After the Gaza Withdrawal

After the Gaza Withdrawal
Mariano Aguirre
Fride Comment, September 2005

Spanish

The withdrawal of security forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip in August opens a series of doubts about the future of the Road Map for peace negotiations, the ability of the Palestinian authorities to control this territory and, in the medium term, whether it will be possible to achieve agreement around the creation of a viable Palestinian state.

The withdrawal of security forces and 8,500 Israeli settlers from the territory of Gaza was accomplished in August with great efficiency on the part of the government of Ariel Sharon and without incident by the Palestinian side. After this, two new questions emerge: Will some type of negotiation between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) regarding the occupied territory of the West Bank continue? And what will become of the political and economic situation in Gaza?

Twenty months ago, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced unilaterally that Israel would return the territory that it has controlled since the 1967 war to the Palestinians. His government has used the concept of disengagement because it denies that there has been an occupation of the territory.

The Israeli Parliament, or Knesset, approved the Gaza proposal on October 26, 2004 by 67 votes in favor to 45 against. Sharon gained the support of Labor, the Likud party as well as the lay parties Shinui and Yahad and some of the Arab representatives. The rest of Likud, the National Union (ultra right) the National Religious party and Shas voted against the proposal. The ultra orthodox and some other Arab representatives abstained. (1)

The political division produced by the withdrawal plan can be seen in Likud, Sharon's
party, which voted against the plan in an internal referendum in May of 2004. The farthest right members of the party, such as the former Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Bejamin Netanyahu, fear that Israel will follow a course that spins out of its control and results in the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. Pressure from Netanyahu could push both Sharon and like-minded Likud members into hard-line policies towards Palestinians and limit any future negotiations. (2)

1.4 million Palestinians live in Gaza, a highly contaminated, narrow strip of land 45 km long. Of these, 965,645 are refugees and 471,555 are packed in eight camps, better described as slums, managed by the United Nations. (3) The situation of Palestinians who are refugees in their own territory dates back to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, when they fled from their homes located in areas that are now Israeli-controlled. (4) The living conditions, particularly in the areas of housing, sanitation, education, sewers and electricity have worsened as a result of the punishing offensives by Israel, particularly the so-called “Operation Forward Shield” in 2004. (5)

The Situation in Gaza

The settlers, who lived in comfortable houses, protected by electric fences and security forces, developed an agricultural sector that employed 3,500 Palestinians and produced 15% of Israeli exports, the majority destined for Europe. One of the major concerns of Palestinians and the European Union is that Israel will leave Gaza outside of the free trade agreements that are currently in force. (6)

Following the withdrawal, many doubts have been raised. It is not clear if the Palestinian Authority or Hamas will control Gaza and what prerogatives Israel will retain. Nor do the Palestinians know what laws govern them. The Sharon government has indicated that it will control the air and sea and the borders, which implies that it will decide which check points to open and close. This also means that it is not clear if free transit between Gaza and the West Bank will be permitted or what system of identification the Palestinians will use.

Henry Siegman, of the Council on Foreign Relations, who, with the former French Prime
Minister Michel Rocard, directed an international task force on Palestinians institutions, states that "if Israel does not allow the opening of the borders of Gaza for the movement of people and property to the West Bank and via the rest of its international borders and blocks the reopening of the airport, then the area will become an enormous prison and the economic result will be disastrous". (7)

Neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority have taken into consideration ideas that are circulating, such as those of the working group coordinated by the former Labor Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami that proposed the creation of a Palestinian Transitional Authority that would guarantee that Gaza does not become a base for Hamas. Meanwhile, Israel must provide guarantees for the viability of the strip. (8) Currently, the EU and Japan, among other donors, have begun to help strengthen Gaza to avoid it becoming a sanctuary for radical groups.

The restrictive measures and the lack of clarity weaken the Palestinian government of
Mahamoud Abbas, and favor Hamas in the medium and long terms. These benefits may be seen as soon as the elections for the Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority that will be held next January. The municipal elections on May 4, 2004 were a preview of the Hamas strategy to gain political power, having won important outcomes the previous year. Hamas interprets the Gaza withdrawal as a triumph of their violent strategy and a failure of the diplomatic approach of the PNA.

Since Arafat's death, the crisis of the national liberation movement Al Fatah and the ascension of a double power have been most notable: the moderate leadership of the PNA President, Mahmud Abbas, and the radical leadership of Hamas and the Islamic jihad. President Abbas must combine three objectives: to hold Hamas and the Islamic jihad to the ceasefire agreed to with Israel in February; to reactivate the peace process; and to keep United States, the EU and the UN engaged, against the will of Israel, in continuing and expanding negotiations. Washington supports Sharon, the European Union wants to see the Gaza withdrawal as part of the Road Map (backed by the US, the EU, the UN and Russia) and the UN is a secondary actor in the process.

