123 in a hurry

PRIME Minister Manmohan Singh is truly an enigma. Last October, he famously said that if the troubled India-United States nuclear deal did not go through, that would not be “the end of life”.

This was widely, and logically, interpreted as his acceptance that it was not politically feasible to push the deal through in the teeth of the opposition led by the Left – regardless of its merits.

Although the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) never gave up on the deal, other UPA leaders indicated that they would not pursue it at the risk of losing the Left’s support, and hence the government. Many U.S. policymakers – including Ashley Tellis, an architect of the deal – have dropped hints that the window of opportunity to complete it is fast closing, if it has not closed already. As Tellis said, it is “probably correct” that the deal is “dead”.

But now, just as the world recognises that the deal may not be doable this year, Manmohan Singh has suddenly upped the ante. In the third week of June, he went into a sulk and insisted that the UPA must back him and tell the Left that the government would approach the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to approve the safeguards agreement signed with the Secretariat.

This would begin the process of completing the remaining steps necessary to finalise the agreement, including clearance by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), and ratification by the U.S. Congress.

Manmohan Singh’s spin doctors say he is determined to have his way – no matter what the cost. Their argument runs thus: “If the Left withdraws support to the government, and precipitates an early national election, so be it. The Congress would only stand to improve its performance because the middle class would be impressed by Manmohan Singh’s ‘steely resolve’ and his passionate advocacy of a strategic alliance with Washington and of nuclear power. In any case, the Congress would have to part ways with the Left before the next election. It would be best to do so on the Congress’ terms.”

With the June 25 meeting of the UPA-Left nuclear deal committee, the crisis caused by the Prime Minister’s new “tough posture” peaked. Yet, the meeting’s far-from-cordial deliberations, during which the Left charged the UPA with handing an easy victory to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) by wrecking the governing arrangement, suggest that the Manmohan Singh group could not browbeat the Left.

The UPA has, for the time being, put off further steps to complete the deal. The Left is clearly against any “compromise” that would allow the government to take the safeguards agreement to the IAEA Board but desist from further steps.

Threat to boycott G-8

Manmohan Singh’s reaction to this has been peevish. He has threatened to boycott the Group of Eight (G-8) countries’ meeting in July in Japan rather than go “empty-handed”. According to one report, he gave 48 hours to the UPA to fall in line – failing which, his spin doctors say, he will resign rather than suffer a loss of face for “the nation”. At stake is India’s prestige and credibility, besides its energy security. Manmohan Singh might tell the Left that the UPA is approaching the IAEA as early as on July 1.

According to another report, he might wait until September – little official business happens in Europe in the holiday month of August – to approach the IAEA, and simultaneously have the U.S. round up support for the deal in the NSG so it can secure “clean and unconditional exemption” from its nuclear trade rules by the end of 2008. Then, the U.S. Congress, by a long shot, might ratify the deal while George W. Bush is still in office. Even if it does not, Manmohan Singh can still take credit for pushing the deal this far. This also betrays a lack of understanding of international and U.S. political processes.

Neither scenario suggests a mature, or even a credible, approach on Manmohan Singh’s part. The assumption that the deal can win votes stretches credulity. Some pro-American sections of the middle class might love it, but their numbers, assuming that they vote, do not count for much. A probably much higher number of people are uncomfortable with the deal or oppose it. As for Manmohan Singh’s display of “steely resolve” and “authority”, it comes too late, after countless Cabinet Ministers have spoken in discordant voices and shown scant respect for his leadership.

Flexible and fragile

The idea that Manmohan Singh could resign out of the courage of conviction simply beggars belief, given his record. His convictions are flexible and fragile. One only has to recall his role as Secretary General of the South Commission, which produced a brilliant report in 1990 for people-centred self-reliant growth, and his performance as the man who introduced neoliberal policies in India the very next year.

Ten years ago, he led the Congress’ attack on the Pokhran-II tests and warned of a ruinous nuclear arms race. He has since become a worshipper of nuclear weapon and complicit in pushing India into an arms race with China and Pakistan. He used to be sceptical of the virtues of nuclear power, but now claims it is indispensable for energy security.

Manmohan Singh’s spin doctors also argue that the nuclear deal has become a “litmus test” for India’s international credibility: any further dithering on the deal, especially at the G-8 summit, will damage India’s image as a country that is decisive and one which the world can do business with.

This proposition is specious. The whole world knows the deal does not enjoy consensual support within India, and that the compulsions of democratic politics are the biggest obstacle to completing it. After all, the UPA is dependent on the Left for a parliamentary majority. Politicians, diplomats and negotiators everywhere understand such domestic factors. The U.S. signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under Bill Clinton, but refused to ratify it under Bush. Australia’s nuclear policies have changed with a change of government.

The Bush administration itself is reconciled to a delay in completing the deal. On June 23, State Department spokesperson Tom Casey said: “We’d like to believe that this deal … is one that can and should be supported by whoever comes into office in January of 2009. But obviously, the next U.S. government will have to look at this and make their own decisions....” Manmohan Singh is clearly following a desperate slash-and-burn strategy.

This, and his admirers’ support for it, is based on three premises. First, the Congress and the UPA are solidly behind him on the nuclear issue, to the point of wrecking their relationship with the Left, and that they stand to gain politically by doing so.

Second, there is a high probability of getting the NSG’s exemption unconditionally and quickly, during its next meeting scheduled for September 21. And third, the U.S. Congress will readily, almost automatically, ratify the 123 Agreement.

Questionable premises

All three premises are questionable. First, a majority of Congress party members do not want to push the deal to the point of precipitating early elections or seeking the Samajwadi Party’s support to stitch together a Lok Sabha majority.

At any rate, only a handful of Congress leaders such as M. Veerappa Moily and Kapil Sibal are strongly with Manmohan Singh. More experienced ones, including Pranab Mukherjee, A.K. Antony, Arjun Singh and Mani Shankar Aiyar, are sceptical.

Most important, Sonia Gandhi does not seem to have made up her mind on whether the UPA can afford to go into midterm elections with a menacing inflation rate of 11 per cent and make a bitter break with the Left, whose help it might need after the polls.

Secondly, the NSG clearance process is unlikely to be smooth or quick, especially if the UPA becomes a minority. According to Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington: “The NSG will certainly take its time to consider the issue, seek answers to longstanding questions from both the U.S. and India, and will very likely attach conditions and restrictions on nuclear trade with India that parallel or exceed” the Hyde Act.

U.S. Election Season

Thirdly, it is also “highly unrealistic”, adds Kimball, to expect the U.S. Congress, “short on time before the U.S. election season hits”, to ratify the 123 Agreement in a hurry and without conditions on its implementation, consistent with the Hyde Act: “The Hyde Act requires that before the 123 is transmitted to the U.S. Congress… several steps must be completed, including ‘substantial progress’ on an Indian-IAEA additional protocol… which IAEA and Indian officials have not formally begun to work on.”

A larger issue arises. The UPA does not have the numbers, and hence the democratic mandate or legitimacy, to execute a radical or paradigm shift in India’s nuclear posture. The people’s mandate has been for an anti-BJP UPA-Left combination.

Yet, deplorably, Manmohan Singh is behaving as if he alone can decide on nuclear and strategic policies. Evidently, he is in a hurry to leave a fait accompli in the form of a tight strategic alliance with Washington.

Praful Bidwai, a fellow of the Transnational Institute, is a senior Indian journalist, political activist and widely published commentator. He is a co-author (with Achin Vanaik) of New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament.