Armed Forces and the Drug War: Between Garrisons, Caletas and Borders

The same player who sent his castle to a dangerous part of the chess board now has the chance to move it back to a more secure place... for everyone

On April 5, 1992, President Alberto Fujimori announced that the Armed Forces would take part in the war on drug trafficking, especially in the coca-producing valleys of the eastern strip of the Andes: Bajo Huallaga, Alto Huallaga, Pichis Palcazú Apurimac, among others. Until then, the armed forces had avoided getting involved in this international "war", causing prolonged grumblings from the "señores de la guerra", especially those in the US State Department and Defense Department, the principal promotors of miliary intervention in the antidrug war in the Andes.

In December 1995 -three years and eight months later- President Fujimori announced the end of army involvement in the drug war and its progressive replacement by members of the Peruvian National Police. In April 1996 Legislative Decree 824 formalized the presidential decision. Nevertheless, in the socially unstable coca-producing regions, the military columns of the Sendero Luminoso (Feliciano group) have taken advantage of an explosive mix: the historical absence of the State, an economic crisis, and deep-rooted violence. Indeed, they have made political-military inroads in the area, by blocking roads through the highland forests and occupying towns. These developments have obliged the government to reopen several military bases, including the base in Aucayacu in Alto Huallaga.

Between 1992 and 1996 the most important cases of involvement (both individual and organizational) of armed forces personnel in drug trafficking were reported. The political response was to allow a notorious absence of police and judicial investigations. Corrupt members of the marines and the Air Force have also made use of their equipment, their routes and their military procedures to ship major quantities of crude coca paste and HCl abroad, taking advantage of a range of institutional facilities.

All of this raises a basic question: "how can the State provide security in Huallaga in the face of Senderista threats, while at the same time launching an effective battle against the peruvian "drug firms", while, at the same time, keeping the members, installations and equipment of the armed forces from being used in drug trafficking?"

Amazonic background.

During the second half of the 1980s, the Amazon region was notable for the absence of State institutions and influence. A broad range of drug traffickers and other "irregular" activities have left the Andean governments powerless, causing a climate of permanent convulsion in the region. The actions carried out by the FARC and the ELN in the coca-growing regions of Guaviare, Putumayo and Magdalena in Colombia, were repeated in Peru by the Huallaga Regional Committee of the Sendero Luminoso and the Northeastern Front of the MRTA in the Peruvian highland forests, which became involved in narcotrafficking to raise resources, distract the State and fuel a process in which social and political contradictions are exacerbated.

Since 1990, a new strategy toward the population and the improved mobility and presence of the Peruvian Armed Forces managed to isolate the Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA from the local populations, especially in the valleys of Apurimac, Ucayali, Alto Huallaga and Huallaga Central. The military actions, supported mainly by the civilian "ronderos" played an important role in this process. To achieve such success, the Armed Forces decided to end the inefficient coca eradication programs carried out between 1983 and 1988 by the CORAH project, with the support of members of the National Police's UMOPAR. These activities had facilitated the arrival and acceptance of the Senderista columns in Huallaga, with the support of the coca producers themselves, who had been affected by eradication, only to be "abandoned" by the government without any sort of indemnization.

Nevertheless, the partial resolution of the conflict in Huallaga did not signify an end to the population's problems.

The drastic application of stabilization programs -in 1987 in Bolivia and 1992 in Peru- worsened the historic divorce between the Amazon region and the State, affecting the colonists, the peasant and the native populations, which found themselves easily subordinated to the illicit economy of drug trafficking. The State agencies providing credit, development and promotional programs were ended; the application of justice in the area was undermined by narcotrafficking and subversion, and by situations of economic, political and social tension. Given such conditions, efforts at alternative development and the search for "valid intermediaries" were reduced to simplistic discourse, without any possibility of being carried out in practice. (2) All that remained of the State in the region were the Political-Military Fronts, with broad decision-making powers and untouched by State oversight, a situation that created perfect conditions for illicit deals and unsavory alliances.

