Do We Need a War? Does December 13 justify India going to war or on war footing? If not, then why is a section of the Indian establishment whipping up war-hysteria and indulging in war-brinkmanship? While terrorist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba are sponsored by the ISI and other sections within Pakistan, they have considerable autonomy to decide what they do, where, and how. Indeed, believing that a Pakistan in current political straits, and coping with severe pressures from the US would choose this time to covertly organize and direct an attack on the Indian Parliament is about as far-fetched as the idea that this was India's rightwing equivalent of a Reichstag Fire. Let us address a key question: why did Jaish-e-Mohammad hit in this dramatic way outside Kashmir? The answer is simple - to deliberately raise the stakes and provoke a disproportionate Indian response. The terrorist groups are not succeeding in Kashmir and can only enhance their importance by transforming the current insurgency/counter-insurgency face-off into a much deeper conflict between nations and peoples, i.e. harness a strong Pakistani patriotism to its side. If India were to militarily attack Pakistan in 'retaliation', then in a context where Islamabad has condemned the Dec. 13 attacks, where it has promised action against the culprits on the basis of shown evidence (no matter how inadequate such action may be from the Indian viewpoint), any military action will be seen as utterly unjustified and push all sections of Pakistan society to unite behind the current government. The issue of group terrorism and its sponsorship will then be submerged completely. While international opinion will accept diplomatic and other responses, it will not accept or approve military escalation by India. American assaults on Afghanistan and Israel's on the Palestinians are themselves forms of terrorism carried out in the name of fighting terrorism, and do not set justified precedents for India to do the same. Besides, Pakistan can and will retaliate in ways that the Taliban and the Palestinians couldn't. Indeed, after 1998 a new dimension of possible nuclear conflict has been added to the India-Pakistan military face-off. This should never have been allowed to happen. But in 1998 our 'strategic community' was so besotted by the illusory importance of nuclear weapons (they still are) that, without exception, they applauded the nuclearization of South Asia claiming this would enhance regional stability! Far from being embarrassed by the exposure of their political ineptitude, let alone re-questioning their perspectives, they will simply rely on public forgetfulness. But isn't Pakistan fighting a "proxy war" against India? This is a misleading metaphor. The Pakistan government has been using terrorist groups to fish in troubled waters to cause as much problems as possible for India. And Kargil was a mistake which they won't want to repeat for a long time to come. But the troubled waters have been created by India. If a big asset is Kashmiri alienation from the terrorists groups, a huge dilemma is continued alienation in the Valley from the Indian government and armed forces. As always, the key to overcoming our problems is what we do politically in Kashmir, not what we do militarily in Pakistan! There are five reasons for the motivated war-brinkmanship of the BJP-led government. 1) Milking whipped-up jingoism for possible benefits in the forthcoming UP elections. 2) Using the post-Sept. 13 and now the post-Dec. 13 situations, to push a domestic policy agenda of authoritarian rightwing nationalism in keeping with RSS-BJP ideology through schemes from POTO to history text-book changes to branding Naxalites terrorists to promoting anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani sentiments as widely as possible. 3) Diverting attention away from New Delhi's political failure in the Valley. 4) Undermining the 'Kargil syndrome', or the Pakistani belief that its nuclear weapons effectively prevent India from waging a Kargil (or more) in reverse. Hence the demand for calling Pakistan's 'nuclear bluff', and the extraordinary statements of 'experts' that in a nuclear exchange India may suffer badly but Pakistan will be annihilated. This is supposed to be reassurance and consolation! 5) Trying to drive a wedge of sorts between the US and Pakistan and swing the former a bit more to the Indian side. Copyright 2002 The Economic Times |
