UNGASS Mid-term Review 2003

UNGASS Mid-term Review 2003

The mid-term review of the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) is scheduled to take place in Vienna on April 16-17, 2003. The two-day ministerial segment will be added to the regular 8-15 April 2003 Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) 46th session, to evaluate progress made and obstacles encountered with regard to the goals and targets set out in the Political Declaration of the 1998 UNGASS. The review provides the first opportunity since UNGASS to re-assess and adjust the current international drugs policy framework and could provide a new opportunity to achieve a genuine evaluation of current international drug control policies.

A positive sign is that Mexico has now been elected by the CND to preside over that mid-term review and the preparations for it. Mexico had originally called for the UNGASS and aspired to it being a forum for critical evaluation of global drug control policy, but they were manoeuvered out of chairing it. In her opening statement for the 46th CND session in March 2002, Mexican Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Patricia Olamendi, recalled some of Mexico’s original spirit in saying, in reference to the 2003 and 2008 deadlines, "in this period of sessions we will be very critical about these ambitious goals." And distancing herself from former UNDCP Executive Director Arlacchi’s preference for trumpeting non-existent success stories, she said: "Above all, we must be honest and not self- indulgent. To report about achievements where there have been none neutralize those that we have genuinely reached."

At this moment, the only certainty about the mid-term review is that it will happen. Whether it will pass by almost unnoticed or whether it becomes a significant moment, fully depends on the
political momentum that can be created between now and April 2003. In March 2002, the CND adopted a resolution (45/7) setting some basic rules. Three one-day preparatory sessions are being held in Vienna in the second half of this year to define the agenda. 

Obstructions

In the CND discussions about the draft resolution, a big cloud appeared already casting shadows on the prospect of a serious evaluation. The United States declared that it was not necessary "to agree on a declaration to be adopted by the ministers at the conclusion of the ministerial-level segment" (the wording of the draft text) because "we already have the Political Declaration of 1998". The objection was against the use of the word ‘declaration’, which might give the impression that the new declaration could replace or adjust the 1998 one. The United Kingdom supported this view, which in fact means that the objective in April 2003 should not be to re-assess the conclusions reached by the UNGASS, but should be restricted to an interim stocktaking on the implementations of the UNGASS commitments and provide recommendations for the period 2003-2007. The final resolution agreed on the wording of a "brief joint ministerial statement" to be issued at the closure of the ministerial segment. 

Another obstacle could be the follow up of the strong attack against the European practice of ‘leniency’ regarding cannabis use and possession which took place at the CND session (11-15 March, 2002) in Vienna. There was an orchestrated attempt to pass a resolution to put a dam against the ‘leniency’. The attempt was based on the latest annual report of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which contained strong language about the tolerance trend. On the first day of the CND session the president of the INCB, Hamid Ghodse, stated in his address to the Commission: "In the light of the changes that are occurring in relation to cannabis control in some countries, it would seem to be an appropriate time for the Commission to consider this issue in some detail to ensure the consistent application of the provisions of the 1961 Convention across the globe." (See: European Cannabis Policies Under Attack)

Several of the hard liners in international drug control (Sweden, Arab countries, the United States) took up this invitation and expressed their grave concern. Countries like Venezuela and Morocco pointed at an emerging contradiction between the trend towards depenalisation of cannabis consumption and a continuing pressure on Southern countries to eradicate cannabis with repressive means. The countries ‘under attack’ like Switzerland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Italy kept silent, opting to avoid a debate rather than add fuel to the polarisation. The language of a first resolution sponsored on ‘Control of Cannabis’ was diplomatically flattened out to just confirm the adherence to the existing conventions and to support the INCB recommendation to "discuss the new cannabis policies in various countries and to agree on ways to address that development within the framework of international law."

At the end a resolution was approved leaving all sides dissatisfied. But next year, a new attempt to construct a CND resolution to slow down the trends towards cannabis decriminalisation, may well be undertaken. This one was focused on ‘use’, where the conventions allow most flexibility, which made it relatively easy for the attacked countries to defend their leniency. If a similar resolution appears on the issues of possession and supply (coffee shops, cultivation) it will be much more difficult to negotiate a compromise. The more liberal-minded countries might be forced to fence off another attack against their lenient domestic drug practice. On the other hand, such an attack might offer the right incentive to counter it by proposing a serious evaluation of the UN Conventions, discuss the interpretation and implementation and press for reform of international drug control policies.

Breaking the Impasse

In spite of these obstructions already in the making, the Mid-term UNGASS review could be an opportunity to break the impasse at the UN level. In order to do so, civil society, drug reform organisations and a group of ‘like-minded nations' should manage to:

• Bring together a critical mass of like-mindedness
• Ensure the UNDCP reform process to continue
• Create political momentum toward April 2003 to overcome the obstacles already in the making

The urgency is to create the political space that would allow the trend of pragmatism to move ahead, guided by open-mindedness, evaluation of practices on the basis of costs and benefits, leeway for experimentation, and freedom to challenge the wisdom of the existing conventions.

A Critical Mass of Like-Mindedness

A necessary pre-condition for a breakthrough will be political will and a concerted effort from those countries interested to pursue this path and convinced of the need to conquer more space
at the UN level for national policy differentiation. This includes European countries like The Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal, Germany, Belgium and the UK, alongside like-minded countries like Canada and Australia, possibly with support from members of the GRULAC block of Latin American and Caribbean countries
like Mexico, Brazil, Jamaica, Uruguay and Peru. Differences aside, policy debates and developments in all these countries demonstrate a common interest in lifting international drug control out of its present stalemate towards policies which offer more room for manoeuvre in the implementation of realistic and pragmatic policies. 

