Needed: Creative diplomacy, not force

No words can fully capture the horror and revulsion caused by the terror attacks in Mumbai. And none are strong enough to condemn the killing of 180 people in a meticulously planned operation, executed with ruthless precision. Nothing, including outrage against the gravest of injustices, can ever condone the butchery of civilians. By all accounts, the fanatics who conducted it were inspired by apocalyptic visions of a world bereft of tolerance, in which their politicised brand of religion must prevail over all other faiths and ways of organising life.

A distinguishing feature of the carnage was the targeting—for the first time—of foreign, especially American and British, nationals, and Jews, in addition to the indiscriminate killing of more than 150 Indians. Another feature was the focus on two iconic luxury hotels, guaranteed to attract publicity because of their affluent and international clientele.

These features, and the terrorists' bracketing of India with the US, UK and Israel, suggest that those who directed the attacks have an international agenda, similar to al-Qaeda's. Unlike groups led by domestic factors, they are driven by a "Clash of Civilisations" perspective, which pits an imaginary global Christian-Jewish-Hindu "coalition" against Islam.

It's fashionable to call the Mumbai carnage "India's 911". This analogy is wrong because the two attacks are dissimilar in context, scale and impact. The Twin Towers casualties were 16 times higher than Mumbai's. They exposed the vulnerability of the American homeland—for the first time in 60 years. Indians have long recognised their vulnerability, having suffered scores of attacks over two decades. 911 changed the way the US looks at the world, especially threats to itself from jehadi extremism. Mumbai won't radically alter India's outlook.

The analogy is also dangerous because it assumes that the US response to 911 in launching a Global War on Terror was right. But GWoT has been a disaster. It has caused a million civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan, fomented Islamophobia, sharply raised the incidence of terrorism, and spread insecurity globally. The American people have paid a heavy price for their government's attempt to prevent another attack through ethnic profiling, intrusive surveillance and the draconian PATRIOT Act.

Our frustration and anger with the failure of India's security and intelligence agencies to issue timely warnings and act in concert to intercept the terrorists, and the delay in sending the National Security Guards to Mumbai, shouldn't blind us to this reality. It's imperative that we radically reform these agencies and improve coordination among them.

It's a relief to note that despite this frustration, the public hasn't succumbed to the anti-Islam, anti-Muslim interpretation being put on terrorism by the Bharatiya Janata Party in its cynical attempt to communalise opinion. BJP propaganda, and Messrs Narendra Modi's and LK Advani's posturing, has repelled the people What India most needs today is unity, cohesion and solidarity based on secularism. Equally important, while the resignations of Messrs Shivraj Patil, Vilasrao Deshmukh and RR Patil are welcome , we mustn't indulge in politician-bashing while extolling militarism.

A great deal of circumstantial evidence—including the attackers' Global Positioning System and satellite phone records, email tracks, markings on armaments, and fingerprints on boats and other materials—suggests that they came by sea from Karachi armed with sophisticated arms. This, says the police, is corroborated by the interrogation of arrested terrorist Mohammed Ajmal Amir Iman alias Qasab. Their use of a Russian server to reroute email messages from Lahore using voice-recognition software, and their mastery of maritime technology and modern navigation methods, speak of a high level of professionalism.

The fact that they carried out their pre-assigned tasks with clockwork precision, that they targeted at least nine sites in Mumbai, killed top-notch Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad specialists including its chief Hemant Karakarey, and battled 500 NSG men for a good 60 hours, speaks of a frightening level of combat training and fanatical dedication.

Going by the available expertise on terrorism, there aren't many groups in Pakistan, barring Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which possess these characteristics, can impart rigorous training to young men and command them to kill themselves. Even so, Indian intelligence and police agencies must painstakingly collect clinching, irrefutable evidence and establish the attackers' identities and connections before making any more public statements.