Even though the Armed Forces, with the support of the local population, managed to defeat the subversives in the coca-producing regions, the same cannot be said of the war on drug trafficking. None of the actors involved in this "Anti-drug war" (including the Clinton administration, several Andean governments, the military leadership, and that segment of the civilian population represented by political parties) could foresee the consequences of the militarization of the coca problem.

International policy: Enter the Armed Forces.

Since 1980 the US and the Andean countries have collaborated closely in drug-related matters, in spite of the obstacles created by the conflicts between the White Hous and US Congressional committees over the assignment of funds to the Andean countries' armed forces, due to the risks implicit in such a decision. That is, the risks of handing over resources to Armed Forces that had a long history of intervention in matters of government, with dubious records in human rights and possibility of having these funds diverted for counter-insurgency tasks.

Nevertheless, throughout the Republican period (Reagan 1980-1988, Bush 1988-1992) the US signed numerous agreements to provide equipment, train military and police, and send military advisors to the countries of the region, including Peru.

In 1986 President Reagan declared drug trafficking to be a national security problem. Beginning with the Andean Strategy (September 1989), the US State Department recommended the intervention of the not only the US Armed Forces, but also the military from the Andean countries themselves. By this time the operation "Just Cause", carried out to capture General Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama, could be considered the first "round" of this regional crusade. While Colombia and Bolivia accepted the progressive involvement of the military through joint activities and bilateral assistance, for the reasons already noted, Peruvian President Alan García refused to accept this militarist approach.

Oddly, his successor, Alberto Fujimori, refused to sign the anti-drugs convention signed with the United States until May of 1991, (3) when under the auspices of the Democracy and Liberty Institute and its promotor Hernando De Soto, the Peruvian government signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the United States. What is certain, though, is that since 1988 the White House's annual strategy presented to the US Congress has included the possibility of using the armed forces in anti-drug efforts. At the same time, these reports have consistently pointed to the risks and problems of such a political decision: the use of anti-drug equipment for battling armed groups (Colombia), the problems of corruption (Peru), human rights problems, (Peru and Colombia) and the matter of efficient use of resources (especially in Bolivia, but also in Peru and Colombia).

The esclation of the military involvement in the drug war reached its highest point during the San Antonio Summit, when President George Bush raised the possibility of creating a multinational forces -anti-drug Blue Helmets- to battle this transnational crime. Nevertheless, with the lack of programs to accompany the anti-drug efforts with funding for "alternative development" in the region, President Fujimori refused to go along, at the same time accusing DEA agents in the Andean region with corruption. In the end, the Summit was a disaster that contributed to George Bush's electoral defeat and brought the Democrats into the White House. In 1993 the government of President Bill Clinton proposed important institutional and policy changes, with a new anti-drug policy that focused on battling drug use. Even so, there was little room for greater national and regional autonomy in formulating and applying policies. While during Clinton's second term the use of presidential certification remains the administration's most important mechanism for pressuring the Andean governments, the uncovering of scandals that mix politics with drugs, and the direct conditioning of economic assistance make up the other "face" of the US foreign policy toward the region.

The Peruvian experience.

The Peruvian armed forces remained uninvolved in anti-narcotics tasks for three fundamental reasons: first, because they were above all tied up with the anti-subversive efforts in Huallaga; second, because of the risks of internal corruption that could accompany such a decision; and third, because previous efforts -eradicating coca production in the early 1980s- contributed to the increase in activities of the Sendero Luminoso in the area.

Then, on April 5, 1992, the Armed Forces suddenly agreed to intervene directly as anti-drug "hounds". In return for the Armed Forces' acceptance of Fujimori's decision to close the Congress and the Judiciary, the president agreed to place the military's Joint Command at the head of the anti-drug interdiction efforts.

To avoid historical problems of coordination between the police (DINANDRO and UMOPAR) and the Armed Forces, important institutional changes were carried out. The Operative Command of the Internal Front (COFI) was created and a rules were laid out that would resolve operative problems by establishing the authority of the Joint Command over other institutions involved.

