The Nuclear Scenario in India: Some Issues

The Nuclear Scenario in India: Some Issues
Dr. Kamal Mitra Chenoy

The nuclear tests conducted by India in Pokhran [popularly known as Pokhran II] in May 1998 shocked the world and much of India. In retrospect, they should not have. India conducted a so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosion' [PNE], which was in reality a weapons test way back in May 1974 [Pokhran I]. Pokhran I, despite the claim that it was only a PNE, triggered off a nuclear arms race in South Asia, with India's traditional adversary Pakistan secretly concentrating efforts to build its own nuclear weapon as a deterrent to the Indian bomb. Though India proposed an extensive disarmament package in 1988, the announcement in Pakistan of the development of an atomic bomb strengthened the hand of the policy elite who advocated outright nuclear armament. The refusal of the Nuclear 5 (the US, Russia, China, the UK and France) to accept any timetable for universal disarmament, the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the finalisation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), coupled with the rise of the pro-Bomb Bhartiya Janata Party [BJP] to leadership of the Indian government led to Pokhran II and a national climate where, excluding the Communist and pro-Communist Left, no major Indian political party opposed the Bomb.

The Indian debate over the CTBT, in which major sections of the peace movement opposed the treaty as being discriminatory, is unique. The pro-nuclear policy elite and the Left's opposition converged on the allegation that the permission for sub-critical and computer simulated testing under the CTBT gave an unfair advantage to the N-5. The N-5, with their advanced nuclear technology, could upgrade their weapons without having to resort to conventional testing. Thus, a core section of the peace and anti-nuclear movement, which dominates the All India Peace & Solidarity Organisation [AIPSO], opposes the CTBT. In response to US and G7 pressure, the BJP and the ruling National Democratic Alliance [NDA] in India, having already had two series of tests in Pokhran II, are willing to sign the CTBT if there is a 'national consensus'. But Congress, the major opposition party, together with the Left and several other Indian political parties persist in their opposition to the CTBT.

Current aggressive postures within the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military policy has accentuated opposition to CTBT and any proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. The Clinton Administration's proposals for a National Missile Defence [NMD] and a Theatre Missile Defence [TMD] have been seen as an attempt to perpetuate US hegemony and to move towards a 'uni-polar world' through nuclear and military domination. The fact that the US and the NATO have sidetracked the UN in recent military interventions has only further fuelled suspicions. Critics, including proponents of the Indian nuclear option, point out that both the USA and NATO do not rule out the possibility of a first strike, in contrast policy in China and India.

In India a substantial segment of the peace movement has opposed CTBT and supported the retention of the nuclear option. There is no support for unilaterally giving up the nuclear weapons option but rather keeping the option open as a bargaining device with the N-5. This would place pressure on the nuclear powers to agree to time-bound nuclear disarmament. The sections of the peace movement who support this option are clear that no actual nuclear armament should take place. This policy, which was termed 'nuclear ambiguity', has been around since 1974 [Pokhran I]. Having demonstrated its nuclear capability, India did not arm but instead developed its potential delivery systems through the Prithvi and Agni rocket programmes. It also sought to acquire other potential nuclear platforms for the Navy and Air Force. As far as its neighbour and traditional adversary Pakistan was concerned, there was no ambiguity. After 1974, Pakistan felt impelled to develop its own programme of nuclear armaments with alleged Chinese and North Korean support.

As critics in the peace movement pointed out at the time, 'nuclear ambiguity' is an unstable concept - the nuclear option that is kept 'open' is always more likely to be used than forsaken. In India, following the indefinite extension of the NPT and the finalisation of the CTBT text, the Indian nuclear policy elite felt that the time had come to carry out the tests necessary for further development of nuclear weapons. Since it was believed that India would be ultimately forced to sign the CTBT, it was felt that this was India's last chance to test. Thus the worst fears of the peace movement came to be realised.

Despite differences on issues such as the CTBT, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the question of nuclear energy, the Indian peace movement is united in opposing the nuclear weapons programme and is demanding that it be rolled back. Every year since Pokhran II, there have been marches, demonstrations, exhibitions and meetings on Hiroshima day and on May 11th, the anniversary of Pokhran II. In particular students in both schools and universities have been approached by peace groups and educated about the dangers and horrors of nuclear war and weapons.

But one major unresolved problem for the Indian peace movement is the proposal to establish a nuclear weapons free zone [NWFZ] in South Asia. This proposal has never been accepted by AIPSO. Opposition is centred round the argument that, in the absence of any time-bound commitment to universal nuclear disarmament, a NWFZ in South Asia is another discriminatory non-proliferation measure. It is argued that a NWFZ in South Asia would fall in line with the plans for US nuclear hegemony. In India's case, this is complicated by the fact that its very large and powerful neighbour, China, is a major nuclear weapons state. India lost a major border war with China in 1962. To date, China occupies thousands of square kilometres of territory claimed by India. There is also a major US nuclear weapons base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean within striking distance of the mainland.

This writer believes that the arguments against both the establishment of an NWFZ and the ratification of the CTBT are gravely misdirected for the following reasons. Though the US supported CTBT, influential opposition in the Senate blocked its ratification, precisely because it is non-discriminatory. Though US ruling circles support NWFZs for their own hegemonic purposes, they do so because they have militarist notions of national security and base their military doctrines on the concept of nuclear deterrence. The peace movement in South Asia, especially in India, must reject militarist notions of national security and of nuclear deterrence. A NWFZ in South Asia cannot be held hostage to the struggle for time-bound universal nuclear disarmament. While various elements of the US-backed non-proliferation regime may be discriminatory, further nuclear proliferation would be an unmitigated disaster.

Like the earlier policy of 'nuclear ambiguity', the opposition to a NWFZ would only ultimately serve pro-nuclear interests. Given the adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, only a NWFZ in South Asia would constitute a viable option if both states were to back away from the nuclear precipice.

Dr. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India