In this edition of ASEM Watch we present two articles of analysis on the recent Summit between North and South Koreaand the implications and enjeux of possible Korean unification.

In this edition of ASEM Watch we present two articles of analysis on the recent Summit between North and South Korea
and the implications and enjeux of possible Korean unification.

THE KOREA SUMMIT by Han Sung-Joo

Former South Korean Foreign Minister who is now Professor of Political Science at Korea University in Seoul. This article draws from Dr. Han's recent articles in the International Herald Tribune ["The Koreas Must Develop Trust, Confidence and Cooperation," June 17, 2000] and the Korea Times ["Major Powers Reassessing Their Positions," June 16, 2000]."

What prompted Kim Jong-Il to emerge from his veil of mystery last week and accept an olive branch from his South Korean counterpart, Kim Dae-Jung? South Koreans are still bewildered, if pleasantly surprised, by the extravagant reception that President Kim Dae-Jung received from his host, Kim Jong-Il, during the historic visit to Pyongyang. They are wondering what is behind the warm gestures and magnanimous demeanor and what it all means for the future of North-South relations. It is possible, though not likely, that the North Korean leader has become an apostle of peace on the divided peninsula. A more plausible explanation suggests other motives.

North Korean Motives

Kim Jong-Il may have determined that if anyone can help the North solve its economic woes, it is the South Korean president. He could have been truly gratified by Kim Dae-Jung's "Sunshine Policy" of engaging the North and wanted to help shore up the latter's reputation. At the same time, Kim Jong-Il saw the summit as a chance to present himself as a national hero in North Korea and as a peace-loving, reasonable, and broad-minded man to South Koreans and the world.

The second motive concerns influence. Kim Jong-Il must have reasoned that a show of Korean amity would aid Pyongyang's efforts to improve diplomatic relations with other countries, particularly the United States and Japan. At the same time, he could have hoped to sow some discord between Seoul and Washington and Tokyo, which may not see eye to eye with South Korea on the urgency of issues such as missiles and nuclear weapons.

The North Korean leader may have deduced that the goodwill earned by being publicly magnanimous could be used at the bargaining table to avoid concrete concessions. This is especially true on such issues as weapons of mass destruction, which are very important to the United States and Japan, and the reunion of families, a question that is politically very sensitive in South Korea.

One thing seems clear. The North's steps toward bridging the divide signal a new sense of confidence that it can maintain its regime even while reaching outside for help. Six years after the death of his father, Kim Jong-Il must feel that he has succeeded in consolidating his own position at home and in building a political system essentially impermeable to outside influence.

Impact on North-South Relations

Whatever the motivation, the appearance of harmonious relations will have a positive effect on the political standing of both Kims at home and abroad. If symbolism was largely substituted for substance, the summit at least opened a line of communication between the leaders. But it is premature to believe that trust and confidence have been built all of a sudden and that an era of cooperation has arrived. Neither is it realistic to expect that unification is imminent. The large-scale economic assistance to the North that may result from the talks could help sustain the viability of the Pyongyang regime.

The South Korean government, even while basking in the glow of the successful visit, has much work ahead. It must maintain the momentum established during the trip and push for concrete agreements in the area of economic cooperation and more important, on a framework for peace and expanded people-to-people contacts.

At the same time, the South must contend with the fact that heightened expectations from the summit have lowered the public's guard against the North Korean military threat, which remains undiminished. An overwhelming majority of the Korean people was born after the 1950-1953 Korean War. They neither remember nor scarcely understand why the US fought in Korea half a century ago and question the presence of US troops today. If the hospitality that Kim Jong-Il displayed on Kim Dae-Jung's visit to Pyongyang can be seen as his own attempt at a "Sunshine Policy," then the North's version may be working even better than the South's.

Within North Korea, there must be those who question the wisdom of embracing the South just as there are those in Seoul who have doubts about engaging Pyongyang. Kim Jong-Il is taking an even greater risk than Kim Dae-Jung. It could ultimately prove to be the undoing of himself and his regime. It is also quite possible that the gamble may pay off for both sides. For North Korea it may be in the form of a revived economy and maintenance of the regime. For South Korea, it could mean a less threatening northern neighbor, increased exchanges between the North and the South, and improved chances of eventual unification.

