It is a relief that President Pervez Musharraf dropped the disastrous idea of imposing a state of emergency on Pakistan, but he still hasn't fully reconciled himself to holding free and fair national elections.
All South Asians who value freedom must feel relieved that President Pervez Musharraf dropped the disastrous idea of imposing a state of emergency on Pakistan, which would have allowed him to postpone the legislative and presidential elections due soon. Musharraf seems to be undertaking some sobering introspection to the point of admitting that his popularity ratings have declined and accepting part of the blame for dismissing Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry -- a deplorable move on which he had to eat crow.
Yet, it would be wrong to attribute Musharraf's decision to some new-found respect for democracy. He blinked because there was tremendous pressure from the United States, exercised through threats and hints, capped by a 17 minutes-long 2 a.m. telephone call by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Secondly, Musharraf probably calculated it'd be far too risky to further inflame adverse popular opinion against the army. Another eruption of public protest--probably worse than the agitation against Chaudhry's sacking--would rob his regime of whatever's left of its legitimacy. A just-released Indian Express-CNN-IBN-CSDS-Dawn-News survey says 55.4 percent of Pakistanis want him to quit as army chief before the presidential elections; only 29.6 percent accept his continuation.
However, Musharraf hasn't fully reconciled himself to holding free and fair national assembly elections, which former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif can contest. On August 11, he again opposed their return from exile because it might create a situation not "conducive" to elections. Nor has Musharraf given up the idea of contesting the presidential election in uniform, or as a bizarre alternative, nominating civilian loyalists--Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz or Chaudhary Shujat Hussain--for the contest if the Supreme Court rules against his candidature. That would be a weird case of illegitimate substitution and a travesty of democracy.
The more one learns about Musharraf's secret deal with Bhutto, the worse it sounds. Under it, she would return to Pakistan and contest elections provided she accepts that Musharraf would stay on as army chief till November 16. Bhutto has confirmed the existence of this "confidential understanding". She claims she would like certain "confidence-building measures", such as withdrawal of corruption cases against her and amending the constitution to enable her to become Prime Minister for a third time. Her spokesperson has said that the General's uniform is not an "obstacle". This suggests that the Pakistan People's Party might not oppose the President's re-election, due earlier.
Bhutto would then consider allying with Musharraf. Bhutto's logic is that forcing him out of power through a street agitation might lead to another spell of military rule or risk an extremist takeover of Pakistan. The logic is dubious. It makes a false opposition between two extremes and rules out the possibility that Musharraf might be forced by the court not to seek re-election from the sitting assemblies whose terms will expire shortly. It also underestimates the strength of public opinion.
It's unclear whether Musharraf maintains a strong enough hold over the army to persuade it to impose another term of martial law. In recent months, the army's standing has greatly eroded because of its long years in power, increasing intrusion into civilian authority, and its handling of the Lal Masjid crisis.
Eight years ago, many Pakistanis accepted Musharraf's coup out of disgust with the corrupt governance of civilian leaders. Some civil society groups even supported military rule.But the military regime betrayed its many promises: to cleanse governance, make the rich pay taxes, oppose the forces of extremism, and adhere to transparency while implementing "free-market" policies. For instance, the Accountability Commission became a farce. Musharraf struck a deal with the MMA. And there were scandals in the privatisation of public enterprises. Today, there's widespread disillusionment with the military.
A recent opinion poll by the US-based pro-Republican International Republican Institute found that Musharraf's approval ratings had dipped to just 34 percent from 60 percent in June 2006. As many as 58 percent of the 4,000 adults polled gave the army-dominated government poor or very poor marks; 56 percent said they felt less safe than a year ago. 62 percent said they wanted Musharraf to step down as army chief if he wants to contest the presidential election.
By entering into a shady deal with Musharraf which allows him to get re-elected as president before fresh assembly elections, Bhutto would violate the Charter of Democracy she signed with Sharif in May, which states: "We shall not join the military regime or any military- sponsored government. No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power or dislodge a democratic government".
This will make it doubly difficult for Sharif to return home. Musharraf bears a special animus against him. Whatever Sharif's faults--and there are many--, his continued exile will be a setback for democratisation. And it would be tragic if the PPP, Pakistan's largest party, were to reach such a compromise with the military regime. There's a distinct risk that the PPP could split or some of its leaders like Aitjaz Ahsan might leave it. That apart, such a deal would help the army entrench itself in a prominent role in public life just as it's losing its credibility. This would undermine some major gains that the momentum towards democratisation has registered.
Regrettably, despite Musharraf's ambivalent record in fighting the Taliban, and the questionable role his secret agencies are playing in Afghanistan, external factors too seemingly favour him. The three major nations that matter the most to Pakistan, the US, China and India, seem inclined to support a large role for the Pakistan army. This is of course understandable in the case of the US which, true to type, follows a myopic policy guided primarily by its Global War on Terror (GWoT). It believes that Musharraf remains its best or sole bet as regards GWoT. China is probably deeply sceptical, if not suspicious, of the prospect of Pakistan's democratisation.
However, India's pro-Musharraf position is less understandable, much less justifiable. India has a long-term stake in a democratic, stable Pakistan which can rein in the military and its secret services, which nurture a strong anti-India prejudice -- probably the obverse, if a more extreme one, of the anti-Pakistan attitude of their counterparts across the border. That certainly conforms to the dominant view held within the Indian security establishment, which has for long years argued that the "state-within-the-state" autonomy which agencies like the ISI enjoy have allowed them to sustain anti-India activities.
Yet, India's National Security Adviser M K Narayanan declared (July 29) that "the worst is over" for Musharraf; there's been no "major dent" in his influence because he accepted the Chief Justice's reinstatement "with grace". Besides echoing the dominant US view of Musharraf's indispensability, this expresses cynicism towards the aspirations of the Pakistani public.
A survey of democratisation in South Asia by India's Centre for the Study of Developing Societies suggests that the democratic aspirations of ordinary Pakistanis are no weaker than those of Indians or Nepalis. One can only wish the people success in making Pakistan a full-fledged democracy, with a properly functioning party system which can respond to the people's wishes on the basis of accountability, and not benevolent paternalism.
