No Indo-Pak Breakthrough

November 2005

  Praful Bidwai

No Indo-Pak Breakthrough
But there is Hope yet
Praful Bidwai
The Daily Star, 13 Setember 2004
(this is a longer version)

Given their sordid 58 year-long history, it's easy enough to sink into pessimism when discussing India-Pakistan relations. The just-concluded first round of comprehensive talks between the two governments since these were announced in January is no exception to this. The round, beginning with the two Foreign Secretaries' meeting in June, did not produce major results. Beyond agreeing to extend the 10 month-long ceasefire at the border, grant each other's citizens tourist visas, and hold some more discussions on confidence-building measures (CBMs), especially on nuclear and conventional security, the two Foreign Ministers who concluded the talks did not have much to show for their two day-long exertions.

The two did some (rather tough) plain speaking at their September 6 joint press conference, with Pakistan sticking to the "centrality" of the Kashmir issue, and India voicing its concerns about "cross-border terrorism". Their disagreement was manifest. Why, some people even saw this conference as "a war of words", however polite and controlled!

Yet, such a pessimistic assessment is unwarranted, indeed unfair. Given both the immediate backdrop to the Ministers' talks, and the long-term, "structural" nature of many India-Pakistan differences, no dramatic breakthrough could have been expected in one round of negotiations. But the complete absence of rancour at the modest outcome of the discussions and the "good chemistry" established between Pakistani and Indian leaders means that the dialogue process will continue at a higher level of mutual confidence and comfort-provided, of course, that their topmost leaders invest energies in it and ensure that the present climate of goodwill is not vitiated.

Besides more talks on some of the 72 proposals recently put forward by India, it would be reasonable to expect some progress on improved trade relations, transportation links between Rajasthan and Sindh, easier visa regimes, and better people-to-people contacts. Apart from a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore on special occasions like pilgrimages, the two governments have agreed to hold a meeting on the very worthy proposal for a bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar across the Line of Control. One can only hope that they will soon sort out their differences over the papers to be carried by the passengers.

At the end of the day, a de facto roadmap has emerged despite persistent differences over Kashmir and other issues. This spells a slow, gradual but sustained continuation of the dialogue process. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf are due to meet later this month in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations. Officials will meet in October and November to discuss transportation links, narcotics control, communications between coastal and border security forces, and jointly survey the international boundary at Sir Creek. The two Foreign Secretaries will meet in December to start the second round of dialogue. And there will be another meeting between Dr Singh and Gen Musharraf during the next SAARC summit in January. This roadmap must be adhered to and fleshed out.

The latest round began amidst discordant noises and allegations of a rise in militant infiltration across the LoC. Then, India's National Security Advisor J.N. Dixit, a well-known hawk, let off remarks about India-Pakistan (indeed South Asian) relations being "held hostage" by differences over Kashmir. At an August 31 briefing, he said Pakistanis are so obsessed with Kashmir that if you ask them even for a glass of water, they will demand "you first solve the Kashmir problem. That is the kind of psyche which affects us".

This remark drew a strong, if politely worded, riposte from Mr Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri in a four-page statement issued a day before his talks with Mr Natwar Singh. This stressed the salience of the Kashmir and said: "Kashmiris are not holding India and Pakistan hostage. By denying them their rights, we have kept their future in limbo, and ours in a state of perpetual tension." This in turn drew an accusation from India of Pakistan's "unifocal" concerns and its own "considerable disappointment".

Despite these jarring exchanges, the talks took place in an atmosphere that was not only "cordial and friendly" but "affable". This itself speaks of a commitment on both sides to carrying forward the dialogue, rather than engage in knee-jerk or tit-for-tat responses and dissipate the momentum built in recent months-a pattern that's all too familiar, indeed sickeningly routine.

We now need some concrete and quick steps to seal an India-Pakistan deal on energy cooperation along the lines discussed between Mr Kasuri and Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar (who happen to be former classmates from the same college at Cambridge). Pakistan imports half its petroleum requirements (18 million tonnes), mainly from the Gulf. India could easily sell it 1.5 million tonnes of diesel a year at a lower cost. The Indian pipeline from Panipat refinery to Jalandhar, now near completion, could be usefully extended to Lahore. If Pakistan needs more diesel, another pipeline can be laid from Jamnagar in Gujarat (where Reliance has a refinery). India could also transfer to Pakistan its expertise on the use of natural gas in running public transport buses.

