Talking Points on the US-Iraq Crisis:
Response to Secretary of State Colin Powell's Presentation to the UN Security Council
Phyllis Bennis
IPS, 5 February 2003
Powell's presentation wasn't likely to win over anyone not already on his side. He ignored the crucial fact that in the last several days (in Sunday's NYT & yesterday's briefing of UN journalists) Blix denied key components of Powell's claims. Blix said UNMOVIC has seen "no evidence" of mobile biological weapons labs, has "no persuasive indications" of Iraq-al Qaeda links, no evidence of Iraq hiding and moving WMD material either outside or inside Iraq, none of Iraq sending scientists out of the country, none on Iraqi intelligence agents posing as scientists, none on UNMOVIC conversations being monitored, none on UNMOVIC being penetrated.
Further, CIA and FBI officials still believe the Bush administration is "exaggerating" information to make their political case for war. Regarding the alleged Iraqi link with al-Qaeda, US intelligence officials told the New York Times, "we just don't think it's there".
The most compelling part of Powell's presentation (though short), was his ending section of the al Qaeda link with Iraq, and the dangers posed by the al Zarqawi network. The problem is that he segued disingenuously, from the accurately scary information about what the al Zarqawi network could actually do, to a not so accurate claim about its link with Iraq - which is tenuous and unproven at best.
A key component of the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda link is based on "detainees tell us...". That claim must be rejected. On December 27 the Washington Post reported US officials acknowledged detainees being beaten, roughed up, threatened with torture by being turned over to officials of countries known to practice even more severe torture. In those circumstances, nothing "a detainee" says can be taken as evidence of truth - people being beaten or tortured will say anything to stop the pain. Similarly, defectors' stories cannot be relied on alone, as they have every legitimate basis for exaggerating their stories and their own involvement in order to guarantee access to protection and asylum.
Powell said one thing at least partially true: "1441 is to try to preserve the peace". (Although it's not true that the US "wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace..".) We should take that commitment to peace as the right approach, continue inspections.
Final - the "even if" rule applies. "Even if" everything Powell said was true, there is simply not enough evidence for war. There is no evidence of Iraq posing an imminent threat, no evidence of containment not working. Powell is asking us to go to war, risking the lives of 100,000 Iraqis in the first weeks, hundreds or thousands of US and other troops, political and economic chaos, and more, because he thinks MAYBE in the future Iraq might rebuild its weapons systems and MIGHT decide to deploy weapons or MIGHT give those weapons to someone else who MIGHT use them against someone we like or give them to someone else who we don't like... We reject going to war on spec.
Assessment of Powell's Description of Iraq - Al Qaeda links
This section of Powell's presentation was arguably the most compelling. He played on the very real and reasonable fears of Americans and others about the capacity of al Qaeda, focusing specifically on the potential threat posed by the al Zarqawi network.
But the disingenuous component was his clever segue from al Zarqawi-as-danger to Iraq-is-harboring al Zarqawi, a claim that is far less clear, that is fundamentally unproven. There is simply no clear evidence of these links; US intelligence officials (both CIA and FBI), have accused the Bush administration of politicizing - cooking - the evidence to bolster the political case for war. UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix said that there are other countries with far greater links to al Qaeda than Iraq.
Powell did acknowledge that the al Qaeda-linked Islamist organization operating in Northern Iraq is "outside Saddam Hussein's control". But he does not mention the crucial matching factor, that that area is INSIDE US control - and in fact the US has troops entering Northern Iraq on a daily basis, who presumably could deal with that group if it indeed posed such a danger. Powell quotes an alleged associate of al Zarqawi saying that "the situation in Iraq is good", as evidence of al Zarqawi's links with the government in Iraq. In fact, such a remark, if it occurred at all, could as easily have referred to al Qaeda operatives being pleased that the likelihood of a US attack in Iraq could well lead to increased support for them, as the population in Iraq and across the region turns against a US invasion.
It was in this section that Powell returned again and again to "detainees tell us", "senior al Qaeda operatives now detained", "detainees tell their story..." In this context, we have particular need to be vigilant regarding the question of torture. Detainees may indeed tell "a story;" given that they may well be undergoing or threatened with torture, their stories must be taken with significant caution.
And finally, the fear-mongering regarding the potential power of al Qaeda networks should not be broadened to sweep Iraq into its orbit.
4 February 2003 - on the eve of Powell's presentation
In a briefing for UN journalists this afternoon, Hans Blix denied or discounted four major claims made by various Bush administration officials. Some of these claims, particularly the one regarding the mobile biological laboratories, are likely to be central to Colin Powell's presentation at the Security Council tomorrow.
The four discounted claims include:
- Mobile biological laboratories: Blix said his inspectors had reports about the claim, but no evidence. "We have never found one", he said.
- UNMOVIC providing info to Iraq: Blix denied that any information had been leaked from any of his inspectors to any Iraqis.
