The War on Cocaine in Peru

TNI

Ricardo Soberón Garrido Soberon

November 2005

The War on Cocaine in Peru
From Cartagena to San Antonio
Ricardo Soberón Garrido
The WOLA Briefing Series: Issues in International Drug Policy, Issue Brief 6, 7 August 1992

Contents

i. Executive Summary

With the signing of the Cartagena Declaration (1) by the Andean heads of state and President Bush, the "war on drugs" was directly tied to respect for human rights, particularly with regard to police and military anti-narcotics activities. As he assumed the obligations of the treaty, Alan Garcia, then-President of Peru (1985-1990), did not foresee the political and economic implications that the issue of human rights could have for Peru. In October 1990, the Peruvian government, under a new administration, announced its new anti-narcotics strategy. The so-called "Fujimori Doctrine" sought to establish a market economy in coca-growing regions, promote respect for human rights, and acknowledge the distinction between the coca leaf growers and the drug traffickers. As of May 1992, one month after President Fujimori's presidential coup,(2) very few of the initiatives laid out in the Fujimori Doctrine had been carried out.

I. Counternarcotics vs. Counterintelligence

The three Peruvian governments which have had to confront the Shining Path insurgency since 1980 have faced an almost unavoidable dilemma: In regions like the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), these
governments have had to carry out police operations against drug traffickers alongside the military's operations against two insurgencies, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, or MRTA).

The Huallaga region was placed under a state of emergency (3) in 1984 by then President Fernando Belaunde Terry (1980-1985). Since then, there have been many obstacles to both police and military operations.

The forced eradication of coca fields by CORAH (4) technicians supported by the police has led to constant abuses against tenant farmers, owners of the targeted coca fields and the local population. This has deepened the public's distrust and fears of state authority and the police forces, which has, in turn, strengthened the position of the Shining Path guerrillas.

On several occasions, eradication activities have been suspended when the military command deemed it necessary for security reasons. These decisions, in turn, have hampered the Peruvian police and US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) antinarcotics efforts.

The frequent divergences between the military and the police in the UHV have fueled allegations from the United States of corruption in Peru. On many occasions, the US media has accused Peruvian military personnel of collaborating with drug traffickers, accusations which continue to date. The US media and authorities, however, have not yet understood how the complex socio-political situation in the illicit coca-growing regions (5) fosters terrorist actions. Because of constant conflicts between the Peruvian police, the military, and government priorities in the region, the Peruvian government has issued a decree (6) which subordinates police actions related to combating both subversion and drug trafficking to the military command in the UHV region.
The Peruvian government's priorities are clear: It is more important for the Peruvian government to defeat the Shining Path than it is to win the battle against the drug traffickers.

In light of Peru's dismal 1991 record of anti-narcotics advances, a US embassy official conceded in November of that year that: "anti-narcotics operations undertaken with the
support of the armed forces have led to the dispersion of laboratories and coca cultivation zones in the Upper Huallaga Valley."

These antinarcotics measures have not, in fact, eliminated the underlying causes of illegal coca production. Instead, they have fostered the proliferation of coca growing areas and the laboratories used to process the coca leaf into paste and eventually into cocaine.

II. The US - Peruvian Anti-Narcotics Accord

In the wake of many misunderstandings, the Peruvian and US ambassadors finally signed a bilateral anti-drug agreement on May 14, 1991. In bold strokes, the treaty reiterates the basic tenets of the "Fujimori Doctrine;" however, it also lays out the priorities of the US government. The treaty, for example, seeks to fulfill reforms in both the economic and state structures laid out in the Fujimori Doctrine, and it also calls for the involvement of the Peruvian military in the war on drugs.

On July 23, 1991 both governments endorsed two "Letters of Agreement" which specified the allocation of US anti-narcotics assistance for Peru in 1991. A cursory glance at the allocation of these funds provides a clear understanding of the priorities set by both governments.(7) The bulk of the economic aid is balance of payments support intended to facilitate the Peruvian government's efforts to balance the budget and meet international debt payments; these funds are not intended to support crop substitution or other programs that would directly benefit local farmers.

