Beyond “New Terrorism” – Local roots and the transnationalisation of ‘Islamist’ Violence

April 10-12, 2008
Definition and Terminology
The term “terrorism” is less than clearly defined, both academically and politically. It is emotionally charged and often used as a label to discredit one’s political enemies, instead as an analytical category. Former US President Ronald Reagan put this succinctly when he exclaimed that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.
Joel Beinin displays a certain amount of skepticism in using the term “terrorism” when he asks: “Can the term terrorism be rescued from its imbrication in (…) a web of propaganda? Is it worth doing so?” He is “not absolutely opposed to using the term”, but in his view “it does not seem very useful in furthering understanding of the events” in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In the academic discourse there are very many and diverse definitions, which can broadly be grouped into five overlapping categories: (1) definitions which focus on violence, committed against civilians, (2) definitions which emphasize a political purpose of the violent acts. These two elements generally constitute a consensus in regard to most attempts of defining terrorism. In addition there are (3) definitions which include an emotional aspect (like frightening a target audience or “terrorizing” it emotionally); (4) definitions which include the means of violence (e.g. bomb attacks and suicide bombings as terrorist, air bombardment as non-terrorist); and (5) definitions implicating the actors of violence (e.g. non-state actors as terrorist, state agencies or military organizations as non-terrorist).
Here is not the place to go into the details of definitions, but a few remarks are in order: First, the last two of these categories seem to be politically not academically based, since they tend to reinforce the use of the term “terrorism” as a political label: Strong actors, especially states and their intelligence agencies and armed forces in these cases would by definition never commit terrorist acts, even if their violent activities are directed against civilians for political reasons. Second, to make “fear” part of the definition is not convincing, since it – wherever it is an important part of a terrorist act – generally is a tool to achieve its political goals. If fear would be the sole or key aim of the perpetrators it would make the terrorist act non-political, thereby eliminating one of the key components of most definitions. If creating fear, on the other hand, is utilized as a means to achieve political goals (and it often is), there is be no need to include it in the definition, because the political dimension generally is a part of the definition anyway. Also, the creation of fear is not specific to terrorism. It was, for example, no coincidence that the US war against Iraq in 2003 was based on a strategy which US military planners called „Shock-and-Awe“.
Finally we should be aware that some authors tend to use the term terrorism consistently or occasionally for all or most forms of political violence by non-state groups, like Moghadam or in some cases even Pape. This is not a useful approach, since in this case the important distinctions between terrorist and other forms of political violence get lost.
In this paper the definition of terrorism is largely borrowed from the US State Department: „The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”
The State Department here has a quite useful and simple way to define the term, but it still has two weaknesses. It again does exclude state perpetrators from the definition, if they are not “clandestine agents”, which obviously is a self-serving use of language. Secondly, it emphasizes the intention “to influence an audience” – which is definitely correct in most cases but not required as part of a definition, since this intention is already a necessary element of the political aspect of terrorism. “Political” intentions imply to aim at “influencing an audience”, since this is their main objective.
Here we will simply use the term terrorism as any form of politically intended violence against non-combatants or civilians.
Our next step in clarifying the concept of terrorism as an analytical (in opposition to a political) tool is to discuss its uses, especially in comparison to other forms of violence. What is important here is the fact that often “terrorism” is imagined as a distinct form of “asymmetrical conflict” or even “war”. This perspective produces concepts like “terrorist organizations” in contrast to other form of organizations, e.g. paramilitary or political ones. (e.g.: “Terrorist groups differ from ordinary political organizations, however, in their belief that violence is the main method or strategy to see that their political goals are met.”) This is of dubious analytical value and actually misleading.
Terrorism generally is an element of a broader political struggle and part of a political conflict. It has no meaning outside this context. In the overwhelming number of cases terrorist acts will be committed not by pure “terrorist organizations”, but by groups which are utilizing several tactics to achieve their goals, both violent and non-violent. These groups might undertake social work, political agitation, conduct negotiations, militarily attack an enemy army (which is violent in character, but not terrorist), organize demonstrations, and do many other things – and in addition to all this they might carry out acts of terrorism. Any group exclusively using the terrorist form of violence to achieve its goal would be weak and vulnerable, since it would ignore important sources of power. The German Rote Armee Fraktion in the 1970s until the 1990s had to learn that this limited tactic leads to social and political isolation and failure. (Even al-Qaida, for instance in Iraq, is not just plain and simple and exclusively a terrorist group, but involved in non-terrorist activities as well. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy to Usama bin Laden, a few years ago had criticized the local Iraqi leadership under Zarqawi to neglect the political struggle.)
Therefore, organizations that use terrorism generally are political (and sometimes paramilitary) organizations which to a larger or lesser degree employ terrorist tactics, not just “terrorist” organizations. Both Hamas and Hisbollah in Palestine and Lebanon are cases in point: They both have committed acts of terrorism, but to a much larger degree are political and to some degree paramilitary organizations which undertake social and political work and even participate in elections. (This is one of the reasons why France and Germany cannot agree on how to deal with Hisbollah.)
This distinction is important, since it helps to understand the character of terrorism: If this specific form of violence would be the main or only activity by a group of perpetrators, it would be relatively easy to isolate and repress. If it is just one element of a broader political struggle with roots in a specific society and of a broad range of tactics, countermeasures are much more difficult.
To put it differently: Terrorism is not a specific category of violent conflict separate from others, it is rarely a strategy, but generally a political tactic that might be used besides others in the context of a broader political struggle. It can therefore to a great degree only be analyzed in the context of a specific political confrontation, and not independently. This applies to both non-state and state actors. To understand Stalinist or Fascist terrorism is only possible if put into its overall political context.

“New” Terrorism and its Importance
Since September 11, 2001 both in academic and political discourses many observers speak of a “New Terrorism”. While it is understandable that the unprecedented event of 9/11 has made this notion plausible, we should remind ourselves that even in the 1980s and 1990s there already have been discussions about a New Terrorism, so this term is anything but new. (We might mention in passing that a “War on Terrorism” had already been declared in the 1980s, too, by US President Ronald Reagan.)
