Conclusions: Democracias bajo fuego

Contents

Conclusion and proposals

• Review by Daniel Gatti

Democracias bajo fuego illustrates that the current repressive drug policies create more damage than that they produce solutions in Latin America. The collateral damage, generated by both drug trafficking as well as the 'war on drugs', are mayor impediments for the process of democratisation on the continent. This 370-page study aproaches the problem from two sides: on the one hand the destabilizing effect of an illicit economy; and on the other the re-militarization caused by the escalating drug war.

In the various chapters of this book, each author presents his or her own conclusions - and sometimes specific proposals - regarding the trends being analysed. Even so, we can identify some key points, regional trends and more general conclusions without detracting from the rich detail of the specific analyses. These were developed through joint discussion in the team of the "Drugs and Democracy" program of Acción Andina and the Transnational Institute (TNI).

1. Militarization and collateral damage

There is a trend toward militarization and transnationalization of anti-drug efforts in Latin America that tends to reinforce and relegitimize the domestic role of the military and militarized police forces. This is similar to the role they played under dictatorships, which led to their being discredited and condemned for their violations of human rights. The "drug war" promotes military intervention in internal matters and the re-establishment of bilateral and multilateral military alliances on the basis of a dubious redefinition of a "hemispheric security" supposedly threatened by drug trafficking.

The "war" also produces a series of "collateral damages" that affect fragile (and in some countries virtually non-existent) efforts toward democratization and demilitarization in the region. This collateral damage includes: military operations accompanied by human rights violations, repressive legislation that violates civil rights, perpetuation of impunity, and the creation of new security and intelligence forces subject to little democratic control.

Considering the great risks that the growing military role in the drug war poses to the current challenge of demilitarizing the region and freeing it once and for all from the shadow of its dictatorial past, we recommend a redefinition that strictly defines the roles of the military and police. The lessons of the past confirm that the principle must be non-involvement by the armed forces in domestic affairs and the adherence to their role of defending national sovereignty. We also suggest that the drug problem no longer be seen in terms of "war," and, by extension, the supposed "threat to national or regional security." Drug abuse and illegal drug trafficking should be considered in terms of public health and the legal system.

Transnationalization of the drug war, which establishes co-operative structures beyond the control or knowledge of national democratic institutions, endangers countries' national sovereignty and democracy. Any formal or informal treaty or agreement about international military, police or judicial cooperation, in operations or intelligence, must at least be subject to previous parliamentary discussion and decision.

2. The US role and ideologizing of the problem

The principal forces behind (trans)militarization in the region are the US's government, Congress and counternarcotics agencies, which use methods including pressure and blackmail aimed at involving "friendly" but not so docile countries in its war.

This pressure frequently generates diplomatic tensions and sometimes open conflict. There are well-founded doubts about the other, "real" US interests and motives behind this policy, especially its effect on decisions pertaining to domestic electoral interests; the self-defense of the giant drug war bureaucracy; economic interests tied to the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); and legitimation of a policy that, besides promoting arms sales in the region, attempts to consolidate and increase the US military presence in Latin America by maintaining present bases and setting up new, long-term enclaves.

We consider the US government's practice of unilateral certification of countries in the drug war to be highly counter-productive to a common search for the best solution to a problem that is a shared responsibility. In general, foreign economic aid should not be conditioned upon the performance of governments and institutions in the drug war, because that once again turns aid into an instrument of pressure and a way of meddling in internal affairs.

The "drug war" is deeply ideologized, reaching levels in the United States similar to the hysteria over the "red menace" during the McCarthy era. We consider this ideologizing unfounded, and the worldwide acceptance it receives worrisome. It makes a rational discussion about the effectiveness of applied strategies and the collateral damage they cause, nearly impossible. It also obstructs the search for and experimentation with possible alternative scenarios.

3. Corruption, impunity and crime in uniform

A complex dynamic exists that is characterized by an intimate relationship between criminal and state structures, demonstrated conceptually in models of state "protection" and "involvement." The phenomenon of corruption, promoted by traffickers in order to guarantee their protection, is directed toward anti-drug forces and the judicial system, as well as the political arena. At this level, corruption may be of an individual, collective, systemic or institutional nature, depending on the monopoly that a particular counternarcotics force has over the drug war and the impunity system which protects those who are corrupted. As far as state "involvement" is concerned, there is a mixture of "criminal" and "official" structures in which high officials of security forces play a significant role in the logistical organization of drug trafficking and other crimes. The mechanisms of corruption and protection in these mixed structures penetrate the highest spheres of political and judicial power. The result is an endemic impunity that, almost without exception, allows these structures to continue operating.

