Establishment of a Regional Monitoring and Verification System for a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

Establishment of a Regional Monitoring and Verification System for a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
Fawzy Hussein Hammad
Inesap Information Bulletin No. 14, November 1997
Preliminary Report, Presented to the Third INESAP Conference, Shanghai, China, 8-10 September 1997

The safeguards and disarmament principles set forth in this report for the first time constitute a sound basis for a reliable Cooperative Integrated Monitoring and Verification Sys-tem (CIMVS) in connection with a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. The elements of the system design were discussed in the framework of those principles. The main components of the system are: data and information center, cooperative integrated monitoring and verification center, qualified manpower and a regional-global linkage. It is essential to emphasise the importance of promotion of scientific, technical and economic cooperation in peaceful applications of dual-use technologies and the dissemination of peace and disarmament culture to institutionalize the partnership imperative and communal responsibilty in security and peace and to enhance confidence building.

Introduction

1. It is essential to emphasize that the cornerstone of establishing a MEWMDFZ is the political commitment and will of the regional parties to enter into this solemn and moral undertaking in the context of a Middle East (ME) regional security regime, and to achieve a legally binding and sound MEWMDFZ Treaty. For this to happen, peace negotiations in the ME must be pursued until peace agreements (1) with the countries neighbouring Israel (similar to those signed with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1995) are achieved as a first step in a long process. The Treaty shall prohibit the deve-opment, production, stockpiling and use of WMD and relevant ballistic missiles and just as well ensure the destruction of existing ones. It shall also ensure their continued absence through a Cooperative Integrated Monitoring and Verification System (CIMVS) to deal with biological, chemical, nuclear and missile activities in order to verify compliance with treaty obligations. Verification is the core of disarmament and non-proliferation measures. A treaty with-out a solid verification system (such as BWC) is just a declaration of intent and contributes little to arms control. A regional monitoring and verification organisation to undertake such responsibilites shall also beestablished. This section deals mainly with the main functions of the CIMVS, newly formulated safeguards and disarmament principles, elements of the system design and a proposed structure of the regional verification organisation.

Main function of the CIMVS

2. The main functions of the CIMVS should include, but not be limited to, the following:

• Monitoring and verification of the dismantling and destruction (DD) of existing stockpiles of WMD and missiles
• Dismantling of the relevant infrastructure, and production facilites or their conversion to peaceful uses
• Safeguarding chemical, biological, nuclear and missile activities in order to detect, at a very early stage, any deviation to initiate or resume development, production and stockpiling of proscribed activities. Safeguarding should be extended to rel-evant facilities and items capable of being modified to WMD and long range missiles
• Monitoring and verification of rel-evant research and development (R&D) ac-tivities, particularly in biological technol-ogy due to the ease with which civilian fa-cilities can be converted for biologicalweapons (BW) purposes. BW capability does not require large laboratories, large in-ventories of BW agents or large production of such agents
• Undertaking R&D work to improve WMD verification technologies
• Establishing an of export-import (EXIM) control mechanism for relevant dual-use technologies
• Establishing an information and data base related to WMD proliferation and illicit trafficking
• Undertaking physical protection measures, as well as other measures to combat illegal nuclear material trafficking and activities of terrorist groups utilizing chemical, radiological and biolological weapons

Safeguards and disarmament Principles

3. A set of principles governing disarmament and safeguards of chemical, nuclear, biological and missile activities has been formulated in the light of existing ex-perience and post-cold-war disarmament developments.Their use in the design, operation and development of CIMVS in the ME is essential in order to ensure with the highest possible level of confidence that the probability of WMD proliferation is the lowest possible. These principles have been formulated in analogy to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Safety Fundamentals. The following prin-ciples are formulated to address the situationin the ME. They can, however, also be of general use for global safeguards and disarmament purposes.