The post-9/11 discourse of a New Terrorism has several elements. Hayes summarized it in the following way:
“The new terrorism is global, independently funded, highly organized, fuelled by individuals from a society who blame their failures on the West (and feel incompatible with western society), growing in lethality and apocalyptic in nature,” while Kometer emphasises its “Islamic” character:
„There is no doubt that the major distinguishing feature of today’s terrorism is the existence of militant Islamic groups throughout the world.”
Other criteria which are often mentioned are its organizational structure as networks, its transnational character and its use of modern technology (like airplanes and telecommunication).
Morgan represents a way of thinking which would be shared by Juergensmeyer:
“Today’s terrorists are ultimately more apocalyptic in their perspective and methods. For many violent and radical organizations, terror has evolved from being a means to an end, to becoming the end in itself.”
Obviously the repeated discovery of a “new” terrorism has become more plausible after the destruction of the Twin Towers, which definitely has incorporated new elements of terrorism, like the number of victims (nearly 3000 killed in one single attack) and the tools of violence (airplanes as weapons). On the other hand, many arguments for a new character of terrorism are of dubious validity or simply wrong. Examples are:
(1) The global or transnational character of terrorism is anything but new. The “old” terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s was quite global, as the attacks of the Japanese Red Army on the Israeli airport in Tel Aviv, the Palestinian Black September group’s killing of Israeli athletes at the Olympics in Munich (both 1972) or the hijacking of a French airplane to Uganda by Palestinian terrorists in 1976 demonstrate. Another example is the most famous terrorist of the 1980s (“Carlos”), who was from Venezuela but mostly operated in the Middle East and Europe, often with some German citizens participating.
(2) The “old” terrorism was also well organized, and often structured in networks, as Tucker has emphasized, and there is very little indication that “old” terrorism had been less well financed, compared to the recent one. Besides that, terrorists during the 1970s through 1990s often used the most modern technology available at this time, while today, as the US National Counterterrorism Center proclaims “(a)s in 2005, most attacks in 2006 were perpetrated by terrorists applying conventional fighting methods that included using bombs and weapons, such as small arms.”
The frequent use of car bombs or similar devices also is not indicative of sophisticated high technology, though of ruthless efficiency.
(3) The “growing lethality”, that is greater number of victims and greater number of attacks, is a myth, supported by plausibility but not facts. With the exception of 9/11 (or may be very few additional attacks) terrorism during the recent years has been neither more numerous nor more lethal than before. From the late 1960s until the mid 1980s the number of terrorist incidents of international terrorism (cross border, or involving actors/victims of different countries) according to US State Department figures increased from less than 200 to more than 600 per annum, only to fall back to less than 200 afterwards. Only in 2004 the number suddenly jumped to 651 (with 1907 people killed), which obviously was a direct response to the US war and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Accordingly, nearly 200 of these attacks occurred in Iraq alone.
For later years no comparable figures are available from the same source, because the methodology of data collection and presentation was fundamentally changed when responsibility was shifted from the State Department to the National Counterterrorism Center.
According to the data provided by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) the number of international terrorist incidents from 1968 through 2007 developed according to this graph:

If minor or medium sized attacks are excluded and only incidents with 30 or more killed victims are taken into account (to focus on terrorism of greater lethality), the number of international terrorist attacks would be like this:

Both graphs do not provide any evidence of an increase of terrorist violence or of any new form of international terrorism. It should also be noted that the worldwide number of major international terrorist attacks (more than 30 killed) remains quite low and stable since the late 1960s, generally in the range of only zero to three per year, world-wide.
(4) A final and analytically important characteristic of a New Terrorism is its supposedly “apocalyptic” form, where (terrorist) violence is perceived not any longer as a means to achieve political goals, but as an end in itself. This notion is often linked to the observation that New Terrorism generally has religious undertones. In the words of Matthew Morgan:
“Whether initiated by cultists or by extremists from more established religions, the violence of religious terrorists can be particularly threatening in comparison with that of the political terrorists of earlier years. … One explanation that has been proffered to account for violent Islamic extremism views revenge as the principal goal of the terrorists. This reasoning makes political change or conventional political objectives irrelevant, and it is consistent with observations that violence is itself the objective.”
There are two problems with this fashionable observation. First, they are in contradiction to one of the few points of consensus in regard to the definition of terrorism: If a terrorist act were an objective in itself and not aiming to achieve some other goal, it would not be political any longer. Non-political violence though would by definition have to be excluded from the category of terrorism. Secondly, while we should recognize a performative aspect in many cases of political or non-political violence, there is hardly any evidence to support the idea that “religious violence” is committed without a purpose or as a goal in itself. Especially if we look at Islamist violence – may it be terrorist or otherwise – generally we will find it more political than religious. Even al-Qaida, despite the “apocalyptic” TV pictures of the 9/11 attacks, is conducting its highly “performative” acts of terrorism to achieve political goals (like demonstrating that the US is vulnerable, or trying to achieve leadership status in the Muslim world). The performative character of some of its terrorist acts does not imply them to be “objectives in itself”. Their symbolic and demonstrative character is indicative of their political intentions, of publicly defining the enemy, and of showing the own resolve.

Islamism and Other Forms of Muslim Radicalism
Both in the public and academic discourse the term “Islamism” is as opaque as “terrorism”. Often it is equated with Muslim radicalism or Muslim violent extremism, which confuses quite different phenomena and makes analysis difficult. Generally speaking, we should distinguish at least three categories of Muslim radical tendencies.
