Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in 1998

The phenomenon of the nuclear weapon free zone and its meaning for non-proliferation has remained - certainly in the literature of the Northern countries - rather underexposed. The first nuclear weapon free zone - for South America and the Caribbean, stimulated foremost by Mexico - dates back already to 1968, but has only seen its real political bloom in 1994. The phenomenon next expanded quickly to, at present, zones for the Pacific, the whole of Africa and Southeast Asia from Burma to Indonesia. This means that the entire southern hemisphere including major neighboring parts of Africa and South- and Central America is free of nuclear weapons with the approval of the nuclear weapon states. Excepting reasonable chances in the near future for Central Asia(the former Soviet Republics like Kazachstan) the easier regions are herewith exhausted. In this article a proposal on general lines for Europe will be elaborated. Europe is heavily burdened by the presence of three nuclear weapon states and the explicit presence of a fourth(the United States) through NATO. Will the phenomenon of nuclear weapon free zones come to a halt at a time of crucial importance or will new courses be found?

Introduction

The number of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones(to be abbreviated as NWFZ) has increased distinctly in the last couple of years from two around 1990 to four today. The contrast with the recent past is even enlarged when we realize that the first NWFZ(for South America and the Caribbean) has only actually functioned since 1994 and that, morover, plans for another exist in at least one region(the one including Kazachstan and Mongolia). Consequence of recent developments is that - with the assent of the nuclear weapon states - the entire southern hemisphere is nuclear weapon free and the nuclear issue has explicitly become the northern hemisphere. s. But this is where the nuclear weapon states are and where it will be much harder, excepting a few regions, to realize new NWFZs. Especially for Europe this will be a real political tour de force to accomplish.

Primarily created to increase the security of the states and region involved, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are, first and foremost, the subject of treaties between states mutually. In the case of South America, considering the initial ambitions of Argentina and Brazil, this is certainly no easy matter. But security is only then significantly increased if the nuclear weapon states are prepared to make so-called negative security guarantees for the region(namely not to use nuclear weapons against the states concerned). Furthermore it is important to look upon the number of NWFZs as the gradual upbeat for a nuclear weapon free world.

In order for the phenonomenon of NWFZs to be fully justified, it is important to distinguish a number of universal definitions that such a zone must comply with in order to be fully effective. In a contribution to the 30-year commemoration of the Treaty of Tlatelolco(based on a 1975 UN-resolution), Enrique Román Morey, present Secretary-General to the OPANAL(Organisation of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone for South America and the Caribbean) has distinguished the following marks:1

1. The initiative for a nuclear weapon free zone lies with the states in the region concerned;
2. The agreement for this should be laid down in a treaty;
3. The zones are characterized by a total absence of nuclear weapons;
4. A sound verification- and control system is necessary;
5. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones must be recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations; and
6. The zone of application must be clearly defined.

It is remarkable that the explicit ratification of such a treaty by the nuclear weapon states is not mentioned in this definition. Morey has also identified this as a considerable shortcoming in the definitions to be concluded from the resolution concerned. At its time of submittance there might have been the assumption that this would be implicitly in force after the recognition of a zone by the General Assembly. Since the oldest treaty on this issue(Tlatelolco) does state an arrangement of explicit ratification by the nuclear weapon states of the NWFZ concerned, it is important to continue distinguishing this aspect explicitly in order to clarify the absence or presence of guarantees by the nuclear weapon states to respect the zone concerned. However, whereas certainly in these times a relative large number of new zones are being implemented, this guarantee could be a matter of time.

A second element lacking in the UN resolution but which the Treaty of Tlatelolco and consecutive treaties do provide for, is the unlimited duration of a treaty. This would exclude the automatic expiration of a treaty and prevent the problem of states which might be inclined not to enter into obligations for a new period.