The future of the negotiations

Various analysts believe that the withdrawal is linked to the construction of new
settlements in the disputed territory of the West Bank and that Sharon is seeking an end to the historic context of the occupation, the UN resolutions and the Road Map. The building of a metal and concrete wall would definitively separate the two areas that Israel wants to control from the limited areas that will be left to the Palestinians. (9)

The construction of the wall in the West Bank is part of a policy of "peace through
separation". (10) This "security fence", as it is called in Israel, will be finished in 2006. Israel explains it as an instrument for its legitimate defense against terrorist attacks. Its route does not follow the so-called "Green Line" (the border prior to the 1967 war and
the one that is recognized by international law) but rather is inside the West Bank and de facto, confiscates Palestinian land. Moreover, it destroys existing infrastructure, separates people from their land and excludes thousands of families from their rights to freedom of movement, education, health, property, work and food. (11)

Harvey Morris, Financial Times correspondent, states that Sharon has turned the argument, of "peace through territory and security", which has guided the negotiations for more than a decade and narrowed links between Israelis and Palestinians, upside down. Equally, he distanced himself from this principal that inspired the Geneva Initiative, launched by Israeli and Palestinian politicians and civil society groups in 2003. (12) On this course, he isolated President Yaser Arafat before his death, initiated the construction of the wall, announced the withdrawal from Gaza and put security in front. (13)

In 2004, President George Bush gave his support by assuming as a fait accompli that "it is not realistic" that, as a result of negotiations, the borders would return to those of the armistice of 1949. The strategy of suicide attacks helped considerably given that many Israelis had no one with whom to negotiate. That left only the resolution by separation and the adoption of unilateral measures and the use of force, including the selective assassination of Hamas leaders.

In this context, Sharon could unilaterally reaffirm the control and sovereignty of Israel over most of the West Bank (where his Government has continued to expropriate territory to expand the settlements), leaving the Palestinians the Gaza Strip and small areas of the West Bank were settlers are also being evacuated.

Neve Gordon, of Ben Gurion University, believes that Israel will continue with a unilateral policy and will connect the settlements of Maaleh Edumim, Gush Etzion and Ariel. This would leave the Palestinians with a disjointed territory on which to build their eventual state. "Israel", he says, "has no plans to discuss two of the most fundamental aspects of the occupation – East Jerusalem and the large blocs of Israeli settlements – and that will dictate the Palestinians' plan". (14).

For his part, Marwan Bishara, of the North American University in Paris, writes that, as a good general, Sharon knows that he can make a tactical concession to advance strategically. In this way, "the withdrawal from Gaza will finally advance his plans for a territory ten times bigger, the West Bank and Jerusalem". (15) And the president of the Israeli party Yahad, Yossi Beilin, has indicated that, with the withdrawal, the Prime Minister will "release Israel from its control of over 1 million Palestinians, he will strengthen its control of the West Bank, and it will be able to continue building housing units there, without having to deal with two of the most sensitive issues that have been on the agenda for decades: the future of Jerusalem and the solution of the Palestinian refugee problem". (16)

Sharon and the Palestinian State

In 2003, Sharon had pressure from the international community and some business sectors to reinitiate negotiations that would lead to a diplomatic peace. Inside and outside government, the specter of the growing Palestinian demographic, much greater than that of Israel, began to cause concern, along with the nightmare scenario that within a decade, the Palestinian majority would demand a bi-national state, resulting in the end of the pure Jewish State. Paradoxically, Sharon held the letter to single-handedly create a Palestinian state.

As pressure could grow in the long term in favor of a bi-national state, in the short term, Palestinians and influential foreigners would call for an international intervention to maintain stability in Gaza. As a result, Israel could preempt both concerns by declaring the Strip the base of the new State. (17) If some Palestinians were to accept the idea negotiations would restart as would divisions among the Palestinian political forces.

