



ERPI 2018 International Conference
Authoritarian Populism and the Rural World

Conference Paper No.74

Farm Dwellers in Kwa-Zulu Natal South Africa and the politics of home

Donna Hornby and Stha Yeni

17-18 March 2018

International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, Netherlands

Organized jointly by:



Cornell CALS
College of Agriculture and Life Sciences



International
Institute of
Social Studies

Ezopus



**Institute of
Development Studies**



STEPS centre



In collaboration with:



**OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS**



OXFAM
Solidariteit | Solidarité

**ROSA
LUXEMBURG
FOUNDATION**



**The Journal of
PEASANT
STUDIES**

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are solely those of the authors in their private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of organizers and funders of the conference.

March, 2018

Check regular updates via ERPI website: www.iss.nl/erpi



Working title: Farm Dwellers in Kwa-Zulu Natal South Africa and the politics of home (Draft)

Donna Hornby and Stha Yeni

Introduction

What does radical economic transformation mean, and in particular, what does it mean for farm dwellers in South Africa? The term has been used by the ruling party, the African National Congress to regain popular support in the face of calls by an opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) to expropriate land without compensation and to transfer the wealth of the country from white capital to black capital. In this paper we draw on data from a survey and anecdotes to explain that farm dwellers are resisting the notion of private property and asserting their own meaning of home and belonging to the land.

The conditions revealed by the data show that farm dwellers suffer employment precariousness together with persistent tenure insecurity. This combination of conditions explains why some farm dwellers leave farms for homes elsewhere or in search of better prospects. However, a significant number of households remain on farms despite difficult and worsening living conditions, which contradicts the processes of “rural hollowing” (Liu et al, 2010) that a simple analysis of push-pull migratory trends suggest. We thus propose that farm dwellers are asserting a politics of home, of belonging to the land. Unable to secure regular or ‘decent’ employment in the ‘new’ South Africa, some farm dwellers hang on to ‘home’ as a silent expression of a ‘subaltern politics’ (Spivak, 1998). This politics arises from national and global drivers of agrarian change, in so far as the structure of commercial agriculture erodes local wage employment as a result of the squeeze on profitability at farm level (in the context of the vertical integration taking place in global agrarian capital), but it also stands in tension to them. Farms are spaces of white control, with the social power of the farmer vested in his historically unlimited ownership of land and control over every aspect of the lives of the people on his farm (‘his’ used intentionally). The politics of home challenges this control and the property relations that underpin it. It thus suggests a possible emancipatory politics in its challenge of hegemonic relations at farm level, but also contradicts the elitism that seems actually to be at the centre of the populist calls being expressed by political leaders.

Our interest is holding dialogues and debates with farm dwellers on what their views are on land and agrarian reform i.e. who should get the land, for what purposes and under what terms. The plan is to develop a curriculum for political education that is aimed at assisting farm dwellers respond to these three questions. This is work in progress and this particular article is not an academic paper.

Conference theme: authoritarian populism and emancipatory politics

We are struggling to use the concepts authoritarian populism to explain the politics of farm dwellers and their forms of resistance. While we have a few examples of politicians’ rhetoric that we think is authoritarian and populist, we are unable to link that to ways in which farm dwellers are dealing with the problems they face on a regular basis. For example, in the beginning of 2017 the former president of South Africa Jacob Zuma faced with strong opposition and divisions in the ruling party, started to speak of ‘radical economic transformation’ while at the same time he maintained that the government economic policies that were based on the free market model would remain intact. His views have recently been reiterated by the newly elected president Cyril Ramaphosa. The opposition party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) under the leadership of Julius Malema has positioned itself as pro-poor, pushing for land expropriation without compensation, but maintain that the current agrarian structure remains. In other words, they are saying white farmers must be replaced with black farmers and everything else should be business as usual. The EFF shares its view on land expropriation without compensation with the ruling party, and their narrative is based on the assumption that such a

move would enable job creation in agriculture. This is something the state president has repeated a number of times. Most of the farm workers we work with do not understand what exactly is meant by Ramaphosa on radical economic transformation, and the few who do, struggle to relate that to their lives.

Farm dwellers are sceptical on the promise of more jobs in agriculture, and this is not surprising given the changes in the agricultural sector in the past two decades that have resulted in consolidation of farm holdings into fewer units, from about 140 000 in the 1940s down to 40 000 by 2007. There has been a casualization of labour and massive job losses on farms with over 150 000 jobs lost between 1994 and 2015. Part of the changes were a result of the dismantling of state support i.e. removal of subsidies, finance, labour regulation and marketing. This was coupled with the growth decline in the sector and liberalization of trade.

While the resolution to expropriate land without compensation has been cheered by many black South Africans as we have observed on social media and on radio, farm dwellers in uMgungundlovu district where our study is located are not celebrating but, instead have raised the following questions “*which land is Ramaphosa talking about, who will it be given to and for what*”? “*Would this include the private farms in which we live and work, and would we finally get ownership of our homes? What about some of us that want to farm on a larger scale for the market, would we get portions of the farm and what’s going to be the criteria? How is the government going to avoid conflict in the process? Are they going to consult with all those living on the farms across the country?*” These are very important questions and they resonate with the views of many black people living on privately owned farms in other provinces. Farm dwellers want land reform that will enable equitable access to productive land and necessary post settlement support that takes into consideration different scales and forms of agriculture while ensuring security of tenure. Not a mere transfer of land to the politically connected people. They are anxious about the narrative that is skewed towards one function of land, i.e. agricultural production, and leaves out the components of home, belonging and social reproduction. All of these questions and concerns were raised at the workshop we attended at the beginning of March, where farm dwellers from uMgungundlovu district met to plan their joint activities for the year.