• Strictly orthodox and/or literalist Muslims, who consider the Koran as eternal and literally a godly truth, which has to be followed without any interpretation or compromise. In the Indian Subcontinent the deobandi school of Sunni Islam tends in this direction. Generally this current is culturally and socially highly reactionary, while politically conservative. Historically it mostly has been non-political, focusing on strict observance of religious commandments and social affairs (like restricting women’s role in public). It also generally has been locally or nationally oriented and displayed little interest in global or transnational activism. Only in situations of acute crisis this religious trend can become radicalized to a degree that it politicizes and develops a potential for violence. Deobandi Islam, for instance, has often included an anti-colonial aspect.
• Olivier Roy has drawn attention to a numerically very small current, which he terms “neo-fundamentalist”. To put it simple, it is made up by a specific kind of “born-again” Muslims, often living in Western societies. These individuals have lost their personal and cultural roots, are highly individualized and often live in a context of alienation from their families, their countries of origin, and the society they live in. They are not the product of traditional social structures (family, tribe, religious communities), but have been uprooted and then individually reinvented their lost religious identity. While in traditional Islamic theology Jihad has several meanings, and its military one is a collective effort that can only be declared by a legitimate leader of the community (e.g. the head of state), these people interpret Jihad primarily as a violent activity and consider it an individual duty, thereby substituting “modern” individualism for a traditional commitment to religious communities.
• The third current can be called Islamism, or Political Islam. It is more driven by political zeal than anything else and transforms Islam into a political ideology. Despite its appearance, Islamism is not “God-driven” or spiritual, nor centered around tradition or observance of rules and commandments, but state-centered. Islamism is a modern, not a traditional phenomenon, and it is about power. It abhors religious traditionalism and formalism and uses religion creatively to maximize its political impact. In this sense it has a secular streak, no matter how “fundamentalist” and rigidly religious its rhetoric may be. Islamism is not a homogenous current; it includes liberal, conservative, reactionary and “fascist” elements, which should not be confused just because they all articulate themselves in radical religious language. Islamism is not necessarily violent, but if it is, it tends to be efficiently so because of a high degree of organization, its modernity and the relative high degree of education of its activists.
Obviously Muslim beliefs and politics are much broader and more complex than these three currents indicate. They include secular and moderate forms of religion and politics, and many versions of “Popular Islam” or “Peoples’ Islam”, to borrow a phrase from Azmy Bishara which entails local or regional belief systems and what Muslim theologians would call superstitions. But since these forms of Islam generally are not of relevance for terrorism we can ignore them here.

Conflict, Violence and Terrorism in the Broader Middle East
Without serious political conflict and crisis there would be little room for major forms of violence, including its terrorist version. The region from Northern Africa to the Hindukush does not lack areas of and reasons for conflict. We can distinguish (1) reasons related to problems of governance, like incompetent, corrupt and repressive Governments; (2) economic and social problems, like economic stagnation, poverty, lack of economic perspective, and grave social inequality; (3) situations of perceived or factual occupation (like in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan) which lead to resistance and therefore are sources of conflict in themselves. But foreign occupation also generates symbolic meaning and mobilization beyond the area of occupation; and (4) Western – especially US – regional policies which to most people in the region appear as attempts of imperial control and as supportive of or responsible for repressive and incompetent local regimes and foreign occupation. Taken together a precondition for major and sustained violence is a context of serious grievances in a society:
“Societies embrace extreme violence when they perceive overwhelming threats to their security, identity, or national aspirations and when they see themselves solely as the victims. ... A progression of radicalization must take place before communities agree to support extreme violence. Without overwhelming threats and feelings of victimization – whether real or perceived – societies are likely to reject extreme violence against ordinary civilians.”
These four factors are psychologically (and therefore politically) intimately linked. The general contempt of local populations for their respective Governments in many Middle Eastern countries is connected to US (and to a lesser degree French and British) support for these, which turns local rulers into “puppets” of the West, “Americans in Arab dress” or transforms President Musharraf into “Busharraf”. In this way Western powers are seen as responsible for local repression, (moral) corruption and economic desperation of key Muslim countries. Both local regimes and the US are perceived as supportive or directly responsible for situations of military occupation and the feelings of humiliation and anxiety that come with them. It is precisely the link of these factors that is the raw material for militancy and mobilization. It integrates serious and real grievances with symbolic and emotionally powerful explanations. These factors do not directly produce violence, but without them the level of violence very probably would not exceed a magnitude any police could handle. It takes political actors to turn these precursors into actual, sustained violence of any kind.
These actors have been secular, nationalist and often left-wing groups in the past, but with the political bankruptcy of Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism after the 1967 war and of Marxism-Leninism since the late 1980s and the fall of the Soviet Union the leadership role was taken over by Islamist groups. In both cases the activists did and do not come from the poorest and most desperate sectors of their societies, but from the middle class. The middle and upper levels of Islamist organizations (in contrast to “fundamentalist” ones) tend to be recruited from relatively well educated, modern strata, often with professional backgrounds as physicians, teachers, engineers, lawyers or (in regard to financial support) modern businessmen, and not from traditional, conservative religious networks. In a sense, the persistent situation of political and economic crisis is the point of departure for Islamist activities, but since this has a cultural and spiritual dimension, religion has assumed an important role as a legitimizing factor for resistance, as a motivating force, as an identity marker, and as a language and system of symbols to express dissent. It can also assume the function to exculpate the breaking of rules (legal or ethical) by disputing the applicability of man-made norms through invocation of God-made ones.
We have already mentioned that Islamism is not necessarily violent, but, as secular forms of politics, can develop a potential for it. In the words of Mahmud al-Zahar, a leader of Hamas:
“We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can fulfill our goals without violence, we will do so. Violence is a means, not a goal.”
Violence is not a necessary element of Islamist politics. And if it turns to violence, it will not necessarily but only potentially utilize terrorism. Whether it does depends, as we will see, more on political considerations that religious ones.
Generally and from a historical perspective Islamist movements despite often pan-Islamic ideologies have began as national (not transnational) movements against their respective Governments and their policies. This often implies their use of nationalist besides religious sentiments and a sphere of overlapping ideology with secular organizations.
