The Politics of Symbolism How should one understand or assess the politics of the symbolic event? The question assumes pertinence given the enormous hype that surrounded the recent visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to meet the Pakistan Premier Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad. We have been told this was a dramatic breakthrough, the dawn or possible dawn of a new era in Indo-Pakistan relations. That it is a courageous initiative which ironically only a leader of a strongly right-wing party or of conservative forces could hope to successfully carry out (haven't you read your Kissinger?). That (are you surprised?) it was a vindication of all the wonderful prospects for greater regional peace and security thrown up by that earlier courageous, dramatic and wise decision to go openly nuclear. And of course, other variations on a similar theme. To soberly evaluate in a balanced manner the actual significance of the recent visit one should have some idea of what the ground rules for assessment should be. First one must clearly recognise that all such events always bear the burden of multiple symbolic representations. Second, the But even more importantly, it also reflects deeper social differences within a society, those of status and power that different classes and groups enjoy and therefore their differing ambitions and agendas. Thus most ordinary folk in India and Pakistan will have had reason to welcome the As is so often the case, popular responses to a symbolic event are a better guide to true worth than the assessments of most members of the foreign policy elite who believe they speak unproblematically for the nation and its interests. Insofar, as such events do carry some `national significance' there is a Golden Rule for how one must go about assessing this. The meaning of some `major' politically symbolic event must always be inferred in relation to the broader and deeper historical context in which it is situated. And it is this wider context that better infuses and shapes the meaning of that symbolic event than vice versa. To put it another way, this visit must be firmly situated in the context of the distinctive character of the over 50 year relationship between India and Pakistan and is decisively shaped by this overarching framework. Have we forgotten President Zia ul-Haq's cricket diplomacy of 1987 and of how little it presaged in regard to future changes in the basic relationship between the two countries? Symbolic acts by political leaders can dramatically express a changed context and accelerate that already established process of fundamental change. But they are never the crucial initiator of that process of fundamental change. Whenever, as in this case, sections of the public media and foreign policy elite seek to impose just such a burden of representation on an event, then it is time to beware and explore the motivations behind such responses. The central point can perhaps be illuminated by two historical examples of the dramatic politics of symbolism - President Anwar Sadat's visit to the Knesset in Israel, and President Nixon's visit to China. From the late sixties onwards Sadat was systematically trying to change the whole context of Egypt-Israel relations from that of the past. He was ideologically prepared to recognise Zionist Israel's diplomatic existence in return for Egyptian lands taken during the 1967 war but could not persuade Tel Aviv of this nor change the entire Middle-Eastern political context in which relations between the two countries were ensconced. For that he had to first break his alliance with the USSR, fight the 1973 war, and effectively ally himself with the US. His visit followed a few years later to accelerate a process already well-established and receiving powerful US endorsement but not progressing as fast as he wanted. Similarly, Nixon's visit was the symbolic culmination of a process of dramatic change in Sino-US relations established and agreed upon earlier. There is no such fundamental change or process of change in Indo-Pakistan relations nor anything even remotely resembling such a possibility on the horizon. This is the only part of the world where a continuing hot-cold war between the same two rival countries has persisted for over five decades with no signs yet of a decisive breakthrough. It has been a posture of mutual strategic hostility where the differences between hawkish and dovish positions is only in regard to how better to manage these tensions. During the Cold War there was probably more people-to-people and cultural exchanges between the USSR and the US and certainly more trade and technological collaboration of various kinds than between India and Pakistan. Yet that framework of relations still remained an institutionalised Cold War. Fortunately, the India-Pakistan conflict does not represent a systemic rivalry which can only be overcome with the systemic collapse of the other. But welcome as all efforts are at promoting greater ease of movement of information, peoples, goods and services between the two countries, this should not be confused as even hinting at, let alone representing, a fundamental political What actually came out in the Memorandum of Understanding certainly did not require a Prime Ministerial summit to bring it about. The MOU is no big deal whatsoever for all the encomiums that have been heaped upon it. It was the summit that had to be justified by the MOU not the other way around! So what were the reasons for the hype from various sections? Clearly different people had different motivations. Both Vajpayee and Sharif for good reasons are facing growing domestic unpopularity. The Pakistan economy is a disaster. Sharif is also under pressure from religious extremist forces and has given ground. Vajpayee, unlike Sharif, is not under pressure from the forces of religious extremism and authoritarianism but is himself one of the principal leaders of such forces in India. His reputation has deservedly suffered because of this and because of what the Sangh Combine is continuing to do. Both Prime Ministers have reason to welcome whatever respite the recent summit has afforded them and to try and cash in as much as possible on its public relations benefit. Another section has every reason to try and make as much as it can of the visit and the MOU. This is the hard-core nuclear elite of both countries. They want to convince all and sundry that going nuclear will usher in, or at least make it easier to bring in a qualitative change for the better, in mutual political relations. So the heart of the MOU, which is a series of general statements regarding areas where nuclear-related confidence building measures can be further discussed and formulated, is played up for much more than they are worth. It is as if having justified the production and distribution of life-threatening and debilitating addict-forming drugs, lavish praise is being heaped on a decision in principle to set up drug rehabilitation centres! No matter how much one believes that it makes sound strategic sense to go nuclear and that considerations beyond South Asia required this on India's part, the incontestable fact is that a qualitatively new danger - of nuclear exchange - has been introduced in South Asia where it did not previously exist. This being the case, and if we cannot reverse the nuclearisation that has taken place, we then have every reason to welcome the existence of nuclear risk reduction measures. But to see all this as the harbinger of a new dawn in Indo-Pakistan relations is not even to mimic those nuclear elites in East and West who claimed that nuclear weapons plus sensible arms control agreements would best manage Cold War tensions. It is to go beyond them in believing or suggesting that the India-Pakistan Cold War can itself be ended either because the regional presence of nuclear weapons will somehow make easier the achievement of a mutually acceptable political resolution of the Kashmir problem or by virtue of its own intrinsic efficacy. Talk about the worship of the wondrous properties of nuclear deterrence! It is said that the most recent converts to a creed are often its most ardent believers. If the reactions on both sides of the border to the recent Prime Ministerial summit is anything to go by, then this would certainly seem to be true of many members of the nuclear elites in both India and Pakistan. Copyright 1999 The Hindu |