Implications for the Major Powers

The major powers with strong interest in Korea, China, the United States, Russia, and Japan, have all welcomed and supported the inter-Korean summit. But it is clear that they are reassessing their positions vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula, as the summit will surely have profound implications for their respective interests.

China

In the short to medium term, China has the most to gain diplomatically from radically improved relations between North and South Korea. As the secret visit by Kim Jong-Il to China only a few days before the Korean summit underscores, China is back on the center-stage in Korean affairs. China did not seem uneasy about improved relations between the United States and North Korea. At the same time, neither would it mind to play a more central role in Korean affairs as a country having good relations with both the North and the South. From China's point of view, a breakthrough in
North-South Korean relations is consistent with its other interests. China prefers peace and stability on the peninsula, maintaining a balance between North and South, and avoiding any conflict into which China could be drawn. China is particularly interested in preventing the collapse of North Korea. An improved relationship between North and South Korea, and the resultant improvement in North Korean economic situation, will not only help prevent the collapse of North Korea but also obviate the need to provide massive assistance to it.

United States

For the United States, a sudden and radical change in the situation on the Korean Peninsula could be seen as a mixed blessing. The United States shares with China many of the same objectives, including peace and stability as well as preventing a sudden collapse of North Korea. Vis-à-vis Pyongyang, the United States has pursued a soft-landing policy, intended to bring about a peaceful transition of North Korea into a relatively open and market-oriented society. This policy resulted from the conclusion that bringing about a sudden collapse of North Korea was neither
feasible nor desirable under the existing circumstances. A thaw between the two Koreas would be quite consistent with this aspect of US policy and interest. However, the United States is committed to preventing and curtailing North Korean development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) including nuclear weapons and missiles. It does not want to see North Korea's nuclear and/or missile program precipitate an arms race in Northeast Asia and proliferation of such weapons globally. Thus, the United States would be concerned that the appearance of improved relations between the two Koreas might divert international attention away from the issues of North Korean WMDs. Furthermore, as North Korea discovers an alternative source of economic support and assistance, the United States might lose some of the leverages it has had in negotiating with North Korea. At the same time, complacency regarding the ever-present military threat of the North that may result from the appearance of good relations between the two Koreas could weaken the rationale for continued stationing of US troops in Korea.

Russia

Russia's main concern regarding the Korean issue in recent years has been not to be left out of the process. Hence, in 1994, it proposed an international conference, which would of course include Russia, in connection with the North Korean nuclear issue. Russia, like Japan, also had apprehensions about the four-party talks on Korea, which excluded both Russia and Japan. Until 1995, Russia's relations with Pyongyang worsened to the extent that Russia decided not to renew its security treaty with North Korea. Since then, Russia has mended fences. Now, Russia would like more than to simply preventing exclusion. Russia made an emphatic gesture of return to the Korean question by announcing shortly before the Korean summit the forthcoming visit by its president, Vladimir Putin, to North Korea.

Japan

Japan's policy goals may be summarized as follows: maintaining peace, stability, and status quo on the Korean peninsula; maintaining Korea as a buffer between it and China, for which maintaining US troops both in Korea and Japan is deemed necessary; ensuring the non-nuclearization of Korea, both for security and non-proliferation purposes; and curtailing North Korean missile program. In the long run, Japan would also be concerned about the possibility of Chinese dominance of Korea. So far, Japan has had only limited involvement in Korean matters, the obvious one being the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) process. However, any large scale economic rehabilitation program of North Korea will inevitably involve some form of contribution by Japan. Hence, Tokyo feels it has the need and claim to be actively involved in the discussion of the Korean question. For this reason, Japan, together with Russia, supports the idea of a six-party (North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States) mechanism on Korea.

Conclusion

Thus, there is a whole new game developing in the international politics involving the Korean Peninsula, where each country is trying to secure a place for itself in determining the fate of Korea. North Korea will try to take advantage of the competitive proclivities of the major powers.

