1) “Authority” or “monopoly of violence” ... as indicated by
• combat deaths, homicide rates
• ‘expert’ opinion aggregated by World Bank ...

Although monopoly of violence is partly “contracted out” and “offshored” since international shipping is safeguarded by American military and security services.

Restoration of inland road- and railways, and mobile telephone reach has grown steadily. Access to information expanding: In 2002, internet users numbered about 3 per 1000; in 2012 about 39 per 1000.

ITU over 2010: claims that 1,704,287 Angolans have internet access ! (= 10 percent penetration)
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.

Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Fragility / Resilience Perspective

2 ) *Territorial “reach” and “bureaucratic strength” of the state* ... as indicated by

- control over illicit goods circuits
- transport & telecom infrastructure
- ‘expert’ opinion aggregated by World Bank ...
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

3) **government legitimacy**

... as indicated by

- voter behaviour
  - 2008 election turnout: 87%
  - MPLA: 82% nationally (51% in Lunda Sul)

- media freedom. Reporters Without Borders ranked Angola
  - in 2002 (of 139 countries) 93rd
  - in 2012 (of 179 countries) 132nd

- expert opinion, World Bank aggregated

state/govt as only legitimate actor setting the rules; depends on building identity (constructivist perspective)

Press freedom ranking affected by media company takeovers, payola, bribery and intimidation of journalists.
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

Conclusions

- *Stability, authority, &c*: consolidation, some forward motion
- *Government capacity*: uneven development from a low base
- *Legitimacy*: stronger than in 1990s, but indications mixed
±4 out of 5 said ‘right direction’ Why?

- Peace: 41%
- Education improving: 43%
- New infrastructure: 57%

IRI Public Opinion Survey in Seven Provinces 13 Dec 2008 – 17 Jan 2009. 1200 persons polled. Mainly open-ended questions. For this question of 946 persons (79%) who answered “Yes, Angola is going in the right direction”, the top three responses to “why?” (open-ended) were as follows.

- Jobs: 35%
- Poverty: 34%
- Education: 31%
- Health: 26%
- Water: 23%
- Wages: 23%
- Crime: 20%
- Corruption: 16%
- Other: 16%

Answers to open-ended question: “What three issues or concerns most impact the daily life of your family?”
Elites’ perspectives. Their development preferences ... 

- orient Angola outward, favour ‘high modernism’; colonial model redux? 
- exclude many from economic roles; as producers, consumers and taxpayers, they count for little. 
- include the rest on usually adverse, precarious terms
Social Transformation?

By way of:
- *jobs*
- *skills*
- *land access*
- ‘*social wage*’
- *shared culture*

Official responses:
- Talk of “Angolans first”; crackdowns on precarious workers
- Training not strongly promoted; trumped by ‘out-sourcing’
- Weak land rights for smallholders
- Social protection minimal
Political system successful in ...

- co-opting & ‘pacting’ elites by managing access to economic rents, status & power
- conflating the state with the MPLA
- conflating governance with the Executive
- excluding real contestation from politics; “Change is not rotation.”
- crucially, gaining allies & advantages from external actors and Offshore Financial Centres
“extra-territorial” Angola

• OPEC since 2007
• deployment of sovereign wealth: Sonangol, Banco Kwanza Invest, *Fundo Soberano Angolano*, &c.
• accumulation by PEPs (Politically Exposed Persons) &c.
• Diaspora activities (contestation!)
• Sum: Change is shaped also by external ‘enabling environment’ and strong incentives at work there, shown in ...
Angola a “low absorber”?

Official reserves in US $ billions

Source for 2000-2010:
In 1990s, est. illicit outflows = ± 6 % of GDP. From 2000 to 2008, ave. $2,7 billion/year = ± 14 % of GDP
Emerging outcomes

- Dispossession sustained
- Non-inclusive development path
- Social strata crystallizing
- Citizen-state reciprocity weak
- Elite reciprocity, also between territorial and foreign-based, sustained thus far
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