The Drug War in the Skies

The purpose of this report is to evaluate the effectiveness and impacts of one of the key US supply side-interdiction programs in the War on Drugs in Latin America. This strategy, known as
"Air Bridge Denial", seeks to reduce the amount of cocaine entering the US and its domestic consumption by blocking the transport of cocaine and its precursors in the Andean-Amazonic region.

As this report will demonstrate, too much has been attributed to air bridge denial programs. Official US claims not only exaggerate efficacy, oversimplify causality, and obscure strategic
defeats behind tactical successes, they also completely ignore the social, political and economic costs that the air bridge denial programs have produced in the host countries. Absent from the official declarations of tactical success are any mention of the growing militarization of the host societies and the concomitant threat to democracy, increases in abuses of authority and corruption, or the growth in criminal activity. Despite the evidence to the contrary, US
officials have trumpeted the success of their air bridge denial programs, using them to demonstrate the overall effectiveness of source country interdiction as a strategy and to justify the continued outlay of funds for these programs. This effort on the part of US officials makes it all the more important to analyze the accuracy of the claims of
success and document the actual impacts of air bridge denial on the host countries.

Part I. Overview Of The Air Bridge Denial Strategy

What Is The Air Bridge?

The "Air Bridge" refers to a drug trafficking strategy that involves the air transport of cocaine base paste (CBP, an intermediary product in cocaine production) and/or "finished" cocaine in the Andean-Amazonic region. Typically, the air bridge involves the transport of CBP from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia where it is manufactured into cocaine hydrochloride (HCl, "finished" cocaine). It also includes shorter transport within the involved countries to move CBP and HCl from production and storage sites to transshipment sites.

The "Air Bridge" strategy was used extensively during the late 1980s and early 1990s as it conformed to the existing division of labor in the production and trafficking of cocaine. This division of labor distinguished between coca-growing nations such as Bolivia and Peru and cocaine-processing nations such as Colombia. By the mid-1990s, this division of labor was breaking down as Colombia had diminished its dependency on Bolivian and Peruvian coca through the initiation of domestic coca planting, a process referred to as verticalization or vertical integration of coca production in the national drug business. Along with this reconfiguration of cocaine production came changes in drug-trafficking strategies, including modifications in the characteristics and importance of the air bridge.

What Is The "Air Bridge Denial" Strategy?

"Air Bridge Denial" is a strategy adopted by the US government to block the air transport of CBP and HCl within the Andean-Amazonic region. This multi-million dollar strategy uses high tech surveillance equipment such as radar, satellites and aircraft in
order to monitor the movement of cocaine and its precursors. It is carried out with the participation of Latin American and US air forces.

"Goals": The primary goal of the "Air Bridge Denial"
strategy is to decrease the amount of cocaine (HCl) entering the US and diminish drug consumption. The logic of this strategy is based on a "chain reaction" of assumptions about the capacity of air bridge denial to affect the flow of drugs towards the US and its influence on the supply and demand for cocaine. This series of assumptions or sub-goals can be delineated as follows:

1. The "Air Bridge Denial" strategy is capable of maintaining an efficient shield that will block CBP air transport to Colombia.
2. This will cause a surplus of CBP stock in coca-growing countries (Peru & Bolivia) and produce a price crisis resulting in the dismantlement of local narco-trafficking structures.
3. At the same time, coca leaf prices will fall, causing a reduction in coca plantations.
4. A shortage of CBP in Colombia will raise its price and diminish total HCl production.
5. Therefore, narco-traffickers' costs of operation will rise, making their final product (cocaine) more expensive.
6. As a result, the US will experience a shortage of HCl/cocaine. On the retail market, prices will rise and purity will drop.
7. Finally, due to the price increase and decrease in supply, cocaine consumption in the US will diminish.

This cause and effect relationship is flawed in that it is based on a first assumption that is demonstrably false, that CBP transport to Colombia can be significantly blocked. Further, it lays out an overly simplistic depiction of the workings of the drug economy that fails to consider parallel or alternative explanations for changes in indicators relating to the supply and demand for CBP and HCl, and it ignores the constantly evolving nature of drug-trafficking. Finally, it demonstrates no understanding of the nature of addiction and its influence on consumption habits.

One other important objective of the "Air Bridge Denial" strategy that should be highlighted is its focus on expanding, consolidating and improving the infrastructure and coordination required to manage and execute multinational anti-drug operations. Unfortunately, this language of "coordination and infrastructure improvement" glosses over a reality that too often means increased militarization of the host countries with concomitant abuses of authority and increased corruption, both significant threats to fledging democracies.

"Operations": In heralding the success and innovation of air bridge denial, US drug policymakers refer almost exclusively to Operations Green Clover (1995) and Laser Strike (1996-present). Actually though, air bridge denial efforts began in Peru and Bolivia in the late
1980s and include Operations Blast Furnace and Snowcap and the Andean Initiative Operations Safe Haven, Ghost Zone and Support Justice I-IV.