Precisely as expected, the radical Palestinian sectors suspect that President Abbas could give in and accept a subordinate Palestinian state and the legitimization of the Israeli occupation of the occupied territories. The withdrawal from Gaza would also allow Sharon to argue that he gave the Palestinians land to govern and they failed. In conclusion, that it would be impossible to continue with the Road Map propelled by the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN). Confirming this hypothesis, Dov Weisglass, advisor to Sharon, indicated on 2004 that handing over Gaza would save the Israeli presence in the West Bank. He reaffirmed the argument again stressing that the Sharon's government is writing the script, avoiding any kind of external pressure, and imposing pressure on the Palestinians to accept the unilateral conditions: "The disengagement plan is the preservative of the sequence principle. It is the bottle of formaldehyde within which you place the president's formula so that it will be preserved for a very lengthy period. The disengagement is actually formaldehyde. It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that's necessary so that there will not be a political process with the Palestinians." (18)

Israel could opt in the future for a long process of negotiations without a clear end,
following some of the mistakes of the Oslo model, irritating the radical Palestinian sectors while diminishing the power of the moderates. From the Palestinian perspective, this scenario is very dangerous: if the moderates accept a weak and fragmented state, there is risk of a civil war. And Israel would not have peace either. But if both the moderates with their pragmatism, and the radicals with their mix of electoral success and violence have nothing concrete, then neither Israeli nor Palestinian society will have stability. As the result, the other option for Israel is to assume that after Gaza, it will need to concern itself will all remaining questions and move ahead, first establishing the broad terms of an agreement that allows the Palestinians to have a viable state, and later, negotiating the details. (19)

The author is grateful for the collaboration of Covadonga Morales-Bertrand in the writing of this article.

References

1. You can follow this debate in the pages of the main Israeli newspaper, Haaretz.
2. "A question of timing", The Economist, September 3, 2005, p. 39.
3. Regarding the internal situation in Gaza, see: Graham Usher, "Gaza Agonistes", MERIP 218, Spring 2001.
4. Kimberley Kelly and Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Gaza", American Association for the Advancement of Science and University of Toronto, 1995.
5. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNCHA), "Preliminary Humanitarian Situation Report. Operation Forward Shield", August 20, 2004.
6. Harvey Morris, "Mandelson urges Israel to retain Gaza free trade deal", Financial Times, May 22, 2005.
7. Henry Siegman, "Israel's Leaders are Now Freer to Make Tough Choices", Financial Times, August 22, 2005.
See "Reforming the Palestinian Authority: An Update". A report by the Task Force on the Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions. Michel Rocard (Chair), Henry Siegman (Director), New York, 2004.
8. Proposal for Governance of the Gaza Strip in the Context of the Announced Israeli Withdrawal, Toledo International Centre for Peace, November 2004.
9. For more information about the security strip that Israel is erecting, see Nieves Zúñiga, "Muro en Palestina, una medida ilícita segun la CIJ", Papeles de cuestiones internacionales, number 86, 2004, pp. 92-94.
10. Isaías Barrañeda, "Falso optimismo para Palestina e Israel", in Manuela Mesa and Mabel González (Coord.), Cartografías del poder, Anuario CIP 2005, Madrid, pp.159-184.
11. "Europa acude dividida al debate de la ONU sobre el muro de Israel", El País, July 17, 2004. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), declared on July 9, 2004 that the construction of the wall "creates an annexation in fact of Palestinian territory" contrary to international law and is therefore, illegal. The findings of the Court required Israel to stop work on the construction of the wall and to repair any damage caused by it. Israel has rejected the verdict of the Court regarding what it deems an internal issue of the country over which it has no jurisdiction. In response, the UN and the ICJ affirms that this is an issue that involved the international community.
12. Yossi Beilin, "Out of Gaza", New Perspectives Quarterly, Volume 21, Number 3, Summer 2004. Regarding the Geneva Initiative, see also, www.geneva-accord.org
13. Harvey Morris, "Going from Gaza, but Sharon reveals little of his intentions for peace with Palestinians", Financial Times, August 4, 2005.
14. Neve Gordon, "El plan de Sharon", El País, 12 de junio, 2005. See also Chris McGreal, "Israel is sealing off Jerusalem Arabs", The Guardian Weekly, April 8, 2005 and Editorial, "Keeping an eye on the opportunity of Gaza", Financial Times, August 15, 2005.
15. Marwan Sishara, "Después de la tormenta de Gaza", La Vanguardia, August 21, 2005.
16. Yossi Beilin, "Out of Gaza?", New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 2004.
17. Bishara, La Vanguardia, 21 de agosto 2004.
18. Haaretz, October 8, 2004 and interview with Dov Weissglas by Ari Shavit, "The big freeze", Haaretz, September 8, 2005.
19. See, for example, the opinion in this sense of the former Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, "Las perspectivas de paz y las falacias de Oslo", El País, March 7, 2005. Also "Disengagement and After: Where Next for Sharon and the Likud", Background Report. Middle East Report number 36, International Crisis Group, March 1, 2005.

Copyright Fride 2005