Farm dwellers have carried the burden of global changes in agriculture, they have lost jobs and their security of tenure remains insecure. Because they live on privately owned land, in most cases they are unable to get state services such as water, electricity and houses. Land owners continuously threaten to evict them from the farms or to squeeze them off the land by creating impossible living conditions. Against all of this, in our survey we found that farm dwellers nevertheless do not see the land on which they live as private land, but they see it as their home, and refuse to move. The resistance of farm workers is however not a direct response to what the politicians say but is based on their lived experiences on the farms and having to continuously find ways to survive.

While their survival mechanisms articulate a particular form of resistance, at this point we cannot say whether such resistance is emancipatory. However, we see the rejection of private property as an opportunity to start the conversation on what types of land rights should people have on redistributed land and to canvas their opinion on the currently topical policy question of whether and when compensation should be paid for redistributed land given the history of white land acquisition and black land dispossession in South Africa. These questions should form part of the visioning process and development of alternatives which some of the farm dwellers in Kwa-Zulu Natal province have started to do but it is still early days.

Pathways out of poverty survey

A survey of 838 farm dwellers households was undertaken by the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), a land rights NGO which works with farm dwellers in KwaZulu-Natal in the uMgungundlovu District, South Africa. Data on current living and livelihoods conditions was

collected on 6 478 farm dweller men, women and children living on 81 farms across seven local municipalities. The survey comprised 15,8% of the estimated 42 300 farm dweller population in the area and collected data on individuals and households on demographic features, migration, use of land, income and access to housing and services, and in some cases tracked changes to these over time. The data demonstrates that farm dwellers are a “fragmented” (Bernstein, 2010:110) agricultural “precariat” (Standing, 2011) subject to centrifugal (push) and centripetal (pull) drivers of mobility that leave them with a precarious hold on rural farm dwellings.

Farm dwellers, we suggest, can be described as something of a rural agricultural precariat. Standing (2014: 33) argues that the fragmentation of the labour market accompanying globalisation has created a new social class of people who are ‘habituated’ to precariousness characterised as flexible, insecure and intermittent employment as well as “uncertain access to housing and public resources”. While the idea that the ‘precariat’ constitutes a specific social class has been thoroughly critiqued for disregarding the (geographically varied) logic of class domination under capitalism (see Breman 2013, Bernado 2016, Munk 2013), further theorisation has linked employment precariousness (or “wageless existence” for Denning, 2010; ‘footloose labour’ for Breman,1996) to eroded conditions of social reproduction (Hart 2014, Bernstein 2004: 205-6, Bernstein 2003: 210). Tania Li (2010: 67) in her essay ‘Make Live or Let Die’ argues that the deepening condition of precariousness is the result of a new round of enclosures leading to the dispossession of large numbers of rural people from land combined with “the low absorption of their labour, which is “surplus” to the requirements of capital accumulation”. It is in this sense that we find the term ‘precariat’ a useful conceptual lens to engage with changing social relations on farms in the rural midlands of KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere in the country.

According to the 2011 Census, 3,7% of South Africa’s population lives on commercial farms that they do not own, and yet little is known about the living conditions of farm dwellers. Farm dwellers are a distinct category of rural dweller, and while there are overlaps with farm workers, to collapse them into a single sociological category blurs important differences between them. Farm dwellers in this study, following AFRA’s definition (2017), include four categories: waged farm workers who have long histories of living on the farm together with their families; waged farm workers who have recently come to live on the farm with their families and have no homes elsewhere; migrant farm workers who have homes elsewhere (often in other countries) but visit them infrequently; and finally families with nobody working on the farm but who have lived many generations on the farm and have no homes elsewhere.

The AFRA survey found that the mean size of farm dweller households is 7,2 members, with 55,8% with six or more members, a significantly higher number than the 3,5 members per household national mean (Wittenberg et al, 2017: 1299). 35% of household members are younger than 18 years, 52,1% are female and the remainder men, with slightly more men between the ages of 18 - 35 (50,9%) than women of the same age.

Drawing from the data and supporting literature, the following sub-sections cover the **precarity, mobility and politics of holding on related to farm dwellers.**

Precurity

Rising unemployment and labour casualization on farms (identified above) combined with declining work opportunities in rural and urban secondary and tertiary sectors, and declining access to land for farming means farm dwellers struggle to secure the conditions for their social reproduction. From our sample, 66,5% of farm dwellers over the age of 18 have no income at all. Of those who do have an income, there is significant differences in mean amounts, with a minimum of R24, a maximum of R20,000, the mean in the first quartile R2,600, in the second quartile R4,000 and in the third quartile R6,600. The differences suggest the occurrence of low paid wage labour (possibly as a result of

casualisation) and diversification of income sources in response to high rates of unemployment. These processes are resulting in social differentiation among farm dwellers with associated fragmentation.

When considering the highest income, a person has from a single source, or their primary income, the data shows that work on farms is the most important income source for farm dwellers. Of those who work on farms, 79,5% are permanent workers (as opposed to the 51,1% reported in Visser and Ferrer 2015: ii), followed by temporary or contract workers (18,9%) with very few people stating seasonal work (1,6%) as their primary income source. Seasonal and casual work on farms is thus less than the national picture of 48,9% noted in Visser and Ferrer (2015:21) and Hall et al (2013: 53).