Thus, proposals for crop substitution and rural development programs included in the Fujimori Doctrine have not received adequate funding and therefore cannot go forward. Development programs in the UHV have been allocated fewer than two million dollars, a relatively insignificant sum.

According to the anti-narcotics accord, both countries committed themselves to set up a bilateral association within six months to undertake the measures laid out in the treaty. Nonetheless, after more than one year, the association has not been put into operation and therefore has not put into practice the policies set forth in the bilateral agreement. Moreover, the funding promised has not been delivered, clearly demonstrating a lack of will on the part of the authorities of both countries.

In July 1991, President Bush issued a determination that Peru met the human rights conditions necessary to receive US anti-narcotics-related security assistance.(8) In response, certain committees of the US Congress suspended the 1991 anti-narcotics aid package earmarked for Peru. Congress continued to withhold the aid until President Fujimori announced a number of specific measures to be taken to improve Peru's human rights record, just before an official visit to the United States in September of that year. The US Congressional Representatives and Senators involved finally lifted the freeze on the aid package, but reduced it by about $10 million and laid out additional conditions to be met for the aid to be delivered.(9)
Congress also stipulated that the aid be delivered in tranches corresponding to compliance with the additional conditions.

However, even after the San Antonio Summit in February 1992, only the first tranche of the 1991 aid package had been disbursed. The concerns of US Congress members will continue until there are clearer signals on the part of the Peruvian government that its counterinsurgency policies will be tied to respect for human rights and that it will confront corruption within the institutions of the state.

Fujimori's recent break from constitutional rule has once again cast doubts over the continuation of bilateral cooperation in the war on drugs.

III. The Corruption Problem

In early 1991, the Peruvian Chamber of Deputies set up a commission to investigate the use of goods seized from drug traffickers in recent years.

After several months of investigation, the commission found serious irregularities and cases of corruption within government agencies.

These included both the disappearance of impounded drugs and confiscated goods - including money, furniture, and jewelry - and the government's control over the movement of precursor chemicals (necessary for the production of cocaine). The corruption uncovered may be the result of a decade of law enforcement-oriented anti-narcotics operations, backed by the US government, which prioritize eradication and interdiction over programs oriented towards socioeconomic development. Unfortunately, the suspension of the Peruvian Congress thwarted the presentation of the commission's final report.

Since the signing of the anti-drug agreement, law enforcement efforts have increased with the help of Tucano aircraft used to intercept planes suspected of carrying drugs. The Tucanos operate out of the Santa Lucia police base in the UHV. On April 10, 1992 the Peruvian government issued orders regarding the functioning of civil aviation companies in coca-growing regions: It authorized Air Force personnel responsible for monitoring flights to shoot down those airplanes which fail to obey orders to land. In addition, the radar equipment in operation in Andoas and Iquitos (both in the jungle region) allowed for a more effective control of air space, until the equipment was withdrawn by the US government in May. Despite these actions, the results achieved to date continue to be disheartening, as the price of coca is on the rise.

In Peru, the excesses of the police forces are compounded by the abuses committed by military personnel, the present corruption within the government agencies in charge of controlling airfields and highways, and by the insecurity caused by subversive groups.

Not even the executive branch is free from allegations of corruption. One of Fujimori's closest advisers is former army captain Vladimiro Montesinos, who has worked as a defense lawyer for drug traffickers.

IV. New Laws, Pacts and Agreements

In June of 1991, President Fujimori requested that the Peruvian Congress give him the power to legislate on economic issues and to develop a comprehensive policy for combating both the insurgencies and drug trafficking.(10) The 126 decrees which were subsequently issued in November of that year lay out the government's national "pacification" strategy. The approximately thirty decrees on the measures for confronting political violence essentially granted unlimited powers to the armed forces throughout the country and especially in the designated "emergency zones." The strengthening of the Peruvian military at the expense of civilian sectors of society contradicts what was set forth in the "Fujimori Doctrine."

Thus, while on the one hand the government claimed to want to develop alternative development programs in collaboration with the coca growers, on the other it sought to promulgate decrees which would limit even further the role of grassroots organizations in developing an effective strategy for confronting political violence.

Of the 126 legislative decrees, five were oriented towards anti-narcotics policies. The first decree declared money laundering illegal; the second established the crime of complicity to punish government officials implicated in aiding in the escape of captured drug traffickers. The latter decree also included the reduction of prison sentences for those who collaborate with judicial authorities. However, although this decree was presented as part of the drug trafficking package, it included a clause stipulating that sentence reductions could only apply to terrorism cases. Hence, accused drug traffickers - the majority of whom are small-scale dealers - were excluded from the incentive program. In sum, the government's proposed judicial reforms left much to be desired.

Apart from these revisions to the penal code, the government presented a law regarding alternative development programs in the coca growing regions.(11) Reiterating previous proposals included in the Cartagena Accord, the president's own "Fujimori Doctrine," and even the bilateral agreements signed with the United States, the law designates "Special Zones for Alternative Development" (Zonas Especiales de Desarrollo Alternativo, or ZEDAS) where the new strategy is to be implemented. It also creates the Institute for Alternative Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Alternativo, or IDEA), the organization with responsibility for overseeing the implementation of alternative development programs. This decree was presented within the context of the government's new agrarian policy which provides incentives for private investment in the agricultural sector, eliminates barriers in real estate exchange, and essentially breaks from the main tenets of the 1969 Agrarian Reform - primarily the longstanding ban on large landed estates.

In the end, Peru's Congress struck down and/or modified the decrees related to judicial reforms, but maintained the alternative development law.

The Fujimori government, however, has failed to distribute land titles to coca growers as proposed in the alternative development law. Moreover, it has failed to address the fundamental cause of underdevelopment in the region: domestic and international markets for the country's agro-industry.

On November 26, 1991, Peru ratified the Vienna Convention (12) on drug trafficking and incorporated it into national law. (13) Peru's ratification of the Convention, however, came with a reservation which clarified the distinction between legal and illegal coca production by differentiating between the production and use of coca leaves for traditional purposes (primarily chewing coca leaves) prevalent in the highlands and the production and use of coca for cocaine production. Nevertheless, Peru's new obligations under the convention necessitate that the government modify numerous laws related to coca production.

Specifically, the Peruvian government will have to make decisions regarding the country's legal coca growing industry, whose producers are represented in the Provincial Federation of Convencion, Yanatile y Lares (Federacion Provincial de la Convención, Yanatile y Lares,or FEPACYL).

According to the new penal code adopted by the Peruvian government in January 1991, coca production is not a criminal activity, although it is classified as such in the Vienna Convention. The contradictions between the existing laws and those mandated by the Vienna Convention are unresolved.

Also unresolved is the status of the formation of an official institution to administer the legal coca market. Despite the president's insistence on dialogue with coca growers, he has not followed through with one of the key outcomes of that dialogue: The formation of a National Coca Institute which would support the legal coca market. Because of these contradictions, many coca growers are reluctant to sign crop substitution agreements with the government. The law on alternative development stipulates that individuals who do not comply with the terms of written agreements - i.e., do not eradicate all coca - can be prosecuted and imprisoned, despite the fact that the act of growing coca itself is not illegal.

In the days prior to the April 5th presidential coup, the Fujimori government attempted to discredit the Congress, and hence justify the need to break from constitutional rule, by calling attention to the lack of progress in bringing drug traffickers to trial. Following the coup, Fujimori reinstated the decrees rejected by Congress related to money laundering and complicity with drug traffickers and on April 10 he gave the Air Force control of all airports and landing strips. It is under these conditions that two Peruvian airplanes shot at and grounded the US Hercules C-130 airplane which, according to US officials, was on an approved anti-narcotics mission in the UHV. This incident has further strained US-Peruvian anti-narcotics cooperation; however, the fact that there have been few political repercussions indicates that neither country wanted to focus too much attention on the incident.

V. The Coca Growers' Predicament

In response to the government's offer of a dialogue on the coca issue, some peasant organizations from the Huanuco and San Martin departments (the latter includes the UHV) initially accepted the government's proposal to create a new relationship between the state and the farmer. The decriminalization of coca production in the January 1991 penal code (14), referred to above, was well received by these groups and facilitated the dialogue process. Likewise, the dialogue emphasized some common interests shared by the government and some of the UHV peasant organizations. Through a ministerial resolution, (15) the government officially recognized as "valid interlocutors" almost 160 organizations of coca growers. In August 1991, the Executive Director of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), Giorgio Giacomelli, visited Peru to evaluate both the United Nations' development projects in the region and the possibility of the UNDCP monitoring compliance with the agreements signed between the coca producers and the government.