4. The principles are given below:

Principle 1:
The transparency, open-ness and intrusiveness embodied in the CWC, the protocol on Strengthening the Effectiveness of and Improving the Efficiency of the IAEA Safeguards system(IAEA, GOV. /2914, April 1997), as well as relevant experiences shall be applied, as appropriate, in an integrated manner to all WMD and missile activities .

Principle 2:
The design of the CIMVS shall be based, as appropiate, on the concepts of the defence in depth (which include redundancy and diversity). This will allow the use of several layers, methodologiesand technologies of monitoring and verification to maximize the confidence level.

Principle 3:
Dismantling and destruction of existing WMD and missiles (with a range above 150 km) as well as the infrastructure and facilities used for their development and production (if not convertedto peaceful uses) shall be undertaken multilaterally, according to approved procedures, in order to ensure verification on the regional and global levels.

Principle 4:
The highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear and related materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling shall be maintained.

Principle 5:
The availability of technological facilities, technical means and infrastructure required for establishing an efficient and effective verification system shall be ensured. Engineering and technicalsupport with competence in disciplines important for monitoring and verification shall be made available.

Principle 6:
Sufficient numbers of adequately trained and authorized inspectors and staff working in accordance with approved and validated procedures shall be ensured. Appropriate training and retrainingprogrammes shall be established.

Principle 7:
Appropriate quality assurance programmes shall be established and implemented in all disarmament and safeguards activities.

Principle 8:
The timely application and analysis of the monitoring and verification results is essential to maximize the effectiveness of the system. Furthermore, a comprehensive periodic evaluation, analysis and correlation of data and information gathered from various sources including surveillance, monitoring and inspection as well as intelligence information shall be carried out to identify future plans. Lessons learnt from operating experience shall be used to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the system.

Principle 9:
Promotion of scientific, technical and economic cooperation in peaceful uses of dual technologies is essen-tial to achieve significant socio-techno-economic benefits and impacts to end-users. The cooperation shall include R&D to improve verification technologies. Fur-thermore, it may include activities in safety, environmental protection, transboundary releases, waste management and peaceful dual technologies. Such undertakings will enhance confidence building and institutionalize the partnership imperative in development and security. Voluntary confidence building measures to be taken by countries in the zone should be promoted by Parties in the region .

Principle 10:
A peace, disarmament and non-proliferation culture shall be established and disseminated in verification organisations, educational systems, and to the public through training, education and public information. This will promote communal responsibility towards disarmament and regional security, and enhance societal verification.

Principle 11:
Each Contracting Party shall establish a legislative and statutory framework for prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of WMD and designation of a competent body to undertake the needed regulatory functions and act as a counterpart for the ME verification organisation. Strong and competent national organisations are the fundamental units of the regional system. The CIMVS should complement national systems and does not replace them. The network of national organisations will further strengthen the cooperative security imperative.

Principle 12:
The MECIMVS shall be linked to global verification systems to enhance the strength and effectiveness of both systems and to assure the international community that the commitment to disarmament and nonproliferation of WMD in the region is maintained. Experiences in regional- global linkages are already available in connection with the NPT and the IAEA-ABACC and the IAEA-EURATOM arrangements.

Elements of design of the CIMVS Information

5. The design of the CIMVS is based on information available or made available on all WMD and related activities in the region. The extent of information available is an important measure of the degree of transparency required by Principle 1. The sources of information include:

• Full declaration and complete disclosure by the States Parties of devices, ma-terials, equipment, facilities of WMD and related activities. It is important to emphasize that uncertainties related to the completeness of the disclosure will consequently lead to uncertainties in verification. In this context, unilateral destruction of WMD and missiles can lead to mistrust and concealement of prohibited activities, materials or devices which will impair the design of the system and make verification a very difficult task, if not impossible.
• Information on EXIM activities related to proscribed activities is an important component of the CIMVS. It warrants timely monitoring and verification to de-tect, at very early stages, attempts to circumvent EXIM control measures.
• Information gathering of related data is an important element of the system to search for indicators of possible undeclared proscribed facilites and activities.