Furthermore, it is politically of great interest that the most important countries in size, political meaning and nuclear capacities will have joined the treaty in order to have its intended political effect. For instance, the Treaty of Tlatelolco for South America and the Caribbean states that it is activated for each separate state after it has become operative as such by the ratification of only three states. This has temporarily resulted in an incoherent patchwork of more or less protected territory that may even lack the support of important countries. That is why, notably for South America, the treaty, although it had been formally in place for years(since 1968), has only acquired effective political meaning since 1994. That year, Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement to the effect of the foundation of an Agency for mutual control, and Argentina finally ratified the treaty.

We shouldn. t think, for that matter, that all treaties are uniform to a large extent. As an illustration of the importance that was attached decades ago to peaceful nuclear tests, this possibility was explicitly entered into in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.The Treaty of Rarotongo for the Pacific, due to the French nuclear tests on Mururoa, explicitly states that nuclear tests are prohibited. And there are more important differences.

In the following, we will first go into the matter of the various existing treaties and their relative zones.

The Treaty of Antarctica

This treaty was concluded on December 1st 1959 and has been in force since June 23rd 1961.2 It is not a specific nuclear treaty, but includes agreements not to use Antarctica for general military purposes such as setting up military bases. However, in clause V nuclear explosions and the dumping of nuclear waste are expressly prohibited. With the prohibition of military bases in clause I this should provide sufficient grounds to regard the treaty also as the installment of a nuclear weapon free zone, albeit in an almost uninhabited territory. So the treaty has been in force for more than 35 years. At that moment it was ratified by four of the five(later) official nuclear weapon states; China only followed in 1983 and thus the nuclear aspect was completely covered only from that time.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco for South America and the Caribbean

The oldest treaty expressly relating to the installation of a nuclear weapon free zone is the Treaty of Tlatelolco of February 14th 1967(organisation: OPANAL), its spiritual father being Mexico, in particular the diplomat Alfonso García
Robles.3 Other countries involved from the start were Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Equador. The effective area the treaty covers includes the whole of South America and the Caribbean, including Cuba and Mexico up to the border of the United States and a wide ocean area around it. The treaty was officially in force starting April 22nd 1968 but, having been ratified only by three countries including Mexico and Brazil, didn. t represent very much. The treaty could only grow gradually in importance with the ratification of an increasing number of countries. It was, however, enervated for years by the discord between Argentina( which joined only in 1994) and Brazil, both of which had important nuclear installations and certain military aspirations. In addition the contents of clause 18, stating not only the admissibility of peaceful nuclear explosions but also that these are permitted using installations or objects and devices equal to those of nuclear weapons, is very remarkable. Still, it is unclear whether this definition played a negative role in the following years. It looks almost like an excuse to be allowed to possess parts of nuclear weapons with the official intention to use them for peaceful purposes. Especially the United States have urged abandonment of peaceful nuclear explosions.4

The friction between Argentina and Brazil was for a long time a measure of the very limited meaning the treaty had for the region during the first decades. In 1990 and 1991, however, both countries concluded a series of agreements providing a basis for the complete ratification that was to follow. Although Brazil had ratified the treaty as early as 1968, it only agreed in 1994 to abandoning the necessity of some definitions in clause 28, paragraph 1 determining among others the control of compliance. Argentina only ratified the treaty in 1994 and also abandoned the definitions in clause 28.5 Moreover, as a member of the Non Proliferation Treaty(NPT) since 1994, it is committed to the definitions of this treaty. This doesn. t apply to Brazil that hasn. t yet joined the NPT. After 1992, amendments to the treaty have been put in force that have effected a consolidation, particularly by permitting controls by the International Agency of Atomic Energy(IAEA). This finished, in fact, the year- long conflict of interest - also by the mutual agreements between these two countries - and 1994 stands as the year the treaty was put in force with sufficient political relevance.

Overall, 33 countries in the region signed the treaty(including Cuba, which hasn. t ratified it yet, however). The other countries also abandoned the definitions in clause 28.
The confirmation by the nuclear weapon states in signing and ratifying Protocol II was established between 1969 and 1979 and so predates 1994 by a long period. France, however, only ratified Protocol I(intended for foreign powers with interests in South America) in 1992, on account of its ties with French Guyana.