Drawing inferences from loosely established facts, and relying on speculation, however informed or intelligent, just won't do. What is needed is solid, hard, incontrovertible evidence, which can withstand critical scrutiny, and on the basis of which the attackers and their co-conspirators can be convicted. Luckily, for the first time, the authorities have caught an attacker red-handed, who can provide invaluable information, evidence and clues for further investigation. Ajmal must be put on trial.

The police say many leads point to LeT's involvement. These must be fully established if the international community is to be convinced and Pakistan's cooperation is to be secured. LeT was created and trained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency. But it cannot be assumed that it enjoys no autonomy whatever and the ISI still fully controls it. Making a direct equation between LeT, the ISI, the Pakistan Army and the elected civilian government, and accusing them of having colluded to engineer the attacks, would be way off the mark.

It strains credulity to hold that President Asif Ali Zardari's government would want to undermine the peace process with India and risk a costly conflict at a time when Pakistan is in serious economic trouble and faces a growing collapse of governance and rising ethnic strife, manifested in the current Mohajir-Pushtun clashes in Karachi, the creeping Taliban takeover of the North-Western Frontier Province, and an insurgency in Baluchistan.

That conspiracy theory sits ill with Mr Zardari's recent statement recalling Benazir Bhutto's words ("There's a little bit of India in every Pakistani and a little bit of Pakistan in every Indian"), and offering not to use nuclear weapons first against India. Besides, Pakistan can ill-afford to unleash against India the forces of extremism which are playing havoc on its own territory and jeopardising the state's integrity. After all, Pakistan is also a victim of jehadi extremists, who claimed Bhutto's life, caused the Marriott hotel attack, and earlier made two major attempts on Gen Pervez Musharraf's life.

True, the Pakistan Army is beyond full civilian control. But it's unlikely that it initiated or was complicit in the Mumbai operation. It knows that would attract Washington's hostility just when it's planning to escalate the war in Afghanistan with greater Pakistani cooperation. Besides, Army chief Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and ISI director-general Ahmad Shuja Pasha both have strong pro-US leanings. This doesn't entirely rule out the possibility of the Army turning a blind eye to the planning of the attacks. But it does make it highly unlikely.

Of course, there are rogue elements in the ISI, who bear visceral antipathy to India, and who might be especially incensed at the deepening India-US strategic alliance, now taken to new heights by the nuclear deal. But their collusion with the Mumbai attackers has to proved, not assumed. In general, it would be a mistake to treat Pakistan as an undifferentiated homogeneous entity.

Pakistan has promised to help India investigate the attacks. Although it has reneged on its earlier offer to send the ISI director-general to India, it still promises to send a senior agency official. India should respond positively to this offer and try to build alliances with the saner elements in the Pakistani state who recognise the dangers of fomenting jehadi terrorism.

However, New Delhi is repeating the mistake in committed in December 2001 by demanding that Islamabad hand over to it wanted fugitives—without adducing evidence against them. Pakistan has rejected this demand. India can't compel it to comply with it. Coercing Pakistan risks a breakdown of the peace process and an armed conflict, which can dangerously escalate into a nuclear war, with millions of casualties. There can be no winners in a nuclear war. The only gainers from any conflict will be hawks and terrorists—besides the US, through a heightened mediatory role for itself.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit makes it clear that the US will push Pakistan to act against domestic extremists only up to a point. India must create and fashion its own diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan.

An honourable and peaceful strategy would be to take the Mumbai case to the United Nations Security Council under Resolution 1373, which requires all states to "refrain from providing … support… to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts…", give "early warning to other states" and "deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts…"—all on pain of punitive measures. This multilateral approach will avert overbearing US influence. Contrary to irrational fears, a 1373 reference won't revive the Kashmir issue in the UN or put India into a disadvantaged position in any other way..

Simultaneously, the government must refrain from enacting laws that restrict civil liberties, and from acting in ways which promote paranoia, fear and social division. Our liberties and our democracy are too precious to be sacrificed at the altar of counter-terrorism.

Praful Bidwai, a fellow of the Transnational Institute, is a senior Indian journalist, political activist and widely published commentator. He is a co-author (with Achin Vanaik) of New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament.