Myth of Deterrence
Achin Vanaik
The Telegraph, 7 September 1999
All nuclear doctrines are dangerous, pernicious and deeply flawed because
their central pillar - reliance on deterrence - is itself incoherent,
illogical, contradictory and flawed. Of course, some doctrines are worse
than others and the Draft Nuclear Doctrine just released is of this type.
Its weaknesses will be dissected here but it is vital to keep in mind that
in doing so one should never fall into the trap of arguing on this terrain
alone or primarily. What the general pro-nuclear lobby in India wants is to
shift objections to them away from explaining why we must not have nuclear
weapons to discussing what kind of nuclear weapons we should have.
The conclusion, therefore, is simple. India must not go forward to further
weaponisation or deployment but must freeze the situation and then move
back towards complete disarmament. Only this can provide security. Anything
else will lead to ever growing nuclear insecurity. With this crucial caveat
in place, let us look at the specific problems in the Draft Doctrine. We
leave aside the issue of whether India even has the capability to build
what it wants. The Draft is a statement of intent and will be treated
accordingly.
Paragraph 1.3 of the Draft talks of 'autonomy of decision making'
concerning strategic matters. 'India will strenuously guard this right in a
world where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimized
for an indefinite future'. This means India also intends to have and
maintain its nuclear weapons system for an indefinite future.
Para 2.1 says that building a deterrent force is 'consistent with the UN
Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence'. The UN charter was
never meant to apply to nuclear weapons. The ruling of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected any such right in regard to nuclear weapons
except in the case of the most 'extreme circumstance of self-defence', on
which it gave no ruling at all. More importantly, the Indian government in
1995 submitted its own memorandum to the ICJ insisting that the use of
nuclear weapons, the threat of their use and even the preparations to build
such weapons were immoral, illegal and unacceptable 'in all circumstances'.
The Draft is trying to use the UN Charter to cover up India's own hypocrisy.
Clauses in paras 2.3 and 2.4 admit that deterrence can fail but in that
case there will be 'punitive retaliation'. Of course, the Draft does not
admit that such retaliation, even if possible, is not just a senseless act
of revenge but a suicidal one since it only leads to further nuclear
exchanges. The Draft, through talk of punitive retaliation is not just
trying to deter an opponent's first strike but also trying to cover up the
fact that once deterrence fails security has collapsed for good and nothing
(no amount of retaliation) can bring it back.
Para 2.4 says 'Indian nuclear weapons is to deter use and threat of use of
nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India'. Para 4.1 says 'Any
adversary must know that India can and will retaliate' to inflict
destruction 'that the aggressor will find unacceptable'. This is so
open-ended that it can mean India needs to prepare a deterrent against
anyone including the US which in turn would require a huge weapons system
if 'credible' second-strike capacity is to be established.
In para 2.5 the Draft says there will be non-use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states if they 'are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers'.
So Japan, for example, does not get an assurance of non-use, only of
no-first-use (NFU). This not only dilutes India's earlier NFU commitment
but is more objectionable than China's NFU commitment which while it allows
for first use on its own territory (e.g. Taiwan) specifically excludes use
against any non-nuclear state regardless of whether or not it is allied to
a nuclear state. This para also flatly contradicts para 8.3 in the same
Draft which says 'Having provided unqualified [my emphasis] negative
security assurances, India shall work for internationally binding
unconditional [my emphasis] negative security assurances by nuclear weapons
states to non-nuclear weapons states'.
Para 3.1 talks of triadic deployment and 'sea-based assets', 'multiple
redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception'. Para 2.2 talks of
developing a capability of 'maximum [my emphasis] credibility,
survivability, effectiveness'. What all this means is simple. In defining
a minimum deterrent the Draft is so ambitious and open-ended that it makes
a mockery of any even passable notion of minimum. The British have moved
towards a single system of deployment; the French are moving towards this
and NATO no longer has triadic deployment (around 150 airborne bombs at ten
different bases and the rest on submarines) but India aims at triadic
deployment! It talks of 'sea-based' not submarine-based which leaves the
option of warheads on surface vessels, i.e. tactical weapons, which,
incidentally, are nowhere repudiated in the Draft.
Para 3.2 talks of shifting from 'peacetime deployment to fully employable
forces in the shortest possible time'. When you link this with the desire
for 'mobility, dispersion and deception' and with para 5.5 which talks of
executing 'operations in an NBC environment' (NBC means nuclear,
biological, chemical) what you have is a rationalization to do two things.
First, it implies possible delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
which contradicts talk of centralizing such a decision at one (PM) point.
In any case, all nuclear weapons systems suffer from this inescapable and
unsolvable contradiction. If there is a 'decapitating first strike' which
is even partially successful, who and how will the release of the remainder
of weapons be decided if delegation has not been allowed for? But
delegation of some sort or the other weakens central control and is more
'provocative' and dangerous. Second, the Draft is clearly talking of the
quickest possible retaliation which must mean launch-on-warning of an enemy
attack, launch-under-attack or immediate launch-after-attack. Whatever way,
one is talking of a nuclear weapons system at a very high level of alert.
To maintain such levels will require regular training exercises. Both the
alert posture and the training exercises will be deeply provocative and
destabilizing.
Para 5.2 talks of 'sequential plans', 'flexibility and responsiveness', an
'integrated operational plan' and 'a targeting policy'. This flatly
contradicts the general government claim that India's weapons are 'not
country-specific' unless you believe India intends to target the moon. In
any case, China and Pakistan are not ever going to be impressed by the 'not
country-specific' claim although it may impress gullible supporters of the
government's claim that India has a responsible nuclear posture.
Paras 7.1 and 7.2 which insist on continuous and unrestrained R & D in the
nuclear field means even if other nuclear weapons states are persuaded to
close or rundown their weapons laboratories there is no obligation at all
for India to follow suit.
This is not a doctrine which is less awful than most others. It is a much
more adventurist, aggressive and destabilizing one. But it is a doctrine
which clearly reveals that the country's decision to go nuclear was not
determined by concrete threats to which there had to be concrete responses
but by obsessions about status and nuclear weapons supposedly being a power
currency for which an open-ended and highly ambitious system had to
elaborated and then built. It is also a doctrine that is entirely in
keeping with the arrogant, belligerent, self-righteous and grandiose
nationalism that the Sangh Combine believes in and which has now infected
so much of the Indian elite.
Copyright 1999 The Telegraph
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