South Korea, on its part, must have the wisdom to distinguish between appearances and realities, and between short-term impulses and long-term interests. It should be able to devise and pursue a diplomatic policy that enables making new friends while keeping old allies.

THE INTER-KOREA SUMMIT: WHAT LIES BENEATH, by Won-Ki Choi
Editor and Researcher, The Joong-ang Daily
Sun-wha-Dong 7 Joong Ku, Seoul 100-759 Korea
Ph: (822)751-5168. Fax: (822)751-5171
June 21, 2000

I. Introduction

The first innocent victims of the historic inter-Korean summit will likely be major broadcasting networks in Seoul. Marking the50th anniversary of the Korean War, most of TV stations, including state-run KBS, have prepared for large-scale series programs, pouring down at least 100 million won. Originally they planned to start airing the production on June 10 with the most dramatic part set for June 25.

But they were caught in a dilemma after the unexpected announcement of the South-North summit, to be held from June 12to 14, coinciding with airing schedule of the programs. If they go ahead with their plan, it can cast cold water to the reconciliation mood between Seoul and Pyongyang, which arrived after a long period of tension. At last, they decided not to broadcast the programs.

Broadcasters are not the only victims. The Ministry of Defense of South Korea were prepared for a large-scale ceremony for the occasion and planned to unveil a major initiative for military build-up. The ministry also changed its plans quietly, opting for a low-key ceremony and delaying the announcement.

These are just two episodes hiding behind the larger picture of the inter-Korean summit. What we can see, for example two leaders shaking hands, is only the tip of an iceberg. This is a story about the submerged part of an iceberg, rather than visible tips above the surface. I will investigate three main driving forces behind the agreement on the summit. Then I will examine objectives of Seoul and Pyongyang and will present the prospect of the post-summit conjuncture on the Korean Peninsula.

II. The Primary Reason For The Summit

The primary reason that the North accepted the summit proposal could be found in the new state strategy that its political elite including Kim Jong-il adopted in 1998-99. Economic difficulty is rather a secondary factor. North Korea didn't do so simply to tide over its economic malaise.

Pyongyang was faced with the worst political, economic crisis stemming from the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994. According to the doctrine of Juche Thought, the North's state philosophy; Kim Il-sung is a god-like being. Only he could establish new doctrines or issue directives to cope with new situations. His death threw the Communist country into an unprecedented chaos that is comparable to the Vatican without the Pontiff. Worse, the North was hit by successions of devastation from floods, typhoons and drought, resulting in the worst food shortage for decades and a collapse of rationing system, a key pillar for the socialist regime. As many as 1 million starved to death largely in the northeastern provinces of Hamkyong, while tens of thousands of citizens escaped to China in search of foods. Hungry soldiers frequently attacked citizens, heightening conflicts between the military and civilians.

From outside, then-South Korean President Kim Young-sam and the United States, emboldened by the German unification in 1989 and the fall of Soviet Union in 1991, have frequently expressed their willingness to absorb North Korea in case the country, which they compared to "an airplane out of order," would finally collapse.

Political leaders in North Korea including Kim Jong-il seemed to feel the acute sense of crisis. If they dealt wrongly with the social, economic crisis that coincided with the death of the elder Kim, it would have made it difficult for them to maintain their regime. A military coup couldn't be ruled out.

The political elite decided to postpone power succession by Kim Jong-il by three years. They argued that Kim was to observe a three-year period of mourning, which Koreans have traditionally undergone after the death of their parent. But actually they hoped to extend the life of authority of the late Kim to solidify their internal power base. Especially, the small Kim made every effort to court the military during the period. He gave priority to the military in food distribution and he even bought hundreds of military leaders top-brand cars such as Mercedes Benz as gifts.

In the name of the so-called "military-first politics," he also promoted many army figures to the center stage of politics. One hundred of army figures were elected as deputies to the 7th Supreme People's Assembly in July 1998. The number is almost double of 57 for the previous session. In addition, both the anniversary of founding of the People's Army, April 25, and the anniversary of the "victory" in the Korean War, which they called National Liberation War, July 27 were designated as the national holidays in 1996.

