Introduction

Andalusia: a central role in the struggle for land in the Spanish State

In a number of European regions it is increasingly difficult to secure access to land. This situation is exacerbated by the neoliberal process and corporate monopoly over land, which is on the rise in Europe. As the European Coordination Via Campesina and Reclaim the Fields have pointed out, across Europe and specifically across the Spanish State, despite their economic, social or environmental differences, many regions share the same problems concerning access to land. Mega-projects and urbanisation affect the entire Iberian Peninsula, pushing up the price of land and seeing more arable land being used to meet industrial and urban demands.

According to the Spanish agricultural census, between 1962 and 2009, the number of farms dropped by 67% (from over 3 million to below 1 million) while at the same time their average size more than doubled. At present 0.3% of farms of over 1,000 hectares (ha) occupy 16% of the total agricultural area (INE, 1962 and 2009). This is due mainly to the rural exodus, the abandonment of plots of land and the process of land concentration. Furthermore, the proportion of agricultural workers has been continuously declining in relation to the total labour force, so that by 2009 agriculture accounted for only 3.9% of the economically active population (INE, 2009).

The agrarian issue has played a key role in Andalusia’s history, which shows the strong linkages between the territory and issues regarding land resources and its management, access, use and property. Unlike other European countries, and despite the overall decline in peasant farming, the rural population has remained stable in Andalusia. This has permitted the formation of strong social networks and for peasant demands to be transmitted across the generations.

Historically, the western part of the region – our study area – comprising the Guadalquivir basin and districts bordering the provinces of Córdoba, Seville and Cádiz, has been characterised by large estates, known as latifundia. This unequal pattern of land ownership is linked to the process of land concentration by the Catholic Church and the aristocracy.

Today, Andalusia is undergoing an acute phase of land privatisation. In 2010, the concentration of land was ten points higher than in the mid-twentieth century: 2% of landowners own 50% of the land (INE, 2011).

Public policies, far from supporting local sustainable production and agrarian workers, are encouraging modes of production that do not correspond to the true needs of Andalusia’s population. Neoliberalism has accelerated the process of concentrating land in the hands of corporations. Among the 16 Spanish districts with the greatest presence of business corporations owning agricultural land, ten are in Andalusia (Such, 2011). The agri-business and food-retailing corporations not only concentrate land ownership, but also the food chain, which gives rise to tensions among different actors in the chain.

The corporate control of land is endangering the future of Andalusia’s food sovereignty and hampering sustainable production. This situation is aggravated by the current economic context, where unemployment affects 34% of working-age population and 40% in the rural area (INE, 2012).
At the same time, as we shall see, Andalusia’s agriculture is controlled and maintained by European agricultural policies, which make it difficult for countries and regions to decide on their own food and agricultural systems. The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2003 brought with it the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), perpetuating the maintenance of highly inequitable land distribution, and encouraging the abandonment of smallholder production. According to the list of beneficiaries of the CAP, large food-distribution companies and rich families both monopolise the land in Andalusia and receive significant subsidies.

In Andalusia, the concentration of land ownership and the reluctance of landowners to create jobs in districts strongly affected by unemployment and chronic poverty have prompted the rural exodus. On the other hand, the region is also one of Europe’s hotspots of social struggles for land: its history of agrarian injustice and the strong peasant class consciousness, have provoked a significant social reaction. This has triggered interesting processes such as land occupations, the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, mutual support networks and partnerships between producers and consumers. Resistance has been articulated around a movement of landless peasants working as agricultural labourers. At key points in Andalusia’s recent history they have maintained the struggle against institutions and landowners to press for one of their oldest demands: agrarian reform and land redistribution.

Today, and after the bursting of the real-estate bubble, some of the construction workers who were laid off are returning to the rural areas in the hope of regaining their former jobs. Along with scores of unemployed urban youths, they are undergoing a process of re-peasantisation and reiterating their demands for land access and work.

The question of obtaining access to land in Andalusia calls for a process of reflection and critique. The first section of this paper describes the historical process of concentrating land in the hands of the few; the second provides data on the agricultural sector, focusing on property regimes and the inequitable distribution of land; the third explains the effect of the CAP on the sector in terms of land-use changes and social injustice; the fourth section outlines the national and international normative framework supporting social claims to access to land; and the fifth and final sections show the main struggles and alternatives, with a special emphasis on three emblematic cases of the Andalusian Trade Union (SOC-SAT).

