From 'Maybe' to 'Yes'

July 2005

  Praful Bidwai

From 'Maybe' to 'Yes'
Praful Bidwai
The News International, 30 October 2003

It is an encouraging sign of good sense that the Pakistan
establishment has quickly moved from a negative response to Indian
Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha's surprise announcement of 12
proposals or steps for improving bilateral relations to a largely
positive one. The first, immediate reaction of Foreign Minister
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri to the proposals was to call them a way of
avoiding a dialogue, which Pakistan is keen on. Sinha's "omission" of
the "core issue of Kashmir", Kasuri said, reflects India's
"non-serious" attitude, itself driven by the "biased attitude of an
extremist Hindu group".

This tone was reinforced by Information Minister Sheikh Rashid
Ahmed's accusation that India indulged in "jugglery of words" and
"delaying tactics". He said the BJP was "playing with the emotions of
people to get their sympathies" and warned: "Pakistan cannot be
deceived by the political manoeuvres of the Indian government".

However, just two days later, Pakistani foreign office spokesperson
Masood Khan promised that each of the proposals would be "considered
very seriously and very cautiously". By Sunday, the government let it
be known through a private media briefing that Pakistan is "not
unwilling" to first discussing "softer issues", as India proposes.
Indeed, it said Pakistan had itself made similar proposals, including
the resumption of sporting ties and the Karachi-Mumbai ferry, and
raising the strength of embassy staff.

Regardless of who made the proposals first and with what motive, one
must hope Islamabad will welcome them because they are intrinsically
worthy. Indeed, there is good reason why India should unilaterally
take some of the steps it has proposed for bilateral discussion - no
matter what Pakistan does, and regardless of Masood Khan's
characterisation of Defence Minister George Fernandes as a
"psychopath" for his "war-mongering".

One may or may not agree with the view that the 12 proposals
represent an attempt to "breathe life into the slow-moving peace
process" which was shakily launched six months ago, or that they were
framed with an eye on Western opinion. But Western opinion has
treated them favourably, as should be evident from the reactions in
London, Paris and Washington (which gushed to "warmly welcome" them
as "a major step towards establishing normal links between these two
important neighbours and for providing a foundation for real
progress..".) Moscow and Beijing also welcome them.

The proposals do mark a significant change and improvement in India's
approach. Pessimistically, they will at minimum facilitate greater
and easier people-to-people contacts between the two countries. On a
more optimistic assessment, they could lead to the crucial thirteenth
step, a comprehensive India-Pakistan dialogue on all issues,
including Kashmir.

Consider the minimalist scenario. People-to-people contacts are in
and of themselves worthy of unconditional, unstinted support.
Admittedly, such contacts are no substitute for state-level or
policy-related decisions. Yet, there is great virtue in citizen-level
interaction in a long-vitiated climate, in which mutually inimical
perceptions thrive on both sides and where hostility is visceral, and
demonisation of each other the instinctive, knee-jerk reaction.

The proposals thus represent an overdue correction of the wanton
disruption of citizen-level exchanges after December 13, 2001. Soon
after Prime Minister Vajpayee held out the "hand of friendship", and
his counterpart Jamali responded positively on May 6, the two
governments retreated, creating a hiatus between official moves and
civil society-level reconciliation.

They permitted limited citizen-to-citizens interaction and MPs'
visits. But they refused to allow each other's high commissioners to
leave their respective capitals or meet any officials of consequence.
In fact, in recent weeks, they have clamped down on people-to-people
interactions and Track-II dialogue and reverted to the familiar
exchange of hostile rhetoric, accelerating nuclear and missile
preparations and racing to acquire sophisticated armaments. A change
of direction away from hostility is itself welcome.

Put bluntly, Sinha's proposals involve accepting a distinction
between "normalisation" and "dialogue", as "The New York Times" put
it. Secondly, besides greater people-to-people contacts, they are
aimed at a modest (mainly economic) target. This is not an ideal
situation. It would certainly be preferable to discuss the whole
gamut of outstanding issues between India and Pakistan in a
"composite dialogue". This should have started five or six months
ago. But if the choice today is between normalisation and closer
trade relations, pending a dialogue, on the one hand, and nothing (or
rather, greater hostility), on the other, then it would be surely
wise to prefer the first.

The modest target in question is progress towards a South Asian
free-trade area, which alone can lend meaning to the next SAARC
summit. India is negotiating a series of fast-track free-trade
agreements collectively with ASEAN, with Brazil and South Africa, and
bilaterally with Thailand and Sri Lanka. The only area where no such
deal has been struck is India's own immediate neighbourhood!

One reason for this is that Pakistan has long dragged its feet on
trade. But in the last round of Kathmandu talks, it extended 250
tariff lines to India - substantial progress according to Indian
foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal. This has raised hopes that the SAARC
summit could produce a trade breakthrough. A trade pact and the 12
proposals would go nicely hand in hand - to both countries' and
peoples' benefit.

Many of the 12 proposed steps are a rehash of what existed, or was
proposed earlier by Jamali. That doesn't negate their worth. The new
idea is the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, for which there is
considerable support on both sides of Kashmir. This would be the
first step in "softening" the border and facilitating contact between
the long-divided people of Kashmir. This bus link should be heartily
welcomed. It won't do to object that it will be the first step
towards making the Line of Control an international boundary. That's
not how international borders are drawn.

Pakistan isn't so weak as to be browbeaten into conceding a boundary
that is patently prejudicial to its perceived interest. Nor is India
being bled so badly by the overflight ban that it has no choice but
to agree to Pakistani terms. So it makes sense for both governments
to resume talks on airlinks between their cities, as well as
overflights. Both need to show flexibility, or they could lose an
opportunity to clinch a deal.

We must accept that there could be more than one pathway to
India-Pakistan reconciliation. While summit-level breakthroughs are
one route, gradualism could be another, if it is sustained and
nurtured carefully so that the present climate of compulsive
hostility is transformed. We have to give the reconciliation agenda
the same chance as Nehru and Ayub Khan gave to Indus river
water-sharing, so that an agreement became possible through the World
Bank's mediation.

The addition of one more rail link, increasing the Lahore-Delhi bus
capacity, and above all, permitting senior citizens to cross the
Wagah border on foot could go a long way in quelling mutual
suspicions and generating goodwill. Many Indians feel New Delhi
should take unilateral steps in a number of areas, which Pakistan
cannot but reciprocate. The same sentiment probably exists across the
border too.

If these pro-reconciliation currents exert persuasive moral pressure
on the two governments, they could contribute to breaking the present
impasse. Surely, we deserve that break.

Copyright 2003 The News International

 

Independent Journalist

Praful Bidwai is a political columnist, social science researcher, and activist on issues of human rights, the environment, global justice and peace. He currently holds the Durgabai Deshmukh Chair in Social Development, Equity and Human Security at the Council for Social Development, Delhi, affiliated to the Indian Council for Social Science Research. 

A former Senior Editor of The Times of India, Bidwai is one of South Asia’s most widely published columnists, whose articles appear in more than 25 newspapers and magazines. He is also frequently published by The Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique and Il Manifesto.

Bidwai is a founder-member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India). He received the Sean MacBride International Peace Prize, 2000 of the International Peace Bureau, Geneva & London. 

He was a Senior Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. Bidwai is the co-author, with Achin Vanaik, of South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, a radical critique of the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan and of reliance on nuclear weapons for security.