We could say that from May 30, 1994 the South American continent and the Caribbean excepting Cuba, can be regarded as completely - politically and legally - nuclear weapon free. The United States and at that time the Soviet Union did note in additional statements that the treaty is no longer regarded by them as legally valid regarding a country attacking another country with the assistance of a nuclear weapon state. For the United States, this statement was directly connected to the events of 1962, when Cuba installed Russian nuclear missiles on its territory.

The Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the South Pacific(Treaty of Rarotonga)

This Treaty 6 was signed on the 6th of August 1985 in Rarotonga(exactly forty years after Hiroshima) by eight countries including Australia and New Zealand.7 The Treaty was enforced within one and a half years, on the 11th of December 1986, when it was ratified by the eighth country, Australia. There was, however, for a long period, one major obstacle before the treaty could satisfy in a political sense one of the intentions of the countries in the region involved, namely the exclusion of nuclear test explosions in the area, especially those of the French on Mururoa. As a consequence of the French on unwillingness to give up their testing area, the United States and the United Kingdom were for years unwilling to support the treaty. China and the former Soviet Union did support it at an early stage. The support of the Western countries only became manifest in a political sense fairly recently, starting the 25th of March 1996. The French at that time terminated their series of nuclear tests of 1995-1996 and were - also by the reaction of world opinion to it - prepared to abandon their testing area after all. The Treaty of Rarotonga namely contains three important protocols stating the support of countries outside the region. The first requires recognition of the treaty by countries outside the region with territorial claims in the South Pacific(the United States, the United Kingdom and France). The second protocol requires guarantees of the five nuclear weapon states that the nuclear weapon free status be respected as is required in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the third protocol demands of the same five states an express commitment not to do nuclear tests in the area concerned. France. s refusal to support particularly this protocol implied, for ten years, the refusal of all three Western nuclear weapon states to sign the three protocols. The three countries have to this day not ratified the protocols. The Soviet Union and China did, in 1988. Politically, however, there is an obligation to honour one. s promises. As noted before, the French abandoned Mururoa as testing area, a course of action not required in the Test Ban Treaty and taken explicitly on behalf of Rarotonga.

The treaty itself does not state definitions about the right to peaceful nuclear explosions, so we don. t see this complication here(see Tlatelolco). A novelty is the emphasis on the exclusion of military nuclear tests, as a consequence of the year-long French presence on Mururoa. A rather weak point in the treaty is that every country can decide by itself whether to grant hospitality to ships and planes(particularly of nuclear weapon states) possibly carrying nuclear weapons. This is all the more important because the area consists largely of international waters and airspace, where no limitations are in force regarding the transportation of nuclear weapons, for instance on account of the treaty regarding free transport over water. The area covered by the Treaty of Rarotonga runs northward roughly to the equator(including some small areas on the northern hemisphere), borders eastward on the area covered by the treaty of Tlatelolco, is bounded southward by the 60th southern parallel and westward covers Australia. The area itself contains thirteen countries of which so far twelve have ratified(Tonga being the exception).

The Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South East Asia(Treaty of Bangkok)

The Treaty date being December 15, 1995, this zone is very recent. It covers ten countries total(icluding the city-state Singapore), including eastward Indonesia, the Philippines and connects on the continent all countries south of China and west of India up to former Burma, today called Myanmar.8
Expansion of the area is not anticipated and - certainly for the present - not actually possible on account of the status of China and India. By the end of 1996 five of the minimum seven ratifications had been won and today, all ten countries having ratified it, the treaty is officially in force. It is however still lacking the blessing of the nuclear weapon states since the protocol providing the respecting of the zone hasn. t yet been signed by any of the nuclear weapon states let alone ratified by them. One of their objections is that the zone has not been clearly demarcated.9 It is unclear whether this objection is real, since in the other treaties straight lines are drawn across ocean areas that would not be actually applicable on account of the obligation to respect the definitions of the Law of the Sea Treaty. In combination with the objection to the unclear demarcation, in the opinion of the nuclear weapon states, free sea passage would not be adequately provided for. It is unclear whether this dispute, of minor importance in the opinion of the countries involved, will continue holding up the signing by the nuclear weapon states.

The Nucear Weapon Free Zone for Africa(Treaty of Palindaba)

The Treaty covers the entire African continent, Madagascar and a number of island groups in the Atlantic and Indian ocean. 10 The treaty was signed the 11th April, 1996 by 53(along with some late-comers) of the some 60 African states. Setting aside some island groups, thus far others on the continent have stayed outside the process: Botswana, Congo(Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Somalia, West Sahara and Tanzania. These are not countries with a nuclear infrastructure; so the political meaning of their current present absence is therefore not so great. The contributions to the UNIDIR book don. t go into the absence of these countries, so it might be a case of too little political interest or acting capability.11 So far, all nuclear weapon states have signed the Treaty, even France has ratified it. Also in this treaty, a protocol explicitly prohibiting nuclear tests was entered into. This is where the South African attempts in the Kalahari desert and the French tests in the Sahara in the sixties play a part. Having been ratified by only two states, Mauritius and Gambia, by October 1996, the Treaty still has to pick up speed in Africa. The Treaty states its coming into force after 28 ratifications, that is, when roughly half of the continent has reacted positively. Relevant to Europe is that the whole of Northern Africa is involved in the treaty. So, the political intention is almost complete, but legal completion is still in its infancy.

In looking at the four mentioned NWFZs we have passed the treaties with a clear status. With these, we haven. t reached the end of future possibilities, though the latter will be definitely harder to realise than the former.

Other initiatives outside Europe

Central Asia

Mongolia proclaimed its territory a nuclear weapon free zone in 1992(unilaterally).
It is hemmed in between the nuclear weapon states Russia and China but could try to connect itself to a possible future zone that would have to embrace particularly Kazachstan(and the other former Soviet states). Mongolia would be eager to see this realised. Uzbekistan has made positive remarks in the UN about a nuclear weapon free zone in the region. Also Kyrgyzstan has been involved in the initiatives. The region is probably the only one left in the world that could be the foundation of a NWFZ. The prohibition of nuclear tests will in this case certainly be included. By far the most tests were done in Kazakhstan. The effort towards a nuclear weapon free zone in this region received a powerful impulse from the international conference held mid September 1997 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.13

The Middle East

The core of the problem in the Middle East is, of course, the threshold status(or rather the unofficial nuclear weapon status) of, on the one side, Israel, and the hostility between Israel and a number of Arabian states, (Iraq, Syria) and also Iran, on the other. Nevertheless, attempts were made in the past to open dialogue on a nuclear weapon free zone.14 As early as 1974, Egypt and Jordan submitted a resolution to the UN about this matter. In the opinion of Egypt, the 1991 Madrid Conference also laid a basis for further handling of the problem. The Egyptian approach did not connect, however, to the complication created by the presence in the region of other weapons of mass destruction. It does recognise the necessity of fundamental change in the region. The main reason for the minimal progress is(of course) that Israel chooses to regard a NWFZ as part of confidence-building measures and a peace process in the Middle East and this rather as a final than an intermediate phase. Other states like Egypt are trying to start consultations already and regard freeing the region of nuclear weapons as part of the process and not necessarily as a last step. Nor is it a politically sound option to leave Iraq and Iran outside of the zone. Precisely these two countries pose the biggest threat to Israel with weapons of mass destruction. Having been not fully checked despite the UN. s custody after the lost Gulf War, Iraq may be the biggest threat and Iran. s nuclear threat to the future may not be fully assessable at this time. Excluding both countries would leave the latent threat towards Israel undiscussed and thus perpetuated and for Israel this would surely be a motive not to join the treaty.

