Burma's Junta Intensifies Bid For Unification

Bringing Autonomous Ethnic Enclaves Back Into Fold Poses Major Challenges
September 2009

The maps say that the town of Mong La is located in Burma, but to the casual observer, it could be China.

MONG LA, Burma -- The maps say that the town of Mong La is in Burma,
but to the casual observer, it could be China. The shop names are in
Chinese. The shopkeepers are mostly Chinese, and they accept only the
Chinese yuan. A suggestion of a meeting at 4 o'clock is met with a
question: "Burma time or China time?"

Mong La is the capital of an area known as Shan Special Region No. 4,
one of 13 autonomous enclaves carved out of Burma's mountainous east
over the past 20 years as part of cease-fire deals that armed rebel
ethnic groups have signed with the generals who run the country.

While central Burma has been driven into penury by economic
mismanagement and sanctions, areas such as Mong La have thrived, along
with the National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State, which
controls it. The region has over the years profited from drugs -- it
lies at the heart of the opium-producing Golden Triangle -- and more
recently from gambling.

In rebel territory, late-model Japanese sedans ferry Chinese punters
from Mong La to the neon oasis of Mong Ma, 12 miles away, where they
sip French brandy and play baccarat with stacks of 10,000-yuan chips.
On the way, they pass the neoclassic pile that Sai Leun, commander of
the National Democratic Alliance Army, has built for himself, complete
with a golf course.

But Mong La's days as a tributary to the river of China's economic
growth could be ending. Last month, a few hours to the north of Mong
La, government troops attacked Special Region No. 1, which was run by
the Kokang militia, driving about 37,000 residents over the border into
China. Today, 80 percent of the shops in Mong La are shuttered, and
their owners, taking refuge in China, are waiting to see whether
Special Region No. 4 will be the government's next target.

Areas such as Mong La lie at the heart of the strategic conundrum that is Burma.

"Without a political settlement that addresses ethnic minority needs
and goals, it is extremely unlikely there will be peace and democracy
in Burma," the Transnational Institute, an Amsterdam-based research
organization, said in a recent report.

For 15 years, the United Nations has advocated a three-way dialogue
among the military government, the democratic opposition and the
country's ethnic minorities, but given many of the groups' history of
drug involvement, it has been a hard policy to promote in Western
capitals.

In recent months, the world has focused on the role of Aung San Suu
Kyi, the imprisoned opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner, but
although she is a key figure, her freedom is unlikely to solve Burma's
long-standing political problems on its own.

Ethnic minorities make up about 40 percent of the country's 60
million people, dominating the mountainous regions that surround the
flood plains where most of the majority-Burman population live. The
minorities have no faith in the government and resent the majority's
domination of politics. Several young Shan professionals used the same
word -- "tricky" -- to describe the Burmans.

The Burmese government has been trying to unify the country since it
gained independence from Britain in 1948, a crusade that has taken
precedence over all other concerns, including democracy, and is still
the driving force behind the current government led by Senior Gen. Than
Shwe.

"When Than Shwe wakes up at night, he isn't worrying about democracy
or international pressure," said a Western diplomat who spoke on the
condition of anonymity. "He's worrying about the ethnic groups."

But the generals who run the country cannot afford to anger China, their most significant ally and investor, in the process.

Over the past 20 years, the Burmese authorities have signed cease-fire
agreements with 27 key opposition groups, most of which are ethnically
based.

China played a key role in persuading the groups to talk to the
government. Many were part of the Beijing-sponsored Burma Communist
Party, which controlled most of the territory along the Chinese border
until it imploded in the late 1980s. At the time, Beijing's interests
lay in keeping the groups as a buffer, but that policy came at a cost
as many Burmese warlords established mini-states, funding themselves
through drugs and gambling and spreading addiction, disease and crime
into China's southern borderlands.

Many analysts now say that the Chinese are eager to see Burma
reunified under a central government, pointing out that Beijing wants
to build pipelines through Burma to import oil and gas from the Andaman
Sea to the populous but relatively poor province of Yunnan and to open
trade routes to the lucrative markets of India.

Signs are growing that the groups China used to see as a strategic
buffer it now regards as a barrier to trade. When the Burmese army
moved against the Kokang militia, one of the weaker groups, the Chinese
government rebuked it over the refugees who were driven across the
border. Beijing urged the junta to "properly deal with its domestic
issues to safeguard the regional stability of its bordering area with
China." Some analysts say, however, that the rebuke reflected
displeasure over how the takeover was handled rather than the takeover
itself.

Bringing Mong La and other cease-fire areas back into the Burmese
fold poses significant challenges for the Burmese as well as the
Chinese.

The Burmese authorities have called on the cease-fire groups to
disband their militias and take part in elections set for next year,
but the groups, which have received little assistance from the central
government, are loath to give up the leverage provided by their armed
wings, although many have said they are not intrinsically opposed to
participating in the elections.

The groups seem more inclined to maintain their militias and use
them to help force a better deal from the new government. The biggest
cease-fire group, the United Wa State Army, is estimated to maintain
20,000 men under arms.

However, with their move against the Kokang militia, the generals
have ratcheted up the pressure, and many residents of the border areas,
like the Chinese traders in Mong La, think the authorities could move
against other groups, picking them off one by one.

The stakes are high. As the Transnational Institute points out, if
the cease-fire groups are not defeated decisively, they will simply
retreat to the mountainous border territory, where they are likely to
resume wholesale narcotics trading to fund a renewed guerrilla
campaign, intensifying regional instability.

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