However, farm labour is only a part of the primary income picture of farm dwellers. All farm labour (that is, permanent, temporary and seasonal combined) constitutes only 49,9% of the primary income sources of farm dwellers in uMgungundlovu who have an income from any source. The figure drops to 38,9% when only work on the farm on which the farm dweller is resident is taken into account, as opposed to work on another farm in the area. In other words, despite the importance of permanent work to those who work on farms, farm labour is nevertheless the primary income for less than half of the adults on farms who do have some income from some source. Indeed, full-time permanent employment on the farm on which they reside is the primary income source for a mere 10% of farm dwellers over the age of 18 when those with no income are included. Child grants and government old age pensions are the primary income sources for 15,9% and 13,4% respectively of those adults who have at least one income source, while 13,8% of farm dwellers with an income secure their primary income *off farm* through permanent, temporary or seasonal work.

The picture of farm dweller incomes is thus extremely complicated, and it is important to disaggregate data on those working age adults who have an income (from any source) from those who have no income at all, between sources of incomes and whether these are primary or secondary sources, and at farm level whether the income is from working on farms or not and on farms on which farm dwellers reside or not. Only through such disaggregation does the full picture of income and employment precariousness emerge.

While primary income sources reveal an important component of farm dweller incomes, the diversification and combination of incomes shows the increasing importance of multiple income sources to farm dweller livelihood strategies (see also Cousins, 2013). More than half of farm dweller households (60,6%) have more than one income source in a range of 0 to 12 while 38,1% of households have a single income. The most frequently stated secondary income source is child grants (15,3%). The most frequent combination of income sources include some form of farm work and social grants, mainly permanent full-time farm work as the primary income supported by child grants but with reversals also apparent, for example, government old age pensions the primary income source supported by part-time work on the farm. Other secondary income sources include other social grants (child foster grants, disability grants), own businesses, second part-time jobs in addition to a primary job, and remittances.

Visser (2016: 19) says most researchers agree that casualisation is increasing particularly on labour-intensive farms where mechanisation is difficult to implement. Our data indicates that unemployment and the absence of any income source is currently a bigger problem on farms than the other processes of labour re-organisation. Khoza (2000: 29) draws similar conclusion regarding farm dwellers on forestry plantations: "Situations often get worse if retrenched workers lived in the forest areas and are now expected to vacate the land and relocate elsewhere. Not only are their sources of livelihood curtailed, but they are also thrown into an abyss of despair. Among retrenched workers, the majority of losers are black workers who often battle to get employment elsewhere." Denning (2010:80) states that "capitalism begins not with the offer of work, but with the imperative to earn a living". With urban and rural unemployment at 26,7% (Stats SA, 2016), the eighth highest unemployment rate in the world (ILO, 2016), this is now an urgent imperative. Ferguson (2015) suggests South Africa's distributive political economy evidenced in social grant allocations is an alternative to livelihoods derived from capitalist production. Our data shows this is not an evenly distributed economy raising the possibility that Tania Li's (2010: 67) observation in Asia that that a "stealthy violence" of "a

politics of let die” in that “large numbers of people [are consigned] to lead short and limited lives” (Li, 2010:67) also applies to people living on farms in South Africa

The total household income from primary sources also affects how farm dwellers view their relationship with farmers. Few farm dwellers rank their relationship with the land owner as good (25%). The survey data shows that where the distribution of the total primary income of households is relatively equal, households are more likely to rank the relationship with the farmer as good. The worst relationship ranking is where most households fall into the first income quartile, and thus a high proportion of households have lower incomes than most other households with extreme inequalities in wage amounts.

Farm dwellers are primarily a group of wageless, income-less adults, whose lives are precarious in that high levels of unemployment co-exist with declining permanent farm work and extremely limited and intermittent seasonal and contract work. Furthermore, farm dwellers are evidence of labour fragmentation, in that those who do have incomes secure them from multiple sources in a variety of combinations, with signs of emerging social differentiation indicated in uneven distributions of income at both individual and household levels. Finally, a simmering politics of discontent surrounding this precariousness and fragmentation is expressed in the large number of farm dwellers who describe relationships with farmers as average or poor.

Mobility

The social dynamics underlying mobility can be analysed in terms of centrifugal or push factors (moving from a central zone to another periphery, i.e. from the farm dwelling to town) and the converse centripetal forces (attractive qualities operating at destination peripheries that attract individuals to them (Colby, 1933 [103]) or pull factors back to the farms. The data indicates that farm dweller mobility falls into three distinct types: eviction, constructive eviction and voluntary migration. In the latter case, migration involves both movements off the farm as well as movements back to the farm.

Regarding prospective evictions, 7,1% of individual farm dwellers¹ have had permission to reside on the farm withdrawn, with 76% of these taking place after 2005. This is the first step a farmer is obliged to take to secure an explicit, or legal eviction.² The reasons given by land owners for withdrawing permission vary (as Table 2 below shows), although in most cases farm dwellers said farmers simply said farm dwellers should make their homes somewhere else.

Table 2: Reasons for farmer withdrawing permission vs Age category

	Make a home elsewhere	Person working elsewhere	Misdemeanor committed	No reason	Other	Total
Younger than 18	30	0	2	3	6	41
18 – 35 years	59	4	4	26	8	101

¹ The data on withdrawn permission was collected for all people over the age of 18 rather than at household level because young adults have reported to AFRA that they are particularly vulnerable to eviction.