Even though the Air Force (FAP) had been involved in air control since 1988, (4), beginning in 1992 (5) the government charged the VI Air Territorial Region (RAT), with the task of establishing air bases and aeronautical headquarters for carrying out air interdiction activities. Air control was established over the cities of Yurimaguas, Tarapoto, Bellavista, Tocache, Santa Lucía, Uchiza, Pucalpa, Tingo María, Constitución, San Ramón, San Francisco y Palmapampa. At the same time army commandos occupied 18 air strips, investigated air craft and destroyed landing strips, with the resulting approval of local residents, who knew that the drug traffickers would waste little time before hiring local workers at attractive wages to rebuild the landing strips. For this effort, the government counted on US assistance with radar equipment, helicopters, and financial resources needed to cover operating expenses.

At the same time, marine infantry units took charge of the operations in the area of Padre Abad and Aguaytia (department of Ucayalí), where narcotrafficking had been present since 1992. For its part, the army set up bases and garrisons in Huánuco, San Martín and Apurímac, which allowed greater control over the sporadic attacks of the remaining Senderistas.

Even so, the price was very high, since it was exactly by way of these routes -the Carretera Marginal, the rivers, and the Amazonic trails- were used by the drug enterprises that set in place their workers to gather the PBC and to allow for the shipments to Leticia and Caballococha (Colombia).

An evaluation

According to the RAT, in 1992 70 airplanes were intercepted; in 1993, 67 airplanes; and in 1994, 36. Through August 1995, 250 day and night operations were carried out and 21 planes were intercepted. Taking into consideration the logistical resources available, the campaigns were a success. Even so, if evaluated from the point of view of costs for the drug rings and the illegal drug economy, the impact was minimal.

In terms of efficiency, it can be said that, in spite of the increase in drugs confiscated (averaging 30 tons of PBC a year), the more than 12,000 arrests for illicit drug trafficking, the dozens of landing strips destroyed (6) and airplanes intercepted, all of these results are far from critical for the economy of the drug barons. These increased expenses can be easily passed along (as with any legal indirect tax) or covered by the local drug producers themselves.

The military's intervention has caused a shift in the cultivation of coca to new areas in Ucayalí, Loreto, and Madre de Dios, in the heart of lowland forests. The same has occurred with the "caletas", or the laboratories for elaborating HCl, subordinating a greater number of local residents into the drug economy.

In any case, the most efficient agent in eradicating the coca plants and temporarily dismantling drug production in Peru, has been the fungus fusarium oxysporum, which became a problem in 1991, along with the extent of the farm crisis being experienced in the coca-growing valleys since April 1995. Perhaps this explains the reduced pressure on Peru -the world's largest coca producer- coming from the US Department of State, compared to US policies affecting Peru's neighbors. (7)

On the other hand, the developments in the conflict in Cenépa (1995) and the persistent border problems with Ecuador should be taken into account when considering the issue of deviation of anti-drug resources. The unexpected Ecuadoran incursion put in evidence the excessive diversification of the Armed Forces' labors in internal and external matters. In an event organized by the Air Force, (8) the head of the VI RAT said that "when faced with the needs of national defense, all of the activities in the internal front should become subordinated to those of the external front". As a matter of fact, just days after the beginning of the conflict, the army dismantled the Huallaga Front, which had been carrying out activities against the Sendero Luminoso and narcotrafficking.

On March 3, 1995, the VI Military Region was created, with headquartersn Bagua, in response not only to the strategy generated by the conflict with Ecuador and the need for a permanent force, but also to the need for rapid development in that area of the Peruvian northeast. However, if we look at the circumstances in which the military has intervened against Peruvian drug trafficking, we find that this intervention was also necessary to maintain the political status quo: the maintenance of six years of recurring states of emergency in the major provinces of Peru where coca leaves or PBC are grown. This situation allows for the political, military and administrative hegemony of the "Political-Military Commands", while curbing the development of local popular participation. It also served to weaken civilian institutions in the Amazon.