The time has come for the European countries leading the way of rational and pragmatic policies to become more assertive about their achievements, to bring a refreshing tone to the UN level and to support Southern countries eager to take steps in a similar direction. To get there means seriously putting the issue of the mid-term review on the agenda of formal fora like the Horizontal Drug Group and the Dublin Group, but will also require more informal channels of communication and strategising to side-step the usual stumbling blocks that prevent reaching agreement on a common position within the European Union and GRULAC blocks.

UNDCP Reform Process

The UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) will play a crucial role in preparing for the review. The Biennial Reports of the Executive Director on the Implementation of the Outcome of the Twentieth Special Session of the General Assembly will form the basis for the evaluation in April 2003 (see also the Consolidated First Biennial Report). In May 2002, Antonio Maria Costa arrived in Vienna as the new Executive Director of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), the umbrella under which UNDCP functions and whose 'impossible acronym' was immediately simplified by Mr Costa  to ODC - UN Office on Drugs and Crime. In his very first speech to the staff upon his arrival in Vienna in May, Mr Costa mentioned the need to be "tough in imposing upon ourselves the sort of efficient monitoring and evaluation of our work needed to restore Member States’ confidence." He promised to make the values of "fairness, transparency and accountability (...) a fundamental part of our culture".  

These statements indicate his commitment to ensure follow through of the ongoing UNDCP reform process. The question remains as to whether the UNDCP will also be able to grow away from its politicised position towards becoming more of a centre of expertise better able to reflect the different views on drug policy and its application nowadays. The UNGASS mid-term review will present Mr Costa with a high-level political opportunity to convince the world of his commitment to take UNDCP in a more rational direction, to say farewell to the years of crisis, to restore donor confidence and to open up the debate. The new executive director’s main task would be to guide a process of internal reform that the UNDCP has to undergo and open up to challenging views outside the agency. 

Create Political Momentum for Reform

Non-governmental organisations and a group of ‘like-minded nations’ who want reform of the current drug control policies should try to establish an agenda on the basis of which they might find common ground. Recommendations for an agenda to work on toward April 2003 are:

1. Arrive at some basic conclusions.At the very least, they should try to prevent the Mid-term Review to recycle the unrealistic pledges and reconfirming deadline thinking of the 1998 UNGASS. A drug free world is an illusion. Instead a common agenda should be constructed to reduce the harm to consumers and society as much as possible, while continuing efforts to reduce the levels of problematic use through treatment, demand reduction and prevention programmes. A first step is to try to bring the debate to the level of a rational evaluation on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of current anti-drug policies, shifting the attention from illusionary global pledges to best practices and lessons learnt.
2. Open debate about conventions
   Till now, the UN Drug Conventions have been sacrosanct, blocking any attempt to move further along the path of pragmatic solutions. The stalemate between prohibition and legalisation is confusing public opinion and paralysing the policy debate. For the prohibitionist camp the UN Conventions are cast in stone. The Conventions represent the ultimate line of defence against the flood of evil drugs. On the other end, many legalisers delude themselves that all the problems could be solved simply by scrapping the conventions. The many realities created by the prohibition regime can only be transformed through realistic and pragmatic steps that can move the international community forward from where we are now towards a more just and effective policy, with a focus on allowing more space for national policy diversity. Questioning the wisdom of the Conventions as they stand today should be an acceptable and normal dimension of that debate.
3. Cannabis regulation
   In several countries debates are now taking place that openly question the wisdom of prohibition of cannabis products and open up the discussion to looking at legal models for the regulation of that illicit market. There have been government sponsored cannabis conferences to explore the
   option to move forward on this issue in Europe. In the case of cannabis, this would not be a step into the unknown because of the de-facto situation in several countries. In order to advance on the cannabis issue, it could be helpful to look at the experiences gained in the meetings about the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on how to legally regulate a harmful substance. Current tobacco negotiations cover many areas, like prevention policy; restrictions on advertisement, marketing and non-smoking areas; taxation and the suppression of an illegal parallel market – cigarette smuggling is a huge criminal business.

The tobacco convention is a potential blueprint for cannabis regulation across all aspects of the production chain – cultivation, trafficking, consumption, including the difficult issue of how to provide other means of subsistence to farmers now dependent on illicit crops, and the inequalities in trade relations between North and South. In the case of tobacco, this is a very delicate subject in the negotiations. The European Commission has proposed that subsidies for growing tobacco (1 billion Euro to 135.000 farmers) be phased out and replaced with support for economic development and transition to alternative economic activities. Alternative Development programmes to substitute illicit drugs-related crops like opium poppy and coca bush are an important instrument within the current UN system of drug control. The record of success, however, is a sorry one. Decades of efforts to reduce global drug supply using developmental and repressive means, have failed. (See: The Future of Alternative Development) On the other hand, Alternative Development never could count on the amount of money which is currently spent on tobacco subsidies.

Using the tobacco example, drug reform organisations and ‘like-minded nations’ can argue that to design a cannabis regulation framework, the international community does not have to start from scratch. The conversion of the illicit cannabis market to a system of regulation is neither a step into the dark nor a risky undertaking, and will provide valuable lessons for policy considerations in relation to other illicit drugs as well. It might well light the end of the tunnel of polarisation and paralysis.