In a bid to consolidate his grip on power and reestablish social order, Kim took a series of cruel measures. Kim ordered some 10 high-ranking officials, including Secretary for Agricultural Affairs So Kwan-hui, to be shot in public in Pyongyang in September 1997. So, a minister-level official was one of the most favored by Kim Il-sung as a main architect of self-reliant agricultural policy.

The period between 1998-1999 saw North Korea emerge from the worst situation. Above all, the food crisis has been significantly eased. The international community including the United States, South Korea and Europe, provided a total of 2.78 million tons of food, worth 1.4 billion .US dollars in aid for four years from 1995, reducing its abstract food shortage to 500,000 tons.

With the economy improving, Pyongyang started to realign the political sector. North Korea revised the Constitution and reelected Kim as chairman of the Defense Committee, a de facto top position in the nation, at the 9th People's Supreme Assembly in September 1998.

Notable is the emergence of the new generation of elite at the center of politics on a large scale. Kim relegated Vice Presidents Kim Yong-ju and Park Song-chol, both of whom led partisan fighters during the wartime, to nominal posts. Kim replaced 21 out of the entire 31 cabinet ministries, and 64 percent of a total of 687 seats at the Supreme People's Assembly.

The new breed of elite has several characteristics in common, which distinguished them from the old elites.

First, they belonged to an age group between the 50s and the 60s. They were born around the year 1945, when the nation was liberated from the Japanese colonial rule.

Second, most of them studied at the Kim Il Sung University in 1960s, unlike the first generation of revolutionaries who fought Japanese as partisan combatants, and the second generation of elites who studied in Moscow and Prague.

Third, they had practical experience as bureaucrats at the Organization and Guidance Department, a key division of the Workers' Party.

Among others, the new leadership includes Kim Young-song, 55, senior representative in preparatory talks for the summit; Kim Pyong-hae, 61, chief secretary of the Party's North Pyongan Province branch; Lee Su-kil, 55, chief secretary of the Party's Yanggang Province branch; Jang Song-thaek, 55, first deputy chairman of the Organization and Guidance Department; Park Seung-bong, in early 60s, secretary of the munitions; Chow Chun-hwang, in mid-50s, first deputy chairman of the Propaganda and Agitation Department; Ri Yong-chol in 50s,, first deputy chairman of the Military Affairs Commission; and Kang Sok-ju, first vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not much is known about the political inclination of this new leadership. But a figure from the West who has recently visited North Korea once said, "The key aides to Kim Jong-il are younger and more ambitious than their predecessors."

It is interesting that these new elite started to recover confidence on ruling in 1998 and tried to project their vision to its citizens. Between 1994 and 1997, the catch phrases that swept the nation were "Great Leader Kim Lives with Us Forever, "and "Arduous March" designed to encourage citizens to willingly make sacrifice at a time of hardship. But in 1998 more active ones such as "Building Up Strong, Great Nation, and March for Socialism replaced these.

Films also reflect such confident mentality. Last year, a movie titled "Forever in Memory" was promoted widely across the nation. To the surprise to many, the film describes the real life in the North vividly. Some scenes reveal problems in the society as they are showing villagers lunching on paste soup, shortage of agricultural production tools, worn-out automobile tires, and false statistics. Such recognition of reality reflects the ruling camp's confidence in the internal stability of the regime.

All of them - the newly emerging political elite, the economy showing signs of recovery, and films that started to recognize the reality -indicate that it is not simply to draw foreign aid that Kim chose to turn out to the summit table. Though it is true that the economic mire is part of background for the agreement, but it doesn't explain all. It would be a better explanation that the North wanted to obtain political, economical sources to facilitate its economic rehabilitation.

III. Political Timing

The summit was arranged in a strategic consideration of timing. The North has sought Washington's commitment to its security and Japan's economic assistance as a key strategic goal. In fact, it has made a significant progress for the past six years. Thanks to its nuclear menace, Pyongyang has successfully extracted the Geneva Agreed Framework from Washington in October 1994, including the official recognition of North Korea and the pledge not to stage nuclear attacks. It also restarted talks with Japan to establish a diplomatic relationship.

