Background of UNGASS 1998

Background

UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) 1998

The United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug
Problem (UNGASS) was held in New York on June 8-10, 1998. It was a
disappointing event. No evaluation of current repressive
drug policies took place whatsoever. It was devoted to, as a New York
Times editorial phrased it, "recycling unrealistic pledges".Originally, Mexico had called to convene an UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs aimed to create a moment of global reflection, ten years after the adoption of the third UN anti-drugs convention, the Vienna Convention of 1988. The Vienna Convention had established stricter obligations to criminalise all aspects of cultivation, production, distribution and possession of illicit drugs in comparison to the previous 1961 and 1971 conventions. 

In its resolution 51/64 of  December 12, 1996, the UN General Assembly decided to convene a special session in 1998 "devoted to assessing the existing situation within the framework of a comprehensive and balanced approach that includes all aspects of the problem [of illicit drugs], with a view to strengthening international cooperation to address the problem". The Commission decided that the preparatory process should focus on the reaffirmation of the political commitment of Governments to international drug control, on the issue of demand reduction and on a number of strategic measures.

Given the continuous rise in consumption and production of illegal drugs during the 1990s, it became clear that drug control efforts had largely failed. For many, the time had come to re-assess. Others, however, concluded there was a need to re-affirm the agreed principles and apply current policies simply with more force to achieve real results. The two visions clashed during preparations for the June 1998 UNGASS on Drugs. A proposal to install an expert committee to undertake an independent evaluation of drug control efforts to facilitate a global and open reflection on ‘new strategies' for the next decade, perished at the very first ‘Prep­Com' meeting in Vienna in March 1997. 

The US, Great Britain and some other countries objected to independent evaluation. In the end, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed 13 "high-level experts" to "undertake a comprehensive review of how the efforts against illicit drugs have evolved within the United Nations System". In fact, most of the ‘experts' were members of the governing board of the PrepCom itself. "The main aim of their work will be to recommend how to strengthen future international cooperation against illicit drugs, and to identify measures aimed at reinforcing UNDCP's activities in the field of drug control." Any reference to independent evaluation was nowhere to be found anymore.

Deadline Thinking

Pino Arlacchi, who became UNDCP Executive Director in September 1997, drew the UN agency into the ‘re-affirm' camp and guided UNGASS to its endorsement of deadline thinking and its re-affirmation of the current repressive multilateral policy framework. Arlacchi imposed the UNGASS motto ‘A Drug Free World – We can do it!' and recycled the illusion that with sufficient commitment and a bold strategy it was possible to eliminate illicit drugs from the planet completely. To reach that goal, during the months before UNGASS, UNDCP elaborated an ambitious plan called SCOPE, the Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination that planned to eradicate illicit cultivation of coca and opium poppy in ten years, by 2008. SCOPE was intended to be endorsed at the June 1998 UNGASS on Drugs. (See for a critical review of SCOPE: Caught in the Crossfire. Developing Countries, the UNDCP, and the War on Drugs)

Washington sought to rally leading governments behind the audacious UN plan during the G8 Birmingham Summit on May 15-17 –three weeks before UNGASS– according to an internal document obtained
by the British newspaper The Guardian. In a briefing paper to aides of the US President, Bill Clinton, State Department officials wrote that the crucial US goal was to "send a strong message that the G8 will continue a vigorous fight against international production, trafficking and abuse of illicit drugs". The US was keen to secure international backing for the wide-ranging plans of Arlacchi with the G8 nations – all major donors to the UNDCP except for Russia.

The State Department officials noted in their paper that "other G8 governments have given only tepid and circumscribed support to the UNDCP". The Americans were unhappy with the wording of the proposed communiqué to be released after the G8 summit. They were worried that the draft wording was not strong enough in its championing of the UN plans and suggested new sentences. It appears their attempt was partially successful. The final communiqué said: "We welcome the UNDCP's global approach to eliminating or significantly reducing illicit drug production, where appropriate through effective alternative development programmes."