Information Analysis

6. A Data Information Analysis Cen-tre (DIAC) in connection with all WMD and missile activities important to the region is essential. The capability of the cen-tre to record, process, search and retrievedata is essential for a timely and periodic comprehensive analysis and correlation of information on a continuing basis accord-ing to Principles 8 and 2.

Export-Import Mechanism

7. Relevant information from export-ing and importing countries in the region constitute the basis of a regional EXIM mechanism. An EXIM office should be es-tablished to serve as a clearing house to receive relevant information from exporting and importing countries, undertake information analysis and decide on the required monitoring and verification plans.

8. The international EXIM control measures and experience should be utilized. These measures are voluntary activities that are pursued by groups of countries. Export guidelines have been developed and are continuously evolving. This international experience can be utilized through the regional-global linkage with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (27 members, com-pared to 7 in 1971), the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, (25 mem-bers, compared to 7 in 1987), and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The experience of the Australia Group in chemical weapons would also be useful. The group, established in 1984, used a list of chemical weapons agents and related percursor chemicals. In 1992 the group (now 22 members) added to the control of a list of organisms used to make biological weapons. The main function of this group is sharing intelligence information. It is important to point out that the comprehensive list of materials, equipment and technology related to WMD recently com-piled by UNSCOM based on the experiences made in Iraq would also be useful.

Monitoring and Verificaton

9. A rigorous monitoring and verification system with the highest possible degree of confidence, reliability and intrusiveness is an essential requirement for establishing a MEWMDFZ. The CIMVS shall be designed, built and operated in accordance with the safeguards principles, particulary, Principles 1 and 2.

10. Technological monitoring plays a major role in confidence building and transparency and a significant role in verification, while on-site inspections play a major role in verification and a significant role in confidence building and transparency. The confidence level is increased by using a multilayer system of monitoring and verification and increasing redundancy, diversity and timeliness (Principle 2). Technological monitoring involves environmental sampling and monitoring, remote or sensor monitor-ing, aerial surveillance and imagery, and oth-ers. It is important to measure the observables and determine the signatures of various laboratories and facilities. In accord-ance with Principles 5 and 6, adequate facilites, equipment and means as well as qualified manpower should be made avail-able in the framework of appropriate qual-ity assurance programmes (Principle 7).

11. Advanced technological means should be used for monitoring and verification.

Examples are given:

• A wide range of sensor types: accoustic, intrusion, radiation, environmental, seismic, camera, ground, etc.
• Networking technology, communica-tions, hardware and software capabilities.
• Aerial and satellite imaging, image analysis, remote monitoring, on-site monitoring with tags,
  seals.
• Data security.
• Data aquisition, processing, analysis and sharing large quantities of data.

12. On-site inspection methodology. An appropriate balanced and cross-disciplinary mixture of multilayer on-site inspection methods should be designed, including baseline, routine (scheduled), on-challenge or no-notice inspections. Joint inspections are novel; they enable better undestanding and increase the capability of verification. Open invitation (anytime-anywhere) inspection may be considered. As mentioned earlier, each of Algeria, Iran and South Africa has invited the IAEA to undertake anytime-anywhere inspections. It is worthwhile to explore this highly intrusive on-site inspection in connection with the potential MEWMDFZ. A risk-based approach should be used to determine the frequency and intensity of inspections. The risk is related to the ease of using safeguarded materials for weapons purposes.

13. This CIMVS allows stronger verification through better understanding and linkage of all WMD activities; they are strongly related. It allows joint inspections such as chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear weapons and missiles etc. The system also allows group assessment of inspections in various disciplines through periodic and timely group meetings to assess inspection findings, exchange information from all available sources and plan future activities, including joint inspections.