Methodology and Study Area

Andalusia’s agrarian structure is heterogeneous in terms of its geography, landholding patterns and the main models of agricultural production in each of its 62 districts. Its 87,268 km² includes areas where small properties predominate, which are basically the mountainous districts particularly in the eastern region. The provinces of Almería and Granada stand out because over the last 20 years they have developed an intensive agro-industrial model, based on greenhouse production.

The western region, comprising the Guadalquivir Basin and districts bordering the provinces of Córdoba, Seville and Cádiz, has historically been characterised by large properties and estates, or latifundia. This area, of enormous natural richness and which is completely dominated by agriculture, is where there have been major land conflicts between the large landowners and the demands of agricultural labourers for access to land. As we shall see in the following chapters, this inequitable distribution was initially linked to the process of land concentration by the Catholic Church and the aristocracy, and later by a process of privatisation.
Our study is focused mainly on the Guadalquivir Valley, with case studies conducted in the area between Córdoba and Seville.

The authors compiled empirical material during fieldwork undertaken in November 2012, through interviews with members of the Sindicato Andaluz de Trabajadores (SOC-SAT), Instituto de Sociología y Estudios Campesinos (ISEC) at the University of Córdoba and University Pablo de Olavide in Seville. Interviews were also conducted with Andalusian government officials (CAP Monitoring Team, DG of Agricultural Structures – formerly the Andalusian Institute of Agrarian Reform – and the General Office of Land Management). The empirical information was complemented by a literature study.

The report is based largely on statements made by the people surveyed, emphasising the aspects considered most important.

**Background to the land conflict land in Andalusia**

The concentration of landownership and the existence of the *latifundia* have their roots in Andalusia’s history.

The origins of its skewed land distribution date back to the Spanish conquest of Muslim Andalusia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when large farms were divided between the aristocracy and Christian religious orders. The Christian kings of Castile conquered western Muslim Andalusia, Al-Andalus, 200 years before they seized control of the more mountainous eastern region. This resulted in some cases in the nobles taking over large tracts of land to protect the borders between the Christian and Muslim kingdoms. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this process was reinforced by the wealth flowing to nobles and courtiers from the conquest of South America, while the merchant class acquired political power along with their social status. The subsequent civil and ecclesiastical confiscation of land during the nineteenth century, coupled with the liberal assertion of individual property rights and land auctions, led to large investments in purchasing land, which effectively maintained the large estates.

Thus, the process by which land became concentrated in the hands of a powerful minority took place over centuries and ultimately shaped a farm-management system based on crops such as grain and...
olives. Although these crops are complementary in terms of their seasonality, they could not guarantee a regular income for peasant families, who were thus forced to work on the large estates. This situation was aggravated by the low wages paid to agricultural labourers, which triggered a number of strikes and rebellions during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In 1932, the recently constituted Second Republic created the *Instituto de Reforma Agraria* (IRA) (Agrarian Reform Institute) and promulgated the first Agrarian Reform law.

This law established various categories of land to be confiscated and imposed ceilings on landholdings; however, large estates were untouched and the capitalist nature of the Spanish property system remained intact. The revolutionary impact of the law was due to its vast area of influence, in particular in western Andalusia, where it affected a third of the land. Specifically in the provinces of Córdoba and Seville it affected 46% and 53% respectively of all cultivated land (Malefakis, 1970). Nevertheless, despite the numerous land occupations during the Republican period, the law was poorly enforced.

During the 1936–1939 civil war, the Agrarian Reform law was applied in the Andalusian districts under Republican rule, and the unions encouraged the distribution and the collectivisation of land abandoned by the former owners, supporters of the *coup d’état*. The process came to a halt following the triumph of Franco’s dictatorship in 1939. From this moment on, the administration focused on neutralising the impacts of the Republican agrarian legislation. Together with the violence exerted against the peasantry – thousands were executed in Andalusia during the war and post-war period – all the expropriated lands were returned to their former owners, as were the crops grown on the land.

Once the peasant movement had been dismantled and was fiercely repressed, in 1939 Franco’s dictatorship embarked on a new period of agricultural policy with the *Instituto Nacional de Colonización* (INC) (National Institute of Colonisation). Through the INC the regime made major investments in irrigation systems on the large farms, and also purchased land with the aim of settling farmers’ families. This interventionist policy did nothing to solve the land problem, and the investments in irrigation were unprofitable, which in 1962 provoked a wake-up call from the World Bank (Liceras, 1988). The INC later became the *Instituto de Reforma y Desarrollo Agrario* (IRYDA) (Agrarian Reform and Development Institute) and its assets were inherited by subsequent administrations.

