Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
A Perspective from Japan (draft only)
Hiromichi Umebayashi
INES International Conference, Stockholm, 14-18 June, 2000

There are successive historic surprise events occurring in Northeast Asia, all of which are related to the new diplomatic thrust made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea): a sudden announcement of the South-North inter-Korean summit, a surprise media report on the DPRK's leader Kim Jong-il's first visit to China, and the approval by the Senior Official Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) of the membership of the DPRK to the ARF. They have positive implication for peace and security of the region, and no doubt present utterly new opportunity to ease the regional tension and to construct co-operative scheme for regional security, although the future trend of the DPRK is very difficult to predict. In particular, the participation of the DPRK in the ARF is very relevant to the issue of a Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia. Before articulating this point, the current situation of the idea of a Northeast Asia NWFZ is briefly summarized below.

Scheme Proposals

A Limited NWFZ: There have been various proposals and discussions relating to the idea of the Northeast Asia NWFZ recently. One of the most extensive efforts has been made through track-II approach led by John Endicott, Director, the Center for International Strategy, technology, and Policy (CISTP), Georgia Institute of Technology. The history and up-dated discussion on their proposal of a limned NWFZ in Northeast Asia (LNFWZ-NEA) appears in a useful review article written by Endicott et al.The geographical arrangement of one of such LNWFZ-NEA consists of a circular zone with a 2000-km radius from a center point at Panmunjom at inter-Korean boundary. It encircles the entirety of Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), DPRK and Taiwan. Countries partially included within the zone are China, Mongolia, and Russia. The United States is also included as a relevant party to the scheme. A similar circular arrangement was proposed independently by a former diplomat of Japan. Another geographical arrangement consists of an elliptical area with its major axis extending from Alaska to Taiwan. It encircles the entirety of the same four nations/area with the circular zone described above. In both the circular and elliptical cases that have been studied by this group, such proposals were agreed to by the participating panel members only if "certain categories (of nuclear weapons) be excluded from inclusion during the initial stages of the Agreement", and "when emphasis be placed on nuclear warheads applicable to non-strategic missiles and other nuclear warheads or devices with . tactical. applications." This is why the zone is called a "Limited" NWFZ rather than simply a NWFZ. A later study by the same group recommended the creation of a League of Non-nuclear Northeast Asian States as the first phase of the subsequent formation of the LNWFZ-NEA in Moscow in 1997. The proposed League of States consists of "Japan, the ROK, possibly Mongolia, and if its non-nuclear status is clarified, the DPRK." It is a new and realistic development which has never been achieved in their previous proposals.

Three plus Three Nations Arrangement: Based upon the recognition that the most critical objective of a Northeast Asia NWFZ (NEANWFZ) is to contribute to preventing a potential competitive escalation of nuclear development among Japan, the ROK, and the DPRK, or between Japan and a reunified Korea, the present author has proposed a realistic approach for a NEANWFZ in a series of articles. The scheme proposed in it is to conclude a trilateral NWFZ treaty among the three nations of Japan, the ROK and the DPRK with protocols for negative security assurances (NSAs) by the surrounding three nuclear weapon states, namely the United States, China and Russia. This approach could be pursued by taking advantage of a favourable current circumstance, and simultaneously avoiding difficulties associated with the involvement of territories of the nuclear weapon states'specifically, one of the three key states, Japan, has long-standing "three non-nuclear principles", which state that Japan will not manufacture, posses, nor allow the bringing-in of nuclear weapons. In terms of the Korean peninsula, the ROK and the DPRK signed the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" on January 20, 1992, in which they agreed that they "shall refrain from the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons", and that they "shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes." It is true that there have been various problems with their positions since they were announced; nevertheless, they remain declared positions currently on record and could serve as the basis for a trilateral treaty for a NEANWFZ.

As one compares the two approaches suggested above, namely "League of Non-nuclear Northeast Asian States" and "Three plus Three Nations Treaty," one finds that the first step of both approaches is very similar . the declared non-nuclear weapon states in the region should constitute the core of a NEANWFZ.

Participation of the DPRK in the ARF

The ARF, established in 1994, is the only standing multilateral Forum to discuss security issues in the Asia-Pacific. It consists of 21 nations and EU, exclusive of the DPRK, covering the United States, Russia, China, the Republic of Korea and Japan, not to mention ASEAN ten countries. It is unique in that ASEAN developing countries are sitting at the center of the forum to discuss the region-wide security issues. Although non-governmental organizations such as the PCDS has long been requesting it to invite the DPRK, its participation has not been realized until now. In this respect, the ARF has been lacking a prerequisite condition of a regional security mechanism that at least all the concerned parties be embraced. The DPRK was not invited to the inaugural meeting in Bangkok in 1994, as a New York Times editorial noted at that time: "Conspicuously excluded & are two of the region's most dangerous potential flashpoints, Taiwan and North Korea." The DPRK did show its willingness to join the Forum at least until 1995. In 1996, the ARF established the conditions for membership, including a clause which states: "Newly participating countries should agree to accept past decisions and declarations of ARF prior to its admission." This condition may have been an obstacle for North Korea to consider to apply again for membership.