² Explicit evictions involve legal processes in which landowners withdraws the farm dwellers’ right to occupy the land, for reasons that include termination of labour, violations of farm rules by the farm dweller, or the landowner’s intention to make productive use of the land occupied by the farm (ESTA, 1997).

36 – 60 years	37	10	4	25	10	86
Older than 60	8	0	0	3	4	15
Total	134	14	10	57	28	243

Despite having their permission to be on the farm withdrawn, not all of the affected farm dwellers have moved off the farm. As Table 3 below shows, of those whose permission to be on the farm has been withdrawn over half (53%) stay home most nights. Perhaps more striking than the impending potential evictions is that of the many individuals who said they have the farmer’s permission to be on the farm, nearly a third (31%) do not stay at home most nights suggesting that more farm dwellers are leaving farms, at least temporarily, for reasons other than an explicit eviction.

Table 3: Permission to stay on the farm vs Stays home most nights

	Permission to stay on the farm withdrawn	Has permission to stay on the farm	Total
Stays home most nights	178	3045	3223
Not home most nights	135	1063	1198
Total	313	4108	4421

Evictions can also take a ‘constructive’ form. Legal, explicit eviction procedures, which require a court order, alternative accommodation and reporting to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and the local municipality, can be onerous and expensive for the landowner (AFRA, 2017). As a result, some farmers pressure farm dwellers to vacate on-farm residences. Constructive evictions thus refer to processes whereby the landowner puts pressure on the farm dweller with the intention of pushing him or her to decide to abandon the property. They can take many forms designed to compel farm dwellers to ‘decide’ to leave the farm, including acts of omission (withdrawing access to basic needs such as water or energy resources), or more explicit acts of commission (fencing in the household and depriving children of access to roads needed to get to schools (Reilly, 2014 [104]) or refusing occupiers permission to renovate their houses, even at their own cost and in an effort to create habitable living environments for their families that secure human dignity³).

Omission of services is a common impetus for constructive evictions, and this is reflected in the relationship between farmers and farm dwellers. The data shows that the higher the number of households that have access to a bundle of goods (including access to electricity, water and toilet, the presence of family graves on the farm and the right to have visitors), the higher the probability that farm dwellers will rank their relationship with the farmer as good. Similarly, if a higher number of farm dwellers do not have access to the bundle of goods, then the relationship is ranked as poor. We

³ In the Constitutional Court case (Daniels v Scribante and Another 2017 ZACC 13, five judges ordered that the farm dweller, Daniels, be allowed to effect renovations to her home at her own cost. They argued that “there can be no true security of tenure under conditions devoid of human dignity”, and that to fail to grant permission to renovate could inadvertently facilitate an illegal eviction because the living conditions are “intolerable”.

assume that poor relationships with farmers are more likely to result in conditions giving rise to constructive evictions, than where relationships are good. However, the relationship to farmer trends suggested by access to a bundle of services, while present, is not strong.⁴

Table 4: Relationship to farmer V Access to bundle of goods

Relationship to Farmer	Good		Average		Poor		Total HH	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Access to service:								
1. Electricity	134	59	167	121	109	179	410	359
2. Water	178	14	263	25	249	39	690	78
3. Toilet	126	66	191	96	121	167	438	329
4. Have graves	88	105	121	167	173	115	382	387
5. Allowed visitors	186	7	259	28	248	40	693	75
TOTAL	712	251	1001	437	900	540	2613	1228
As %	73,9	26,1	69,6	30,4	62,5	37,5	68	32

Evictions, constructive or explicit, are not the only reason farm dwellers leave farms, as centrifugal forces are at play. Of the 31% of adult farm dwellers who have the landowner's permission to live on the farm but do not stay on the farm most nights, nearly half (41,6%) left because they have found work elsewhere followed by a third (32,1%) who went to live with relatives living elsewhere, sometimes in order to provide support to those relatives. It is also possible that while some respondents stated that various household members had gone to live with other relatives, they had in fact been told by the farmer that they should leave the farm.⁵ As Table 5 below shows, there is a gendered dimension to this centrifugal mobility, with more men (61,6%) than women (38,8%) leaving for reasons of finding work elsewhere, while many more women left the farm for reasons of marriage (86,3% compared to 13,7% of men) or to live with families elsewhere (57,4% of women compared with 48,6% of men). Finding work elsewhere was the most frequently given reason given by men for leaving the farm (61,6%) whereas going to live with relatives was the most frequent reason women had for leaving the farm (32,1%).

Table 5: Gender of farm dwellers with permission to be on the farm who have left

Male/female breakdown	Breakdown of samples by gender
-----------------------	--------------------------------

⁴ Just over a quarter of households who rank their relationship to the farmer as good do not have access to a bundle of services, while nearly two-thirds of farm dwellers who rank the relationship with the farmer as poor do have access to a bundle of services. In some respects, this indicates a methodological difficulty in researching the conditions that give rise to constructive evictions, as pressures exerted by land owners on farm dwellers to leave the farm can take many forms and different actions may be interpreted differently by farm dwellers and farmers.


⁵ This interpretation, which emerged in discussion with AFRA staff, was not canvassed in the survey, however.

