Is a just peace possible in Palestine?

Is a just peace possible in Palestine?
Achin Vanaik
Summary of a speech delivered at a conference Peace in Palestine, Putrayaja, Malaysia, 28-30 March 2005

Yes, but we are far from it and this would require a very substantial shift in the global and regional relationship of forces against Israel and the US if it is to come about. Three questions are pertinent here. A) What would be the shape of a just peace? B) What were and are the post-Cold War 'peace efforts' all about? C) What conditions need to emerge for us to get from where we are today to where we need to get for there to be a truly just and enduring settlement of the Palestine issue?

A. The one-state solution - a secular non-Zionist territory where Jews and Palestinians live together and enjoy equal rights in all respects is less feasible than a just two-state solution. The biggest barrier is that the overwhelming majority of Jews in Israel would find it much more difficult to accept such a situation where they would soon be in a minority even though any such one-state solution must guarantee 'national minority' rights to Jews. Palestinians could come around to this view if a just two-state solution, which incidentally, continues to have a far wider and stronger popular base, comes to be seen as extremely remote and the balance of forces shifts against them. But to get Israeli Jews to accept a one-state solution would require a far greater shift in the balance of forces than would be required for them to consider and eventually accept a just two-state solution. It may well be that a just two-state solution plus an historical experience of living together peacefully might be the necessary prelude to the eventual emergence of a just one-state situation. In that sense the one-state and two-state 'solutions' need not be counter-posed to each other as the debate around it often tends towards becoming.

What then would be the parameters of such a just two-state solution? Full implementation of all the relevant UN resolutions (194, 242, 338).

• Jerusalem as an 'international city' and complete dismantlement of all Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.
• The Palestinian state to comprise fully contiguous territory in all of the West Bank and all of Gaza which is not to be imprisoned on all sides (including sea) by the Israeli military as it now is.
• Palestinian or genuine international control over the corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza.
• Some minor exchange of territory to ensure Palestinian access to the sea and to make the territorial division a geographically sensible and stable one.
• Palestinian control over its water and land resources and over its airspace. There should be an equitable water-sharing treaty with Israel.
• A demilitarized Palestine - Palestine should not aim to militarily match or counter Israel. This is the only area in which Palestine can voluntarily abjure the attributes of full sovereignty rights.
• Israel's unequivocal acceptance of the 'right to return'. This is an individual and fundamental democratic right which cannot (and should not) be bartered away by any Palestinian leadership. The exercise of the right to return can be subjected to negotiations. The acknowledgement by Israel of this principle/right is in effect the admission by Israel of the historic injustice done to Palestinians and without this admission there can be no new psychological-political beginning to a new era of peace and justice between the two countries.
• Substantial reparations by Israel (which can be abetted by the international community) to Palestinians for historical appropriations.

In short, a just two-state solution would be a repudiation of all the Bantustan-type solutions that have been proposed by Israel and US so far - from Oslo onwards, and regardless of the damaging concessions already made by the Palestinian leadership.

B. Today the US is primarily motivated by the aim of permanently sustaining and deepening its dominance over the Middle East. In this regard its basic strategy is to promote the security and power of Israel, as Israeli elites understand this. Differences within the US political establishment - Republicans and Democrats, neo-conservatives and liberals or traditional conservatives - are to do with tactics and nuances of policy not over fundamental objectives and strategy.

The same applies to Israel and its various political party and factional differences. Israel has a maximalist and a minimalist agenda. The former is politicide - massive expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied territories leaving only a manageable minority and the establishment of an Eretz Israel through permanent incorporation of the occupied territories. The latter agenda is - if forced to contemplate this because of an adverse shift in the balance of forces - a Bantustan type solution via amenable Palestinian leaders, e.g. Abbas.

The current Israel-US strategy is (i) to get Abbas to curb and fight against Palestinian armed resistance and all those elements that are instransigently opposed to Israeli occupation. In effect, they are trying to promote a debilitating internal civil war among Palestinians. (ii) To buy time through a prolonged and procrastinating negotiations process so as to further consolidate the settlements and to establish ever more 'facts on the ground' in the occupied territories, e.g. the apartheid wall in part or whole. (iii) Use carrot and stick policies to get more concessions from the current Palestinian leadership.

C. How can things change externally as well as internally within the occupied territories, so as to greatly benefit the Palestinians in their search for a just peace?

1. Political defeat of the US in Iraq.
2. Overthrow of some pro-US regime(s) and its(their) replacement by an anti-US government(s) in the Middle East.
3. Establishing an ever more effective solidarity network for Palestinians.
4. A new kind of Palestinian leadership needs to emerge which must pursue a strategy that aims to
   
   1. eliminate corruption and patronage within the PLA and Al Fatah.
   2. Bring far more democratic local governance within the occupied territories.
   3. Greatly increase the democratic presence/representation of Palestinians in the diaspora outside the occupied territories so as to forge the maximum unity of all Palestinians.
   4. Pursue an essentially non-violent strategy that, simultaneously, is intransigently opposed to Israeli occupation and rejects any Bantustan-type 'solution'.
   5. Concentrates on a politics of unifying Palestinians and sustaining and deepening their political morale through greater internal democratization, fair and uncorrupt social and economic policies and practices, promoting mass civil disobedience tactics both outside and inside the occupied territories in place of 'militarised' forms of resistance.
   6. Develop a politics of appeal to the rest of the world, especially in Europe and the US itself. The greatest political strength that the Palestinians have is the moral clarity and integrity of their struggle and the patent injustice and brutality of Israel and its supporters, above all the US government. It is precisely this moral clarity and integrity that is the biggest weapon of the Palestinian Cause.