Religious groups which are a part of a broader – national – struggle in a given society find it difficult to only rely on religious ideology since this would easily cut them off from the general political discourse surrounding them and undercut their local support base.
This even applies to parties and groups which emphasize a pan-Islamic ideology. When they progress, they have always either dropped their transnational, pan-Islamic streak or reduced it to mere rhetoric, as we can see, for instance, with the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, India and Bagladesh. When we look at the key Islamist organizations in Palestine and Lebanon, Hamas (sunni) and Hisbollah (shiite), their national orientation is quite clear.
In regard to Palestine Hafez explains:
“The discourse of Hamas and Islamic Jihad is not purely religious; they, along with secular groups such as the AMB and the PFLP, draw on deep nationalist feelings to inspire people to die for the nation. To be sure, the secular groups rely on the culture of martyrdom fostered by the Islamists. Similarly, many of the suicide bombers of Hamas and Islamic Jihad reference nationalist goals and desire for defiance and revenge in the face of repressive Israeli measures. It would be a mistake, therefore, to claim that the bombers of Hamas and Islamic Jihad rely on religious motivations, while the bombers of the AMB and the PFLP rely on nationalism; the motives of the bombers are much more complex and interwoven.”
Only when local Islamist organizations fail to take roots in their societies and especially when this is the result of severe state repression such organizations may turn outwards and start building transnational – often violent – networks. The development of the Egyptian jihadist groups, which led some of them first to Afghanistan (or Pakistan) and later into al-Qaida, or the careers of key personnel of al-Qaida itself (including Usama bin Laden and other Saudi activists) are examples. One exception to this rule may be Hizb ut-Tahir, which is quite untypical, because it truly emphasizes Pan-Islamism and combines it with a highly militant and violent (and anti-Semitic) ideology – but after many years still has not committed serious acts of violence, because these should supposedly only being undertaken by an “Islamic army” after the establishment of the Khilafah in Muslim countries, the restoration of the historical rule of caliphs which ended in Turkey in 1924 (and which obviously is difficult to imagine being re-established in the foreseeable future).

The Usefulness and Cost of Terrorist Tactics
The resort to violence and adoption of its terrorist forms are to be distinguished, both in legal and political terms. If in cases of war, civil war, insurgency, or foreign occupation a party to the conflict attacks armed forces of the opposing side, this might be right or wrong, useful or self-defeating und it does constitute a form of violence – but according to the definition provided above it is not terrorism. In many cases this would not even be illegal, as in the struggle of Afghan groups against Soviet occupation or of French or Soviet resistance groups against German Nazi occupation, to mention only a few of the less controversial historical cases. (Obviously occupation forces affected by such counter-violence tend to call all kinds of it “terrorist” for political reasons.)
If, on the other hand, this violence is not targeting armed groups or combatants but civilians of the opposing side (e.g. restaurants, buses, mosques, markets, private homes, shops) it would cross the threshold to terrorism. This differentiation is important morally, politically and legally. Even in the context of a legitimate violent resistance (like self-defense), attacking civilians remains illegitimate, as in cases of Afghan “mujahedin” attacking orphanages, killing prisoners of war or bombing markets while fighting the Soviet Union.
In case a violent conflict occurs between two sides of very uneven military capabilities, an obvious practical difficulty arises for the weaker side. If militarily weak armed resistance groups openly attack well guarded and strongly defended military installations, this will generally not be successful and even lead to heavy casualties. Therefore open and conventional military attacks on an overwhelmingly strong enemy generally are useless or harmful. This is the reason why weak military movements tend to turn to “guerrilla” warfare, which is based on hit-and-run tactics und quick dispersal after surprise attacks. In case the resistance or paramilitary force is even too weak for this (or the context is not conductive to such tactics) some armed groups respond by also attacking civilian targets. The rational for this is quite pragmatic: Civilians generally are unprotected, the risk of attack therefore is much lower, and the number of civilian targets is much too big to provide security to all of them, even by a strong military force. Also, if a force would try to protect very many potential civilian targets, this would spread it thin and open up additional opportunities to attack soldiers guarding “soft targets”. (E.g. it is much easier to attack a few soldiers guarding a train station compared to a fortified military installation.)
Therefore, terrorist tactics in the context of a violent conflict have definite pragmatic advantages to a weaker party, which are even increased by the instrument of suicide attacks. Mohammed Hafez put it like this:
“Asymmetry in power compels the weak to innovate in order to surprise opponents and circumvent their stronger capabilities. Human bombs are smart bombs that are versatile, accurate, and extremely lethal. They are also relatively inexpensive, and their psychological impact on the enemy is potent.”
This is an accurate description. In regard to suicide bombings (the figures available do not always distinguish between terrorist and paramilitary ones, that is between attacking civilians and combatants) Pape found that such attacks from 1980 to 2001 globally constituted some 3 percent of all terrorist attacks, while causing 48 percent of the deadly casualties, excluding 9/11. Cronin finds for the years 2000-2002 that suicide attacks constituted just one percent, but were responsible for 44 percent of causalities. Also, simple suicide attacks (e.g. using a belt of explosives) will cost only a few hundred dollars and require very few perpetrators (may be half a dozen to a dozen, including one or two actual suicide bombers), while military or paramilitary operations are indefinitely more expensive, and at the same time imply much higher casualty rates for the attackers.