An obvious consequence of the DPRK's participation in the ARF is that the parties concerned with a NEANWFZ are all present out in this forum. Moreover, NWFZ issues have been a constant subject of the ARF because the establishment of the Southeast Asian NWFZ (Bangkok Treaty), its entry into force, and then the accession to its protocol by the nuclear weapon states have been central to the recent security concerns of the ASEAN nations. Therefore the ARF will be more than adequate a venue for consultation on the subject once one of the three core nations for the proposed arrangements wants to take an initiative. Without this new development of full participation, a proponent nation would have to search for an appropriate venue for consultation among nations concerned.

Another implication of the DPRK's participation in the ARF is related to Japan's policy with respect to the DPRK. In the last ARF in Singapore in July 1999, the Government of Japan (GOJ) went aggressive and, in cooperation with the United States and the ROK, took advantage of the ARF, in the absence of the DPRK, to warn it of the "serious consequences" of conducting a missile test. In consequence, the ARF "Chairman's Statement" adopted a sentence; "The Ministers expressed concern over the August 1998 payload launch and other missile-related activities which could heighten tensions and have serious consequences for stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region." In fact, Japan attempted to make the ARF act more strongly, but this was blocked by China. This example typifies the nature of the GOJ's policy toward the DPRD, "isolation and containment," which has been incommensurate with the concept of a NEANWFZ. However, the participation of the DPRK in the ARF will compel Japan to re-evaluate its approach. The "North Korean Threat" rhetoric has been effective as long as the DPRK refuses to show its face at multilateral fora. The new situation may open a way for Japan to make more cooperative approach to the North Korea, including a NWFZ.

A Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula vs a NEANWFZ

The improvement of the inter-Korean relationship will expedite the process to implement the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on Korean Peninsula, which will in turn expedite the process of the 1994 Agreed Framework process between the US and DPRK because one of its provisions writes, "The DPRK will consistently take steps the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." In the final stage of this whole process, two aspects should be noted.

1. In order that the Joint Declaration may be fully implemented, the both Koreas are stipulated not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. For the purpose of verifying the implementation of such provisions, the Declaration provides that they will establish and operate a Joint Committee on Nuclear Control. At this final moment, how do people in the Korean Peninsula feel the gigantic capability of Japan to reprocess plutonium left intact even if it is under the control of IAEA? They will hesitate to proceed without involving Japan in the same scheme of verification. Here is a reason why we have to prepare for a three-nations NWFZ in this region to start with.
2. When a legally binding nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is attained, the negative security assurance provision of the 1994 Agreed Framework will have to become legally binding as well. The provision says, "The US will provide assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US" Then, hwy won. t ROK request similar assurances from Russia and China? This means that a Treaty on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula will have to have protocols for negative security assurances by all the nuclear powers just as other NWFZs do. At this stage, Japan will find itself left behind in that only Japan has no legal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons of Russia and China, and is protected by an old-fashioned nuclear umbrella of the United States. In this regard, a NEANWFZ will become a favourable idea on Japan.

Because of the continuing negative attitude of the GOJ toward a NWFZ in Northeast Asia and political intention of the United Stated and Japan, only the idea of the nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is frequently cited and promoted in inter-governmental fora. The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference reminded and welcomed the 1992 Joint Declaration and the 1999 final report of the Tokyo forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and disarmament, and expert forum convened by the GOJ, adopted key recommendations including "to redouble their efforts to achieve the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula as soon as possible," but didn. t pay a word to a Northeast Asia NWFZ.

Considering the fact that strong public support continues to prevail on this issue in Japan, the GOJ is identified as a target nation to be encouraged for a policy change. In this respect it is a positive development in this direction that the Democratic Party of Japan, the biggest opposition, has recently adopted a comprehensive nuclear disarmament policy, including the "Initiative on the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," which "would work towards a treaty stipulating that Japan, the ROK and North Korea would " make such zone and conduct mutual inspections.

Also an idea to find a nation to play a mediator role is worth considering in an appropriate stage. Ina recent book, Robert Green took the example from the role played by Japan in hosting and funding UN negotiations on a Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and wrote: "In the case of the Northeast Asian zone, there could be scope for other more impartial but interested states with a good track record on disarmament - like Australia, Canada, New Zealand or South Africa - to host and mediate further negotiations."

Lastly I want to point out that another area to be identified for future NGO's efforts is to build up cooperation between NGOs in Japan and in ROK with respect to this specific objective.

References

John, Endicott and alan G. Gorowitz, "Track-II cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons form the Limited Nuclear. Weapons-Free Zone for Northeast Asia," Pacifica Review, Vol. 11, No 3, October , 1999
Kumao Kaneko, "Japan Needs No Umbrella", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 1996.
Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy, Georgia Technical Institute, "The Moscow Memorandum of the Expanded Senior Panel of the Northeast Asia Limited Nuclar Weapons Free Zone", November 28, 1997, cited from Special Report, Norteast Asia Peace and Security Network (Nautilus Institute)
Hiromichi Umebayashi, "A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," Peace Review 11:3, 1999; "Northest Asia NWFZ - A Realistic and Attainable Goal," INESAP Information Bulletin #10, August 1996
Reprinted in the Asahi Evening News, April 5, 1994
Robert Green, "The Naked Nuclear Emperor . Debunking Nuclear Deterrence," Chapter 7, published by The Disarmament and Seurity Centre, New Zealand, 2000.