Next Chechen Election Test

Next Chechen Election Test
Boris Kagarlitsky
The Moscow Times, 28 October 2003

Akhmad Kadyrov got himself elected president of Chechnya, and the Kremlin apparently decided that the political situation in the republic was finally under control. The federal authorities would be dealing directly with their proteges in Grozny, and their proteges would carry on siphoning off the federal money earmarked for rebuilding Chechyna. This idyllic state of affairs would be disturbed from time to time by mine blasts, gun battles and sweep operations.

Having put Kadyrov in the driver's seat in Chechnya, the Kremlin has guaranteed that the status quo in the republic will continue indefinitely. In other words, the war will not end any time soon. And yet the political battle in Chechnya is far from over; it is entering a new and much more serious phase.

Neither the Kremlin nor Kadyrov could afford for him to lose the election. Moscow pulled out all the stops to remove his rivals from the race. The separatists boycotted the election, and other serious opponents were eliminated long before the voters went to the polls. As a result, election day went off without a hitch. The only problem is that no one takes the election results seriously.

Soon Chechen voters will take part in the State Duma election - an entirely different proposition. Kadyrov will not be running, of course, and the people close to him aren't exactly cut out for parliament. Putin took care of Chechnya's current representative in the Duma, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, by taking him on as an adviser - a move clearly designed to keep this somewhat unpredictable politician on a short leash. But then Salambek Maigov threw his hat into the ring.

Until recently, Maigov was the Moscow representative of Aslan Maskhadov, an arrangement that lasted just a few months before he parted ways with the outlawed rebel leader. But his break with Maskhadov does not mean that Maigov has broken with the separatist movement. Maigov, Lema Shakhmurzayev and many other Chechen politicians have taken to calling themselves the "political wing of the Chechen opposition", following the example of Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. In the 1990s, many Chechen activists believed that only independence could guarantee the safety of their people. But de facto independence in 1991 and 1996 failed to make life any safer in the republic. Hopes that the international community would intervene proved unfounded. The West likes to talk about human rights, but it has shown very little interest in what actually goes on in the Caucasus. Today, a new generation of Chechen politicians has come to realize that there is no point changing Chechnya's relationship with Russia if major changes do not take place within Russia itself. And if Russia ever becomes a truly democratic federation, the Chechens might not need independence at all.

Political systems reflect underlying economic and social reality. For the past decade, the social ideology of the Chechen separatist movement has been vague at best. Yet many of its members have become convinced that at the international level the interests of the Chechen people have been most consistently defended by the left. It's far too early to say that the supporters of the "political wing of the Chechen movement" have all become leftists overnight. But discussions have begun within the movement that recall the old arguments typical of Third World national liberation movements in the 1950s.

Maigov's election campaign should answer a lot of questions. Is the new generation of Chechen activists prepared to wage a political battle, and to seek a dialogue with those who are pushing for democratic changes in Russia? To what extent has the movement hammered out its social policies?

The Kremlin faces an even more serious question. It is more than clear that if the vote in Chechnya is free and fair, Maigov stands a very good chance of winning a seat in the Duma. The Putin team could intervene and engineer his removal from the race, of course, but this would lead only to an escalation of the armed conflict in the republic. Kadyrov has already proven himself incapable of bringing a halt to the fighting, whereas the top priority of the separatists' "political wing" is a peace process.

The Kremlin's other option is to allow for a free and fair election, accepting the risk that a representative of the separatist opposition might well wind up in the Duma. He would be just one of 450 deputies in the lower house, after all. But for the Kremlin, even this scenario might seem too risky. Whatever the outcome, both sides are in for a serious test.

Copyright 2003 The Moscow Times