Don’t ditch Iran

September 2005

India and Pakistan today share an identical experience,
something they
have very rarely done in the past 58 years. They are
both under
growing pressure to side with the United States in its
escalating
diplomatic-political confrontation with Iran, and in
particular, to
abandon the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas
pipeline. They are
also being offered inducements to "sweeten" the
coercion.

Pakistan and India should do everything within their
power to resist
Washington’s pressure. This Column argues that not
doing so would
deeply compromise the interests of their own peoples,
besides closing
avenues to long-term cooperation between South Asia,
and West,
Southwest and Central Asia, with all its tremendous
potential
benefits.

Iran has become a test case for Indian and Pakistani
diplomacy, and
for the independence of both states’ foreign policies. The
reason is
simple. The US has unilaterally decided that Iran is—like
Iraq was 15
years ago, and again, three years ago—hell-bent on
acquiring weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Washington is going all-out
to isolate Iran
and have its nuclear activities referred to the United
Nations
Security Council for possible sanctions. The crunch
could come next
Monday when the board of governors of the International
Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) meets in Vienna. It alone can refer Iran to
the Security
Council.

There are two differences between the Iranian and Iraqi
cases. The US
has demonised the Iranian government right since the
Islamic
Revolution of 1979, regardless of the political changes
under way
there, especially in recent years. It declared Iran a
"rogue state"
just as it was emerging from the shadow of Ayatollah-
style Islamic
extremism.

By contrast, Washington backed Saddam Hussein
during the Iran-Iraq war
of the 1980s, passed on vital intelligence to him, and
condoned his
use of chemical weapons against civilians—before
turning against him.

Secondly, the US, with Britain’s collusion, built up some
sort of a
case in 2002-03 that Iraq had, or was about to make,
WMD. Most
sensible people didn’t fully believe this or the sexed-up
intelligence
on which it was based. They were soon vindicated. Now,
even Colin
Powell says he regrets having made a false report on
Iraq’s WMD.

However, not even a remotely plausible case has been
made that Iran
has WMD or that its nuclear programme has a military
component. The
IAEA has repeatedly given Iran a clean chit. In its latest
reports, it
concludes, on the basis of tests, that the traces of
enriched uranium
detected two years ago at Iranian nuclear facilities are
attributable
to equipment imported from Pakistan. Repeated
inspections have found
no evidence that Iran is running a clandestine nuclear
weapons
programme. But the US dismisses these and the fact
that Iran, unlike
Saddam’s Iraq, has cooperated with the IAEA.

It’s perfectly legitimate to enrich uranium for peaceful
purposes
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other
laws. Iran could
of course use enriched uranium for military purposes in
the future.
But that’s a matter of intention. Negotiated ways could
be found to
prevent Iran from realising that intention. But the US has
already
pre-judged Tehran’s intentions as unalterable, and
decided that
sanctions are indispensable.

Washington is being profoundly, paranoically, irrational.
It has
seriously misjudged the international mood. Unlike
Saddam’s Iraq, Iran
enjoys a fair amount of goodwill the world over. It won’t
be easy to
isolate it. Regrettably, Washington is encouraged by the
pusillanimity
of the European Union-3 (Germany, France and Britain)
and the
inconsistent approach they showed in their two years-
long negotiations
with Iran.

In 2003, the EU-3 persuaded Iran to suspend uranium
enrichment. Iran
also signed the IAEA’s tough Additional Protocol that
year. But the
EU-3 missed an agreed deadline (this past July 31) to
propose a
political and financial incentives-based deal to Iran.
Actually, the
EU-3 had developed a package on the assumption that
Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani would win the presidential election. When he
lost, they
hardened the deal’s terms and demanded that Iran
permanently renounce
uranium enrichment. Iran refused.

The crisis worsened when the IAEA reported Iran had
produced seven
tonnes of uranium hexaflouride gas at Isfahan. (The gas
can feed
enrichment centrifuges at another facility, in Natanz. But
Iran has
not started enrichment yet.)

The EU is reluctant to refer Iran to the Security Council.
So are
two-thirds of the IAEA’s 35-member board—including
Pakistan and India,
besides 13 other Non-Aligned countries. Russia and
China are even more
reluctant to sanction Iran. Russia is building a nuclear
power station
at Bushehr and says Iran hasn’t violated the non-
proliferation regime.
The IAEA has always taken decisions by
consensus—which won’t be
possible on Iran. So the US is pushing for a change in
procedure, to
voting.

To do this, Washington must split the Non-Aligned
Movement group in
the IAEA board, currently headed by Malaysia. NAM
adopts a unanimous
position at the IAEA. It defends Iran’s "right" to enrich
uranium for
peaceful purposes. Malaysia declares this to be "basic
and
inalienable".

The Iran issue has become a symbol of Third World
defiance of bullying
by the First World, led by a power which has no intention
of disarming
its own nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that Iran
should not
make nuclear weapons. But its legal right to civilian
nuclear energy
must be defended—whatever one’s reservations about
nuclear power as an
energy technology, often expressed in this Column.

The US is mounting pressure on India, Pakistan and
other states to
change their stand on Iran. It has challenged India, with
Russia and
China, to take the leadership in isolating Iran. It has
reportedly
offered incentives to Pakistan through civilian nuclear
cooperation.
Both governments have shown signs of vacillation,
especially on the
IPI pipeline. India’s vacillation became evident during
Prime Minister
Singh’s July visit to Washington, when he questioned the
pipeline’s
feasibility on the ground of high investor risk.

India and Pakistan must stand firm behind Iran and the
pipeline—on
principle. They should know that Washington is
overplaying its hand
and will probably fail at the IAEA board. The nuclear
allurements
Washington is holding out to India and Pakistan cannot
possibly
promote economically viable or environmentally
sustainable energy
paths.

The IPI pipeline makes a lot of sense—with energy
conservation caveats
added. It will deliver natural gas at less than half the cost
of gas
pumped from Turkmenistan. The IPI pipeline is not just
an economic
project. It will open new political vistas through fruitful
cooperation between West and Central Asia, on the one
hand, and South
Asia, on the other. It will spur closer integration of these
regions.
Ultimately, it’s in such integration that India’s and
Pakistan’s
future lies, not in subordinate partnerships with the US.

A final word. The US is already facing enormous
difficulties in
occupied Iraq. If it attempts a diplomatic-political, and
especially
military, misadventure against Iran as well, its plans for
Empire
could come crashing down. Iran is a strong middle
power, has a vibrant
economy, and the second largest known oil reserves
after Saudi Arabia.
Culturally, Iran is flourishing. Democracy has imparted
some popular
legitimacy to its government.

The US will find it hard to humble Iran through coercion.
Pakistan and
India would be disastrously mistaken to overestimate
American power.
That’s one more reason for standing firm.

Copyright 2005 The News International

Independent Journalist

Praful Bidwai is a political columnist, social science researcher, and activist on issues of human rights, the environment, global justice and peace. He currently holds the Durgabai Deshmukh Chair in Social Development, Equity and Human Security at the Council for Social Development, Delhi, affiliated to the Indian Council for Social Science Research. 

A former Senior Editor of The Times of India, Bidwai is one of South Asia’s most widely published columnists, whose articles appear in more than 25 newspapers and magazines. He is also frequently published by The Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique and Il Manifesto.

Bidwai is a founder-member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India). He received the Sean MacBride International Peace Prize, 2000 of the International Peace Bureau, Geneva & London. 

He was a Senior Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. Bidwai is the co-author, with Achin Vanaik, of South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, a radical critique of the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan and of reliance on nuclear weapons for security.