But even if both countries do cooperate, the reliability of this cooperation would remain a crucial point. All this means that the prospects are not so good for this region, for a treaty without Israel would lack any political relevance and could at the most be regarded as a means of pressure against Israel.

North East Asia

This area embraces both Koreas and Japan. As we know, a bitter dispute arose in 1994 between North Korea and the United States over the nuclear status of North Korea. North Korea joined the NPT only very late(in 1985) and has since adopted a very difficult stance towards the obliged IAEA inspections. 15 This was solved relatively well, considering the circumstances, by supplying nuclear installations and gradually taking apart the suspect ones. North Korea is still denies that there ever was a real problem aside from the bad relations with the United States.16 Even in 1991 a treaty was signed by North and South Korea to the effect of denuclearize the peninsula, by means of mutual inspections to obviate the too weak IAEA regime. But this never came into effect due to the bad relations between the two countries. This treaty even went further than the treaties of the then existing NWFZs on the points of prohibiting uranium enriching and upworking activities. These definitions - if, of course, complied with - would indeed be sufficient to guarantee the certainty of absence of military nuclear activities, provided the confirmation
that no fissile materials have been produced in advance. That is not the case for North Korea.

Apart from North Korea. s rather serious intractability on the international scene, there is in itself a reasonable prospect that in a few years the way towards a nuclear free zone for the region will be disclosed, after the completion of nuclear installations presently under construction with Western support, the taking apart of the older nuclear installations and the surrender of about ten kilograms of plutonium. Today, it is still in question whether North Korea either has none, one or two nuclear weapons.

South Asia

This region indicates the Indian subcontinent including its relation to China. Particularly crucial is the position of India because of its bad relations with both China and Pakistan. The relationship with China in India. s position is crucial, the one to Pakistan, more secondary. Since China can be expected, although not certainly, to be willing to abandon its nuclear status, albeit only jointly with the other four established nuclear weapon states and since India is only willing to abandon its threshold status in conjunction with either global or Chinese nuclear disarmament, there is actually no real prospect whatsoever for a nuclear free zone in this area. Another complication is that Pakistan almost certainly won. t abandon its threshold status without Indian disarmament. One of India. s political parties recently even urged to openly recognise India. s nuclear status.17

Europe - the previous history

Although the situation in Europe is particularly complicated by the presence of three nuclear weapon states within the European territory and the stressed involvement of a fourth(the United States) through NATO, and on top of that, the complication of the Cold War from 1945 to 1990, this doesn. t mean attempts were never made to
initialize a NWFZ in certain regions of Europe. I will name the following:18

1. In 1956, the Soviet Union proposed to banish the stationing of nuclear arms in Europe. It is unclear whether this was meant to include the Soviet Union. s European territory. It did intend, of course, to counteract nuclear arms in England and, possibly later, in other European states.
2. In 1957, Poland produced the Rapacki-plan(adjusted in 1958 and 1962) to keep Poland, the GDR and the GFR free of nuclear arms.
3. Rumania made a proposal for the Balkan area in 1957. This was repeated several times, also by the Soviet Union in 1969, adding an expansion towards the Adriatic.
4. The Soviet Union made a proposal for the Mediterranean in 1963.
5. Poland made a proposal in 1964 that also contained, compared to 1957, Czecho-Slovakia.
6. Sweden, in 1961, put forward a plan to research the support of a nuclear weapon free zone.
7. This initiative was taken up by Finland in 1963, and repeated in 1971 and 1973, particularly for the Northern region.
8. Ireland made a proposal analogous to that of Sweden in 1969.
9. A recent proposal, an actual post-Cold War one, is the one made in 1990 by Belarus for the creation of a zone from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This would mean that a number of countries like the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia and neighbouring states like Chechya, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria could join, and possibly even Sweden and Finland. In the meantime, the complication of joining NATO has emerged for some states in this area. In 1996, the initiative was revived by a letter of the Belarus president Lukashenko to the UN Secretary General. But the problem is that, on account of his fascist sympathies, this same president does not at all seem the right person to support the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in Europe. Moreover, the political independence of Belarus vis á vis Russia is - by its own wish - considerably smaller than the other former Soviet states. .

