At the Edge (11-13 November 1999)

AT THE EDGE
Towards 21st Century Internationalism

TNI 25th Anniversary (1974-1999)

The Next Intervention? Colombian Conflict and International Responses

In spite of the renewed attempt to get a peace process off the ground, the armed conflict in Colombia is intensifying, while taking on increasing significance regionally and internationally. The USA is now characterising Colombia’s civil war as a threat to regional security, attempting to draw neighbouring countries into supporting military intervention. Argentina has entered into an extra-NATO military alliance with the US and has applied for full NATO membership, while Peru is indicating support for regional military action on Colombia. On the other hand, Venezuela and Brazil are strongly opposed to any form of foreign intervention. The USA’s direct involvement exceeds even that of its heyday of intervention in Central America during the Cold War, with hundreds of advisors already in place in Colombia, military aid figures tripling each year, and its planes involved with counter-insurgency operations. Europe could play a countervailing role in supporting the peace process, but has chosen to keep its distance for now. The Netherlands, meanwhile, has agreed to aid the USA’s interventionist plans for Colombia by hosting US military anti-drug bases on in the Dutch Antilles.

Speakers: Alfredo Molano, Coletta Youngers, Martin Jelsma, Theo Roncken, Gregorio Wolff
Chairperson: Jenny Pearce

Jenny Pearce explained that the session was to discuss various dimensions of the ongoing conflict in Colombia and the way the phenomenon of drugs is fueling this violent situation. In particular, the session will discuss the interaction between current drug policies, designed and implemented in particular by the United States; the situation in Colombia; and the situation in the Andean and Caribbean regions as a whole.

Alfredo Molano will talk about the roots of the Colombian conflict, and the context and preconditions necessary for a successful negotiated solution. Coletta Youngers will then speak about US policy towards the Colombian conflict and recent developments in this regard. Next, Martin Jelsma will speak about the other actors on the global drug policy scene, focusing on possible alternatives to the US strategy. Theo Roncken will go on to talk about overall US military strategy for Latin America, with Gregorio Wolff paying particular attention to the recent installation of two new American Forward Operation Locations (FOLs) in Aruba and Curacao.

Alfredo Molano: The violence in Colombia is so complex that it is necessary to explain the historical context that led to this situation. The three main questions to be asked are: firstly, is the guerrilla a movement of bandits or is it political? Secondly, what about the link between the guerrilla and drug traffic? And thirdly, what is the role of the United States in the peace process?

During the nineteenth century, Colombia was a peaceful democracy - one of the few places at that time where regular elections took place. The problems start in the 1930s and are to a large extent connected to the problem of land ownership. Agrarian reform resulted in the laying off of many day labourers and caused intense conflict between peasants and land owners, lasting until the 1950s. The period between 1948 and 1965 is known as "La Violencia". The Colombian army was assigned the role of arbiter between the conflicting sides, and in most cases, took the side of the land owners. This eventually led to the arming of the peasants' movement. While the Liberal Party purported to support the peasants' front, subsequent agrarian reform resulted in no real change. Peasants mobilised again, this time occupying lands.

In the context of the US war in Vietnam, demand for marihuana grew. Peasants started cultivating marihuana in
the hidden and marginal areas, while big landowners began growing marihuana more openly. For peasant farmers, marihuana was the only viable crop with a market at that time. The industry did not produce much wealth, but it helped peasant farmers survive.

The guerrilla profited from increased migration towards the rural areas, establishing their control over areas which the government had abandoned. A sharp debate on the merits of marihuana cultivation ensued between guerilla and peasants, with
peasants demanding their right to make a living. At the same time, paramilitaries, defending the interests of big landowners, were active in these areas. Their presence fortified peasant support for the guerilla. It was during this time, that the guerilla started using kidnapping and taxing of the drug trade as a means of war finance. The army, meanwhile, had little or no control over either guerilla or paramilitaries. The civil war was largely rationalised as being caused by communist insurgence.

After the Cold War, communism could no longer explain the war. It became clear that agrarian reform lay at the root of the problem and that the solution was political. Between 1971 and 1985, the guerilla pressed for constitutional reform, and in 1985 won an opportunity to participate in the constitutional assembly. Before this could happen, however, the state launched a massive military offensive against the guerrilla, dispersing them across the national territory, and unleashing harsh repression against civilians suspected of supporting the guerilla.

