Chacha pag Wala na si Gloria

Chacha pag Wala na si Gloria
Joel Rocamora
Institute for Popular Democracy, 18 July 2005

'Gloriagate' is going to bring constitutional reform much sooner than we thought possible, or push it back many years into the future. For Pres. Arroyo, offering constitutional reform can be a way to undercut calls for extra-constitutional change. Speaker De Venecia and former president Ramos have risked supporting a discredited Pres.Arroyo in return for another promise to step down for early implementation of parliament. For Arroyo opponents on the Right, constitutional reform forms part of the promise of a more stable future even as they work to destabilize the present political order.

We should be suspicious of an idol that everyone bows to. We should concentrate on removing Gloria in order to take away the constitution as a club that each side beats the other with. But in a post Gloria situation, constitutional reform is obligatory. The main beneficiary in a constitutional succession, Vice President Noli de Castro, reportedly plans to convene a constitutional convention if and when he assumes the presidency. Even if the Left succeeds in forming a 'Transitional Revolutionary Government', like Cory Aquino in 1986, its first task will be to craft a new constitution, then call an election for a regular government.

The reason chacha is on everybody's lips (sometimes without passing the brain) is that the bankruptcy of this political system now stares everyone in the face. The jueteng and election tape crisis highlights the systemic character of our political crisis. Behind the reported role of the Arroyos, the jueteng scandal shows yet again the way illegality undergirds both the police and local politics. The connection between local politicians, police and various illegal gambling rackets is so widespread that some analysts say that if illegal gambling were to be eliminated, alternative financial resources will have to be found for these institutions.

The election tapes scandal is more serious. The Comelec should be completely revamped, the long delayed modernization finally implemented. But the problem goes way beyond reforming the electoral system, what is in crisis is the whole system of representation, the heart of any democratic system. The 2001 ouster of Estrada, the post election protests in 2004, the ongoing moves to remove Pres.Arroyo are all instances of the refusal of not just one but several elite factions to accept the legitimacy of elections as a means for mediating elite competition. Reforming the constitution will not necessarily secure compliance by everyone, but it is a necessary first step without which there are no others.

The Protagonists

Prediction is an intellectual's constant temptation. It is particularly hazardous under current conditions when all political players are recalibrating their options in expectation of the collapse of the center, the presidency. Because all constitutional options, resignation, impeachment, a De Castro succession are either unwelcome or not feasible, the possibility of extra-constitutional options increases uncertainty. Predicting what will happen to constitutional reform is even more difficult because it is only one component of the whole political equation, one that is both an instrument and an outcome. If you cannot predict outcomes, the next best thing is to identify the protagonists and the terrain of maneuver.

Former Pres. Fidel V. Ramos' (FVR) eleventh hour 'rescue' of the Malacanang 'damsel in distress' is a perfect example of the way chacha is used as an instrument for other political goals, in this case, saving Pres.Arroyo from downfall, and not incidentally, increasing the diminishing political stock of FVR. What people forget in the drama of FVR's 'white knight' rescue is that his proposal is extra constitutional. His 'Commission' is not one of the legal ways to amend the 1987 constitution. While Gloria was under no condition to refuse FVR's offer that Black Friday afternoon, FVR's ten month schedule for Gloria to step down is a little too steep. FVR's hint that he might have generals to back up his project is not believable. Gloria has since backtracked on her promise.

The most persistent proponent of constitutional reform is House Speaker Jose De Venecia. Using his control of the House, the Speaker has pushed constitutional reform with dogged persistence. He has made it clear that he wants the process to be speeded up so that the 2007 election becomes an election for a new parliament. Because of his preference for sooner rather than later, the Speaker prefers a constituent assembly. A consummate politician, the Speaker has come out for an elected constitutional convention instead of a constituent assembly when conditions required. With impeachment first on the agenda in the coming session of the House of Representatives, the Speaker is in a position to provide the votes needed. His threat value is greater than that of FVR.

The Speaker has made his agenda very clear. "House Concurrent Resolution No.16 Calling for the Senate and the House of Representatives to Constitute Themselves as a Constituent Assembly to Introduce Amendments to the Constitution" was approved as early as 19 March 2003. It proposed specific amendments which clearly laid out the Speaker's plans.

1. Art.II (Declaration of State Principles and State Policies), Sec.1 would specify that the Philippines is a "...Federal Republic with a Parliamentary Government"...

2. Art.VI. A President as "Head of State" but mainly vested with ceremonial powers. The President is to be elected by direct vote to a term of five years.

3. Art.VII. Sec.2, No.1 The parliament will have not more than 300 members elected in single member districts, for a term of five years (Sec.4). Districts will be contiguous territory with at least 250,000 population. (No.3)

4. Party list members will constitute 20% of the total number of district members. But details on how they would be elected will be "as provided by law". Art VII, Sec 2, No. 2

5. Sec.5 requires the election of a successor before a vote of no confidence on a Prime Minister can be passed. No confidence votes may not be passed one year after an election, and one year before the next election.