In order to decrease the corruption and distortion of the economic, judicial and political systems caused by money from drug trafficking and other organized crime, it is necessary to establish the means to publicly control political parties' income and electoral campaign financing. It is also necessary to put mechanisms in place to protect certain strategic economic sectors against investments of questionable origin. Investigating the sources of funds requires drastic changes regard to the secrecy of banking systems.

The impunity of state officials who systematically violate human rights and national laws, as well as permissiveness toward elements of a "parallel state," perpetuates power structures that obstruct democracy. It is necessary to establish, in the civilian sphere, effective control mechanisms for anti-drug operations and the judicial system.

4. War, Violence and Civil Security

Drug trafficking increases levels of criminal and political violence, feeding and prolonging armed conflicts. In Colombia, paramilitaries in the first place, and guerrilla groups in the second, support themselves with income from the illicit drug economy, pushing the conflict to higher and higher levels of violence. In countries that are presently in a phase of post-war reconstruction, demobilized armed groups and elements purged from former
security forces merge easily into criminal organizations, providing arms, experience in running a dirty war, and impunity. The increasing social inequity, marginalization and unemployment promotes integration of the informal and illicit economies, leading to the criminalization of the social sectors involved. The combination of these phenomena produces an alarming level of civil insecurity, which appears to be worsening throughout Latin America.

5. An authoritarian trend

Considering our study's two central angles - the destabilization resulting from the illicit economy itself and the remilitarization fuelled by the drug war - the "drug factor" reinforces the trend toward new authoritarian models in Latin America, as part of a series of factors that include:

• The shadow of a dictatorial past that refuses to die;
• Strong illegal economic interests that have taken the form of organized crime embedded in the power structures, in some countries reaching the level of a parallel state that undermines democratic structures or renders them impotent;
• State reform processes that, with few exceptions in the region, seek greater efficiency, but actually lead to a greater concentration of powers;
• The relegitimation of a domestic role for the military, based on the image of drug trafficking as a threat to national security;
• The public outcry for strong measures against threats to civil safety, which facilitates the imposition of laws, repressive policies and authoritarian regimes.

6. Failures in counternarcotics strategy

In terms of concrete results, current anti-drug strategy is a total failure. Indicators such as the number of seizures, hectares eradicated or number of arrests merely reflect the energy being invested; they do not serve as a measure of the strategy's effectiveness. Drug trafficking has an enormous capacity for readapting after supposed "final blows," through changes in modus operandi: new routes, new cultivation areas, new contraband methods, replacement of organizational structures, etc. After various decades of repressive strategy, it is still impossible to speak of substantive change in the growing illicit economy. Fluctuations in consumer price levels, quantities produced and the amount shipped to consuming countries respond more to laws of the illicit market than to interventions aimed at destroying it.

The only lasting solution to the political and social instability and the corruption of governments and security forces, which are linked to drug trafficking and its enormous illicit gains, lies in gradual decriminalization of the market. This would also reduce the fuelling of conflicts and collateral damage caused by present policies.

The first step toward such a solution should be a re-evaluation and reconceptualization of the drug situation in terms of public health and the legal system, and the demilitarization of all anti-drug efforts. At the same time, juridical standards must be re-established, and special laws that violate established norms of justice must be revoked.

The second step is a depenalization and/or decriminalization at the two far ends of the market - subsistence cultivation and individual consumption - adjusting the severity of sentences according to principals of proportionality. This should be followed by decriminalization of certain products, based on scientific reclassification (for example, a distinction between "soft" and "hard" drugs, removing the coca leaf from the UN -List 1- of prohibited substances, etc.).

With regard to subsequent steps, we believe serious, non-ideological studies are urgently required to define possible alternative models for regulating the entire illicit drug market chain, models that would also attempt to prevent an increase in drug abuse at the consumer level. The international community should rapidly open up space and means for legal testing of these models.

The poor results of the enormous investment in drug interdiction and eradication of illicit crops makes maintaining high budgets for these programs unjustifiable. The practice of spraying illicit crops with herbicides should also be prohibited immediately, because of its harmful effects on people and the environment.

We recommend that funds devoted to these efforts be redirected toward drug abuse prevention and sustainable development programs. Only these two areas can produce lasting, rational and fair solutions that will benefit the many people who are, in one way or another, victims of the problem.