Since then, there have been two or three attempts at peace negotiations. A ceasefire has proved impossible to negotiate. The proposal from the guerrilla was to have a so-called "despeje" (demilitarised) zone in a FARC-controlled area, where illicit crops are also cultivated. This was eventually accepted, but in the areas outside this "despeje" zone, the war continues. It is common knowledge that the FARC is training and killing people in the area under their control. Many soldiers (500) have also been kidnapped. The agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC states that the civil authorities in this guerrilla controlled area are to be the mayors of the municipalities.

The farmers complain that the paramilitary are in fact the military. It is certain that there is very close collaboration between paramilitaries and the army, making impunity complete. Meanwhile, United States' support for the Colombian army further fuels the war, and adds another obstacle to finding a solution. Any victory will bring dictatorship, whether it is the state, the paramilitary or the guerrilla. Europe can play a crucial role in helping Colombia end its war, and it is essential that something is done before the situation evolves into a full blown international conflict.

Coletta Youngers: I have here the impossible task to explain to you US policies towards Colombia. I must stress that there is not just one clear policy; due to party rivalry there exist several different positions concerning the Colombian question. Despite the contradictions, one thing is very clear: the military do have a very clear perspective on what they are doing. Through US support for the Colombian military, the US is prolonging the war, supporting human rights violations on the part of the Colombian military, probably supporting paramilitary activities. The result is an undermining of the Colombian peace process.

Recently, a frequently asked question was whether Colombia will be the next Kosovo, the next point of US military intervention. One view was that this would be an easy option, a quick means to end the war. The problem is that it would have domestic implications - like a new wave of refugees seeking asylum in the United States. In the end, a more subtle form of intervention was decided upon. The Drug War is the best thing that has happened to the US military since the invention of the B2. It justifies their existence in a very clear way, and in a very practical sense. Their Command base, SouthCom, again has a position from which to negotiate. There was a shift from the Cold War to the Drug War, and the case of Colombia came along. The threat of the so-called narco-guerrilla, the regional threat and the possible spilling over of the conflict to thee region, could justify their
military presence in the region. In the words of one military man, it "is not a one night stand, but a marriage for ever".

Until now, the Drug War strategy is based on the so-called El Salvador model, which means a behind-the-scenes involvement, logistical support and training of the local armed forces, etc. Since the war in El Salvador was won according to that logic, they implemented it in the case of Colombia as well. Elements of this strategy are financial assistance (for 1999, $370 million to support the Colombian security forces), aid for a new elite group dedicated to counter-insurgency, and the founding of four new units over the coming three years. Another element is intelligence, the gathering of which will be made possible by 5 radar systems set up in Colombia and the installation of Forward Operation Locations in the region. The spy network in the region is increasingly oriented towards Colombia and not just against the drug trade. The last element is the training of army personal, with the aid of military advisors and special training programmes.

There seems to be no attention paid to paramilitary involvement in the drug trade. The counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency struggles are mixed up. In order to define the special aid package in support of the peace process (Plan Colombia), the US sent 4 teams to elaborate this plan, in which all economic assistance is mixed with military aid. This plan was frustrated for several reasons. The $ 1.86 billion package proposed by the Republicans, which stressed the military component, failed. There was a lot of confusion between government and the State Department about the source of the extra funds. These would have to come from social security funds and would constitute a risk for votes. In the foreign policy department, prioritising Colombia might prove too risky whereas a focus on peace between Israel and Palestine would have useful domestic spin-offs.

At the end of January 2000, the issue of the aid package will be brought up again in the House of Representatives. Our impression is that it will be difficult to pass. The underlying problem is political. The drugs issue is okay, but when it touches on bigger political issues, it becomes touchy and does not fit with US policy. Nevertheless, the US military strategy will go ahead.

Theo Roncken: I'll be talking about the supposed success of the War on Drugs in the Andean countries, particularly with regards to two strategies: eradication policies as implemented in the Andean countries, and the so-called Air bridge Denial, which refers to the successful interruption of cocaine transportation from Peru to the US by air. The chain of arguments presented by the US military to support the success of this last strategy goes as follow:

1. Drug planes can be stopped effectively.
2. The overstock of cocaine paste will cause a decrease in the market prices.
3. There will be a shortage of cocaine paste.
4. And this will eventually lead to the reduced availability of drugs in the US.

