Peace and Security Cluster, 7 Sept. 2004 Asia-Europe People's Forum.

Peace and Security Cluster, 7 Sept. 2004 Asia-Europe People's Forum.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: IMPLICATIONS ON ASIA AND EUROPE

The Hazards of Depleted Uranium - What to do?

by Henk van der Keur
Laka Foundation, Documentation and Research Centre on Nuclear Energy, the Netherlands

International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW)

Depleted uranium (DU) is a radioactive and heavy metal. DU is the by-product which is left over after enrichment of natural uranium. Huge stockpiles of DU, especially in nuclear weapons states, has to be stored forever. However, since the 1950s the nuclear waste product has become raw material for numerous civil applications, amongst others counterweights for airplanes and bore heads, and military applications. This paper is about the military use of DU in weaponry, particularly in anti-tank shells. The core of these classes of munitions, called the penetrator, consists of solid DU metal, which can be fired from tanks, armoured fighting vehicles or attack planes. Besides anti-tank shells DU metal is also used in the armour of certain types of main battle tanks to protect them to hostile DU anti-tank shells.

DU anti-tank shells have been tested in the U.S. since the 1960s. Based on this experiences the the U.S. research and engineering company Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) states in an July 1990 U.S. Army report appendix among others: [DU is a] "low level alpha radiation emitter which is linked to cancer when exposures are internal, [and] chemical toxicity causing kidney damage [... ] "Short term effects of high doses can result in death, while long term effects of low doses have been implicated in cancer." The authors compare the use of DU with tungsten and make the following remarks: "While much more is known about the health effects of uranium than of tungsten alloys, the comparable information on chemical toxicity indicates that insoluble DU is approximately 25 times more toxic than insoluble tungsten and soluble DU is 20 times more toxic than soluble tungsten when exposure is at the limits allowed by the regulations." Besides "cleanup requirements on ranges and the battlefield, as well as combat exposures to soldiers", the SAIC report also observes: "Public relations efforts are indicated, and may not be effective due to the public's perception of radioactivity. Fielding and combat activities present the potential for adverse international reaction. Public relations efforts are not needed [for tungsten]. Increased costs can be expected for DU public relations when compared to tungsten." It is noteworthy that the engineers included the cleanup costs in their analysis. After the 1991 Gulf War Pentagon spokesmen have declared several times that the U.S. had no plans to clean the battlefield. The costs to maintain their propaganda that DU poses no harm to human health and nature, is only a small fraction of the costs to remediate the soils in Iraq and the Balkans.

In one of his reports the US expert on DU Dan Fahey notices: The U.S. Army states cleanup involves removing "the top layer of soil," which could be potentially devastating to an environment, especially if DU contaminates arable land or wetlands. Further, the cost involved in removing the topsoil from contaminated areas could be astronomical. As an example, the cost of cleaning up and disposing of the estimated 69,000 kg of DU dust and debris on 200 hectares of the U.S. Army's Jefferson Proving Ground in Indiana has been placed at least US$4 billion. After the Kosovo War it appeared that the spent DU bullets were made from contaminated stockpiles of DU, which means the by-product coming from the enrichment process of reprocessed uranium, which contains traces of plutonium and other transuranic elements. In the West civilians are saddled up with fear for dirty bombs, in the Balkans and Iraq civilians are saddled up with the reality of spent dirty bombs used by the US and British Forces.

In wars, uranium weapons were used for the first time during the 1991 Gulf War. At least 315 metric tonnes of DU were fired, especially by the A-10 ground attack planes. Subsequently the same type of plane fired DU anti-tank shells during the wars in the Balkans. In '94/'95 in Bosnia (3.3 metric tonnes) and in '99 in Kosovo (9.5 metric tonnes), and again in the 2003 Iraq War (best estimates: 200 metric tonnes). There is circumstantial evidence that DU munitions have been also used in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

At least sixteen countries have weapon systems with DU in their arsenals: Bahrain, France, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

As long as a DU penetrator remains intact there is virtually no risk for human health. However, on impact, when a DU penetrator hits a tank, DU is turned into its most dangerous form. Clouds of very tiny DU dust particles are dispersed and depending on the local climate they can be airborne for at least three years. The local population can ingest or inhale these micro-sized particles. The inhaled insoluble particles will remain in the human body for many years. From the lungs the particles enter very slowly into the blood stream and finally they will be settled in the bone. DU poisoning is connected with symptoms of heavy metal poisoning, auto-immune diseases, cancers, and mutagenic effects. Children are most vulnerable in two ways: their rapidly dividing cells are more sensitive to toxicity and radiation to get cancerous, and a victim exposed to DU, can get children with inherited malformations. Since 1994 Iraqi physicians and medical scientists urge for assistance from the international community for extended investigation, research and epidemiological examinations.

There is a huge gap between the protective measurements in the West and the way in which residents in the affected areas are kept completely ignorant about possible dangers. After the 1999 Kosovo War and the 2003 Iraq War pictures were shown in newspapers with children playing on destroyed tanks, possibly contaminated with DU dust. These pictures sharply contrasts with the TV images from January 2001 in Kosovo of UNEP field researchers, who were measuring radioactivity and who worn well suited coveralls.

So far too little is known about the health effects of DU poisoning. Only a few dozens of soldiers out of the hundreds of thousands have been tested so far. Independent experts, such as Dr. Keith Baverstock - Head of the Radiation Protection Division of the WHO (EURO) from 1991 to 2003, indicate that there are serious flaws in the currently used models on internal contamination with depleted uranium. Last July at the Low Level Radiation and Health Confenrence in Edinburgh Dr. Baverstock noticed: "Official researchers use essentially the untested models to determine the risks from internal contamination."

The International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW) campaigns for a ban on the military use of DU in weaponry and urges for extended independent medical examinations and proper health care for the victims. Therefore ICBUW promotes the Draft Convention. The Draft Convention contains a general and comprehensive prohibition of the development, production, transport, storage, possession, transfer and use of uranium ammunition, uranium armour-plate and of any other military use of uranium. The Convention also outlines obligations concerning the abolishment of uranium weapons and the destruction of uranium weapons construction facilities. States Parties undertake to report on the fulfilment of their obligations. The Convention obliges to decontaminate or to ensure a rapid decontamination of contaminated areas at latest five years after its entry into force, emphasising the protection of and assistance to civilians living in these areas. The fulfilment of the obligations has to be secured through international help and co-operation of States Parties as well as financial help for the State Party concerned by voluntary funds.