India has now come to recognise the viability and economic value of an overland gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan. This will be about 10 times cheaper than an underwater pipeline. The project poses security concerns: Won't Pakistan turn off the gas in a period of hostility? But these concerns can be addressed through commercial contracts (by providing for penalties for turning off gas supply and allowing international arbitration in case any disputes arise). The two governments have made considerable progress to satisfy themselves that such a pipeline is technologically sound and in their mutual interest. Pakistan stands to gain $700-800 million annually in transit fees from it.

Once such a pipeline proves useful and secure, it could lay the basis for larger-scale gas transportation from Turkmenistan over Afghanistan-Pakistan and open new economic vistas for India in the hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian region-subject to the imperatives of energy conservation, of course. Its very negotiation will have demonstrated the potential for India-Pakistan economic cooperation, which has barely been explored. That could produce some new CBMs and create a climate of trust.
Having said that, India-Pakistan differences over Kashmir won't be easy to resolve. This is a tangled and complex issue, on which both countries have centred their definitions of nationhood as well as territorial claims. How far can Pakistan and India depart from their stated positions to resolve the issue? Pakistan can afford to be relatively flexible. At maximum, it would like to incorporate the whole of Jammu and Kashmir into its territory. But, at minimum, it might be prepared to accept some role for itself in a loose federal arrangement for Kashmir, like a quasi-condominium.

This needs to be seriously explored. But it must be done without coercion-either in the form of jehadi militants crossing the border, or via the Hurriyat Conference's reorganisation under the hawkish Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Pakistan must stop pushing Kashmiri leaders such as Messrs Omar Farooq, Yasin Malik and Shabbir Shah to accept Mr Geelani's tutelage under the pretext of "unity".

India, for its part, must confront the reality of alienation of the Kashmiri people from New Delhi (largely because of its own policies). As the status quo power, it's tempting for India to skirt Kashmir, while trying to improve bilateral relations through trade and CBMs. But it has to rise above this and begin thinking about alternative arrangements. Can it propose something that averts a division of Kashmir through the conversion of the LoC into an international border, but which still satisfies Pakistan, and more vitally, the Kashmiri people?

Kashmir's division will be painful. It will be opposed by people on both sides of the LoC. Besides, there is nothing in it for Pakistan, and even less for the Kashmiris. Such a "solution" will create a perennially unhappy, sullen neighbour. On the other hand, Pakistan's claim to Kashmir is based on religion, and 58 years after Partition hardly sounds tenable. Yet, there is a pro-Pakistan constituency within Kashmir. Reconciling all these contradictory claims and considerations will be possible only if some creative proposals are circulated in civil society and put on the negotiating table after they have received inputs from different sections of people, especially Kashmiris.

Several such ideas could be considered-for instance, an arrangement in which both India and Pakistan grant their respective parts of Kashmir exceptional autonomy, and create a "soft" border across which progressively freer movement is possible. Security as well as autonomy of both zones could be guaranteed by the two states.

Such ideas sound radically idealistic, even outlandish. But as historian Ramachandra Guha has recently documented in Economic & Political Weekly, they were actually under discussion 40 years ago. Proposed by Sheikh Abdullah, and elaborated during a 1964 trip to Pakistan, they had Nehru's support. Indeed, they were also backed by C. Rajagopalachari and Jayaprakash Narayan, both Opposition leaders. We need to think "out of the box" on Kashmir. And we need to pursue the dialogue in good faith. Failure could be fatal.

Copyright 2004 The Daily Star

 

Independent Journalist

Praful Bidwai is a political columnist, social science researcher, and activist on issues of human rights, the environment, global justice and peace. He currently holds the Durgabai Deshmukh Chair in Social Development, Equity and Human Security at the Council for Social Development, Delhi, affiliated to the Indian Council for Social Science Research. 

A former Senior Editor of The Times of India, Bidwai is one of South Asia’s most widely published columnists, whose articles appear in more than 25 newspapers and magazines. He is also frequently published by The Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique and Il Manifesto.

Bidwai is a founder-member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India). He received the Sean MacBride International Peace Prize, 2000 of the International Peace Bureau, Geneva & London. 

He was a Senior Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. Bidwai is the co-author, with Achin Vanaik, of South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, a radical critique of the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan and of reliance on nuclear weapons for security.