6. Art.XI, Sec.5 "Parliament shall determine the distribution of powers between the Federal Government and parliament on the one hand and the states and state assembly on the other, their concurrent jurisdictions, as well as the assignment of residual powers. The next two sections further increase the power of parliament over federal states. Sec.5 "In matters within the exclusive legislative power of the parliament, the state assemblies have power to legislate only where and to the extent that they are given such explicit authorization by federal law. Sec.7 "Legislative powers not expressly granted in this constitution to the parliament or to the state assemblies are powers reserved to parliament."

7. Art.XIII, Sec.2 "The parliament shall by law define national policy for the use and development of natural resources which shall include the sharing of revenues from the utilization of the resources between the federal government and the local states."

These proposed amendments are carefully crafted to maximize the Speaker's strengths, especially the support of the members of the House of Representatives. The new political system would give unprecedented power to current members of the House of Representatives. The new parliament would be elected in the same single member districts where local political clans have concentrated their efforts for political control. To make room for new aspirants, especially in areas where contests for control are intense, the number of single member districts would be increased from the current, slightly over 200, to 300. Terms would be increased from 3 years to 5 years and the limit on the number of terms is removed. While a concession is made to party list members by keeping their number to 20 percent of single member district representatives, how they are elected would be left up to the new parliament to legislate.

Most importantly, the power of the parliament would be maximized with the abolition of the presidency and the Senate, the House' main competitors under the current form of government. While there would be a directly elected President, she/he would only have ceremonial powers not unlike those of the Queen of England. Even local governments are not spared. While rhetorical concessions are made to federalism, the distribution of powers between the central and local governments would be left up to the new parliament. Not incidentally, the Speaker/Prime Minister would be the all powerful center of the new political system. He cannot even be removed through a vote of no confidence until after his successor has been elected, making his removal extremely difficult.

In the last few years, the main obstacle to the House' ambitions has been the Senate. It should not be difficult to understand senators' objections. The logic of a shift to a parliamentary form of government is the abolition of the Senate in its present form. Even if the new parliament were to be be bicameral, it is likely that the second chamber would represent states in a federal system, not the nationally elected training ground for presidential ambition that the senate has become. Factional balance in the current Senate has shifted away from chacha. Senate constitutional reform committee chair and strong chacha advocate Sen.Angara has been replaced by Sen. Richard Gordon who wants the constitution changed piecemeal, the American way. The minority, the four LP and the two NP senators, are against chacha, at this time for different reasons.

The situation of the Liberal Party provides a good example of the complexity of motives and interests at play in constitutional reform. After the failed Black Friday political coup, the Liberal Party is split and vulnerable. This is a rather severe reversal of its political fortunes. The LP was the biggest gainer in the 2004 election, now had a powerful bloc within the Senate, and was quickly gaining new members among local politicians. Whereas Senate President Franklin Drilon had been supportive of a constitutional convention in 2003, he now did little to get constitutional reform going in the Senate. Party member Mar Roxas topped the 2004 Senate race and quickly developed ambitions to run for president in 2010. Although the LP remains officially committed to constitutional reform through a constitutional convention, Roxas has been made head of a party committee to reevaluate this stand. Even former LP President Butch Abad has been considering a variation of the Constituent Assembly formula to pass needed amendments.

Although LP insiders say this is not party policy, this mode of constitutional reform is called the "Bernas Formula" after the eminent constitutional law expert, and member of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution. Pointing to unclarities in the mode of amending the constitution, Fr. Joaquin Bernas says, one way of interpreting Sec.1, Art.XVII is that it possible to process constitutional amendments following normal legislative procedure in both houses as long as specific provisions on extraordinary majorities are followed. This was welcomed by senators who were worried that the House would insist on the two houses meeting and voting jointly with equal voting power.

The first attempt at using this formula was made by Rep Hermilando Mandanas, 2nd dist, Batangas, and an LP member. He says that based on Sec 1, Art XVII of the 1987 constitution, "any amendment to, or revision of, this constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three fourths of all the members; ..." Sec 105, Rule XV of the Rules of the House of Representatives: Form of Proposals and Procedure for Adoption. - Proposals to amend, or revise the Constitution shall be by resolution which may be filed at any time by any member. The adoption of resolutions proposing amendments to or revision of the Constitution shall follow the procedure for the enactment of bills." (See also Philippine Star, April 8, 2005, p.13)

Mandanas earlier this year introduced Hs Res 686, changing the term of office of all local officials, and members of the House of Representatives from 3 to 4 years, and extending the terms of these officials by one year, from May 2007 to May 2008. Another, Hs Res.687, what Mandanas calls "...uniting the executive and legislative functions of government" is really only to allow members of the legislature to become members of the cabinet, and to require "That the President shall nominate and appoint at least sixty per centum (60%) of the members of the cabinet, including the Executive Secretary, from among the members of Congress." Mandanas also introduced HR 688 which allows Congress to create more autonomous regions than the two allowed in the 1987 constitution.