The situation in Peru has worsened over the past months. The Fujimori government has refused to modify its economic structural adjustment policies, which favor the importation of agricultural products subsidized abroad at the expense of agricultural production in the UHV. In addition, it has virtually closed down government institutions which fund agricultural development (bancas de fomento agricola), cutting the flow of funds needed to finance agricultural campaigns.

The Fujimori government has also established an agrarian policy (16) which, by lifting the ban on large estate holdings and deregulating the sale of lands, effectively breaks with the principles of the 1969 Agrarian Reform and the 1979 Constitution in which the reforms are laid out.

In the area of alternative development, the government has not taken a single step forward; it has not even created the Institute for Alternative Development.

In light of these facts, the farmers of the UHV feel that the government's decisions regarding drug policy have been made behind their backs, despite the agreements signed with the coca growers organizations. Since 1991, a fungus which attacks the stems of coca plants has appeared, threatening the livelihood of the coca growers. This fungus, called "fusarium oxysporum," has also attacked other crops. According to local farmers, the fungus is not only prevalent in the UHV region, but has spread to the distant region of La Convencion, where most of Peru's legal coca is grown, in the Cusco department in the southern part of the country. Peasants have given testimony that helicopters carrying DEA agents and the Peruvian police have been spotted dropping pellets containing the fungus onto coca fields; however, there is no other solid evidence to support these allegations. This fungus appears to be the principal threat to the coca plant. Its broader impact on the local environment is not yet clear. It is, moreover, not too likely that the fungus will be a significant factor in the eradication of illegal crops: There are now poppy plantations providing the raw material for the international heroin market in the Amazon department and in the Biabo Valley in San Martin.

In the meantime, the predicament of the FEPACYL farmers in the Cusco region has yet to be resolved. In November 1991, the government decreed (17) the cultivation and marketing of legal coca crops to be under a state of emergency, thereby further extending the government's control over the coca industry. Apparently, this was done to enhance the progress of the ongoing negotiations with the United States. Another reason for this legislative decree was to prevent the transfer of the National Coca Company (Empresa Nacional de Coca, S.A.,
or ENACO) from the national government's jurisdiction to regional government control. The government's deadline for submitting a report on the future of legal coca production and ENACO was not met.

VI. The Failure of the San Antonio Summit

On the 26th and 27th of February 1992, the second anti-drug summit designed to address the drug issue within the context of the Andean Initiative launched by President Bush in 1989 - took place in San Antonio, Texas. The Andean participants in the Cartagena Summit were present in San Antonio, as well as Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, which are primarily transit countries for drugs en route to the United States. Prior to the San Antonio Summit, representatives of each country met in Quito to draft the joint document to be signed in Texas. In this preliminary session, no agreement was reached on either the sweeping US proposals for drug interdiction or the Colombian government's proposal to eliminate drug trafficking by the year 2010; nor was President Bush forthcoming with an economic aid package for the implementation of crop substitution and alternative rural development projects. Finally, the critical opinions voiced by President Fujimori in San Antonio regarding corruption and bilateral cooperation found echo in the other Andean delegations, which generally agreed with his viewpoints.

On January 28, weeks before the San Antonio Summit, Hernando De Soto, Fujimori's primary adviser on the drug issue, submitted his letter of resignation, citing his disagreement with the government's implementation of economic reforms and antinarcotics policies. De Soto hurled serious accusations against the Peruvian government, including inaction, corruption, and even of the murder of Walter Tocas, a leader of one of the coca growers' organizations. As things stand, the future looks bleak, both for the US government's objectives in the drug war and for the Andean countries efforts to solve their deep-rooted economic problems.

In this election year in the United States, the San Antonio Summit highlighted the fact that few advances have been made in the effort to control international drug trafficking, while at the same time the socioeconomic situation continues to deteriorate for those living in countries where the raw materials for cocaine and heroin are grown.

