A Euroskeptic's Monologue
Boris Kagarlitsky
The Moscow Times, 6 May 2004
The enlargement of the European Union that took place this weekend has stirred up feelings of resentment in Russia. A decade ago, despite the fall of the Iron Curtain, no one complained that Russia was not part of the EU, which was a club of Western countries, living according to its own rules and far removed from us not only geographically but also economically.
The distance between Eastern and Western Europe has not changed since then; indeed the gulf in living standards and economic development has widened in many cases. Now, however, the EU is granting entry to all comers, irrespective of the state of their economy or proximity to Brussels.
Given that this is the case, what makes Russia any worse than the rest? Moreover, transformation of the Kaliningrad region into an exclave surrounded on all sides by the EU both creates political tension and the feeling of being within striking distance of the forbidden fruit. Turkish citizens, it would seem, are also experiencing something like this. If Russia and Turkey ever join the EU, then very soon Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Syria and Mongolia will start to get ideas as well.
Interestingly, the more problems a country has, the greater its enthusiasm to join a united Europe. One gets the impression that it is not simply a political act but some kind of mystical act enabling countries to rid themselves of all their problems in a flash. Enthusiasm for integration is also the flip side of an inferiority complex. To command respect, you need to hitch yourself to the strong and the successful. The more corruption in a country, the greater the hope invested in Brussels bureaucracy; and the weaker the domestic currency, the stronger the belief in the euro.
On the other hand, it is easy to understand why Norway is getting on just fine without EU membership and without the euro. The Viking scions have no need for the blessing of Brussels officials; they can sort out their problems themselves, thank you very much.
Unfortunately, bureaucrats sitting in Brussels are not endowed with the magical powers often attributed to them. The desire of East European countries to dump all their unresolved problems on the EU only serves to highlight the inability of their elites to deal with these problems themselves. And thus, these problems will probably not be resolved.
On May 1, the EU became much larger, but has it become stronger or more effective? Not at all. New tensions have been added to the old ones that were already tearing the EU apart. And it is not just the fact that many East European countries are diplomatically oriented toward the United States, nor even the difference in levels of wealth. The fundamental problem is that the confederation has no effective mechanism for resolving its internal conflicts.
Integration enthusiasts have a tendency to cite the success of the countries of southern Europe following their accession to the EU. Spain, Portugal and Greece at the end of the 1970s were also much poorer than France and Germany, and even today they lag behind in many respects. But that did not get in the way of them joining. Euroskeptics, on the other hand, argue that the magnitude of the problems resulting from the accession of new members in the 1980s cannot be compared to that which lies ahead following the most recent round of enlargement. And relations with the United States were very different: The Soviet Union still existed, and so America had an interest in strengthening, rather than weakening, Western Europe.
However, the most important thing that has been overlooked by both sides is that the EU of 20 years ago differs dramatically from that of today. There was no single currency, no Schengen zone, no Maastricht Treaty. The main mechanisms of state regulation at the national and supranational levels, through which the EU has managed to resolve differences in growth to date, have now either been destroyed or seriously undermined. And that means polarization between rich and poor can only grow.
It is easy to imagine that once it becomes clear that there's no easy fix, the citizens of East European countries will start to blame Brussels and the selfishness of their Western partners for their problems (which will only be partially true). Blaming Brussels is as pointless as waiting for a miracle. The belief in miracles is born out of these countries' own weaknesses. To resolve their problems, citizens of East European countries have to learn to change their social order. Western Europe can get in the way, but it cannot help in this endeavor.
Copyright 2004 The Moscow Times
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