In a similar situation, in other Andean countries use has been made of the state of exception in order to face similar problems, which curiously, take place in scenarios involving drug trafficking. These controls have contributed to cases -recognized by government authorities themselves- of corruption involving judges, police and military. In general, in the Andean region, this unlimited use of states of exception has allowed for the free movement of military units, and their involvement in a range of legal and illegal actions.

Corruption and drugs

Clearly the key to the drug business is the security of operations, which requires the complicity of civilian, police and military authorities. The experience of Bolivia in 1981, when leaders of the military regime (General García Meza and General Arce Gomez) both ended up in jail, served to show the extent to which drug trafficking can corrupt authorities. The development of Proceso 8000 and the accusations that drug organizations were financing political campaigns highlight the extreme vulnerability facing institutions in the Andean countries.

Similar experiences have been seen in other countries outside of the region. In Pakistan, ex-military regimes were accused of direct links to drug trafficking. In Myanmar (ex-Birmania) -the world's most important producer of opium- the present dictatorship faces similar accusations. What is certain is that throughout the world, narcotraffickers have managed to take advantage of existing conflictive situations by entering into deals with one or the other side in the conflict (Lebanon and Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s).

The cases of corruption between 1992 and 1996 involving the Peruvian military, have been made public through a number of distinct channels: testimonies of ex-armed forces members; (9); US Department of State reports on Peru; (10) press reports; (11) and investigations involving charges from members of the drug trafficking organizations themselves. (12). Even though official statistics do not exist regarding the reported cases of corruption, (13) two types of evidence exist as to the reactions these cases have produced.

The military's own tribunals and the armed forces internal agencies have kept these cases out of the civilian justice system, in spite of the Penal Code stipulation (Article 296) to the contrary. Thus, impunity regarding these cases has been constant, which surely has influenced in the decision of President Fujimori in keeping the military out of this line of work. Recently, the Supreme Military's Attorney General, Colonel Raúl Talledo, argued that drug trafficking cases in which civilians and military are implicated should go before military tribunals because of their demonstrated "efficiency and speed". Another common response has been to deviate investigations into drug-related charges and to drag on proceedings.

Nevertheless, other worrisome cases exist in which the military authorities have acted in exactly the opposite manner. This was the case between 1991 and 1993 with General Ríos Arayco, chief of the Military Political Command in Huallaga and General Bellido and his successor General Bellido. In Ríos Arayco's case, the intervention of the civilian judiciary was permitted to investigate and deduce criminal responsibility in the case of an official possibly involved in drug trafficking. His principal crime, however, was that he had failed to support General Hermozo Ríos as commander of the Peruvian Armed Forces. In the second case, in spite of the accusations in the press and demands for justice, General Bellido did not bother responding to the courts while he was military attache in Israel, and when he returned, he went into retirement.

Another important characteristic has been the way in which the government dealt with the cases of known drug dealers and heads of local drug enterprises, who had been erroneously sent to tribunals on charges of treason (for the links between the drug enterprises and the local SL committees); thus avoiding charges of common crimes. In the case of Limoniel Chavez Peñarera, alias "Vaticano", when he was expelled from Colombia and sent back to Peru, he was swiftly charged with treason, and tried in a military tribunal. He was then sent to military prison, evidence was withheld, and witnesses faced problems when they went to testify. Finally, however, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The weak reaction of the other public institutions should also be pointed out. First, the Judiciary frequently abdicated in disputes of jurisdiction with the military tribunals, when faced with specific cases in which the civilian courts refused to absolve implicated officers or release them from prison. The oversight activities of the Task Force on Chemical Inputs and on Congressional Corruption were stalled completely after April 5, 1992, a situation that should be corected for the welfare of the country.

Since 1992, the Democratic Constituent Congress (later the Congress of the Republic dominated by the official majority) also gave up on oversight, especially in relation to the cases implicating military and civilian leaders close to the government.

