Reading the Elections

November 2005

  Phyllis Bennis

Reading the Elections
Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies, 1 February 2005

  • The millions of Iraqis who came out for the elections were voting their hopes
    for an end to violence and occupation, and a better life; their hopes are not
    likely to be met.
  • George Bush will be the major victor in this election, using it to claim legitimacy
    for his occupation of Iraq . This election does not mean that the invasion and
    occupation of Iraq is legitimate - democracy cannot be imposed at the point
    of a gun.
  • The election, held under military occupation and not meeting international
    criteria, including those of the Carter Center , remains illegitimate; legitimacy
    is not determined by the number of people voting.
  • Even the expected victory of Shi'a-led political parties is not likely to
    result in the new assembly calling for an immediate withdrawal of US troops.
  • US domination of Iraq 's economic, political and social life will continue
    through the military occupation and the continuing control of money, the legal
    system, and political patronage.
  • The US has a long history of using elections held under conditions of war
    and occupation to legitimize its illegal wars - the January 2005 elections in
    Iraq mirror the 1967 election held in South Viet Nam , also held to give credibility
    to Washington 's puppet government.

The individual Iraqis who came out to vote clearly were very brave and eager
to reclaim control of their country. They were voting for their hopes, for secure
streets so children can go to school, for electricity and clean water, for jobs,
and mostly for an end to the US occupation. The elections, however, are unlikely
to achieve any of those goals; the violence is likely to continue, perhaps even
increase. The US occupation is STILL the problem, not the solution, in Iraq
, and only bringing the US troops home, not imposing elections under continuing
occupation, will lead to an end of violence.

Millions of Iraqis participated in the election, but it is still unclear how
many. International journalists were limited to five polling stations in Baghdad,
four of which were in Shi'a districts with expected high turnout. The US-backed
election commission in Iraq originally announced a 72% participation immediately
after the polls closed, then downscaled that to "near 60%" - actually claiming
about 57% turn-out. But those figures are all still misleading. The Washington
Post reported (two days after the vote, on page 7 of the Style section) that
the 60% figure is based on the claim that 8 million out of 14 million eligible
Iraqis turned out. But the 14 million figure itself is misleading, because it
only includes those registered Iraqis, not the 18 million actually eligible voters.
Similarly, the claim of very high voter participation among Iraqi exiles is misleading,
since only 280,000 or so Iraqis abroad even registered, out of about 1.2 million
qualified to register and vote. The participation of women, both as candidates
(imposed by the US-backed electoral law) and as voters, was significant, but
key demands of Iraqi women, particularly involving economic and social rights
disproportionately denied to women, are unlikely to be met through this electoral
process.

At least in the short term, George Bush will emerge as the major winner in this
election, through the false propaganda claim that Iraqi participation and enthusiasm
for the elections somehow equals legitimacy for his continued occupation and
the preventive war that put it in place. This is the latest effort to identify
mileposts "on the road to freedom" in Iraq - earlier ones included the " Mission
accomplished" claim, the capture of Saddam Hussein, the "transfer of sovereignty,"
and none of them led to freedom, independence and security for Iraqis. In fact,
Bush's false claim of legitimacy continues to hold the Iraqi population and the
150,000 US soldiers hostage to his agenda and occupation.

The Bush administration's goal is to increase the legitimacy of the occupation
and the broader Iraq project, including a more vigorous counter-insurgency war,
in the eyes of Americans and international public and governmental opinion.
This may lead to some European leaders, in particular, eager to rejoin the Bush
bandwagon, to use the election's "success" as the basis for challenging their
own population's continuing opposition to the US occupation. The president
of the European Commission, José Manual Baroso, congratulated the Iraqi people
for their courage, and said that the election represented "European values."

It is a huge insult to the people of Iraq to claim that enthusiasm for democracy
only emerged when it was "offered" to Iraq in the form of elections imposed under
the conditions of military occupation.

The Iraqi election was not legitimate. It was held under conditions of a hostile
military foreign occupation. The Hague Convention of 1907, to which the US
is a signatory, prohibits the occupying power from creating any permanent changes
in the government of the occupied territory. These elections were arranged under
an electoral law and by an electoral commission installed and backed by the occupying
power. They took place in an environment so violent that voters could not even
learn the names of candidates, and the three days surrounding the vote included
a complete lock-down of the country, including shoot-to-kill curfews in many
areas, closure of the airport and borders, and closure of roads. There were
no international monitors in the country - unlike Afghanistan (with 122 monitors)
and Palestine (with 800) during difficult elections held under occupation, Iraq
was deemed too dangerous for international election monitors. The Canadian-led
team of international election "assessors," who made an early claim that the
elections met international standards, were in fact based outside the country,
in Jordan.