Our team undertook a study to analyse this so-called success story. The results suggest something different:

1. The Air bridge Denial Strategy caused a change in the flow of drugs, but the trade did not disappear.
2. Cocaine paste was already being produced in other places than Bolivia and Peru, caused by shifts in production patterns. Prices had already gone down, especially in Peru. Essentially, this was the result of increased production of coca leaves in Colombia, which in itself was the result of other phenomena and developments in the drug production, trade and routes.
3. There was no shortage of cocaine paste, because Colombia took the place of the biggest coca and paste producers in a very short period.
4. The quantity and quality of the trade changed. One could say that the drugs trade democratised because of the involvement of more people. One of its effects is the enormous increase in the prison population held for drug offences in the region.

It has just been announced that three new military bases in the main coca-producing region of Bolivia will be established. If the eradication programme has been so successful, why, then, are new bases necessary? We suspect this is part of an overall military strategy for the region, and that these particular bases will be used for training and special programmes consistent with that strategy.

Martin Jelsma: I will speak to you about European drug policies and the alternative framework for a global drug strategy that they constitute, with particular reference to the Colombian case.

In a letter to Koffi Anan recently, fifty intellectuals expressed concern that the failure of the Colombian peace process would be a disaster for Colombia and the region. The question is to what extent Europe can play the role of counterweight
to the US, and to what extent can the United Nations play a role in mediating the Colombian conflict.

At the moment, international involvement in the Colombian conflict is limited to the United States, save for other limited informal diplomatic contact. Neither the Colombian government, nor the FARC, have any wish to involve the UN. The FARC, in particular, finds it hard to distinguish between the USA and the UN, although there are some improvements on that front. Several European Union countries - such as Spain, Sweden and Norway - are involved, together with the Special High Commission on Human Rights and the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), which has the potential to become a lot more involved. A successful alternative development (crop substitution) pilot project has contributed to building confidence among the partners. The UNDCP are very positive about the role of the FARC in this programme, but there are also contradictory signals from within UNDCP. These have to do with the use of herbicides to eradicate illegally cultivated coca and poppy, and a more recent initiative to use a fungus or biological means for forced eradication. The UNDCP is considering supporting this very controversial programme, which is likely to compromise its involvement in the peace process.

The $ 3.5 billion 'Plan Colombia' of President Pastrana has similar contradictions. Its stated aim is to promote the peace process, through a mix of "carrot" (development aid) and "stick" (repression). The US has indicated that they will support the peace process only if there is a continued commitment to the War on Drugs, referring to support for the fumigations to forcibly eradicate illicit drugs crops. The US wants to contribute to the "stick" side of the Plan - military aid, forced eradication of crops by means of fumigations - while Europe is asked to fund the alternative development dimension for which 26 municipalities have been targeted within the drugs-producing and war zones, even while the War on Drugs continues. The two strategies are in contradiction with each other and this does little to promote confidence in the peace process.

Gregorio Wolff: In April 1999, the USA and The Netherlands agreed to the use of Aruba and Curacao for new airbases, necessary after the dismantling of the US base in Panama. Why, one could ask, Aruba? In the first place, it has the appropriate facilities for the military, radar etc. Its geographical location is very convenient as it lies near the coast of Venezuela, which is important now that it is not the biggest ally of the USA in the region. It also will be able to cover a bigger part of Central and South America. We, at first, thought that the main reason for the Dutch to agree to these installations was the fact that there were no costs involved for them. But there might be other reasons. One of which could be that Aruba is one of the countries on the US black list for not being very co-operative in the War on Drugs. Curiously, Aruba has now fallen off the black list.

We ask ourselves whether these bases be used to fight the drugs or the guerrilla. The distinction between the two is very blurred. With the construction of the FOLs, two command centres will be integrated, where intelligence-gathering and drug traffic monitoring become one.

Drugs are a major problem on the island and something has to be done about this, but we do not wish to get involved in the Colombian conflict. But we are against the FOLs because they intervene in a political conflict in Colombia. There is a war going on in Colombia and the FOLs are used by one of the parties involved in that war. We are making available a part of our territory and by doing so are becoming party to the conflict. Aruba is a small island, dependent on tourism, and we have about 20,000 Colombians on Aruba, including the illegal people. This makes Aruba very vulnerable if it gets involved with such a complicated conflict.