Torture Reflects Failure of Bush's Iraq Policy
Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies, 17 May 2004
The Abu Ghraib torture scandal is symptomatic of the overall failure of the Bush Administration's Iraq war policy. There is no way to "get past" the current crisis; the only solution is to withdraw US troops from Iraq.
New information surfacing almost daily makes clear that the torture and abuse of prisoners was not the work of unaccountable rogue soldiers, but rather the result of a clear policy throughout the chain of command, including both the regular military hierarchy and the Pentagon's unaccountable private military contractors in charge of interrogation of prisoners. The military hierarchy - up to the Commander in Chief as well as the secretary of defense - all bear responsibility for what happens on their watch, and for creating a climate in which the Geneva Conventions and any protection of prisoners are scoffed at by the highest levels of authority.
The escalating violence and instability in Iraq are overwhelmingly aimed AT the US occupation forces, as well as civilians who are in Iraq to take advantage of the US-imposed privatization of Iraqi resources and industry. The situation is likely to get far worse for US troops and contractors, leading to incidents such as the horrifying on-camera execution of an American contractor. The execution clearly violates the Geneva Convention's absolute prohibition on targeting civilians, a prohibition that stands even during legitimate resistance to illegal occupation. Since the US occupation itself is the target of the violence, there can be no serious possibility of "improving" the security situation as long as that occupation remains in place. The only solution is to end the occupation.
The US military and civilian leadership of the Bush administration are attempting to contain the public relations damage caused by the Abu Ghraib scandal without changing the conditions that gave rise to the torture in the first place. Even General Antonio M. Taguba, whose initial report provided comprehensive evidence of the systematic nature of the abuse, backtracked during his Senate appearance where he was escorted by two of his top superiors. As a result he said that the "command failures" responsible for the torture occurred from "the brigade commander [General Janis Karpinsky] on down." Rumsfeld's assistant, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone also attempting to keep accountability at lower levels, claimed that there were clear directions from Rumsfeld down to General Karpinsky.
While the media remains focused - for the moment - on the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners, the US military occupation has continued its provocative escalations and offensive attacks. The assault on the Baghdad headquarters of Mokhtada al-Sadr further spurred Iraqi public outrage, already sky-high. The Abu Ghraib atrocities, long known to most Iraqis but now confirming their worst fears, have become part of the popular understanding of the goals, intentions, and designs of the US occupation. This is particularly significant given that the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that up to 90% of the 46,000 or so prisoners arrested by the US occupation forces so far have been illegally swept up and arrested for nothing.
The morale of the US and "coalition" occupation forces continues to deteriorate. Lower and mid-level troops are certainly resenting the refusal of top military officers to take responsibility for the Abu Ghraib scandal; they are also seeing a major jump in the willingness of Iraqis to publicly urge the foreign troops to leave (as reported on BBC following revelations of British abuse of prisoners). The significance of military families and resisters will continue to rise.
|
