How to Build Peace in Asia and Europe:

How to Build Peace in Asia and Europe:
US Strategies and Human Security
Martin Broek

I would first like to thank the organisers for giving me the opportunity to speak at this important forum at such an important time in the history of Korea. Yesterday during an exchange of views with Korean participants, I learned a lot about the reunification process. The process is an absolute necessity for peace on the Korean peninsula and beyond and also a necessity for the well being of all Koreans who, as a result of Cold War politics, have been divided now for almost fifty years.

During this short introduction I want to address two areas:

1. Arms trade to and from Korea;
2. A European perspective on Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

Before I start, I want to first draw your attention to a development in European arms export policy that is of great concern. In the past few months, the six leading European countries involved in arms manufacturing signed a Frame Work Agreement for co-operation between them. As part of this co-operation, the parties agreed to draw up a checklist of measures that would ensure greater collaboration between European companies exporting arms. This list has not been made public and thus is a step back on the road to greater transparency on arms exports. Discussion is now taking place on the detail of the agreement enabling governments to follow their own guidelines on arms exports and establishing the grounds on which an EU country may be removed from the co-operation agreement. As some point out real politics will be a barrier for a country to use these possibilities and deteriorate relations with its partners in the framework agreement. So the white list will provide in fact a cart blanche for arms exports to destinations on the list.

Let me now turn to one of the two areas of this introduction. TMD, yet another acronym from the military, stands for Theatre Missile Defence, which basically means that it provides a shield against ballistic missiles. TMD is a smaller version of National Missile Defence (NMD), which dominated the headlines last year. While I am an activist working mainly against the trade in arms, I think TMD is important enough to include in my scope of work for several reasons. The two main reasons for me are (and I am sure other reasons will be added during this workshop):

1. The introduction of NMD is creating new tensions between the major powers. How serious this is can be shown by the fact that, this year, Russia threatened Western Europe several times with a nuclear strike if conflict between the two regions should break out. In one case, it pointed very precisely to a small village in Northern Norway, where a radar station is being built for NMD.
2. The second is that the introduction of NMD will lead to a new arms race on the conventional as well as nuclear level. If a shield is developed, then weapons capable of penetrating the shield will also be developed. This is an eventuality that even US intelligence sources have predicted. Campaigning against the trade in arms without tackling the development of NMD is as useful as carrying water to the sea.

I think it is also important to recognise that the debate in East Asia concerning TMD and NMD differs to that in Europe. In East Asia, NMD and TMD are treated as being interchangeable and it is often stated that there is no difference between either systems. This is not the basis of the argument in Europe.

From a European viewpoint there are distinctions between NMD and TMD:

1. NMD is designed to protect the US against assault from different types of Ballistic Missiles, including the so-called Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). TMD has nothing to do with this form of protection. The distinction is of major significance for Russia, which lost almost all of its strategic leverage towards the US and only has its ICBMs to redress this 'balance.' For China a shield against its 20 nuclear-armed ICBMs is not the major concern. A shield over Taiwan and Japan against shorter ranged Tactical Ballistic Missiles is threatening its position in the region and strengthening the US hegemony.

2. NMD is intended to protect the whole continental US, far larger than that which TMD can protect. TMD's main function is to protect military bases, industrial centres and intervention forces deployed on the ground. But although the shield provided by TMD is smaller than that provided by NMD, the Theatre (a chilling phrase to describe a battle field) Missile Defence can still protect Japan and Taiwan against ballistic missile attacks and is, therefore, changing the fragile strategic balance of power in East Asia.

3. The last point I want to raise is the reaction in Europe to TMD and NMD. European opposition is fed by two main considerations: preventing any damage to Europe-Russian relations and, at the same time, keeping the US on board. The issue of TMD does not form part of this debate. While most European leaders oppose the National Missile Defence, they are at the same time studying ways in which TMD can be strengthened. This is happening at a bi-lateral level between the US and Europe and within NATO. The most significant TMD effort now underway is a joint study between defence-industry conglomerates on both sides of the Atlantic. Analysts expect the US to develop the missile technology (in co-operation with Japan) while Europe will focus on improving radar systems. This co-operation has advantages for both regions. For Europe, it means participating in the technological developments currently underway in the US while, at the same time, keeping the North Americans firmly involved in European security developments. The US can use European technology to improve its TMD systems.

In the near future, many defence programmes are going on to have TMD capability. This process is happening by stealth. At the same time there is a more open debate, especially in the US to scrap NMD and, instead, start to develop an expanded version of TMD, with capabilities comparable to NMD. If that is the case, then all criticism now focused on NMD should be equally directed towards the developments in TMD.

I want to address briefly some issues relating to the arms trade to and from Korea. (I wish to mention Jenny Franco, who is not present, but who prepared an essay on this topic prior to this meeting.) South Korea is one of the main arms importers in the world. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranks South Korea as the fourth largest recipient of major conventional weapons. While the US remained by far the most important supplier of arms to South Korea between 1995-1999, a new trend emerged in the 1990s that saw a marked increase in the European share of arms trade to South Korea. The European Union has a Code of Conduct on arms exports, including a limitation on the amount of arms that can be exported to, what is termed, 'a region of tension'. Obviously, East Asia is a region of tension, but it clearly looks like this criterion applies only to opponents of European policy and not to an ally such as Korea.

South Korea has a domestic defence industry, producing a wide range of weapons with foreign technology and support. Among those weapon systems is the fighter aircraft F-16, built through a US license. The production of this fighter will possibly be followed by 'an indigenously' developed fighter, the KTX-2. At the moment, fighter aircraft inventories for the South Korean air force are full. In any event, the KTX-2 is not yet ready to go into production. Nevertheless, production facilities, custom built to construct the KTX-2, lie idle and are costing taxpayers money. Yet Korean arms manufacturers, Samsung in particular, have been lobbying the government to order more F-16s so that their production lines remain busy. So the government ends up spending money on aircraft the military does not need. Economically it is not clear if this combination policy (continuing production of the F-16 and bringing the new KTX-2 on stream) will lead to open production lines as no deadline has been set for the KTX-2 production.

While South Korea is already a major arms importer, it also wants to become a player on the export market. Arms exports from South Korea to the Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh corroborate this point.

A final point to consider is that Bangladesh recently ordered a US$100 million frigate from Daewoo, a South Korean company. The ship will be constructed in Korea while the on board equipment will be supplied mainly from the Netherlands and Italy. This leads to two questions:

• It would be interesting to know to what extend the Dutch, Bangladeshi, Italian and South Korean public are aware of such an expensive and costly deal and the roles their governments are playing in concluding them.
• In an era of 'world weapons' (a term introduced by Ann Markusen), how do we hold arms dealers accountable for the consequences of their actions, particularly where the dealers supply weapons to areas marked by wide-spread poverty, 'low intensity' conflict or have the potential to develop into areas of high-tension conflict? This is a major challenge for peace activists today.

Martin Broek, AMOK, The Netherlands