The consequence of associating the 'war on drugs' with the 'war on terrorism' is that the failure of the former could end with the failure of the latter. The predominant military approach to 'narcoterrorism' fails to recognise the complex factors underlying both the drug problem and the violence; it assumes that the drug problem can be solved by force and that the armed conflict can be resolved by intensifying the conflict - that is, more war on war; and it has facilitated the consolidation of conventional drug-trafficking structures.
This policy briefing analyses the results of the partial agreement on drugs reached at the talks being held in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, and the Colombian government.
The distribution of land and its unjust use are the major causes of violence in Colombia. For this reason land issues are the starting point of current peace talks between the Santos government and the FARC guerrillas
While escalating civil conflict in Colombia is attracting increasing international interest and concern, the complex relationships between drug trafficking, political violence, and the many actors involved in the social conflict in Colombia are often absent from the debate.
A radically different approach to the current War on Drugs must be developed and integrated into the Peace Plan for Colombia otherwise the drug circuit and armed conflict will continue to undermine the prospect of realizing the goals of the Peace Process ultimately bringing to an end the war in Colombia.
It is unfortunate that 35 years after the first chemical spraying in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, we are still writing about aerial sprayings in Colombia, demanding the current government to definitely defer an ecocide and incompetent policy.
For 37 years Colombia has been spraying chemicals to combat illicit crops, particularly coca. These massive eradication programmes became part of the US-backed 'War on Drugs'. The fumigations are controversial for their proven inefficacy to reduce supply and demand for the use of herbicides such as glyphosate.
La idea de responsabilizar a los países productores (y que Pence seguramente viene a repetir), está tomando fuerza en Estados Unidos y nos haría volver a la mano dura. Pero las estadísticas indican que el quid de la cuestión hay que buscarlo allá.
Para llegar hasta Briceño, en pleno corazón de la región de Antioquia, se necesita un buen vehículo, mucho tiempo y algo de suerte. La semana antes de nuestro viaje, previsto para mediados de julio, unas lluvias torrenciales destruyeron parte de la carretera entre Briceño y Pueblo Nuevo, y dejaron a la gente aislada a uno y otro lado. Tuvimos suerte, y el día en que viajamos a la zona no llovió. Pero necesitamos seis horas para cubrir el trayecto entre Medellín y Briceño, y otras tres de angustiosas curvas hasta Pueblo Nuevo. La misma carretera sin asfaltar nos hizo pensar en los retos que enfrenta Colombia con su plan de eliminar 50.000 hectáreas de coca este año, a través del Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito, conocido por el acrónimo PNIS.
Getting to the Briceño region in the heart of Antioquia requires an excellent vehicle, and a lot of time and luck. The week before our journey there in mid-July, heavy rains wiped out part of the road between Briceño and Pueblo Nuevo, stranding folks on one side or the other. We were lucky on the day of our journey – no rain. But it took a six-hour drive to get from Medellín to Briceño, and another three hours of sometimes harrowing curves to Pueblo Nuevo. The dirt-road drive itself was a stark reminder of the challenges Colombia faces as it seeks to eliminate 50,000 hectares of coca this year through the crop substitution program, Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito (National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops), known by the acronym PNIS.