While terrorist tactics tend to be an efficient tool of political violence in causing harm to a much stronger enemy, this does not necessarily translate into achieving the hoped-for political results. They can create costs to the perpetrators’ cause, because the killing and maiming of civilians, including women and children, will often be seen as appalling, and discredit the political goals and organizations that are undertaking them. Terrorist acts can undercut the prestige and credibility of a perpetrating group amongst its (would-be) followers, or increase the determination of the opponent group or affected society to defend itself. Therefore, to achieve its goals terrorism does not only require technical efficiency, but also a supportive political context. Scott Atran emphasizes the “need (for) strong community support” as a condition for successful campaigns of terrorism, but this might be broadened to include also other kinds of sustained violence against an overwhelmingly superior military adversary. Guerrilla warfare, for instance, would also require strong backing for the insurgents by at least relevant parts of the local community or society. This is the reason why strategies of counterinsurgency and counter-guerrilla warfare generally focus on undercutting this community support. Local support by large sectors of the population is therefore important for insurgent forces but not specifically to terrorism alone. As we have mentioned above (page 4) very often groups utilizing terrorist tactics are also likely to use non-terrorist forms of violence, and non-violent means, like social and political work. This can be explained by two arguments: First, often violent policies and groups grow out of local conflicts and local movements, which implies a local support base; and secondly, even if this is not the case, any group which attacks a much stronger enemy by force is in need of local support, which in turn puts a premium on political and social activities to attract or stabilize it. In the words of Jessica Stern: “Jihadi groups' social welfare activities, especially the practice of compensating militants' families in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Palestine, seem to play a role in making the groups more appealing to the poor.”
Another factor required for terrorist type of violent resistance generally is a polarized form of political conflict, reducing it to an us-versus-them / good-versus-evil situation. This tends to reduce the number and chances of opportunities for a non-violent solution, and it opens the door to ideologically charged policies. When a conflict of interest is translated and transformed into one of identity (along moral, ethnic, religious, nationalist or other secular lines) compromise will become much more difficult: It often is possible to reach a compromise with an antagonist on a delineation of interests, but few people are willing to compromise their identity. What started as a conflict over specific grievances in this way can turn into a conflict over basic values, and thereby trigger a discourse that will make the own group represent the side of goodness and humanity, and the other into evil and sub-human creatures. This process of dehumanization of the opponent often is a psychological precondition to move from mere violence against an armed enemy to terrorist attacks against civilians, women and children.

Local, Transnational, and Global Dimensions of Islamist Terrorism
The last chapter has already thrown some light on the local dimension of terrorism. Without local (and regional) serious and sustained conflict of interest there would be little chance for larger and sustainable violence, neither locally nor transnational. Obviously conflict of interest is not enough to produce violence, but it is a precondition. The general causes and the transformation of these pre-conditions into actual campaigns of political violence has been dealt with elsewhere. Terrorism can result if relevant groups with major and permanent grievances are confronted with an overwhelmingly powerful enemy and do not perceive ways for a non-violent solution of the conflict. If then an ideologization of the conflict and a dehumanization of the enemy is coupled with a rational and de-ethicalized cost-benefit analysis, terrorist tactics can be seen as attractive. Religion may be useful here to displace ethical considerations, but this can also be achieved by secular ideologies (e.g. nationalism, racism, “progress”, democratization, self-defense). Obviously Islamism is well-placed to achieve this, since it already is a political ideology expressing itself in theological terms, thereby plausibly creating its own and greater-than-human ethics.
Palestine and Lebanon.
Palestine and Lebanon are obvious cases with local roots of terrorist and non-terrorist violence linked to both secular and Islamist movements. Hamas and Hisbollah are not the sole violent actors, but secular groups and the Israeli Government have to be counted in. It should be noted here that the partial Islamization of violence since the 1980s has not led to its globalization, but to its nationalization: While secular terrorist acts of the 1970s and 1980s often have been undertaken in Europe and elsewhere, during the last decade at least nearly all acts of violence have been restricted to the local and immediate cross-border area (including Israel). Neither Hamas nor Hisbollah (or Islamic Jihad or the secular actors of violence) are any longer known to attack Western, US, or other foreign targets – again with the important exception of Israel, which as an occupation force (Palestine, formerly also Lebanon) and party in wars (Lebanon war, 2006) is both a special case and a local actor in Palestine and Lebanon. Here Islamist violence is of a “national” character, not a global one, with the minor and quite untypical exception of last year’s fighting in a refugee camp in Northern Lebanon initiated by Sunni extremists. Both Hamas and Hisbollah have not linked up to transnational or global Islamist terrorist networks like al-Qaida, and al-Qaida despite its anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rhetoric has undertaken no attacks on Israel and few against Jewish targets. In a sense both Hamas and Hisbollah are waging classical “wars of national liberation” (comparable to some Liberation Movements of the 1970s), but using Islamist ideologies instead of Marxist-Leninist ones. This is neither “New Terrorism” nor global.
The situation in Afghanistan and Iraq is much more complex. Here we have (since 2001 and 2003) local insurgents fighting what they perceive as occupation forces (NATO and US troops) but in connection with global Islamist forces. Let us first consider Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.
After the fall of the Taliban in autumn of 2001 the level of political violence in Afghanistan was quite low, and the Taliban were in shambles. Most of the international (Arab, Uzbek, Chechen) jihadist fighters linked to al-Qaida had fled to the Tribal Areas of neighboring Pakistan. The Taliban had never been a part of global Islamist terrorism, but were a purely local group of reactionary fundamentalists with hardly any interest in the outside World, an extremely low level of education and technical expertise and capabilities. Al-Qaida, on the other hand, was an Islamist group (with a “fundamentalist”, wahabi streak) mostly interested in global Jihad and a terrorist campaign against the West (primarily against the US). It was basically interested in using Afghanistan as a base for global terrorist acts, not in Afghanistan itself. Their relation to the Taliban was a marriage of convenience, where al-Qaida supported and strengthened the Taliban regime while receiving a secure home base in exchange.