The problem is that both Washington and Tokyo have only long-term programs toward the Communist nation. North Korea is in an urgent need of funds for construction of power plants to solve the energy shortage, and improvement of agricultural industrial structure and production tools. But Washington has only provided 500,000 tons of food per year in humanitarian aid. The amount falls far short of meeting the North's food need. The same can be said about Japan. The North might receive $5 billion to $10 billion in reparation for Japan' colonial exploitations as a result of diplomatic normalization. But this money is not immediately available. South Korea, which normalized relationship with Japan in 1965, spent about 15 years before an agreement was concluded. North will likely wait for at least three to five years. Besides, this year is Clinton's final year in office. It is unlikely that Clinton administration, already faced with the fate of a lame duck, will give "big gift" that North Korea eagerly awaits. If the Republicans win the presidential election, the conservative administration is highly likely to turn to hard line policy toward the North. Against this backdrop, North Korea faces a tough choice between two. One is to wait and see to determine relationship with the next US administration. The other is to wrest a certain promise from Clinton that will precondition the relationship between the North and the next US government. Against the backdrop, the summit is the best choice for the North. Above all, President Kim Dae-jung has frequently hinted at his willingness to offer short-term economic cooperation that the North needs. In addition, the summit will help renew KimJong-il's image overseas, as well as speed up normalization of ties with Washington, Tokyo and European nations including Rome. On the other hand, the announcement of summit plan was timely arranged ahead of South Korea's general elections to elect new lawmakers were scheduled for April 13. Kim Dae-jung won the December 1997 presidential election as the first opposition leader to take power in the Korean history. But his victory was an unstable one. Kim's National Assembly for New Politics alone - now renamed the Millennium Democratic Party -couldn't secure a majority of the National Assembly. To consolidate his power base, Kim had to join hands with the minor opposition United Liberal Democrats, which retains a stronghold in the central region of the nation. In this respect, the stakes were very high for Kim who wanted his party to occupy majority seats at the Assembly alone by winning the general election, which was held two years after he took office.

Kim Jong-il was well aware of what Kim Dae-jung aimed at. He shrewdly calculated the effect that the summit card would have on the South's election results. His calculation is that if Pyongyang agreed on summit, Kim Dae-jung will have owed a heavy political debt to Kim of the North. The more dramatic the announcement of the summit was, the greater the effect. The summit agreement was signed on April 8, and the announcement came two days later. It was just three days ahead of the election.

IV. Secret Negotiations

Contacts between ranking officials in secret for more than 500 days also played an important role. The first closed-door meeting was held in the fourth week in November in 1998 and continued for 17 months. The secret channel of communications between the National Information Service of the South and the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee of the North was instrumental to both sides. Through this channel, the two Kims traded messages and explained their policies.

They got impatient to know whether their real intention was conveyed. They sometimes bargained over political, economic offerings, and sometimes deceived each other. All these were done through the secret channel. Rumors are making round in Seoul that Kim Dae-jung has promised something big to Kim Jong-il in exchange for the North's acceptance of the summit proposal through this channel.

To the eyes of a journalist like me, the lesson that the North learned from the relationship with the Hyundai Group also seems to have driven Pyongyang to positively respond to the summit proposal. The largest conglomerate group in Korea has exerted a huge influence on North Korean officials since it began Mt. Kumgang tourism program. Hyundai paid $150 million in an initial batch of money and currently pays $8 million per month in entrance fees to the scenic mountain.

Given that North Korea's exports totaled only $560 million in 1998, the amount Hyundai gives to the North on a monthly basis is tremendous. The North has also maintained close relationship with Hyundai officials and this perhaps helped open their eyes to the merits of capitalism and breed economic ambition in their minds.

Interestingly, the same figure represents North Korea in meetings with both Hyundai and the South government. Hyundai has worked together with Asia-Pacific Peace Committee Chairman Song Ho-gyong for Mt. Kumgang tour package and other joint businesses for the past two years, It was none other than he that signed the agreement document for the summit on April 8. This indicates Hyundai's important role in hammering out the accord.