So it is of the greatest importance for the success of a plan for installation of a NWFZ in Europe, that the initiative be broadened, preferably to countries like Sweden and Finland, if it is ever going to succeed.

Outlines of a Treaty for a European nucear weapon free zone

This part lays out what such a treaty could look like. In general, only the most important elements as regards content and the politically most sensitive are touched upon. The exact contents of such a treaty is lawyers. work and at this time not relevant. I have consciously chosen an integral approach, one involving every country, rather than beginning in Central Europe. The latter could always be returned to if the whole of Europe being a starting point would be the subject of a veto by many of the countries concerned. After all, the premise is that a NWFZ be an initiative of the countries concerned in a region. The question remains as to what such a veto would mean in the case of a non-nuclear weapon state. I don. t recall that, for instance, Argentina ever formally protested against its being included in the NWFZ concerned without being party to the treaty.

Should the treaty get off the ground, it might still result for years in an incoherent patchwork. But, for Europe, the political weight of any kind of start would be of the utmost importance. In case such a zone would begin with - for an example - Ireland, Finland, Ukraine and Slovakia then this would hopefully put the necessary pressure on the NATO countries. Even the treaty of Tlatelolco got off to a poor start but finally grew into a solid whole

It would be wise to note carefully the comment of Michael Weston, former British deputy to the Conference on Disarmament at the Tlatelolco conference. He is, in fact, stating a complete - certainly for the moment - rejection of the proposal and is ostensibly speaking for other European NATO countries. NATO will definitely not be willing to abandon the existing nuclear doctrine where nuclear arms still form the cornerstone of defense. Nevertheless, a glance at the world map shows that Europe is the area - apart from the Central Asian region - where the mutual enmity between former East and West is considerably smaller than in the other reviewed non-nuclear weapon free zones. Should the attempt fail to set up a reasonable beginning of a nuclear weapon free zone in Europe within the next ten years, then it can be said, with a variation on the Indian Ashok Kapur. s statement, that the concept of the nuclear weapon free zone works effectively where least needed, and, where most needed, not at all.20

Description of the proposal

1. The intended nuclear weapon free zone contains the entire area marked as Europe including Iceland, the European part of Turkey, and Russia up to the
   Ural.
   If this proposal would be unacceptable to some of the countries involved, this would be a motive to - as noted before - shrink the area involved to for instance parts of Middle and Eastern Europe. It would, however, lose - hopefully only temporarily - a major part of its political challenge.
2. Every European state has the right to join the treaty.
3. The states party to the Non Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and to the Test Ban Treaty repeat, on joining, their obligations regarding these treaties, particularly regarding its clauses I, II, III and the abandoning of nuclear explosions in their territories. With the said articles there would be sufficient basis for the abandoning of nuclear arms and sufficient basis for the control thereof.
4. The states to join are obliged to refuse stationing nuclear arms, as well as specific equipment such as missiles, of the nuclear weapon states or to demand its removal before joining can be effected.
   

   This part is specifically applicable to the remainder of American tactical nuclear arms in the various NATO states. It is, of course, more logical and desirable that the decision to withdraw would be taken once in the NATO context for all countries concerned. For some states to go it alone would mean the practical disintegration of NATO which is outside political reality at the moment. Pursuing this course, it may be an option to put the land-based strategic nuclear arms(of Russia and France) next on the agenda. The nuclear submarines of Russia, France and the United Kingdom can certainly only be addressed in the final stage of a universal solution to the nuclear arms problem. The question today is whether this issue is already on the political horizon. 21

5. The states to join are obliged to deny access to their ports, territorial waters, airports and airspace all ships and airplanes transporting nuclear arms. This
   point has been added to clearly define . nuclear purity. and to prevent possible forms of pseudo-stationings. Being nuclear weapon free should, for the participating states, be without compromise.
6. The three nuclear weapon states within the territory of Europe: Russia, France and the United Kingdom, can join the treaty on condition that they declare considerable parts of their territory to be part of the nuclear weapon free zone, or decide to exclude from it certain limited parts. They can enter into this for a period of ten years with the possibility of requesting a one-time extension of ten years. Thereafter they shall have to join as common members with an entire(European) nuclear weapon free territory, or they shall have to withdraw.
   

