestine still in flames, talk of invading Syria
  and threatening Iran, has largely ended, as have the grandiose proposals
  behind the now stumbling Greater Middle East Initiative. The version
  that will be presented at the G8 Summit in George next week reflects
  little of the stirring rhetoric and vision it once held.
• The main indicator of the continuing internecine battle is the decision
  of the Bush administration to go to the United Nations at all, however
  false their commitment to international accountability may be. The global
  opposition to the war has not faded as the invasion moved inexorably
  into occupation. Only Bush's desperate need for international legitimacy
  could force him to return to the Security Council chamber, hat in hand.
• The new US-UK draft resolution endorsing the interim government
  and turning the US and "coalition" forces into a UN-mandated
  "multinational force." It is designed to provide international
  legitimacy for the continuation of the US occupation and control of
  Iraq. The changes Washington and London have offered the Security Council
  in the revised draft are aimed at pacifying European opposition, not
  providing real sovereignty for Iraq.
• It is unclear whether Washington's largely cosmetic concessions on
  the security issues involving the so-called Multinational Force (MNF)
  will satisfy Security Council opponents. China has been unusually outspoken
  in opposing the early drafts of the US-UK resolution, calling for
  much earlier expiration of the MNF mandate with the election in January
  2005 of the transitional assembly. Russia wants the new Iraqi prime
  minister to meet with the Council as well as the foreign minister. France
  has asked for an automatic end to the mandate if the Interim Government
  (the current one) requests it. Germany has called for a specific expiration
  date to be included in the resolution, as well as clarifying the Transitional
  Government's right to end the mandate.
• The revised draft resolution still does not provide a specific expiration
  date for the mandate of the so-called "multinational force."
  The reference to expiration "at the completion of the political
  process" still leaves final decisionmaking in US hands as to
  defining when that political process (assumed to be the January 2006
  election of a permanent government) is actually over. While the draft
  would allow the Transitional Government (to be elected in January 2005,
  not the current Interim Government) to request that the Council end
  the mandate of the force, the reality of the US veto means that Washington
  could simply vote No to deny the request. And is there is any delay
  in the proposed timetable, the mandate remains in place; any effort
  to end it would require an affirmative Council vote, which the US
  could veto.
• The second disagreement is whether the Iraqi military or government
  has any control over operations by the US occupation forces. France,
  China and Algeria want Iraq to be able to block major military missions.
  But Washington rejects that out of hand. Secretary of State Colin Powell
  said, "You can't use the word 'veto.' There could be a situation
  where we have to act and there may be a disagreement and we have to
  act to protect ourselves or to accomplish a mission."
• It is unlikely that any of the opponents will veto the resolution.
  But it is possible, if there is enough international opposition, that
  the resolution could fail to get sufficient positive votes to pass.
  The resolution needs nine positive votes; if enough Council members
  abstain, it could fail. The likely yes votes include the US, UK, Romania,
  Philippines. The possible no votes or abstentions could come from France,
  Russia, China, Algeria, Brazil, Spain, Germany. Pakistan, Chile, Angola
  and Benin could go either way.
• Without international pressure on governments around the world the
  resolution could well pass unanimously, institutionalizing the UN "bluewash"
  of the occupation. That pressure is all the more necessary because the
  US-backed Iraqi interim foreign minister Hoshyar Zubari called the
  revised draft a "positive text" and warned the Security Council
  of the dangers of a "premature" departure of the occupation
  forces. He did not back the call for Iraqi control over US military
  operations, saying only that Iraqi "views should be taken into
  consideration," something quite consistent with the US position
  that it will work "in consultation" with the Iraqi government.

The occupation remains.