14. Monitoring and verification of existing WMD, missiles and related facilities (or their conversion for peaceful uses) is a crucial item for peace and security in the region. DD is a one time activity that should not be undertaken unilaterally. In the case of Iraq, unilateral destruction was used to conceal elements of its proscribed programme, which makes verification ex-tremely difficult, in spite of the UN Secu-rity Council (UNSC) authority under chap-ter 7 of the UN charter. According to Prin-ciple 3, DD should be undertaken multilaterally to ensure cooperative monitoring and verification regionally and globally. In this connection article 6 of the African Nuclear- Weapons-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty sets a precedent which is suitable for the ME. It requires Parties to destroy and dismantle nuclear explosive devices that have been manufactured prior entry into force of the ANWFZ Treaty. Verification of DD of weapons and the destruction or conversion of production facilities shall be undertaken by the IAEA and the African Commission of Nuclear Energy. This regional-global linkage in verification of DD is essential to assure verification with a high level of confidence in the region and the world.

15. The ME region set a precedent for successful cooperative monitoring between Egypt, Israel and the USA in Sinai in the period of February 1976 to January 1980. The US, as a third party, established a field mission to monitor access to the Giddi and Mitla passes in Sinai with sensors and per-formed overflights. The various sensors employed were seismic, accoustics, mag-netic, strain, infrared and video camera sensors as well as watch stations. The sys-tem successfully distinguished between significant and insignificant sensor activities. All violations were relatively minor and resolved by a joint commission. The system was closed after conclusion of the 1979 Camp David Peace Accord. The success of this cooperative monitoring system in confidence building should encourage the building of a wider regional system to monitor and verify all WMD and missile activi-ties in connection with a MEWMDFZ.

Manpower

16. In accordance with Principle 6, sufficient numbers of adequately trained inspectors and staff is a must for building and managing a credible CIMVS. The technical capabilites and skills of inspectors and inspection teams, the leadership and managerial capablities of team leaders are vital to the system. The inspectors and staff will be selected primarily from the region and mainly from national verification organisations to be established according to Principle 11. The strength of national organisations and avail-ability of competent staff is crucial to the es-tablishment of a credible regional CIMVS.

17. Proper manpower development programmes in the relevant fields take a long time to implement. Therefore, it is of prime importance to consider the develop-ment of national and regional, short and long range, manpower development programmes which can be implemented in the region, in advanced countries and in glo-bal verification organisations.

The regional-global verification linkage

18. Due to the high importance of linking regional to global verification systems (Principle 12), some elaboration is re-quired. Regional verification ensures the regional responsibility and cooperation in designing, building, and operating the CIMVS, sharing inspectors, technology and techniques, information and results as well as assessing the situation periodically and handling abnormalities. Through these cooperative measures, the contracting parties are mutually convincing themselves of the compliance to their obligations. However, as in all NWFZ treaties, the linkage with global verification systems (e.g. the IAEA) is extremely important to assure the international community that the commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation is maintained. Technological developments in verification technology in global systems will be available to the regional system which can also cooperate in such efforts. Linkage will also allow exchange of experience and lessons learned as well as relevant intelligence information. The regional system can gain access to global information databases on WMD and related activities and the international EXIM mechanism and databases as mentioned earlier.

19. Furthermore, through linkage the region as a whole can benefit from global technical cooperation, R&D and training programmes especially for qualifying inspectors. It will also allow the region to participate effectively in the ongoing global developments to increase the strength and effectiveness of verification, particularly with regard to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The region will also gain additional access to global organisations and hence the UNSC in case of non-compliance.

20. To evolve these benefits, States in the region should accede to the NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT, as well as forthcoming treaties. This will end the varying attitudes in the region. The NPT is universally applied in the region, except in Israel, and the CWC is signed by Israel and several countries in the region. Other countries will not sign the CWC unless Israel accedes to the NPT. Strong regional-global linkages will strengthen both systems and in particu-lar the regional one.

References

1 Unfortunately, the peace process seems to face insurmountable problems since the Likud government takeover in Israel in 1996