   In rule 6, a possible perspective has been outlined with respect to the three European nuclear weapon states, intended to prevent their prior exclusion rather than expecting their immediate commitment. It puts France and the UK, in particular, in a dilemma regarding the aim of a nuclear weapon free status within twenty years. A longer period would be irrelevant; in which case the rule might as well be struck off and the three countries involved might as well be expected not to join.

7. The states situated partly in Europe and partly in Asia can either include their European part or their entire territory into the nuclear weapon free zone. Formally,
   this applies to Turkey but is also crucial for Russia. The rule provides Russia with the option to give a maximal demonstration of its goodwill towards Europe and still choose for the . final solution. with its Asiatic part.
8. The treaty will be in force after its ratification by at least five states. Thereafter it will be in force for each separate state.
   The low threshold is a compromise between a circumference being at least somewhat substantial and still having a threshold as low as possible. Especially if a start is made the in Middle of Europe, fewer rather than more than five states could be considered. The threshold is higher than the one of the treaty of Tlatelolco, but lower than the ones in all other mentioned treaties.
9. In an additional protocol the nuclear weapon states declare to offer so-called unconditional negative security guarantees to the states party to the treaty, and not part of any military alliance which includes a nuclear weapon state; similar to the ones offered in the other nuclear weapon free zones. This means that they can never be threatened or attacked with nuclear arms, not even in the case of an armed conflict.
   Rule 9 is not more complicated than the definitions entered into in the protocols of the other treaties. The rule requires the nuclear weapon free zone to be equally respected with regard to independent countries and applies in practice to all non-NATO countries.
10. The nuclear weapon states commit themselves at the same time to apply the principle of no first use in the case of conflicts in the nuclear weapon free zone, that means regarding countries having already joined the treaty. This applies in particular, to the protection of participating states which are, at the same time, part of an alliance that inclides one or more nuclear weapon states.
    

    A much bigger problem arises regarding the NATO states without nuclear arms. As long as a form of American nuclear guarantee remains in existence within the NATO context, Russia will, with regard to these countries, never agree to a guarantee similar to the one regarding, for instance, Finland, the Baltic states etc. This can be deduced with certainty from the additional statements made by several nucear weapon states to the protocols belonging to the treaties of nuclear weapon free zones, where an exception is made regarding a state having or seeking an alliance with a nuclear weapon state in the case of a conflict. The no first use declaration, as formulated here, has no bearing on a direct conflict between nuclear weapon states and is, as such, less comprehensive than a general no first use arrangement. The latter would, of course, be a much better solution, but if it were rejected for the time being, this limited form could hopefully be favoured within a European context. This is an attempt to protect NATO states considering joining the treaty from the negative effects of the nuclear guarantee. If the US would abandon the(first) use of nuclear arms in a European conflict that is not directly to do with US-Russia relations, Russia could also abandon (first) use against non-nuclear NATO states. The aforementioned does imply such an amendment to the NATO treaty. A death-blow to a . genuine. European nuclear weapon free zone would be a command or instruction from NATO not to join. Only if, within a complete transformation towards a security- rather than a defence pact, the NATO nuclear strategy would be expunged, would the protocol of rule 9 be sufficient for sustaining the treaty.

11. The nuclear weapon states commit themselves, at the same time, in the said protocol to exclude the threat and use of nuclear arms in the case of a European conflict where the UN has called for peace operations and where European states act either separately or within an alliance with nuclear weapon states.
    