Beijing also has made a significant contribution to the summit agreement. According to sources in Seoul, the Chinese authorities offered a variety of convenience to North Korean officials who visited Beijing, calling them with a code name "Student." There lies "Taepodong factor" behind China's support for the summit. When a military tension was heighten in the Northeast Asia in the wake of North Korea's launch of Taepodong 1 missile on August 31, 1998, and Japan's hurried move to introduce the theater missile defense (TMD) system, China appeared to be very nervous. This is believed to have made Beijing to change its stance from a bystander to an active mediator.

V. The Meaning and Goal of The Summit

If successful, the summit will become the most brilliant landmark in the peninsula's 55-year history since the national division. There were two centerpieces that have shored up the inter-Korean relationship - the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué (1972) and the Inter-Korean Agreement on Non-aggression, Reconciliation, Exchanges and Cooperation General Agreement) in 1991. But the two agreements became increasingly creaky and virtually of no use. The both agreements were results from political maneuvering of leaderships in Seoul and Pyongyang without
full willingness to implement them nor mature objective conditions. This time, however, two leaders will sit down face-to-face for the first time. Their encounter itself has a great significance considering the top North Korean leader's absolute power.

Of course, there was an unsuccessful attempt to arrange a summit in July 1994. But it was brokered by former US president Jimmy Carter. Things are quite different this time. The upcoming summit was initiated by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il accepted it. There was no foreign mediation.

The summit is also the first full-fledged effort for reconciliation since the end of the Cold War, which has put extreme limitation to efforts to bring together the two Koreas. In this respect, the international conditions have never been more favorable than now.

Following are what two leaders seem to aim at:

Kim Dae-jung

Seoul appears to have three goals in mind - putting an end to the Cold War on the peninsula, inter-Korean economic community and basic agreement. Kim will reiterate that two Koreas should never repeat the tragic history, reminding Kim Jong-il of the Korean War that left more than 4 million dead. He will also express his willingness to offer economic cooperation to help the North out of the current economic mire. He is also expected to propose a cabinet-level talks or reopening of a joint committee as stipulated by the 1994 General Agreement. He will also make a suggestion to push
reunion of separated families more actively. But Kim should not accept the North's unification principle that is founding of the Confederation of Koryo. Promising to offer excessive amount of economic cooperation is also politically dangerous, as the opposition, which has secured the majority in the April election, is keeping a close eye on this issue. Kim also should not pay homage to the memorial facility for the late Kim Il-sung or his statues.

Kim Jong-il

Pyongyang's intention can be viewed in two perspectives, principle and reality. In the aspect of principle, which the North called "fundamental matter," Kim Jong-il will persist that South accept of its unification principles, sever cooperative ties with the United States and guarantee free activities of "pro-democracy and unification" activists - what the Communists required as prerequisite to improvement of the their relationship. But in the aspect of practical interest, he may hinted that the bilateral relationship will make progress depending on whether or not
Kim Dae-jung put into action his commitment to economic assistance which he made in the so-called Berlin Declaration on March 9.

Currently the North hopes for economic support in various areas including agricultural production tools, electricity supply, and creation of West Sea industrial complex. He will also attempt to complement his relative lack of charisma, in comparison with his father, by trumpeting that he made a summit, which his father couldn't. Kim is also using the event as a chance to improve his image as a tyranny who pushing missile projects while the population starving to death.

Given such intentions, the summit will never make a flop, though being short of a big success. For the both sides afford to reach a joint communiqué worded with neutral terms such as one nation, history, and prevention of war, reconciliation, peace and the 21st century. The North is eager for economic aid and both need an extensive TV coverage. Therefore, we can expect the summit to produce at least a joint communiqué, a joint committee for economic cooperation, and measures for reunion of separate families with a certain of limitation.

VI. Will It Last?

A lesson from the Korean history is that we should be cautious when a rosy picture such as a summit emerges in the inter-Korean relationship. In fact, the relationship followed a repetitive pattern in which a tense standoff continues for more than 10 years before being replaced by a short period of peace that is driven by an external change and lasts for six months to one year.