Reasons for leaving the farm	Females	Male	Female sample	Male sample
Found work elsewhere	38,3%	61,6%	173 (31%)	278 (52.8%)
Left to live with relatives elsewhere	57,4%	48,6%	179 (32.1%)	169 (32.1%)
To continue education	46,6%	53,4%	48 (8.6%)	55 (10.4%)
To get married	86,3%	13,7%	157 (28.2%)	25 (4.7%)
Total (of 1084)	52%	48%	557 (100%)	527 (100%)

There is also a significant gender-generational nexus to those leaving farms for the purpose of working elsewhere. More than half (58%) are young men below the age of 35. This is probably due to a combination of factors, including that young adult men do not have social grants to reduce their income vulnerability and that women are more likely than men to be expected to undertake family duties where there is a need for support and care.

Centripetal forces also operate to draw farm dwellers back to the farm in migration patterns often described as circulatory. A perhaps surprising feature of the data is the high preponderance of young adults who are on the farm. As Table 6 below shows, 71% of young adults between the ages of 18 and 35 stay at home most nights. Although most of the people leaving farms for work elsewhere are young men in this age group, the size of this age group on farms together with the high proportion who have no income from any source suggests that this is the most vulnerable sub-group in the agricultural precariat, and that residence on farms is the best of their a very limited range of options for living.

Graph 1: Age Category of Farm Dwellers Home Most Nights



Anecdotal evidence from AFRA (Sithole, 2017 [105]) suggests that this growing population of younger adults, many of whom are better educated than their parents and who have a better understanding of their legal rights, is a source of friction on farms. Whereas older generations tend to adhere to the farm rules, younger adults are more willing to confront farmers around what they view as unreasonable actions. In a particular case in the Umgungundlovu District, the farmer locked the gate and prevented a farm dweller household from admitting visitors who had arrived by car to attend a ceremonial family function. The younger adults eventually cut the lock, which resulted in a confrontation with the farmer, who had a firearm, and his wife. The conflict was recorded on phone video and sent to AFRA. Strikingly, the farmer asserted his right to lock the gate on the basis that

“This farm is mine. I have a title deed”, to which the young farm dwellers in the dispute responded: “This is our home. This is where we live.” We turn now to consider further these centripetal forces of that pull farm dweller back to homes on farms, or the politics of holding on to the land.

The politics of holding on to land


Unjust land politics and skewed land ownership elicit deep emotional responses. Farms are neighbourhoods that constitute the foundations of well-being and identity of those who grow up on them (AFRA, DATE). Together with deep connections to graves and the recreation of these links through ongoing burial practices, “[I]and ties people to their histories” (Greenberg, 2010: 975). Greenberg (ibid) argues that these ties, the conflict skewed ownership is ‘bound’ to produce and the potential of agrarian reform to create small scale farming as an alternative to wage employment constitutes both a *political* and *economic* imperative for land reform. Li (2010: 67-8), covering a similar set of conditions, poses a different dilemma:

“If the population rendered surplus to capital’s requirements is to live decently, it will be because of the activation of a biopolitics that places the intrinsic value of life—rather than the value of people as workers or consumers—at its core. But what are the social forces that would activate such a politics?”

AFRA (2005) argues that farm dwellers have an attachment to the land they live on that extends beyond their relationship to the farm as wage workers. Despite restricted financial resources, Mosoetsa (2011), in a study of home in settlements on the periphery of cities in KwaZulu-Natal, shows that familial solidarity is not compromised, and is expressed as “eating from one pot”. The reference to food as an anchor for the farm dweller family is also supported by the data, which indicates that 69% of households cultivate gardens on the farm and 44% own some livestock. Visser and Ferrer (2015), however, have disputed the emphasis NGOs place on farm dwellers’ security of tenure arguing that labour conditions and housing constitute the key concerns of farm workers. Our data shows that farm dwellers assert ‘home’ as a place that belongs to them based on histories to specific land that are re-enacted through ceremonies in the present, along with entitled remuneration for a life of labour. This idea of land as lived home space occupied by farm dwellers co-exists with the farm as landed property owned by the farmer. We see this as the expression of a subaltern politics that constitutes part of the social forces that activate ‘land’ as a politics of place and home and not simply as a site of production.

Nearly 70% of households (69,6%) arrived on the farm where they live before 1994, with 59% of those stating that the family had either always lived on the farm, or one or both of their father and grandfather had been born on the farm. There is a key correspondence between *when* a household came to live on a farm and who they believe will take over the home on the death of the household head.

Table x: What will happen to the house V When the family came to this farm



The majority of respondents who came to live on the farm before 1994 said family would take over the house on the death of the head of house whereas most of the respondents who came to live on the farm after 1994 stated that the farmer would take over the house. The reasons given by those who say a family member will take over the house include that they have always lived in the house and that they have no house elsewhere. A life of labour without adequate remuneration was also a justification. As one respondent stated: “My husband worked on this farm all his life and when he died, there was no pension. So I took this house to be his pension.”

The data indicates further that 82,2% of farm dwellers who live in single room houses believe the farmer will take over the house whereas 78,7% of those who live in houses with five rooms or more said family would take over the house with only 0,06% stating that the farmer would take over. This corresponds with the presence of family on the farm as single-room quarters invariably (77%) have two or fewer occupants in the them whereas 87% of houses with more than five rooms are occupied by households with six or more family members. Households that have lived on the farm since before 1994 thus tend to be bigger and have more rooms, suggesting that these are homes for families.