After the overthrow of the Taliban by US and Afghan Northern Alliance forces in late 2001 al-Qaida survived despite heavy losses utilizing both Afghan (e.g. the support of Hisb-e-Islami /Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) and Pakistani connections in the Tribal Areas of the Northwest Frontier Province. The Taliban were extremely weak in 2002 and 2003, but started a comeback after that, due to grave political mistakes by especially US forces (for instance US support to highly unpopular, repressive and criminal warlords who were appointed to key governments posts, like Governor Gul Agha Shirzai of Kandahar) and to the mistakes and weaknesses of the new Afghan Government. These local conditions proved decisive to trigger a new insurgency by Neo-Taliban, which spread dramatically in 2005 and 2006, while growing somewhat slower in 2007. But since these local conditions now included heavy-handed US troops and other NATO forces, the ideology of the Neo-Taliban was transformed to now include a more transnational streak, which it never had before. Links were established to Islamist forces, especially in the Arab World, but also to individual born-again Islamists and small Islamist groups in the West, especially Europe. This trend did not just strengthen the financial base of the Taliban, but also brought in some cadres with a better education and technical and political competence. The result was a considerable increase in overall strength. For the first time, the Neo-Taliban became a serious threat for Western powers, primarily in the local arena, but to a lesser degree also in regard to Europe itself. NATO occupation as seen by the Neo-Taliban and many Afghans reduced the substantive differences to al-Qaida and forced them to at least partially develop from a local to a transnational actor of violence. The first step obviously has been the involvement of key Afghan Neo-Taliban commanders in the developing civil war and terrorism in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, linking up with newly formed tribal jihadists and al-Qaida groups.
To understand the resurgence of the Taliban we have to appreciate not just the weaknesses and mistakes of their enemies, briefly mentioned above, but also their own strategy and tactics. Obviously the Taliban are organizing an armed insurgency, which implies the use of force.
One element among others in this context is the utilization of terrorist means by selectively attacking (1) pro-Government or pro-US civilians, including tribal or religious leaders; (2) state-functionaries, including low-level ones; (3) foreigners, including NGOs activists in several cases; and (4) sometimes groups from the general public. These terrorist tactics complement a general policy of attacking Afghan Government and international armed forces, wherever possible, including militias and police.
The violence of the Taliban is not an “objective in itself” but precisely tailored to achieve specific political goals. Among them are: Denying control of relevant rural areas to the Government’s forces; undercutting or destruction of any state structures, wherever possible; and substituting the Taliban’s own quasi-stately institutions for Government institutions, e.g. tax collection, criminal justice system. The core strategy for the Taliban is not to just harm the military forces of the Government and foreign troops or to kill people, but to deny the Government effective rule and to destroy its political and organizational infrastructure and local backing. Violence is skillfully tailored to serve this strategy. For instance, attacks on schools or the assassination of teachers are not primarily caused by the Taliban’s skepticism of education, but by the fact that in many rural areas the teacher is the only representative of the Government. (In some cases the Taliban started building their own schools after destroying the ones built by the Government.) The insurgent strategy is focused on denying and achieving power at the local level, and any form of violence, including terrorist is designed to support it. In this sense, the Taliban are not a “terrorist organization”, but a political one using political, social, and violent means in an integrated manner, and applying terrorist practices in this context when seen as useful and as more efficient than other tactics.
This strategy also determines the relationship of local to transnational and global policies. The presence of US and NATO troops is a key hindrance for the Taliban to achieve its goals and pursue its strategy of marginalizing the Government. These troops force the insurgents to not any longer remain a local factor, but start acting on the stage of transnational politics. The Taliban are aware that they have no chance of militarily overcoming NATO on the Afghan battlefield, and their strategy aims at influencing the public in NATO countries to demand disengagement and withdrawal. For this it is not necessary to “win” militarily, but not to lose; and to hit foreign forces hard enough to make their presence painful and costly. The kind of violence applied is tailored to achieve these goals.
Iraq
When US-President Bush declared “mission accomplished” in May of 2003, the US was in complete control of Iraq and low-level political violence was a minor nuisance, not a threat. Neither loyalists of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein nor jihadist groups were serious actors. The background to the illegal war and the incompetence on running the occupation by the US Government and military and civilian authorities again have been dealt with elsewhere.
While Saddam Hussein had been a brutal dictator ruling a political system comparable to European fascism, his regime had no ties to global jihadist groups or al-Qaida. After the war and as a result of the occupation, Iraq turned into a battlefield and breeding ground of regional and global jihadist groups. Today Iraq is the central arena for Al-Qaida’s violence, a source of inspiration and motivation for most violent transnational Islamists and the hotbed of global terrorism. In 2005 nearly 30 percent of all global terrorist incidents occurred in Iraq alone, causing 55 percent of worldwide lethal causalities. Since the second half of 2007 though, the level of violence has fallen.
The structure of violence in Iraq is quite complex. To simplify the situation we can distinguish at least four different wars in Iraq, which are intimately interconnected.
(1) A largely Sunni insurgency against foreign troops, foreign occupation, the Iraqi Government and groups supporting these. Later some Shiite organizations began their own insurgent campaign against foreign troops; (2) Civil war between Sunni and Shiite groups; (3) Violence and an emergent civil war between Shiite groups struggling for primacy, and to a much lesser degree between Sunni factions; (4) Foreign Arab jihadi violence as part of a regional and global strategy of violent Islamist groups. This jihadi campaign has targeted US, British and other foreign troops, the Iraqi Government, and Shiite groups and civilians simultaneously, and one of its goals has been to trigger a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, to create chaos which would weaken the occupation forces and the Government. This was relatively successful, and a key tactic for this success has been terrorism against Shiites (e.g. the bombing at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf and of the Golden Mosque in Samarra). In 2007 the link between Sunni insurgents and Sunni tribes with al-Qaida in Iraq has weakened or even broken, and now some Sunni groups and tribes are fighting it.