The weaknesses of the Armed Forces

In light of the above described facts, the removal of the armed forces from drug interdiction is also justified because of certain "disadvantages" unique to military institutions:

• Their vertical and hierarchical structures reduce the possibilities of controls (a commonplace in the military is the statement that orders are to be obeyed and not questioned). At the same time, this structure implies that when an official is corrupted, so are those officers under his command, backed by the institution's "esprit de corps" that tends to defend members of a unit under investigation, producing cases bordering on impunity. Given such a political and military framework, strange cases have been presented, in which uniformed officers involved in drug trafficking are charged with minor crimes, while civilians, including those involved in terrorist groups, are charged as "narco terrorists."
• Low salaries for officers, while not a new problem, explains how narcotrafficking so easily "permeates" and infiltrates these institutions.
• The excesses in maintaining the States of Emergency in the departments and regions of the eastern part of the Andes. This implies the political predominance of the military leadership over civilian authorities. This interferes with efforts to keep investigations above water - the recent cases of the airplane of the Grupo 8 (174kgs of cocaine), the BAP "Matarani" and the "Ilo" (172 kgs. of cocaine), demonstrate the involvement of personnel from within the military in the coca producing regions, and the enormous risk of infiltration.

A proposal

1. Corruption is a phenomenon that is not limited to security forces. Therefore, civil society (the media, public opinion) must move beyond this reductionist analogy that corruption is synonymous to military, since it does not tell the whole story. As one presidential advisor once said regarding the issue of drugs: "if firemen went to Huallaga they too would become corrupted".
   Even so, it is necessary for the armed forces to recognize the existence of corruption, and more importantly, they should be totally open in carrying out their investigations.
2. The effectiveness of civilian institutions should be guaranteed in coca-producing areas: mayors who are concerned with the services they provide, representatives of the State in their region; judges capable of resolving conflicts between individuals.
3. Controls over the activities of the public institutions should be assured: inspectors, intelligence sources, state attorneys, judges, comptrollors, etc. The decision of the Marines -when drugs were discovered on one of its ships- to order an immediate search of more than 100 installations and ships, is an example.

References

1. Name used in the drug-producing zones of Peru for the installations in which drugs are stored while awaiting shipment to Colombia and Brazil.
2. Neither the Law for Alternative Development, nor the AADA, nor the IDEA were launched. At the moment, a similar development has been seen with the National Prevention Plan and CONTRADROGAS.
3. See Quehacer, number 70, Soberón, Ricardo, "Entre el Convenio y la Pared", March/April 1991.
4. Between 1990 and 1992 63 airplanes and 1.6 metric tons of PBC were confiscated, La Republica, March 1, 1992.
5. Decree law 25426, April 1992.
6. It is believed that at least 270 clandestine landing strips exist in Peru, used by aircraft to bring PBC to laboratories for refiing.
7. The new agreements between the US and Peru, published 11-12 August, 1996, in El Peruano, show that neither eradication, nor cases of corruption are determinant factors in bilateral relations.
8. Conference on Security, organized by the Peruvian Center of International Studies (CEPEI), the Advanced School of Air War and the US Fort Leavenworth, December 1995.
9. The case of Major Evaristo Castillo, from General Robles himself.
10. "There are also instances of narcotics-related corruption within the Army that have impeded the completion of police counternarcoticsoperations", International Narcotics Control Strategy (1991), US Department of State.
11. The case of BAP Eten in which captain Eduardo López de Casstilla loaded 235 kgs. of cocaine for shipment to the US. The reports in the magazine CARETAS and the opposition daily La República have been indispensable sources.
12. Accusations made within and from outside of the criminal cases of key drug traffickers, such as Chavez Peñaherrera Tejero, López Paredes and the "narco-agenda" that was found on them.
13. The President of the Defense Commission of Congress, Gilberto Siura, said on July 24 that since 1993, 66 officers and 41 lower ranking officers of the Armed Forces had been handed over to the civilian justice system for drug-related charges.

This article is a translated version of an article published in the magazine Qué Hacer, No. 102, July-August 1996