Building on the Thaw
Seize the Moment Now !
Praful Bidwai
India-syndicate.com, 18 June 2002
The war clouds over the sub-continent have receded, and with them the nuclear threat, because of US pressure and not due to India's 'show of strength'. It is time to consolidate these gains by moving towards a settlement of contentious issues like Kashmir and monitoring of the border to check infiltration
With General Pervez Musharraf’s commitment to "permanently" stop infiltration of jehadi militants into Kashmir, and New Delhi’s tiny reciprocatory steps, the threat of a sub-continental war has receded somewhat. This is the first significant thaw since September 11 in badly vitiated India-Pakistan relations. India must seize the moment. To do so, it must disabuse itself of a few half-truths.
Three of these are important. First, a "determined" India made Pakistan blink; "coercive diplomacy" worked because it was backed by 700,000 troops. Second, New Delhi called Islamabad’s "nuclear bluff". Moreover, it has broken out of the "mental block" of nuclear deterrence. Third, India should act in Kashmir as it likes, unfettered by "cross-border terrorism".
The reality is more complex. Pakistan has indeed executed a major shift. It agreed to permanently cease supporting cross-border infiltration - without conditions. This happened more through US mediation than through Islamabad’s capitulation before India’s military might. This mediation has been visible. US officials took turns to talk to Mr Vajpayee and Gen Musharraf and shuttled between their capitals. Gen Musharraf blinked - not to New Delhi’s stares, but to Washington’s.
At the end of May, a desperate Islamabad brandished the nuclear sword. Senior diplomat Munir Akram said: "India should not have the licence to kill with conventional weapons while Pakistan’s hands are tied..." This lost Pakistan all global sympathy. India’s show of military strength admittedly played a role. But the role was minor. International opinion favoured India not because it was impressed by India’s might, but because it saw it as the "aggrieved party" - terrorism’s victim. It is because India produced evidence of Pakistan’s general involvement in infiltration - and invited the US to verify this - that Washington intensely pressured Islamabad.
It is open to question if India could have achieved this with non-military means, including approaching the United Nations Security Council. But it is beyond question that India and Pakistan practised rank brinkmanship - to frighten everyone with war in "the world’s most dangerous place". Pakistani statements and the peculiarity of the sub-continent’s military balance convinced many that war, once it broke out, would escalate to the nuclear level.
Nuclear war is everybody’s business. That’s why the US intervened and defused the situation. This is "deterrence at a distance", working even more fallibly than Cold War-style Superpower deterrence. This only highlights the crucial importance of the nuclear factor in the subcontinent. It is ludicrous to claim that India successfully "called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff". Pakistan was not bluffing. Its nuclear doctrine, and strategic asymmetry vis-à-vis India, predisposes it towards a nuclear first-strike. Each war-gaming exercise by strategic think-tanks concludes with a nuclear exchange.
Many South Asians have become insensitive to this danger - because they are unaware of just how destructive nuclear weapons are. Many recall that India and Pakistan fought a conventional conflict at Kargil, but nuclear war didn’t break out. Ergo, it won’t happen now. This reasoning misreads both history and the deterrence doctrine. Wars are premised not upon high probabilities, but possibilities. States annually spend billions on defence not because wars happen every year. Besides, we know that Kargil came close to the nuclear precipice. Pakistan had indeed prepared a nuclear attack.
Nuclear deterrence is flawed. At best, it works unreliably. Deterrence can fail - with potentially disastrous consequences - because of miscalculation, accident, or divergent perceptions of how much damage combatants can inflict/bear. Deterrence tells us that not only our generals, but theirs too, will always think rationally. I have interviewed Pakistani officers who think their country can "absorb" one, two, ten Hiroshimas, and survive! As Salman Rushdie put it: "India and Pakistan are... rolling ever closer to the edge [of a cliff]... These old pathetic fighters must be pulled apart..."
That’s what happened. Rather than claim triumph for our "coercive diplomacy", we must thank our stars that war didn’t break out. The next time around, we could be reduced to radioactive dust. To prevent this, India must build upon the new thaw with Pakistan. It should rapidly de-escalate the border build-up, and fully restore diplomatic relations and communication links. It must not seem to be dragging its feet.
Two issues have now become critical: who verifies that there is no cross-border infiltration, and what stand India takes on Kashmir, especially if there is a dialogue with Pakistan. India can’t be both the complainant and the judge as regards infiltration’s cessation. This calls for neutral, external verification. Here lies the crunch. India is proposing joint patrolling with Pakistan, but Islamabad sees that as a prelude to making the LoC a permanent boundary, thus cheating it of a Kashmir deal. It rejected that idea 30 years ago. /p>
Pakistan wants the UN Military Observer Group, now reduced to a token existence, to be expanded into a verification agency. New Delhi sees that as a bid to "internationalise the Kashmir issue", something it vehemently opposes. Perhaps the best compromise would be a multilateral body, composed of a number of states and non-governmental organisations, like Verification Technology Information Council and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. This does involve some external involvement. But only ostriches can pretend that Kashmir remains purely bilateral. Unlike in the past, India’s position on Kashmir is no longer viewed with universal suspicion.
India must evolve a well-considered Kashmir policy: to halt repression, demilitarise daily life, and rebuild popular trust. For the 30 years of the Shimla agreement, New Delhi has failed to hold a serious dialogue on Kashmir - including the 18 years when "cross-border" militants didn’t exist.
The government must not play games to thwart free and fair elections in which all currents of opinion take part. The indications so far are largely negative - witness Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s arrest, and the toughening official posture against a dialogue with the Hurriyat.
If India doesn’t get its Kashmir act together, today’s gains will be quickly lost.
Copyright 2002 Content Provider International
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