The US-based Carter Center , which has monitored elections around the world
for more than a decade, declined to participate in Iraq . But they did identify
key criteria for determining the legitimacy of elections, and their spokesman
noted the day before the elections that none had been met. Those criteria included
the ability of voters to vote in a free and secure environment, the ability of
candidates to have access to voters for campaigning, a freely chosen and independent
election commission, and voters able to vote without fear or intimidation.

The new Iraqi transitional Assembly, despite a certain majority of Shi'a-dominated
parties, will be unlikely to call for an immediate withdrawal of US troops.
Despite claims by many Shi'a leaders that they want an end to the occupation,
this "government," whose legitimacy will remain tainted by its ties to the occupying
forces, will remain in power only with the backing of the US troops. The Sunni
current interim president, Ghazi al-Yawer, one of the most critical voices of
the US occupation, announced after the vote that it would be "complete nonsense"
to call for an end to the occupation.

Despite the effort to maintain an "Iraqi face" on the troops guarding the voting
process, it was clear that, according to Newsweek magazine, "the US army role
was pivotal in the election." US embassy officials also told the San Francisco
Chronicle that it was important "not to read too much" into the level of security
that made the elections possible - guarding polling places is easier than fighting
a counter-insurgency, they said. Bush announced after the elections that "as
democracy takes hold in Iraq , America 's mission there will continue." Newly
installed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice affirmed that, " US troops will
stay till Iraqis can do the job."

US domination of Iraq remains unchanged with this election. The US-imposed
Transitional Administrative Law, imposed by the US occupation, remains the
law of the land even with the new election. Amending that law requires super-majorities
of the assembly as well as a unanimous agreement by the presidency council, almost
impossible given the range of constituencies that must be satisfied. Chiefs of
key control commissions, including Iraq's Inspector General, the Commission on
Public Integrity, the Communication and Media Commission and others, were appointed
by Bremer with five-year terms, can only be dismissed "for cause." The Council
of Judges, as well as individual judges and prosecutors, were selected, vetted
and trained by the US occupation, and are dominated by long-time US-backed
exiles.

The 40,000+ civilian and military "advisers," including private contractors and
US government officials, seconded to Iraq 's ministries and all public institutions
will remain powerful; with the new assembly sending new staff to these ministries,
the US "advisers" may hold the institutional memory.

The $16 billion of US taxpayer money not spent in the reconstruction effort
(the billions paid to Halliburton, Bechtel, and others has come almost entirely
out of US-appropriated Iraqi funds) as well as the $50 billion/year military
costs will become a potential slush fund for the new assembly's favored projects.
The US-backed privatization schemes imposed by former US pro-consul Paul
Bremer remain in place. The current interim finance minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi,
touted by the Los Angeles Times as a potential candidate for deputy president
or prime minister, recently announced his support for the complete privatization
of Iraq 's oil industry.

A New York Times article of September 4, 1967 , is entitled "US Encouraged
by Vietnam Vote : Officials Cite 83% Turnout Despite Vietcong Terror." It reads,
"United States officials were surprised and heartened today at the size of turnout
in South Vietnam 's presidential election despite a Vietcong terrorist campaign
to disrupt the voting. According to reports from Saigon , 83 per cent of the
5.85 million registered voters cast their ballots yesterday. Many of them risked
reprisals threatened by the Vietcong. A successful election has long been seen
as the keystone in President Johnson's policy of encouraging the growth of constitutional
processes in South Vietnam . . .The purpose of the voting was to give legitimacy
to the Saigon Government . . ."

 

Director of the New Internationalism Project at the Institute for Policy Studies

Phyllis Bennis is a fellow of both TNI and the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington DC where she directs IPS's New Internationalism Project. Phyllis specialises in U.S. foreign policy issues, particularly involving the Middle East and United Nations. She worked as a journalist at the UN for ten years and currently serves as a special adviser to several top-level UN officials on Middle East and UN democratization issues. A frequent contributor to U.S. and global media, Phyllis is also the author of numerous articles and books, particularly on Palestine, Iraq, the UN, and U.S. foreign policy.