    This rule was added . to be quite on the safe side. , but probably won. t generate(extra) problems. It implies that, for instance, neither Russia nor the US should be allowed to jeopardize by nuclear threats a UN-action that they might not(any longer) agree with.

Conclusion

It needs no argument that any attempt to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in Europe is a complex and precarious affair. After all, four of the five official nuclear weapon states are directly involved. Moreover, NATO. s role with its American nuclear guarantees towards the non-nuclear member states is equally complicating, primarily, of course, by the present stationing of American nuclear arms. It is obvious, however, that without the removal of these weapons the zone will never really gain any momentum and will be predestined to remain a Middle European affair. Still, Europe is almost predestined to become the next nuclear weapon free zone after the one in Central Asia. If not, the whole process might grind to a halt. On account of the present tensions, time is even less ripe in East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. The emergence of a treaty that possibly only non-aligned states would initially be a part of, could hopefully create some positive tension for those NATO countries that could see advantages in joining. This proposal is a thinking exercise on behalf of a viable course, should the political will emerge to give the concept a chance in Europe.

References

1. Román-Morey, E. (1997) Precursor of other Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones, chapter 2 of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century,New York: United Nations/UNIDIR. Many notes have been derived from this book and from here on will be named only with author, title and chapter.
2. See Goldblat, J. (1994), Arms Control,Stockholm: SIPRI, 309-313.
3. See Goldblat, J. (1994), p. 326-341.
4. See Nuclear Confidence Building between Argentina and Brazil.
5. See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation And Disarmament Agreements(1996), 5th edition, New York: United Nations, 58-78.
6. See Goldblat (1994), 502-511.
7. See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation(1996), 222-226. Also Baaro, M. (1997), The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga),UNIDIR, chapter 7.
8. Status of Multilateral Arms Regulations(1996), 255-270.
9. This objection can be found in the contribution by Ganapathi, A. (1997), The Treaty on the South- East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (The Bangkok Treaty), chapter 9, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.There was another objection regarding the entering or not of negative security guarantees. As such, the required guarantees are clearly defined in art. 2 of the protocol.
10. See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation(1996), 271-294.
11. See Román-Morey, E. (1997) and Ayewah, I.E., The Treaty on the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Africa (The Pelindaba Treaty), UNIDIR, chapter 2 and 8.
12. See Enkhsaikhan, J., Central-Asia Future Perspectives, UNIDIR, chapter 14.
13. International Conference on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, 15-16 September 1997, Disarmament, A Periodic Review,United Nations, XX, 1, 1997.
14. See Elaraby, N., The Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, and Lior, Y., Middle East- Future Perspectives, UNIDIR, chapters 12 and 13 respectively.
15. See Sijde, B. van der (1995), Kernwapens op hun retour?,Nijmegen: Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken, cahier 61, 82-87 and 92-106.
16. See Seo-Hang Lee, Denuclearization Efforts on the Korean Peninsula, chapter 15 and Kim Chan Sik, The South of Asia and the Korean Peninsula, UNIDIR, chapter 16.
17. Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a conversation on January 8, 1998.
18. This enumeration was derived from a contribution by Alyaksandr Sychou, ambassador of Belarus. See Sychou, A., Status of the Initiative to create a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Space in Central and Eastern Europe, UNIDIR, chapter 10.
19. See Weston, M., A possible Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Europe, UNIDIR, chapter 11.
20. The remark of the Indian Ashok Kapur originally relates to the Non-Proliferation- Treaty (see Van der Sijde (1995) and Kapur, A. (1990), Dump the Treaty, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,46, 6 (June)), but has the bitter undertone that India made one of the most negative contributions to the NPT. It would be distressing if NATO were to play a similar role in Europe regarding a nuclear free zone.
21. See Sijde, B van der (1997), Kernbewapening is een vergeten probleem, NRC/Handelsblad,December 29.

Dr. B. van der Sijde is Senior Lecturer in Physics and Society at the Technical University of Eindhoven. He is also Board member of Pugwash Netherlands and council member of the IKV(Interchurch Peace Council).