Ban isn’t the best solution to deal with the Naxal problem
Praful Bidwai
Khaleej Times, 11 September 2005
After an attack on September 3 on Central Reserve Police Force personnel, which killed 24 of them, the Chhattisgarh government has banned Naxalite groups, including the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The state government and the CRPF were obviously shaken by the sheer ferocity of the attack, involving a powerful mine and a relatively crude bomb.
The mine caused such a powerful explosion that a Mines Protective Vehicle carrying the CRPF men was blown up and sent flying 35 feet up in the air till it landed some 90 feet away. If this could happen to a specially reinforced vehicle meant to withstand high-explosive blasts, the state police cannot possibly feel secure with the flimsy protective gear they use.
The Chhattisgarh ban comes less than three weeks after the CPI-Maoist was proscribed in Andhra Pradesh following a series of Naxalite-police clashes, including ‘encounter’ killings of CPI-Maoist cadres, capped by the killing of a Congress legislator in Mahbubnagar on Independence Day.
Ironically, it coincides with some rethinking among Andhra policy-makers about the wisdom of banning a whole range of pro-Naxal organisations, including the Revolutionary Writers’ Association, Radical Youth League, Rythu Coolie Sangham, Radical Students’ Union, Singareni Karmika Samakhya, etc. A legal appeal is pending against the very first arrests made after the ban, under the harsh AP Public Security Act — those of poet Varavara Rao and Kalyan Rao, former mediators in talks with the Naxals.
More important, the Telangana Rashtra Samiti, a Congress ally which recently walked out of the state government, is deeply unhappy and is agitating for revoking the ban. The CPI-Maoist wields considerable influence in the Telangana region. In the last election, it tilted the balance in favour of the Congress-TRS by telling its followers to vote against the Telugu Desam which had a repressive policy towards Naxalites.
Neither the Congress nor the TRS can afford to annoy the CPI-Maoist. There is sympathy for it in their own ranks and among the public. For instance, Andhra Pradesh Congress chief Keshava Rao’s the very first reaction on hearing about the Independence Day attack was: 'I told the government so many times not to indulge in fake (police) encounters'. So the mood among political leaders and rank-and-file policemen is rather different from the machismo and hubris of the trigger-happy Andhra director-general of police Swaranjit Sen, who threatens to sue journalists who even interview CPI-Maoist activists. Many Andhra policemen are afraid even to wear uniform. The Naxals have announced prizes of up to Rs 5 lakhs on the heads of some prominent ‘tough’ officers.
Amidst this situation, what is the likely effectiveness of a ban on Naxalite groups and their sympathisers? To start with, a ban cannot significantly expand the government’s power to deal with Naxalite violence. Plenty of such power is available under existing criminal laws, which cover a wide range of acts of violence, and abetting, assisting or promoting them. If anything, the Public Security Act is draconian. It criminalises even acts of sympathy for Naxals, including giving them food and medical care. It punishes people who might use the Naxalites’ help in settling disputes, which the courts would take years to resolve. This role of the CPI-Maoist has been praised as ‘positive’ even by senior police officers.
Past experience of bans doesn’t suggest they are effective. The People’s War Group, which merged last September with the Maoist Communist Centre to form the CPI-Maoist, was proscribed in Andhra way back in 1992. Barring a short interval in 1996, it remained banned until July last year. But through these 12 years, the group’s activities and influence grew in Andhra and adjacent states like Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and most recently, even Karnataka.
Naxalism, the movement named after an armed uprising of 1967 in Naxalbari village in West Bengal’s Darjeeling district, is different from other militant movements which typically remain confined to single states and to limited issues such as secession from India. Indeed, over 38 years, Naxalism has steadily grown both in its core areas — Andhra, Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh — and in contiguous states.
According to the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management, Naxalite presence expanded from 55 districts in nine states in November 2003 to 156 districts in 13 states in September 2004, and to 170 districts in 15 states this past February. In their strongholds, about 55 districts in 12 states, the Naxalites run a parallel government.
The reasons for the Naxalite’ success are fairly straightforward. They flourish where there are huge disparities in assets and incomes. Prakash Singh, a former senior IPS officer, Border Security Force chief, and author of a book on Naxalism, holds: 'The Naxal movement is irrepressible because it draws sustenance from the grievances of the people which have not be addressed by the government.' Regarding land reforms, even the Tenth Five Year Plan document admits, 'the record of most states in implementing the existing laws is dismal'.
In India, only 1.25 per cent of agricultural land has been redistributed through tenancy reform and ownership ceilings — compared to 43 per cent in China, 37 in Taiwan, 33 in Japan, and 32 per cent in South Korea.
The Indian state’s recent withdrawal from public services, leading to their near-collapse, and growing illegitimacy of numerous state governments, coupled with corruption, has led to failing states in many parts of the country. Agrarian distress, growing unemployment, and depredations of the forest department-contractor mafia, have intensified popular discontent.
Most mainstream political parties cannot relate to the phenomenon. The Naxalites articulate it and voice the concerns of the marginalised. Their aims are worthy although their means are not. Yet, Naxalite violence cannot be treated as a mere law-and-order problem. Naxalite politics is a (distorted) reflection of urges for change from below.
Governments and mainstream parties must recognise these urges. Andhra did the right thing last year by initiating talks with the CPI-Maoist. But the dialogue wasn’t pursued honestly and perseveringly. All affected states must seriously explore the path of negotiations. If the government can talk to the Nagas, ULFA and Kashmiri secessionists, why can’t it talk to the Naxals?
Copyright 2005 Khaleej Times
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