During Franco’s dictatorship, the structure of land property continued to reproduce landless peasant farmers, mainly in southern Spain. In places such as the provinces of Córdoba and Seville, by 1956 more than half of the peasant farmers were landless, as shown in Figure 2.

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**Figure 2. Landless peasants, male population, 1956**

After Franco’s death, the Instituto Andaluz de Reforma Agraria (IARA) (Andalusian Agrarian Reform Institute) was created in 1984 to replace the irrigation projects driven by the IRYDA. It was set up by the Regional Government, under the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), thus responding to one of Andalusia’s greatest historical aspirations. But the lack of funding and political will resulted in the Agrarian Reform becoming a source of unemployment benefits for landless and/or unemployed peasant farmers, reducing public land expropriation to the minimum. Even so, the IARA purchased about 25,000 ha, where many cooperatives were formed.

Spain’s entry to the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 further hampered the promotion of policies to support peasant farmers, aimed at guaranteeing their access to land. Indeed, it created an ideological conflict with the principles of the Agrarian Reform, which had aspired to increase both agricultural productivity and agricultural employment. This is because, by that time, encouraging productivity was no longer a European goal, and European agricultural products were not competitive in the global market. As we shall see in Chapter 3, the CAP subsidies played an important role in this process.

Clearly, this stage of the Agrarian Reform, which lasted from 1984 until the beginning of the 1990s, had very little impact. Its main contribution was to encourage a production-oriented model of farming, but the Andalusian Regional Government did not address the issue of land concentration or other measures that could have promoted better land use. From the 1990s the trend towards transforming the agricultural structure was totally abandoned, as was the land redistribution policy, liquidating the IARA assets to only 9,000 ha, or eight or nine farms scattered throughout the region, while the remaining farms were re-categorised in order to become urban areas during the construction boom.

The IARA ended its irrigation interventions aimed at boosting the most productive sector, which were inherited from Franco’s period and were still going on right up to the end of the twentieth century. Towards 2000 the Andalusian Administration considered this stage of the Agrarian Reform had concluded and, although the IARA kept functioning, the Andalusian Parliament avoided using the term ‘Agrarian Reform’ because nobody wanted the debate to be reignited in view of its political costs during the 1970s and early 1980s. In 2010 the IARA was officially closed down, although it had effectively been dead for the previous 15 years. Currently the Andalusian administration is not seeking to resolve the issue, which is the source of dispute between the two governing coalition parties: the PSOE and Izquierda Unida (IU) (United Left).

Concentration of land and property regimes in Andalusia

Territorial inequality and land concentration

Andalusia has always been an important agricultural region in the Spanish State and farmlands currently make up 45.74% of the territory, although the number of farms is declining. In 2009, there were 246,104 farms, down by 40% since 1962 (INE, 1962 and 2009) and its economy is now based mainly on the tourism sector.5

Andalusian agriculture remains far more important than in other European countries or regions, generating 8.26% of the total income and employing 8.19% of the population. The sector is characterised by the proportion of wage labour as opposed to agricultural entrepreneurs and family labour (Dolors García et al., 1995).

Notably, Andalusia has the EU’s highest unemployment rate, affecting 35.42% of the region’s economically active population, and 40% in the rural areas (INE, 2012).
Land concentration, land grabbing and people’s struggles in Europe

As mentioned in the previous section, Andalusia’s history is strongly linked to inequitable property rights (Oliver and González de Molina, 1999; Dolors García et al., 1995; Sánchez and García, 1996). The attempted Agrarian Reform failed to change the profound social cleavage, with a few powerful landowners and huge latifundia (Dolors García et al., 1995) monopolising the available land, and a multitude of smallholdings with very little land to develop production. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, 2009) (National Institute of Statistics), in 2009 66.53% of Andalusia’s arable land was concentrated in 6.32% of farms. Similarly, according to EUROSTAT data, in 2010 at the national level 5.17% of farms of over 100 ha accounted for 55.1% of the agricultural area in active use (UAA).

Far from diminishing, Andalusia’s structure of large landowners is actually increasing (Such, 2011). Figure 3 shows that holdings of over 30 ha account for most of the regional UAA, whereas the majority, with areas between 2 ha and 10 ha, hold a tiny percentage of that area.

Andalusia illustrates the effects of urban speculation, which leads to a rise in the price of land because of its scarcity.

These difficulties are increased for marginalised people. Women in particular own less than 22% of farm holdings (INE, 2009), meaning that they enjoy even less equality than women in Lesotho or Malawi.