Part 2: Evaluation of the Air Bridge Denial Strategy: The Success of a Failure

The effectiveness of the air bridge denial strategy is evaluated using seven criteria derived from its policy goals, from the official assumptions about how the strategy would play out and from the indicators used by proponents of the strategy in touting its
success. For each criterion, the available data on the strategy's outcomes is analyzed and the claims of success are reviewed.

1. Increased Multinational Cooperation

Many of the loudest claims of success for the air bridge denial strategy are based on the assertion that the strategy has been instrumental in building a well-oiled, multinational drug war machine. In his testimony before the house National Security Sub-Committee on July 9, 1997, Robert Newberry, Director of Department of Defense Drug Enforcement Policy and Support testified that "The most encouraging results of Green Clover and Laser Strike have been unprecedented cooperation among countries of South America in drug interdiction efforts; and the involvement of countries that had heretofore been uninvolved in attacking the drug threat."

There are, however, different perspectives on this much lauded "cooperation". On the ground in Latin America, the "cooperation" so touted by US officials is often spoken about at best as
an imposition and more often as a violation of national sovereignty on the receiving end. In addition, increased militarization of the host countries has been the result in many places as money, materials and training are provided to the police and military under the guise of expanding cooperation and building infrastructure for multinational drug operations. This has tended to reinforce and re-legitimize the domestic role of the military and militarized police forces, a very serious and negative side-effect, especially in those countries with histories of repressive military dictatorships and human rights violations. This increased militarization of society in the host countries is a side effect of these operations that threatens the health of fledgling democracies and is contrary to US rhetoric about promoting democracy and the development of democratic institutions.

2. Disruption Of Air Transport In The Andean-Amazonic Region

The most immediate objective of air bridge denial operations is the blockade of trafficking flights within and out of the Andean-Amazonic region. This supposedly sets off the chain reaction that should eventually discourage cocaine consumption in the US Evaluation of the air bridge denial strategy in achieving this objective, however, is complicated by a lack of clear data regarding the number of planes actually shot down or captured as well as difficulties in analyzing the impacts of these interdictions on the volume of drug trafficking. For example, during a Congressional hearing in 1994 the number of planes shot down over Peruvian airspace was unclear. Figures cited ranged from zero, to 3-5, to 31, leading one participant to refer to the debate as a "sweepstakes," and lament that "it would be sort of nice to have our three top experts be prepared to answer such an unbelievably elementary question."

The lack of consensus on the statistics is exacerbated by a lack of analysis of or means to interpret the data. Without knowing the total volume of flights (including legitimate commercial flights) used to move illegal drugs, it is difficult to impossible to measure the impact of these operations. This problem is compounded by lack of knowledge about what percentage of drugs are transported by air rather than by containers, "mules" (individuals transporting small quantities), or by water. In one of the few studies publicly available on the impact of air bridge interdiction, a 1994 study on the impact of SOUTHCOM detection and monitoring by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that during the five month
period it studied, the attack on the air bridge had at best ambiguous effects on trafficker and drug movements.

The effectiveness of air bridge denial operations is also made difficult to assess because changes in flight patterns easily offset the deterrent effect. The 1994 GAO report notes that drug flights continued during air bridge operations. Traffickers had merely modified their strategies to use less flights, larger shipments, night schedules, briefer loading and unloading times, and more circuitous routes. In addition to diversifying air routes, narco-traffickers have evaded the deterrent effect of the air bridge denial operations by rerouting their shipments by land and water.

Air bridge flights continue not only because of shifting routes but also because of strategies employed by traffickers, to avoid detection. Traffickers make extensive use of new technologies, including stronger and faster planes and continually develop new strategies for eluding air and ground surveillance of their flights. These strategies include flying in zigzag patterns, shadowing the flight paths of legitimate commercial flights and taking off in groups of three that then disperse using distinct routes. Drug traffickers have also effectively used corruption to get around air space control by bribing local officials to help them evade detection and monitoring of cocaine transport flights.
A Peruvian official in Iquitos stated that members of the armed forces collaborate closely with drug traffickers: "Instead of infiltration I see it as a fee that traffickers have to pay, much like the one that they paid to Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] in the areas controlled by that group. I believe that objectively, the trafficker as a businessman knows that his landing strip is in a zone controlled by the security forces and it is not difficult for him to purchase the services of certain units so that his plane can take off."

A final factor complicating the evaluation of the impact of the air bridge denial strategy are the changes in the structure of narco-trafficking taking place in Peru and Bolivia, related to the previously described verticalization process taking place in Colombia. Peruvians and Bolivians began producing more cocaine/HCl. The 1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) noted that in the past year Bolivia has become the second largest cocaine-producing nation in Latin America. These changes in Peru and Bolivia limit the impact of the air bridge denial operations since they have decreased the importance of the Peru-Colombia and Bolivia-Colombia air link. CBP and HCl production continues, but using other structures and routes less dependent on the "original" air bridge.

