As part of a delegation of 13 Indians comprising retired bureaucrats, journalists and academics that was officially hosted by the Iranian Ministry of energy, I was in Iran recently for almost a fortnight. We were the first foreign delegation to be taken to see their Heavy Water plant in Arak since it was commissioned in August 2006. We also had lengthy interchanges with top Iranian bureaucrats.
Clearly, Iran is both totally determined to develop a sophisticated and highly modern civilian nuclear energy sector, yet still several years from having the capacity to produce enriched uranium at a level whereby they could, if they wanted to (which they officially deny), also make the bomb. And the United States knows this. So why the pressure via the IAEA and what do Iranians think about all this? Iran is very much in the early stages of nuclear energy development whose eventual contribution to meeting Iran's overall energy needs will be very limited. So, the issue is mainly one of prestige and angry nationalism. Whatever the public's feelings about their government's general political behaviour — this is undoubtedly a politically repressive society whose recent police clampdown on female dress codes in public has justifiably created much resentment — on this issue there is broad unity. What right, Iranians say, do nuclear weapons possessing states like the US have, to tell Iran not to develop nuclear energy?
As for the IAEA, Teheran is perfectly correct to point out that it was illegal and unwarranted for the IAEA to transfer the Iran dossier to the Security Council (SC) — something that has never been done for any other member country whose civilian programmes have been investigated. There have been several of these and clarifications routinely take several years. Indeed, Iran is willing to answer all queries from the IAEA within a month, but rightly demands that the Iran dossier be withdrawn from the SC and sent back to the IAEA. The point, of course, is that the US (which successfully got the EU, India, Russia and China to back it) wanted to shift the issue to the SC precisely because the latter has sanctioning power while the IAEA does not.
The US game is simple. Iran is rightly seen as their long-term opponent in West Asia for reasons that go well beyond the nuclear issue. It is seen by the US, and most certainly sees itself, as the rising power in the region. Indeed, the US invasion of Iraq has not only put an end to the unified Iraq of almost a century, but its unintended outcome has been to immensely enhance Iran's influence in Iraq and beyond! The US, if it wants to maintain its own (and Israel's) dominance in the region must therefore try and squeeze and isolate Iran by using the nuclear issue as an excuse, a tactic that has some plausibility because of the inherently dual-use nature of all civilian nuclear energy programmes.
What was also obvious to the delegation is that Iranians at all levels were genuinely shocked by India's IAEA vote since there has been a very friendly political relationship between the two countries both during the Shah's rule and afterwards. Indeed, despite constant contact at the highest governmental levels, Iran had no inkling that India would vote against it and therefore their sense of betrayal is all the greater! Amends are being made and the latest statements of Pranab Mukherjee, India's foreign minister, about Iran's civilisational greatness and the dangers of trying to isolate it, are evidence of this.
But given the long term and foundational rift between the US and Iran, the Indian government faces an enduring dilemma regardless of the pipeline deal or its other commercial-economic dealings with Iran. It is the politics that is crucial. At a maximum the US wants India on its side against Iran, at a minimum India must be neutralised vis-à-vis Iran. This is the sub-text of the Indo-US nuclear deal and India cannot have it both ways, namely, steadily improving relations with both countries. The US will see to that, and Iranians are waiting and watching!
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