As in Afghanistan and elsewhere terrorism is part of the local conflict, but it is not a decisive or the most important factor. All actors of violence are – to a lesser degree even al-Qaida – primarily political actors combining political agitation, propaganda, paramilitary and military violence with terrorism. With the exception of foreign jihadists electoral politics is part of the agenda of most groups. To varying degrees the internal actors have links to regional or external partners, for instance some of the Shiite organizations to Hisbollah in Lebanon and to Iran, and the Shiite/Kurdish dominated Government obviously to Washington, but the regional links are of secondary importance for the dynamics of conflict. Terrorism has played an important role in creating a general atmosphere of insecurity and helped trigger, sharpen and speed up conflict and violence between different sectors of society, but today it is of somewhat lesser importance. A key problem now is the weakness and fragmentation of the state. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior for instance is completely run by Shiite factions and has little control over some of its own police forces in several provinces. Weak statehood does not only hamper efficient response to violence by police, militias and the armed forces, but also the important function to re-integrate society politically.
The domestic and local dimension of violence and terrorism constitutes a grave humanitarian problem in Iraq; it undercuts regional stability and negatively affects the energy market by keeping Iraqi oil exports low. It also weakens Washington’s prestige and political strength in the region. But besides that the direct repercussions for global security are limited. This is not true though for the global jihadist violence in Iraq. Especially al-Qaida has gained tremendously by fighting the US and its local allies in Iraq. It’s weakening in Afghanistan after autumn of 2001 has been more than compensated by its role in Iraq, which increased its credibility, prestige and political relevance with many Muslims globally, including secular ones. The two key dangers today are (1) new opportunities to recruit individual Muslim radicals (see page 11) and small groups in Western countries and elsewhere, and (2) that Iraq is turning into a breeding ground and training area for jihadist Islamists globally, comparably to the role Afghanistan played in the 1990s, which produced a whole generations of experienced Islamist fighters and terrorists, which later returned to their respective countries as political cadres or to form groups linked to al-Qaida.

Loss of control
What does all of this imply for the control of terrorist violence? One of the key lessons is that terrorism can only to some degree be contained by police and military forces, but not be “controlled”. It is only a symptom of political problems and a tactic in a much broader struggle. While it would be quite unreasonable not to utilize police and the justice system against terrorism, this will only work if (1) there actually exists a functioning system of justice and a functioning state structure to run it, which is not the case in Afghanistan, Iraq or Palestine; and (2) terrorism is not treated as something special, and separate from a general situation of violent conflict, but as a secondary instrument in its context. While it is not realistic to control terrorism by accommodating groups which are primarily engaging in this specific tactic, the need to address the political and economic grievances of affected societies is a precondition for success. Only a combination of repressing terrorist tactics by force while at the same time undercutting local community support for jihadi groups offers any promise of success. A control of terrorism therefore to a big degree has to focus not on the terrorists themselves, but on the political and social conditions in local societies which provide them with a supporting environment. This by itself would not stop violence, but it would isolate and weaken jihadist groups to a degree which would allow a functioning and representative state to successfully deal with them repressively.

Footnotes
1. Reagan Urges Congress to Pass Contra aid Package, in: US Policy Information and Texts, March 6, 1986, p. 18
2. Joel Beinin, Is Terrorism a Useful Term in Understanding the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?, in: Radical History Review, Issue 85, Winter 2003, pp. 12–23
3. Juergensmeyer believes: “What makes an act terrorism is that someone is terrified by it.” Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God - The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London (University of California Press) 2003, p. 141
4. Assaf Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism; New York (Chelsea House) 2006, S. 36f; und: Pape, Robert A.; Dying to Win - The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism; New York (Random House) 2006, S. 9
5. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, Washington 2004, p. XII; http://www.mipt.org/pdf/2003pogt.pdf
6. Assaf Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism; New York (Chelsea House) 2006, S. 36f; und: Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win - The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism; New York (Random House) 2006, S. 36
7. Helga Baumgarten, Hamas – Der Politische Islam in Palästina, München 2006, and its chapter on Hamas‘ electoral policies, pp. 163-187
8. Two examples proclaiming a “new terrorism” which were written shortly before 9/11 are: Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism - Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford 1999; or: Mark Juergensmeyer, Understanding the New Terrorism, in: Current History, April 2000, p. 158-163
9. Craig O. Haynes, US Counterterrorism vs. the New Terrorism: Leadership and Strategy are the Keys to Success, United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico/Virginia 2002, p. 27, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404938&Location=U2&doc=Get...
10. Michael W. Kometer, The New Terrorism - The Nature of the War on Terrorism, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, July 2004, p. 4
11.Raphael Pearl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy; Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Updated April 11, 2003
12.Matthew J. Morgan, The Origins of the New Terrorism, in: Parameters, Spring 2004, S. 30
13. See also: Doron Zimmermann, The Transformation of Terrorism – The “New Terrorism”, Impact Scalability and the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception, in: Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 67, ETH Zürich, no year given
14.David Tucker, What’s New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?, in: Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, Autumn, 2001, pp. 1–14, here: p. 3
15.US National Counterterrorism Center, Report on Terrorist Incidents 2006, Washington, 30 April 2007, p. 10
16.Jochen Hippler, Internationaler Terrorismus - Seine Folgen für die Internationalen Beziehungen („International Terrorism – Its Impact on International Relations“, German), in: Globale Trends 2007 - Fakten, Analysen, Prognosen, hrsg. von Tobias Debiel, Dirk Messner, Franz Nuscheler für die Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, Frankfurt 2006, S. 105-122
17.US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, several yearly editions; US National Counterterrorism Center, A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004, Washington, 27 April 2005
18.Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Terrorism Knowledge Base, accessible through: www.mipt.org
19.Matthew J. Morgan, The Origins of the New Terrorism, in: Parameters, Spring 2004, S. 34; emphasis by this author
20.This might raise the usefulness to create a separate category for “apocalyptic”, “purposeless” or “senseless” violence along with criminal, domestic, political and other forms of violence. It is not suggested here to just ignore it, only not to confuse it with political motivated terrorist violence. But we might assume that “purposeless” violence generally will be committed by individuals or small groups, with little organization and advance planning.