In sum, there is only contradictory and misleading data regarding the number of flights intercepted or downed and little overall knowledge about the total volume of narco-trafficking flights with which to interpret the data. While there is evidence that air bridge denial operations have an impact on flight patterns, there is, at the same time, evidence that drug traffickers are very innovative and are able to quickly adjust to any disruptions through new air, river and land routes, use of new technologies, and corruption. The spread of corruption is one of the clear negative side effects of the strategy and appears to be rampant in all the countries involved in the strategy. Another negative side effect is the killing of innocent civilians through mistaken shoot downs of civilian air craft. There have been several known or suspected shoot downs of innocent planes during air bridge denial operations.

3. Decline In The Price Of Coca Leaf

Market theory posits a direct causal relationship between the price of coca leaf and the amount of coca planted. As such, it is held that when prices are high, more coca will be planted and when it is low, the planting of coca will diminish. The price of coca has therefore been used as an indicator of the success of the air bridge denial strategy. The underlying assumption is that disruption in the air routes will result in difficulties in transporting coca leaf and CBP, thus creating a surplus in the producer countries, causing prices to
drop.

One of the key claims of success for the air bridge denial strategy rests on the basis of a crash in the price of coca leaf starting in the first few months of 1995 that was most strongly felt in the Peruvian Alto Huallaga valley, where the coca market was completely dependent on Colombian buyers. Between January and September of 1995, coca prices in the Huallaga fell from $3.00 to $0.40 per kilo, and CBP prices from $850 to $100 per kilo. While US authorities claim this price crash to be entirely the result of air bridge denial operations and additional interdiction efforts by the Peruvian anti-drug police forces, the actual data on the event indicates that the vertical integration of coca leaf production in Colombia was the cause of the price crash.

By 1995, Colombian narco-traffickers were no longer dependent upon Peru for coca leaf to process into cocaine because of the widespread planting of coca within Colombia. As such, any problems that the air bridge denial operations could have caused the narco-traffickers had already been solved in response to this internal restructuring of the trafficking operations. This alternative explanation also explains the data concerning the short longevity and limited significance of the Peruvian price crisis. According to the DEA, the 50% reduction in coca prices in Peru in 1995 was "on the rebound by early 1996.", though air bridge denial was reported to continue apace. The latest information on prices in Peruvian coca producing areas and on cocaine production in the Andean countries confirm a nearly complete recovery of prices and indicate the recomposition of narco-trafficking structures within the limits of economiclaws. The market now counts on a more significant participation of Colombian-grown coca, the survival of the competitive parts of Peruvian and Bolivian coca growing operations,
and a more significant Peruvian and Bolivian participation in cocaine production.

4. Decrease In Hectares Of Coca Fields Planted

According to the assumptions guiding the air bridge denial strategy, the decline in coca leaf price should lead to a decrease in the hectares of coca fields planted. In fact, coca production in Peru did decline dramatically. According to official data, there was an 18% decrease in 1995, 27% in 1996, 27% in 1997 and 26% in 1998, dropping from a high of 129,100 hectares in 1992 to just 51,000 hectares in 1998. Overall, this was a 60% decline that closely coincided with air bridge denial programs. This was, according to US officials, a stunning success for the air bridge denial strategy.

Again the Colombian verticalization process provides an alternative explanation that better explains the reduction in Peruvian coca fields and does so within a regional context. At the same time that Peruvian coca planting was declining, there was an increase in coca planting in Colombia. When the Colombian planting is taken into account, there is no net regional decline in coca planting; in fact, local sources report that the number of hectares planted in 1996 was more or less the amount of coca needed to supply the world market of cocaine, seizures included. It should also be noted that Colombia has now, according to official data, surpassed Bolivia and Peru as the largest producer of the coca leaf.

5. Increase In The Price Of Cocaine

One of the effects of the air bridge denial strategy is supposed to be an increase in the price of cocaine, due to the increased costs born by narco-traffickers as a result of the disruption of their operations and forfeiture of their goods. One of the first disruptions assumed to occur and lead to price increases is the shortage of CBP in Colombia due to blocked air transport routes. However, from the previous analyses, it is clear that there never was a shortage of CBP in Colombia. Neither has there been a net reduction in total Andean HCl production. A 1996 DEA report recognized this: "Although the air bridge interdiction initiative is considered to be a counter-drug success, this year long campaign does not appear to have caused any measurable shortage of cocaine paste for processing in Colombia." Thus, without a shortage of CBP, one of the key reasons for an increase in the price of cocaine is rendered null and void.