Despite the US pressure, the scepticism of some major donor-countries and criticism from NGOs prevented SCOPE from being presented at the UNGASS meeting.  Instead, the Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development was endorsed, a consensus document containing a set of general guidelines and proposals. Nevertheless, SCOPE's basic principle – the elimination of coca and opium poppy within ten years, by 2008 – was still reflected in the Political Declaration adopted during UNGASS. The UN Member States welcomed "the global approach by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme to the elimination of illicit crops" and stated that all countries should commit "to working closely with the Programme to develop strategies with a view to eliminating or reducing significantly the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008." Moreover, although not endorsed as an integral global strategy, several SCOPE components and guidelines were pursued and contributed to the appearance of the mycoherbicide programme (the development of fungi to eradicate coca and opium poppy), to support for national master plans like Plan Colombia and Plan Dignidad (Bolivia) and to negotiations over an opium ban with the Taleban regime in Afghanistan.

After having lost the opportunity to use UNGASS to re-assess current anti-drug policies, several countries tried to safeguard the concept of ‘shared responsibility' between the North and South,
developed in the eighties. They pressed for the elaboration of an Action Plan for Demand Reduction – along the guidelines set by UNGASS in the Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction – which should achieve "significant and measurable results" by 2008, acknowledging the basic fact that if the world is not able to reduce demand for illicit drugs, it is an illusion to think that supply can be eliminated. (Read TNIs evaluation of the event: UNGASS: A Lost Opportunity)

NGO Participation

Participation of non-governmental organisations at UNGASS was largely limited to critique from outside. The Lindesmith Center initiated a one-page advertisement in the New York Times ("We believe the global War on Drugs is now causing more harm than drug abuse itself" - signed by some 500 prominent people, see Public Letter to Kofi Annan). Strengthened with two well organized press conferences, this attracted the bulk of press attention for the ‘alternative' side. The International Coalition of NGO's for Just and Effective Drugs Policy (ICN) issued a manifesto For a Just and Effective Policy on Drugs. The manifesto outlines considerations and proposals of NGOs concerned with the growing impact of the illegal drugs trade, and those policies to control it. 

Inside the UN Building NGO presence was discouraged. Under pressure from UNDCP, the Vienna NGO Committee on Narcotic Drugs decided to transfer all NGO activities into the Church Center across the street. This was an attempt to avoid any possible confrontation with UNDCP or Member States over certain NGO panels within the building. Only one NGO-organised seminar in the end was held inside, a TNI-hosted debate about the negative impact of the War on Drugs in the Andean region. At the last minute some NGO-participants were allowed to speak for 5 minutes each at the ‘Ad-hoc Committee of the Whole' – where official delegates, UN and other international agencies, and guests had assembled. This was the only
opportunity to deliver some dissident viewpoints directly to the official delegates. Omayra Morales of the Andean Council of Coca Producers (CAPHC) spoke on behalf of the coca-producers. Marsha Burnett, a former addict and mother who lost custody
of her children although she had kicked off drugs, delivered a speech on behalf of consumer organisations. 

Their interventions made a visible impact. The noisy huge conference hall, where many delegates were only half listening to the proceedings, suddenly fell silent when they addressed the official audience. Absolute attention and heads turning around to see who the hell was speaking, characterised the ten minutes of the two speeches together, ending in applause (not a common practice) when the two women gave each other a hand. It was obvious many delegates felt that here two people were talking who could really claim to talk in the name of many ‘victims' of the drugs issue, on each extreme end of the drug-chain. Victims whose problems these delegates imagined to be solving, but whose voices had not been heard in this global summit and who now expressed severe criticism about what the UNGASS was about to decide. A clear moment when the hypocrisy of the event became briefly apparent and perceptible, even to the ones who were running the show. (See: The Guardian report)

The mid-term UNGASS review – a two-day ministerial segment due to take place in Vienna during the last two days of the CND session on April 8-17, 2003 – could provide a new
opportunity to achieve a genuine evaluation of current international drug control policies. The two-day ministerial segment will evaluate progress made and obstacles encountered with regard to the goals and targets set out in the Political Declaration of the 1998 UNGASS. The review provides the first global opportunity since UNGASS to re-assess and adjust the current international drugs policy framework.