As a female militant of SAT states: ‘In many of the crews, women’s salaries are lower than men’s (...), we are making demands through the Union, and (we are) also making demands about immigrant rights. The Union is achieving the same agreement for all of us, no matter the gender, colour or language spoken’ (interview, 2012)

In addition, women are responsible for 98% of all care work, as part of the invisible domestic and family workforce, making it more difficult for them to obtain a job and gain economic independence.

At the same time, the rural world has aged dramatically: over 30% of holdings are maintained by people aged 65 years or more, and over 76% by people over 45 years of age. Those of 34 years or under own just over 6% of the land (INE, 2012). This demography also entails land abandonment, causing losses in the associated bi-cultural memory since knowledge is not being handed down from one generation to the next.
Property regimes

Another very interesting aspect obtained through INE data concerns land-tenure regimes, classified as property regimes, lease, sharecropping and others. Over 95% of farm holdings in Andalusia are under the private property regime. This percentage has grown since 1999, as has – albeit slightly – the percentage of leases, while the proportion of sharecropping and other unspecified regimes – comprising common use, cooperative, and union lands as well as the free assignment of lands - has declined (Algibez Cortes, 1978; Anuario, 2005).

If we compare the data from the First Agrarian Census of 1962, there is a big difference regarding the current status of land tenure. In that year private holdings represented 73% of the total in Andalusia, in line with the national average, right up to 2005 (INE, 2005). Sharecropping accounted for 4.5% and other regimes for over 8%. The percentage of leases remained stable. These data indicate that private property has grown enormously, while the other regimes – more interesting from the viewpoint of facilitating access to land, such as sharecropping and others – have diminished significantly. This is evidence of the destruction and decay of communal property.

According to the study conducted by Fernando Fernández Such (2011) on land distribution and tenure, the commodification of land and speculation have pushed up the price of land. From 1993 to 2008, the average annual growth rate increased by 5.6%, but land prices began to fall from 2008. The global crisis and the collapse the real-estate market have also affected land prices, and the amount of land on the market, by 39%. Thus the national average price per hectare of agricultural land stands at 10,485€. These low prices allow corporations to buy up large amounts of land, displacing small farmers or labourers who do not have the financial resources to compete.

In the Spanish State, corporations and public entities own the largest estates, especially bearing in mind that only 20% of public land is fertile and the rest is forest and unsuitable for agriculture land (Such, 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporations</th>
<th>Public Entities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm holdings (thousands)</td>
<td>LA (thousand ha)</td>
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<tr>
<td>200-300</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-500</td>
<td>1,043</td>
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<tr>
<td>500-1000</td>
<td>1,170</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt;1000 ha</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 4. Ownership of estates of over 1,000 ha. Key: LA: Land Area; UAA: Utilised Agricultural Area. Source: Such, 2011

Private land ownership is, consequently, the most common land-tenure regime in Andalusia, although the last decade has seen a significant change in the structure of land tenure, with a major increase in corporate landownership.

According to Such (2011), the number of corporations (excluding cooperatives and agro-processing companies) owning farmland has doubled and now represents a significant percentage of agricultural land. In 2011, among the 16 Spanish districts with the highest percentage of agricultural land (more than 25%) under corporative ownership, 10 were in Andalusia.
Land concentration, land grabbing and people’s struggles in Europe

Such points out that, although currently available data do not show the extent of the agri-business and large agri-food companies’ ‘empire’, some business groups such as Ebro, Siro, Gullón or Pascual are known to possess over 10,000 ha.

Regarding communal lands, data suggest that at 12% Andalusia is below average for the Spanish State as a whole, whereas regions such as La Rioja are over 65%. These data show profound inequality with regard to land tenure and communal land use.

Role of the European Union Common Agricultural Policy in the agricultural sector

The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) began in 1962, with the goal of increasing agricultural productivity in order to guarantee a decent standard of living for the agricultural community, stabilise markets and ensure reasonable prices for European consumers. Its budget for subsidies for European farmers and ranchers represents a significant proportion of the European Union (EU) expenditure, indirectly orienting the choice of production (management, crops, areas, quantities, etc.) (Torremocha, 2011). During its 50 years of existence, including a number of reforms, it has had significant impact on the agricultural sector, and has also been the subject of internal and external criticism.

The repercussions of the CAP at the European level include surplus production, the disappearance of small family farms, farmers’ increasing dependence on subsidies and the environmental and landscape impacts of agro-industrialisation (Soler, 2005; Torremocha, 2011; González, 2011: 24). Organisations of peasant and small-scale farmers, as well as other social movements, have criticised the EU’s agro-industrial model, which implies more inputs, product homogenisation and concentration, and at the same time a hugely indebted agricultural sector (Torremocha, 2011).