While length of residence and presence of family is important to a notion of home, belonging is forged through keeping the link between identity and place alive in the present. This can be seen in the data on graves. Just over half of farm dweller households (422) have graves on the farm where they live. Hornby (2015) shows that on farms in KwaZulu-Natal ceremonial practices around the deceased are drawn-out, extended affairs located in specific homestead spaces and involve animal slaughter, communication with ancestors, and participation of extended family and community. The entanglement of graves, land, family and community possibly explains why burials hold such potential for conflict between farmers and farm dwellers, and that 60% of households that assessed their relationship with the farmer as being ‘poor’ have graves on the farm. Further, of the 99 households that are no longer allowed to bury on the farm, 46,6% judged their relationship with the farmer as ‘poor’ and only 6% said they had a ‘good’ relationship.

Tying this together with unemployment figures and the on-farm household demographics shown above, the conclusion is that a large number of residences on farms are not housing for farm workers

but homes for families who have lived on the farm for 24 years and longer, expect that their homes will remain theirs into the future, and who continue to construct ‘home’ through ceremonial activities such as burials. However, this conclusion is contrary both to farm tenure legislation as well as the conclusions drawn by Visser and Ferrer (2015). As noted above, the ESTA (Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997) closely links farm wage work with on-farm residence, placing the tenure of the farm dweller at risk if their employment is terminated (see AFRA, 2017). Visser and Ferrer (2015: 85) argue further that the state focus on litigation to prevent evictions is “misplaced” because movement off farms is the “inevitable” result of agricultural “modernisation” and tenure security without a livelihood is “not sufficient”. While we do not dispute Visser and Ferrer’s conclusion that that “[e]xtending on-farm tenure security and protection from eviction is no longer the single, biggest need of farm *workers*” (ibid: v1, italics added) and that farm workers are an increasingly diverse group with a range of livelihood and tenure needs, our argument is that the farm is nevertheless “home” for a significant proportion of rural dwellers, many of whom do not secure their primary income from farm work. The land politics this gives rise to is neglected in Visser and Ferrer’s otherwise comprehensive account of farm workers.

Conclusion

We have shown the living conditions on the farms, the politics that has informed these conditions and ways in which farm dwellers navigate their daily lives. Our plan going forward is to work with others that can help shape the next research agenda that builds on this survey, and will be centred on assisting farm dwellers develop more concrete alternative proposals that begin with the notion of ‘land as home’ as an alternative to the idea of private property rights and then going on to consider land redistribution as a question of production with an equitable and just distribution of land-based livelihoods. With the current political climate in South Africa where land, and particularly land expropriation without compensation, is a topical issue, we are hoping to influence in ways that put the views of people living in rural areas into consideration. We see this as both an opportunity and a challenge. The challenge is the limited capacity of people working with rural citizens on land and agrarian questions, to support them to craft and develop well researched and informed alternatives. The opportunity we see is in the political atmosphere which is conducive for the debates to take place and the availability of researchers and academics that are interested in working closely with NGOs and rural activists. The conference in The Hague is one of the spaces we are hoping our ideas will be strengthened and there will be an opportunity to explore possible collaborations.

References

- AGRI SA. 2017. Land Audit: A Transactions Approach. AGRI SA. Johannesburg.
- Alcock, Rauri. 2017. Drought and Communal Livestock. Presentation to SAEON-NRF workshop on drought, Hoedspruit, Limpopo.
- Aliber, M., & Cousins, B. (2013). Livelihoods after Land Reform in South Africa. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 13(1), 140–165.
- Amoateng, A. (2007). Towards a conceptual framework for families and households. In: Amoateng, A. and Heaton, T. (eds.). *Families and households in post-apartheid South Africa: Socio-demographic perspectives*. Cape Town: HSRC Press: 27–42.
- Andrade Daniela. 2016. ‘Export or die’: the rise of Brazil as an agribusiness powerhouse. *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal* Vol. 1, Iss. 5, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1353889>
- Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) (2017). *Pathways Out Of Poverty: Improving farm dwellers’ tenure security and access to housing and services*. Pietermaritzburg.


- Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) (2005). This is our home – it is our land, our history, our right. AFRA, Pietermaritzburg.
- Bernado, Francesco. 2016. The impossibility of precarity. *Radical Philosophy*, vol 198. July/Aug 2016.
- Bernstein, Henry, 1996. ‘How White Agriculture (Re)positioned Itself for a “New South Africa” ’. *Critical Sociology*, 22 (3): 9–36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/089692059602200302>
- Bernstein, Henry. 1998. Social change in the South African countryside? Land and production, poverty and power. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*. Vol. 25. Iss. 4. doi.org/10.1080/03066159808438681.
- Bernstein, Henry. 2003. Land Reform in Southern Africa in World-Historical Perspective, *Review of African Political Economy*, 30:96, 203-226. Bernstein, Henry. (2004), ‘Changing Before Our Very Eyes’: Agrarian Questions and the Politics of Land in Capitalism Today. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4: 190–225. doi:10.1111/j.1471-0366.2004.00078.x
- Henry Bernstein. 2006. Is There an Agrarian Question in the 21st Century?, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement*, 27:4,449-460 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2006.9669166>.
- Bernstein, H. 2010. *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change*. Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies Series. Fernwood Publishing, Halifax and Winnipeg.
- Breman, Jan. 2013. A Bogus Concept? *New Left Review* 84. Nov-Dec, 2013.
- Breman, Jan. 1996. *Footloose Labour: Working in India’s Informal Economy*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
- Colby, C.C. 1933. Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in Urban Geography. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 23(1).
- Cousins, B. and Hall, R. 2017. SA still struggling to ‘give back the land’. *The Citizen*. Talking Point. 13, November.
- Cousins, Ben. 2005. Agrarian reform and the "two economies": transforming South Africa's countryside. In Ntsebeza, L. & Hall, R. (eds.), *The Land Question in South Africa: The Challenge of Transformation and Redistribution*, 220-245. Pretoria: HSRC Press.
- Cousins, Ben. 2013. Smallholder Irrigation Schemes, Agrarian Reform and ‘Accumulation from Above and from Below’ in South Africa. *Journal of Agrarian Change*. Volume 13, Issue 1. January 2013. Pages 116–139. doi:10.1111/joac.12000,
- Cronje, Frans. 2015. Farmers’ rights must be defended. *Mail & Guardian*. Accessed from <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-15-farmers-rights-must-be-defended>, on 30 January, 2018.
- CSAG (2017) Phase Two: Report on the update of the 2009 report “Development of a Status Quo Analysis on the Impacts of Climate Change in KwaZulu-Natal” Report to the Department of Economic development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs, Provincial Government, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
- D’Haese Marijike, and Guido Van Huylenbroeck. The rise of supermarkets and changing expenditure patterns of poor rural households case study in the Transkei area, South Africa. *Food Policy*. Vol 30. Issue 1. February 2005. 97-113. doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2005.01.001
- DAFF (South Africa Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). 2016. Abstract of Agricultural Statistics 2012. Available from: http://www.daff.gov.za/docs/statsinfo/Abstract_2012.pdf (accessed 12 December, 2017).
- Davids, Tracy & Meyer, Ferdie. 2017. Price formation and competitiveness of the South African broiler industry in the global context. *Agrekon*. Volume 56, 2017. No 2. 123-138.
- DRDLR, 2013; State Land Audit Booklet; accessed 28 November, 2017 at www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/.../land%20audit%20booklet.pdf
- De Lange, J. 2017. Who owns SA’s land? *News 24*, 29 October; <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/who-owns-sas-land-20171028> accessed 5 December, 2017.
- Denning Michael. 2010. Wageless Life. *New Left Review* 66. Nov-Dec 2010.

- Du Toit, A. 2004. 'Forgotten by the Highway: Globalisation, Adverse Incorporation and Chronic Poverty in a Commercial Farming District of South Africa'. Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper No. 49.
- Ewert Joachim & Andries du Toit. 2005. A Deepening Divide in the Countryside: Restructuring and Rural Livelihoods in the South African Wine Industry. *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 31, Iss. 2, 2005.
- Ferguson, James. 2015. *Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the new politics of distribution*. Duke University Press. Durham, North Carolina.
- Greenberg, Stephen. 2015. Agrarian Reform and South Africa's Agro-Food System. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 2015. Vol. 42, No. 5, 957–979.
- Groenewald, Y. 2015. Who owns the land? City Press, 3 May; <http://city-press.news24.com/News/Who-owns-the-land-Ownership-by-numbers-20150503>; accessed 5 December, 2017.
- Hall, Ruth. 2009a. Land reform for what? Land use, production and livelihoods. In (ed) Hall, R. 2009. *Another Countryside: Policy Options for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa*. Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies. University of the Western Cape. Cape Town.
- Hall, Ruth. 2009b. Dynamics in the commercial farming sector. In (ed) Hall, R. 2009. *Another Countryside: Policy Options for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa*. Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies. University of the Western Cape. Cape Town.
- Hall, Ruth and Ben Cousins. 2017. Exporting contradictions: The expansion of South African agrarian capital within Africa. *Globalizations* 1-20.
- Hall, Ruth and Thembele Kepe. 2017. Elite capture and state neglect: New evidence on South Africa's land reform. *Review of African Political Economy*: 1-9. doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2017.1288615
- Hall R, Wisborg P, Shirinda S and Zamchiya P (2013) 'Farm workers and farm dwellers in Limpopo Province, South Africa'. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 13(1): 47-70.
- Hart, Gillian. 2014. *Rethinking the South African Crisis: Nationalism, Populism, Hegemony*. University of Georgia Press.
- Khosa, Meshack. 2000. Forestry Contracting in South Africa, September 2000. A report prepared as part of the South Africa Country Study for the international collaborative research project steered by IIED: Instruments for sustainable private sector forestry KwaZulu-Natal Province. 2017. *Provincial Economic Review and Outlook: 2016-2017*.
- Legassick, Martin, and Wolpe, Harold. 1976. The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol 3. No 7. 87-107.
- Ledger, Tracy. 2016. *An Empty Plate: Why we are losing the battle for our food system, why it matters and how we can win it back*. Jacana Media. Johannesburg.
- Li, T. M. (2010), To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations. *Antipode*, 41: 66–93.
- Liu, Yansui, Yu Liu, Yangfen Chen, Hualou Long. 2010. The process and driving forces of rural hollowing in China under rapid urbanization. [Journal of Geographical Sciences](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-010-0817-2). December 2010, Volume 20, Issue 6, pp 876–888. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11442-010-0817-2>.
- Marais Hein. 2011. *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change*. Zed Books. London and New York.
- Mtungwa, Dumisani. 2014. *The Impact of Land Legislation on Farm Dweller Evictions*. Unpublished MA thesis. Wits University. Accessed 22 November, 2017. <http://mobile.wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/15305>.
- Mosoetsa, Sarah. 2011. *Eating From One Pot: The Dynamics of Survival in Poor South African Households*. Wits University Press. Johannesburg.
- Munk, Ronaldo. 2013. The Precariat: a view from the South. *Third World Quarterly*. Vol 34, No 5. 2013.