In addition, there is agreement among researchers that most increases in costs of operation would have a limited effect on consumer prices because costs levied against producers and traffickers closer to the source have a negligible impact on drug prices in the US This is confirmed by a look at actual data on the price and purity of cocaine in the US during the time period of the air bridge denial strategy. As the following graph demonstrates, while anti-drug spending has been increasing, cocaine prices have dropped slightly while purity has been holding steady. The one spike in the data in 1991 is attributed to the disarticulation of the Medellín cartel. The data clearly show, however, that it was only a temporary setback for traffickers.
Acknowledging these facts, in a 1996 phone interview, Gen. McCaffrey stated that "it seems whimsical to suggest that our [US SOUTHCOM's] efforts drove up the price and drove down the use of cocaine."

6. Decrease In The Amount Of Cocaine Entering The US

There is little to suggest that increasing trafficker costs and drug seizures lead to physical shortages of CBP or HCl. With regard to physical supplies of drugs in the United States, the chart below notes that at no time during the programs in question did drug supplies sink anywhere near the estimated average annual consumption of 300 metric tons, though total expenditures on drug control were increasing.

7. Decrease In US Cocaine Consumption

Although according to market logic, steady purity and declining prices should result in more cocaine consumption, in fact, the opposite has been the case. Occasional use has dropped significantly, while hardcore use has leveled off after an initial decline in the late 1980s. While these trends are clearly positive in terms of drug abuse, there is nothing in the market logic employed by the drug warriors that can explain it. Clearly, the market logic underpinning the air bridge denial strategy is seriously flawed, throughout its chain of assumptions. While the end result of lowered cocaine consumption has occurred, there is absolutely no reason to believe it has anything to do with air bridge denial or other supply side interdiction programs.

Other Collateral Damage

In addition to the negative side effects of increased militarization, widespread corruption and possible shoot downs of civilian air craft already covered, the air bridge denial strategy has also resulted in other collateral damage in the host countries. These include the following:

"New Populations And Areas Involved": In the face of on-going eradication efforts, coca planting has spread out to new geographic areas and involved new population groups. In addition, as trafficking structures and routes have changed new actors have become involved and old actors have taken on new roles, including HCl production.

"Criminalization Of Poverty": For many of subsistence farmers who have had their only source of income eradicated, the only "solution" they can find, in a desperate effort to guarantee their family's survival, is a deeper involvement in narco-trafficking structures. Latin American prisons, rather than keeping narco-trafficking kingpins from doing their business, are filled with these poor people - a mirror of the situation in the US where the drug
war has also criminalized poverty.

"Expanded Drug Consumption In Latin America": Cocaine consumption, mainly CBP, is one the rise throughout the Andean-Amazonic region. The expansion of routes has brought along new drug users, mainly by the use of payment in species mechanisms.

"Exacerbation Of Conflicts": The dispersion and adaptation of trafficking strategies and routes has generated and exacerbated social conflicts and upheaval.

Conclusions

While US policy makers have been quick to announce victory, on the field studies and data analysis show that the recent changes in the Andean narco-trafficking business anticipated the air bridge denial program and show no direct relation to its implementation.
Although the US government continues to inflate local or restricted impacts of air bridge denial in specific nations into a claim of the overall success of their air bridge denial strategy, regional analysis indicates otherwise. Since the strategy's inception, there has been no reduction in cocaine availability and purity and no price increase in the United States. Nor has air bridge interdiction met its more immediate goals of creating a shortage of cocaine base paste (CBP) for cocaine production in the Andean region.

US officials claim that they have been able to deter coca paste shipment and trafficker transport, but at best they have temporarily inconvenienced traffickers and forced them to either switch to harder to monitor routes or reorganize production processes to obviate the need for transport of materials over long distances and national borders. These changes to disperse riverine, ground and maritime routes and restructured production have served to greatly swell the budget and scope of South American interdiction policy, drawing additional nations, and increasingly their militaries, into its programs.

The air bridge denial program has had an impact on Latin America though beyond the immediate transformations it has helped fuel in the transport strategies of drug traffickers. It has catalyzed and exacerbated the extension of drug trafficking both territorially and socially. As drug traffickers move their operations to avoid interdiction, and coca growers migrate evading spraying or other eradication tactics, new regions and actors have become involved in drug production and trafficking. One result has been to diversify and multiply production and trafficking patterns, making the phenomena more difficult to define and address, while expanding and diversifying the social base of such activities.

Government repression, increasingly militarized, thus finds itself before an "enemy" ever more disperse, far flung, and socially variegated. In sum, they find themselves criminalizing poverty and in confrontation with ever larger sectors of society, a recipe for social disaster and greater, more generalized violence. In countries with weak democracies and/or increasing levels of social violence and repression, these "side effects" of the US's drug war "remedy" may prove more detrimental than the narco-trafficking disease.