There is no knowing whether the summit will close the final chapters the Cold War, the theme of the 20th century, or just a one-time event like an TV commercial that comes and immediately go. The fate of the summit could depend on external factors rather than meeting itself. Following are factors that will work positively or negatively for the maintenance and development of the current rapprochement conjuncture.

Positive Factors:

Economic cooperation: Economic cooperation is a key engine that could extend the peaceful mood. After the summit, the Samsung Group, the second largest chaebol, will advance into North Korea. But in the long term, it is desirable to create a multi-party economic development programs including South Korea, the United States and Europe. The issue related to North Korea's bid to enter ADB and IBRD will also work in the positive direction. The economic gains will help leverage Kim Jong-il's position before North Korean citizens.

Cooperation from the international community: Cooperation from Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow and European Union including Rome is essential to sustainable peace in the peninsula. Especially, if Washington leaves North Korea on its blacklist of terrorism-sponsoring nations shortly through fine-tuning with Seoul and lifts trade sanctions on the nation, it will significantly promote the inter-Korean peace. Washington might do well to give a greater leeway to Seoul by introducing a long-term change in the status of the American army forces stationed in the South. The Italian government's normalization of relationship with Pyongyang will serve as a good example. Pyongyang feels less burdensome in having relationship with European nations, unlike with the United States. Other European nations have to follow Italy in opening Pyongyang's doors toward the outside world.

Kim Jong-il's Seoul visit: Many projects the summit will ends up as a one-time event as they believe Kim Jong-il will never make a reciprocal visit to Seoul after Kim Dae-jung's Pyongyang tour. If Pyongyang truly wants peace, it should make its will visible and Kim's Seoul visit will be the best way to do so. That will also beneficial for the North.

Novel Peace Price: If Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il are chosen as co-recipients of the Novel Peace Prize, its will have a significant psychological effect on further solidifying peace. Giving honor will be a cost-effective way to get such a valuable result.

Negative Factors:

Sticking to old habits: If Seoul, Pyongyang and the international community stick to old habits from the Cold War era, the peaceful mood will not last long. For instance, Seoul should not want to exert an excessive influence on its counterpart. Peace will be marred if Pyongyang persists on its old principles such as immediate unification and withdrawal of the US Forces. If Washington tries to force the South to raise issues of nukes and missiles, which are their priority agenda, it will undercut the South's position. Washington and Beijing should not use Korea issue for the sake of their conflicting interests, turning the two Koreas into innocent by-standers who get hurt in a Titanic struggle.

North's readiness to open doors: How much Kim Jong-il and Pyongyang's elite understands the implication of economic development and open-door policy. Especially, if Kim Jong-il finds the political effect and the pie of economic cooperation smaller than expected, it is possible Pyongyang to return to the old brinkmanship diplomacy using nuclear and missile threats. The military's perspective on the summit and reconciliation is another variable.

Back-door agreement: The rumor is making round in Seoul that Kim Dae-jung has pledged a certain "huge gift" in a bid to extract the agreement on summit from Kim Jong-il. If this is true and disclosed, it will put his political position in danger and put on the brakes to his sunshine policy.

VII. Concluding Remarks

I still remember the day when the July 4th Joint Communiqué was announced in 1972. My teacher delivered the news to using the classroom saying in excitement "Unification comes at last." All were shocked and emotional so much that class was discontinued.

Twenty-years later, as a journalist, I feel it curious that South Koreans are relatively unaffected by the news. I am not saying that they are totally indifferent. Perhaps almost all hope for its success, they accepted it as nothing to fuss about. Such an attitude, I think, is a silent expression of a message that says, "We want the summit to go well. But don't give Kim Jong-il too much."

Such a pragmatic attitude suggests this: First South Koreans don't want an immediate reunification. They have learned from the German example that reunification comes with a hefty price tag. But they are not satisfied with the current division, for which they are paying a high price and lives in tension. What they want is a transition to an "acceptable" division with a less cost and reduced tension, The Korean War left 4 million, a 20 percent of the entire population then, dead or injured. Some one million families still remain separated and the peninsula suffered from the longest, most painful Cold War.

Is it about time for Koreans to see their simple dream of "acceptable division" come true?