21. “Religious violence” is a difficult term. There is no consensus whether it applies to violence only when this is part of religion itself (e.g. sacrifices), whether religiously inspired violence or even violence which is justified in religious terms would be included, or whether any violence committed by a religious group or a group placing itself in a religious context would constitute “religious violence”.
22.For the example of deobandi Islam in Pakistan see the chapters on political religion and on the JUI party in: Jochen Hippler, Das gefährlichste Land der Welt? – Pakistan zwischen Militärherrschaft, Extremismus und Demokratie (“The Most Dangerous Country in the World? - Pakistan Between Military Rule, Extremism and Democracy”, German), Köln 2008
23.Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies), London 2004
24.Azmy Bishara, Islam and Politics in the Middle East, in: Jochen Hippler/Andrea Lueg (Eds.): The Next Threat - Western Perceptions of Islam, London 1995, pp. 82-115
25.Jochen Hippler, Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten – Grundprobleme einer konfliktträchtigen Region („The Near and Middle East – Basic Problems of a Conflict-Prone Region“; German), in: Jochen Hippler (Ed.), Von Marokko bis Afghanistan – Krieg und Frieden im Nahen und Mittleren Osten, Hamburg 2008, pp. 11-27
26.Hafez, Mohammed M.; Manufacturing Human Bombs - The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers; Washington (United States Institute of Peace) 2006, p. 57
27.Political Violence and Civilisation in Western and Muslim Societies, A study by Jochen Hippler with commentaries by Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid and Amr Hamzawy, German Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (ifa), Stuttgart 2006, pp. 272-280
28.zit. nach: Pape, Robert A.; Dying to Win - The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism; New York (Random House) 2006, p. 41
29.Frédéric Grare, Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent – The Jamaat-i-Islami, New Delhi 2001; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution – The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan, Berkeley 1994
30.Hafez, Mohammed M.; Manufacturing Human Bombs - The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers; Washington (United States Institute of Peace) 2006, p. 46
31.See, for example: Ahmed Rashid, Jihad – The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, London 2003, pp. 115-136
32.Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs - The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers; Washington (United States Institute of Peace) 2006, p. 7
33.Pape, Robert A.; The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism; in: American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, p. 4f
34.Audrey Kurth Cronin, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 28.8.2003, S. 9
35.Scott Atran, Mishandling Suicide Terrorism; in: The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2004, p. 81
36.Jochen Hippler, Counterinsurgency and Political Control – US Military Strategies Regarding Regional Conflict, INEF-Report No. 81/2006, Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen, p. 39-45;
online: www.jochen-hippler.de/neu/pdf-Dokumente/INEF-Rep81.pdf
37.Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God, New York 2003, p. 285
38.It should be emphasized here that this does not apply to isolated acts of violence, but only to more systematic and sustained forms of political violence.
39.Jochen Hippler, Die Quellen des Terrorismus - Hinweise zu Ursachen, Rekrutierungsbedingungen und Wirksamkeit politischer Gewalt (“Sources of Terrorism – Remarks on Causes, Conditions for Recruiting, and Effectiveness of Political Violence”; in German), in: Friedensgutachten 2002, edited by Reinhard Mutz, et al., Münster 2002
40.For background see: Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending – Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present, London 2005
41.See above, pp. 9-10
42.For an illustrative on-the-ground report, see: Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue – Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban, New York 2006, pp. 63-83
43.Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop – The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, London 2007, which despite its title is a well-founded contribution to the understanding of post-2001 Afghanistan
44.Jochen Hippler, Das gefährlichste Land der Welt? – Pakistan zwischen Militärherrschaft, Extremismus und Demokratie (“The Most Dangerous Country in the World? - Pakistan Between Military Rule, Extremism and Democracy”, German), Köln 2008, chapter on civil war in the North Western Frontier Province
45.The strategy and tactics of violence of the Neo-Taliban against NATO-troops is of considerable difference compared to their earlier military conduct against purely Afghan forces in the middle of the 1990s. In regard to the latter see: Antony Davis, How the Taliban became a Military Force, in: William Maley (Ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? – Afghanistan and the Taliban, Lahore 1998, pp. 43-71
46.Jochen Hippler, Von der Diktatur zum Bürgerkrieg – Der Irak seit dem Sturz Saddam Husseins („From Dictatorship to Civil War – Iraq after the Fall of Saddam Hussein“; German), in: Jochen Hippler (Ed.).) Von Marokko bis Afghanistan – Krieg und Frieden im Nahen und Mittleren Osten, („From Morocco to Afghanistan – War and Peace in the Middle East“; German), Hamburg 2008; Jochen Hippler, Nation-Building by Occupation? – The Case of Iraq, in: Jochen Hippler (Ed.), Nation-Building – A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?, London 2005, pp. 81-97; and: Jochen Hippler, Der Weg in den Krieg – Washingtons Außenpolitik und der Irak („The Path to War – Washington’s Foreign Policy and Iraq”, German), in: Friedensgutachten 2003, hrsg. von Reinhard Mutz, et al., Münster 2003, S. 89-98
47.US National Counterterrorism Center, Report on Incidents of Terrorism, 2005, Washington, 11 April 2006, p. IX.
48.International Crisis Group, The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, Middle East Report N°52, Brussels, 27 February 2006
49.In regard to this jihadist terrorism in Iraq see: Guido Steinberg, Der nahe und der ferne Feind – Die Netzwerke des islamistischen Terrorismus, München 2005, pp. 197-235
50.International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report N°50, Brussels, 15 February 2006
51.Kenneth Katzman, Iraq and Al Qaeda, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, Updated December 7, 2007
52.Steven Simon / Jeff Martini, Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support, in: Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter 2004/05, pp. 131–145

Jochen Hippler is a TNI fellow and also research fellow at Institute for Development and Peace (INEF, Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden) of the University of Duisburg-Essen (Germany)