- Iraq intercepting UNMOVIC conversations: Blix said it was "impossible" that Iraq had been able to spy on UNMOVIC telephone conversations because of the high level of security of UNMOVIC communications operations.
- Iraq hiding weapons material inside or outside Iraq: Blix said his team had seen no evidence that Iraq had moved weapons material just before inspectors arrival in order to hide it from inspectors.
3 February 2003
Colin Powell's presentation at the UN Security Council on Wednesday is likely to be strong on quantity and weak on quality - with little or no new information, and little or no actual proof of the presence of WMDs in Iraq, or links between the Iraqi government and al Qaeda. There will be lots of photographs, charts, and barely-audible sound-bites ostensibly demonstrating links between Iraq and al Qaeda or other terrorists.
Powell will likely try to apply the Pentagon's new favorite battlefield strategy of "shock and awe" to the Security Council, overwhelming the foreign ministers and ambassadors present (as well as the global television audience) with massive amounts of material.
To answer Powell's presentation, challenges will likely need to focus on:
- Photographs of people cleaning a "suspect site" do not equal proof of hidden weapons
- Satellite photos of trucks with equipment on the back do not equal proof of "mobile WMD production facilities"
- Snippets of intercepted telephone conversations of such remarks as "can you believe they missed that one?" or the equivalent do not prove links with al Qaeda or proof that Iraqis are trying to hide WMDs from inspectors
- US officials admit some of their "evidence" comes from interrogation of detainees held incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay. The Washington Post (Dec. 26) quoted Bush administration officials suggesting detainees held in US custody in Afghanistan, some of whom may now be in Guantanamo, have been tortured or threatened with being sent to countries which routinely practice torture. Any information resulting from torture (or threat of torture) is not only illegally obtained but of questionable veracity.
Other challenges to the US position:
1) Hans Blix himself has denied recent Bush administration claims of Iraqi violations, some of which officials claimed were based on the inspectors' reports. He denied Powell's claim that Iraqi officials were hiding and moving WMD material inside and outside Iraq, saying inspectors had not found any such incidents. He said he had not seen convincing evidence Iraq was sending scientists out of Iraq. He denied Bush's State of the Union claim that Iraqi agents were posing as scientists or that UNMOVIC had been penetrated by Iraqi agents. Crucially, he said he had "seen no persuasive indications of Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda". (New York Times, 1 February 2003)
2) Both the CIA and FBI have questioned the veracity of Bush administration claims that intelligence backs up their claims of Iraq-al Qaeda links, or of clear WMD presence in Iraq. "Some analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency have complained that senior administration officials have exaggerated the significance of some intelligence reports about Iraq, particularly about its possible links to terrorism, in order to strengthen their political argument for war, government officials said. At the Federal Bureau of Investigation, some investigators said they were baffled by the Bush administration's insistence on a solid link between Iraq and Osama bin Laden's network. 'We've been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we just don't think it's there,' a government official said. ... "Mr. Bush asserted in his State of the Union address this week that Iraq was protecting and aiding Qaeda operatives, but American intelligence and law enforcement officials said the evidence was fragmentary and inconclusive". (New York Times, 2 February 2003)
3) Most important: Even actual evidence of iraqi violation(s) of un resolutions, including 1441 or the original disarmament/sanctions resolution 687, do not represent a basis for war.
The US and Britain have agreed to a "good cop/bad cop" formula, with Britain taking the lead urging a second Security Council meeting as provided for in resolution 1441, and some version of a second resolution aimed at gaining UN support for war on Iraq. The timeline will likely look something like this:
February 5 - Powell presentation to Council, prepared responses from Council members.
February 14 - Blix & el Baradei present next interim reports on inspectors' findings. At that meeting or soon after, Council will accept British proposal for setting an ultimatum for Iraqi compliance, without specifying what the consequences would be for non-compliance. Deadline will likely be 30 days. This vote might be close to unanimous; the language will not explicitly authorize a military response.
February 28 - Next UNMOVIC & IAEA interim reports; will likely still be equivocal. Council may determine at that meeting Iraq still not in full compliance. They will likely call on Baghdad to comply with the demands of the ultimatum.
Mid - March - Last UNMOVIC & IAEA interim reports issued. If reports do not confirm full Iraqi compliance, the US & Britain will claim a free hand to attack Iraq under authority of the February 14 ultimatum resolution, claiming there is no need for any further authorization. France, Germany, Russia, China (and several other Council members) will state that the Feb. 14 resolution does NOT authorize a military strike. They will then stand aside, allow the US and Britain to attack Iraq, while telling their respective outraged publics that they do not endorse military action. They will make no move to challenge the US-British war in the Council. Inspectors will be pulled out of Iraq "for their own safety". (The question will be raised whether this time the UN's humanitarian staff will be withdrawn as well, or left under the bombs as they were during Desert Fox in December 1998.)
|
