A grim nuclear question-mark hangs over the planet’s future

June 2005

  Praful Bidwai

A grim nuclear question-mark hangs over the planet’s future
Praful Bidwai
published in Italian in Il Manifesto, 1 May 2005

An important international conference begins in New York on Monday, in which as many as 188 states will participate, and which will review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On the outcome of the review will depend Planet Earth’s survival and security.

The treaty is one of the basic arms control agreements ever negotiated globally. It came into force 35 years ago and was indefinitely extended in 1995. The NPT is the world’s sole bulwark against the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons.

The review conference is taking place just when the global danger of nuclear proliferation is probably greater than ever before. Clandestine nuclear activities in North Korea, Libya and Iran, and disclosures about Pakistani expert A.Q. Khan’s "nuclear Wal-Mart" highlight that danger. There is also a growing black market in nuclear materials suspected to be smuggled out of Russia.

The first NPT review conference was held in 2000. It agreed on 13 steps towards complete global nuclear disarmament and re-emphasised the goal of complete elimination of these horror weapons from the world. This generated hope. Today, despair, rather than hope, prevails.

Intervening between the two reviews were not just five years, but the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US. Following these, Washington set its face against all the 13 commitments of 2000. It says that post-9/11, it is no longer prepared to accept any constraints on its weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, or on ways of using them pre-emptively to "defend" itself.

The US is mounting pressure to amend the NPT so that it will no longer obligate the NWSs to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. This could greatly weaken the moral force of the treaty, and open the floodgates for the unlimited spread of nuclear weapons, with potentially catastrophic global consequences.

In a world where there are no barriers to the proliferation of horror weapons, no state or people can be secure. The NWSs may thus be opting for a suicidal long-term bargain by wilfully undermining the NPT’s positive aspect.

This NPT, despite its flaws, has won near-universal adherence. Only India, Pakistan and Israel have refused to join it. All three of them possess nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold in 1998. Israel is believed to have between 100 and 300 nuclear bombs, each enough to kill perhaps 100,000-200,000 people at one go.

The NPT is widely seen as a bargain or trade-off under which the five NWSs agree under the treaty’s Article VI to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, while everyone else agrees not to acquire nuclear weapons.

The bargain is not exactly equal. The obligations on the non-NWSs are immediate and subject to close physical verification. They must allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor their nuclear power facilities to ensure there is no diversion of atomic material to military uses.

But the obligation on the NWSs is neither time-bound, nor subject to verification. Article VI only mandates them to "pursue negotiations in good faith" to end the arms race, leading "to nuclear disarmament."

Despite this imbalance, the NPT has effectively limited the number of NWSs to under 10. (In the 1960s, it was feared there would be 20 to 30 NWSs by 2000.) That is partly because the NWSs at least verbally pay obeisance to Article VI and can cite some progress in reducing the number of missiles and warheads, especially since the 1980s.

However, after 9/11, the Bush Administration claims the NPT can only work if it allows the nuclear powers to keep their nuclear weapons, but strictly prevents the non-NWSs from having them! It says the 2000 review conference resolution is merely "a historical document" and can be set aside.

However, Article VI does not allow anyone to keep their nukes. According to an International Court of Justice verdict of 1996, the NWSs have a duty to bring to a successful conclusion talks for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The ICJ is the world’s highest authority on international law and has declared nuclear weapons to be incompatible with it.

The 13 steps agreed in 2000 include early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, talks on a fissile material cutoff, an "unequivocal" undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals, the principle of irreversibility for nuclear disarmament measures, and establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, the US has "unsigned" the CTBT and reneged on other commitments. Worse, it wants to develop "usable" mini-nukes and redesign older bombs for "bunker-buster" capabilities. The US has launched multi-billion dollar programmes to do research on fusion-based weapons, and space-based nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the US has weakened the concept of "negative security assurances"—whereby NWSs would not threaten non-nuclear states. Washington says it might use nuclear weapons in response to a biological or chemical attack, or even in other circumstances.

The blatant contradiction in US policy is being translated into a rejection of Article VI of the NPT, coupled with even stricter obligations on the non-NWSs. These obligations do not produce foolproof results. Inspections can often fail to detect nuclear activities.

The Bush Administration now emphasises "counter-proliferation", which will mean intrusive searching of the nuclear facilities and ships of "rogue states", including searches on the high seas, much like modern-day "official" pirates!

The US would like certain countries (e.g. Iran) not to have materials like enriched uranium even to produce power because they can "undermine the NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening international security". But Washington turns a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal.

These double standards send out the message that possessing nuclear weapons can earn you respect—the worst message from the non-proliferation perspective!

The bargain at the NPT’s heart has always been fragile. If the NWSs, led by the US, undermine that bargain altogether, the whole global non-proliferation regime can come crashing down. The fate of the world hangs by a slender thread in New York.

 

Independent Journalist

Praful Bidwai is a political columnist, social science researcher, and activist on issues of human rights, the environment, global justice and peace. He currently holds the Durgabai Deshmukh Chair in Social Development, Equity and Human Security at the Council for Social Development, Delhi, affiliated to the Indian Council for Social Science Research. 

A former Senior Editor of The Times of India, Bidwai is one of South Asia’s most widely published columnists, whose articles appear in more than 25 newspapers and magazines. He is also frequently published by The Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique and Il Manifesto.

Bidwai is a founder-member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India). He received the Sean MacBride International Peace Prize, 2000 of the International Peace Bureau, Geneva & London. 

He was a Senior Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. Bidwai is the co-author, with Achin Vanaik, of South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, a radical critique of the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan and of reliance on nuclear weapons for security.