- Nicholson, J. 2001. *Measuring Change: South Africa's Economy since 1994*. Durban: Trade Union Research Project, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
- O'Laughlin Bridget, Henry Bernstein, Ben Cousins and Pauline Peters. Introduction: Agrarian Change, Rural Poverty and Land Reform in South Africa since 1994. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol. 13 No. 1, January 2013, pp. 1–15. doi:10.1111/joac.12010
- Oxfam. 2014. *Hidden Hunger in South Africa: The faces of hunger and malnutrition in a food secure nation*. Oxfam. Johannesburg. 13 October.
- Reilly, John. 2014. *Actual versus Constructive Eviction*. Accessed on November 17, 2017, from <http://www.thedataadvocate.com/actual-eviction-vs-constructive-eviction/>.
- SAPPI. 2016. SAPPI Corporate Factsheet, 1936-2016. <https://www.sappi.com/global-business-segments> accessed on 5 January 2018.
- Sender, J. and Johnston, D. (2004), Searching for a Weapon of Mass Production in Rural Africa: Unconvincing Arguments for Land Reform. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4: 142–164. doi:10.1111/j.1471-0366.2004.00075.x
- Sithole, Siya. 2017. Personal Communication, October. Land Rights Unit Co-ordinator, Association for Rural Advancement.
- Spivak, G. 1998. *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*. MacMillan.
- Standing, Guy. 2011. *The Precariat: The new dangerous class*. Bloomsbury Academic, New York. London.
- Stats SA. 2007. Community Survey. Government of South Africa. http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=3914.
- Stats SA. 2011. Census 2011. Government of South Africa. <https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf>.
- Stats SA. 2013. Annual Report. Government of South Africa.
- Stats SA. 2016. Community Survey. Government of South Africa.
- Stats SA. 2015. Trends in the Agricultural Sector 2015. Government of South Africa.
- Stats SA. 2017. Poverty Trends in South Africa. Government of South Africa. www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334
- Stern Review (2008) *The Economics of Climate Change: Executive Summary*, 2006. Available: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8AC/F7/ExecutiveSummary.pdf> UK London: Her Majesty's Treasury.
- Tips, 2017. *The Real Economy Bulletin: Third Quarter 2017*. Accessed <https://www.tips.org.za/publications/the-real-economy-bulletin/item/3402-the-real-economy-bulletin-third-quarter-2017> on 16 December, 2017).
- TIPS (2016). *The Real Economy Bulletin: Provincial Review 2016: KZN* (accessed <https://www.tips.org.za/publications/the-real-economy-bulletin> on 15 December 2017).
- Visser 2016. *Going nowhere fast? Changed working conditions on Western Cape fruit and wine farms. A state of knowledge review*. Working Paper No 41. September 14. Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS). University of the Western Cape.
- Visser, Margaret, and Ferrer, Stuart. 2015. *Farm Workers' Living and Working Conditions in South Africa: key trends, emergent issues, and underlying and structural problems*. International Labour Organisation, February.
- Wegerif, Marc, Bev Russell and Irma Grundling. 2005. *Still Searching for Security: The Reality of Farm Dwellers Evictions in South Africa*. Nkuzi Development Association. Johannesburg.
- Wittenberg, Martin, Collinson, Mark and *Decomposing changes in household measures: Household size and services in South Africa, 1994–2012*. *Demographic Research: Volume 37, Article 39*. 1297-1326.
- Ziqubu, Ndabe. 2017. Personal Communication, October. Rural Democracy Co-ordinator, Association for Rural Advancement.

ERPI 2018 International Conference
Authoritarian Populism and the
Rural World

17-18 March 2018
International Institute of Social Studies (ISS)
The Hague, Netherlands



About the Author(s)

Donna Hornby is a post-doctoral researcher at PLAAS, University of the Western Cape; and a senior researcher with the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), a land rights NGO in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa. She is currently conducting a demographic and land rights survey with 800 farm dweller families for AFRA.

Stha Yeni is currently the national coordinator of Tshintsha Amakhaya (TA), a civil society alliance for land, food and water justice in rural South Africa. Before joining TA, she was the Rural Transformation Project manager at Oxfam South Africa and prior to that a researcher at the Land and Accountability Research Centre at the University of Cape Town. Her experience in, and passion for land and agrarian issues was moulded during her seven years at Surplus People Project where her work involved lobbying and advocacy for small-scale farmers, farm workers and farm dwellers' access to land, water and alternative agricultural development resources and models. She received her Mphil in Land and Agrarian Studies at PLAAS UWC, and MA in Development Studies at the ISS, in The Hague.

The Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative (ERPI) is a new initiative focused on understanding the contemporary moment and building alternatives. New exclusionary politics are generating deepening inequalities, jobless 'growth', climate chaos, and social division. The ERPI is focused on the social and political processes in rural spaces that are generating alternatives to regressive, authoritarian politics. We aim to provoke debate and action among scholars, activists, practitioners and policymakers from across the world that are concerned about the current situation, and hopeful about alternatives.

For more information see: <http://www.iss.nl/erpi>
or email: emancipatoryruralpolitics@gmail.com