The failure of the US government's "Andean Initiative" is clear, as is the lack of political will on the part of Andean governments to come to a realistic understanding of the problem. Thus, the first reactions to the summit noted the lack of progress in resolving the political disputes between the countries involved in the war on drugs.

VII. The Presidential Coup and the War on Drugs

The unconstitutional actions taken by President Fujimori on April 5th have failed to improve the negative image of Peru's efforts to carry out the war on drugs.

Although Fujimori claimed that the inefficiency of Congress and the judiciary in approving his national pacification and drug control laws lay at the root of the coup, the truth is that since April 5 there has been little advancement on the antinarcotics front in Peru.

On the contrary, within a short period of time, a series of obstacles has once again threatened US-Peruvian bilateral relations. First, the United States suspended aid because of the presidential coup; then, Peru clashed with the US over the Hercules airplane incident. In recent weeks, the Peruvian press has speculated about the potential withdrawal of US DEA agents due to the ongoing conflicts between the Peruvian military and police which reflect the competing priorities of simultaneously combating the Shining Path and drug traffickers.(18) Finally, the US Supreme Court decision affirming the legality of US agents kidnapping accused criminals abroad for prosecution in the United States further darkens prospects for the future of bilateral relations.

Within this context, it is difficult to believe that Peru can achieve any better results in its fight against drug trafficking than it has in recent years. As long as the words and intentions of Peru's de facto president continue to be held suspect by the international community, Peru's increasing isolation in the hemisphere will continue. Fujimori's inability to follow a clear path to return to democratic rule only serves to further aggravate this situation. Moreover, the recent bloody offensive by the Shining Path is a direct result of the break with constitutional rule on April 5, 1992. One of the tragic results of the presidential coup may be that Fujimori's unconstitutional actions play directly into the hands of both drug traffickers and the Shining Path.

References

1. The Cartagena Declaration was signed February 15, 1990.
2. On April 5, 1992 Alberto Fujimori - with the full backing of the Peruvian armed forces -closed the Peruvian Congress and judiciary and suspended those elements of the constitution perceived as hampering executive efforts to implement authoritarian measures.
3. Areas declared to be in a
"state of emergency" are put under the control of a Political-Military Command, headed by a military general, and are commonly referred to as "emergency zones." Human rights violations in Peru are concentrated in the country's emergency zones, which presently encompass nearly half of the Peruvian population.
4. The Project for the Reduction and Control of Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley is financed by the United States government.
5. Coca is grown for traditional forms of consumption - chewing coca leaves, tea, etc. - in many different areas of Peru. The coca grown in the UHV and other jungle regions is channeled into the illegal cocaine industry.
6. Legislative decree 137-91-PCM, issued by President Fujimori on September 3, 1991, set by both governments.
7. The aid figures reported in Peru are:

$24.85 million in US military assistance
$52.7 million towards the Peruvian budget deficit;
$4.5 million towards small industry aid programs; and
$1.9 million for development projects in the Huallaga region.

8. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1991 stipulates that before any of the Andean countries could receive US anti-narcotics-related security assistance allocated for Fiscal Year 1991, the President must issue a determination that each country meets certain human rights requirements that it is cooperating with US antinarcotics efforts and that its police and military forces are under civilian control.
9. The additional conditions include criteria related to both human rights and cooperation with anti-narcotics programs. For more details, see Issue Brief #5, Peru Under Scrutiny: Human Rights and US Drug Policy.
10. The Peruvian constitution allows the president to issue legislative decrees, which are then subject to congressional veto. Most laws in Peru are in fact issued by the executive branch.
11. Legislative decree 753-91-PCM.
12. The Vienna Convention's full title is the "1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances."
13. One of the conditions stipulated by the US Congress for Peru to receive US assistance was precisely the ratification of the Vienna Convention.
14. Coca production was classified as a crime in some previous laws.
15. Ministerial resolution 293-91-PCM, on July 22, 1991.
16. This agrarian policy is laid out in Legislative decree #653.
17. Legislative decree l51-90-PCM, published on November 14, 1991.
18. There is no indication from Washington that the withdrawal of the DEA is being contemplated at the present time.