During the first few years of her presidency, Pres. Arroyo played coy on the issue of constitutional reform. While making the required bow to reform, the President allowed her adviser for Special Concerns, Norberto Gonzales, to support De Venecia's plans. It was only after the May 2004 elections that she and her lieutenants became more active, this time to block De Venecia's ambitions. The President now made it clear there was no way she would give up power in the middle of her six year term. During the campaign for the May 2004 elections, Arroyo hinted that she might be prepared to step down in 2007 to make way for a shift to a parliamentary system. After she won, she reactivated her old political party, Kampi, in the House. Led by her son and brother-in-law, Kampi recruited within the ruling party, Lakas, then threatened to block De Venecia's reelection as Speaker. For good measure, the President announced that she supports a shift to a federal, parliamentary set-up, but through an elected Constitutional Convention.

With the President and the Senate leadership supporting a constitutional convention, one might have thought that this would be enough to convince De Venecia that the only way he could get constitutional reform was through a constitutional convention. Instead, after the new congress began its work in July 2004, concern about a fiscal crisis provided an excuse for concentrating on passing tax bills and a moratorium on the constitutional reform issue. Despite this, De Venecia ally and House constitutional reform committee chair, Cong. Constantino Jaraula reintroduced House Resolution 16 early in 2005, expecting that once the last of the tax bills passed, constitutional reform could get off to a running start. Although the last tax bill, the VAT passed in May, Pres.Arroyo announced that she did not want to reopen constitutional reform until 2006. This way, if reform would be through a constitutional convention, there was no way a new parliamentary government could be elected in 2007.

Apart from the politicians who have hostaged constitutional reform to their personal and political party ambitions, discourse has been shaped by civil society organizations which have worked quietly and painstakingly over the course of the last few years. Their influence was shown most strikingly in 2003 when they succeeded in getting support from a broad range of opinion leaders including Cory Aquino, Cardinal Jaime Sin, and the leaders of the El Shaddai and the Iglesia ni Christo in their campaign to stop a De Venecia-led drive to get the Senate to support a Constituent Assembly. The most organized of these groups is the Citizens Movement for a Federal Philippines (CMFP) and groups which have concentrated on pushing a shift to a parliamentary form of government. They are now in the midst of a campaign to bring the discussion to the provinces.

Crisis and Reform

The most important advantage of Pres. Arroyo in the ongoing crisis is the personalism of Philippine political culture. When people think of the crisis, the question that immediately comes to mind is "If you bring down Pres. Arroyo, who are you going to replace her with?" Indeed the opposition is so bereft of leadership that the person they want to lead them, Susan Roces, is acceptable to the public precisely because of her refusal to be associated with opposition politicians. All other proffered 'solutions' to the crisis from a 'civilian-military junta' on the Right to a 'Provisional Revolutionary Government' on the Left fall outside the capacity for political imagination set by Philippine political culture.

This is the reason why the combined efforts of the elite opposition and various Left groups have not yet generated widespread popular support. Popular sentiment against another People Power mobilization is clearly based on the sentiment that these popular outbursts only replaced one elite personality with another. In theory, this anti-elite sentiment should be consistent with the call for systemic change. "Somewhere down the reform agenda of all the proposed variations of a transition government is the revision of the 1987 constitution. Most of the groups are amenable to supporting the shift to a parliamentary, federal form of government, an amendment that's a priority among charter-change advocates within the administration... Calling for a shift in the form of government is actually a common ground between the opposition and administration in the face of what both camps acknowledge to be Pres.Arroyo's battered credibility." (Miriam Grace A. Go and Isagani De Castro, Jr., "Talk About a Revolution", Newsbreak, July 18, 2005, p. 27)

Despite what would seem to be the compelling logic of popular sentiment and the positions of all the protagonists, constitutional reform has been slow to come to the forefront of discourse in the crisis. It is something all protagonists talk about but do not push actively. One of the reasons is the means of arriving at constitutional reform, and suspicions about the motives of proponents. Another is the way the crisis compels primary attention to the issue of what happens to Gloria. Most political and intellectual energies will be focused on the 'endgame'. Constitutional reform gets mobilized to serve the varieties of preferred endgames. It will not take center stage until Gloria is out of the way.

In the end, all we can do is lay out what would seem to be the most "rational" responses of various political players under conditions of crisis. The outcome, however, is not likely to be "rational" from the vantage point of what is best for the country because it will be the result of the interplay of various competing "rationalities". We might agree with analyst Amando Doronila that "...constitutional change...is a political option that offers the country an exit mechanism from the series of political stalemates that have debilitated it...These stalemates, inherent in the present system of checks and balances in the presidential system, have been responsible for the meager production of results from both the executive and legislative departments." Amando Doronila, "ConCon Call GMA Way of Defusing Tensions", PDI, June 6, 2005)

Given current trends, it is unlikely that Pres.Gloria Macapagal Arroyo will be able to remain in power until the end of her term in 2010. How she leaves office will determine many things, not least the fate of constitutional reform. What would be ideal would be if constitutional reform gets 'bundled' into whatever process ends up being the one that solves the current impasse. This would be relatively easy if the election of delegates to a constitutional convention were to be held at the same time as new elections for president. Or if Pres.Arroyo volunteers to step down in 2007. What could push constitutional reform way into an uncertain future would be if a military junta takes over after a period of upheaval.