The CAP has also been criticised for its impact on the process of ‘de-peasantisation’ and destruction of rural society, through incentives to abandon agricultural activities (González, 2011: 24; Confédération paysanne, 2007). The decoupling of aid and production incorporated in 2003 allows farmers to receive subsidies without actually working the land, producing food or creating jobs. The race towards productivity and competitiveness has created a ‘dual’ agricultural system, which combines intensive and export-oriented production with small-scale agriculture (Confédération paysanne, 2007).

Finally, ‘the definition and formulation of CAP lacks a gender approach and neglects the situation of inequality of women and men in the rural environment and in agricultural activities, as well as the structural and systemic causes of such inequality’ (de Gonzalo, 2012). The structural aid for the agri-food sector received by Spain since joining the EU in 1986 has led to significant changes. In 2011 it was the second largest recipient country after France, with €5,812 million (distributed among 950,919 beneficiaries), and 10.4% of the CAP’s budget. Within Spain, Andalusia is the biggest recipient, with €1.7 million, 29% of the total.

Agricultural unions and various other organisations that defend the need for a vibrant rural sector and the right to food have severely questioned the direction of the different CAP reforms. They criticise the injustice and illegitimacy of their implementation, which are promoting the preservation of Andalusian latifundia and de-peasantisation.

Indeed, such policies are largely responsible for the fact that agriculture is no longer considered to be a gratifying activity. As a result, rural areas are depopulated, the rural population is ageing, and it is increasingly difficult to ensure that new generations will take over. Added to this are the rising
prices for consumers and the declining farm-gate purchase price of agricultural products, as well as the impoverishment of ranchers and small and medium-sized farmers. Between 2003 and 2008 the Spanish agricultural sector suffered a loss of 124,000 jobs and a decline in agricultural income of 26% (CEIGRAM, 2010).

Unfair distribution of the CAP subsidies

The CEIGRAM13 (2010) (Centre for Studies and Research on Agrarian and Environmental Risk Management) observes that the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) treats farmers, agricultural sectors and territories unequally, and generates conflict between two types of farmer, those who work the land and the owners of farming assets, favouring the latter. In addition, the SPS acts as a barrier to entry for young farmers.

The criteria for access to aid promote the concentration of subsidies in large landowners and food corporations (Valiño, 2010). The list of beneficiaries of the CAP, published by the Spanish government in 2009, demonstrates irrefutably the monopolisation of subsidies, since 75% of the aid is received by only 16% of the recipients.14 Indeed, members of Spanish aristocracy are among the major beneficiaries (Guerra, 2009).15

On the other hand, and as pointed out by FIAN (2004), the CAP has transformed the agrarian model ‘in the interests of the food distributors and agribusiness’. In 2008, 237 major food industries and transnational companies (TNCs) received over €1 million in CAP subsidies.16

In 2011, the CAP also benefited large food distributors such as Mercadona S.A (2,599,483 €), LIDL SUPERMERCADOS SA (691,655 €) and Carrefour S.A (126,679 €). A Veterinarios Sin Fronteras (Veterinarians Without Frontiers) report (VSF, 2012) shows that, thanks to aid received from the CAP, some corporations have seen their profits increase by up to 140% between 2009 and 2010.

González (2011, 63-64) underlines the ‘extreme’ concentration in the Spanish food chain: the five largest national groups concentrate over 60% of the retail distribution, while the agricultural input supply industry is led by large multinational companies in an almost monopolistic position. This disequilibrium creates tensions between the different actors in the chain and price structures characterized by marked differences between the prices of raw materials and consumer goods: only in 2009 the difference in prices from the field to the table rose to 490%.

Even the European Parliament has denounced oligopolistic practices in continent-wide distribution, and called for measures to counter financial speculation in the food chain.17

Finally, as pointed out by Guerra (2009), some Rural Banks also received European subsidies during 2008,18 and some aid has come to light because of the high profile of the beneficiaries, which include real-estate companies.19

Changes in land use

As stated by one of the researchers interviewed, ‘a decoupling between food and production (has been created). We have become specialised in the market for some products, and forgotten other products – equally necessary. This has triggered the expulsion of farmers by the abandonment of land and lack of productivity, in absence of competitiveness. There is a sector of our agriculture that does not produce any more. There are problems in Sierra Morena, Sierra de Segura, Sierra de los Pedroches, Sierra Norte de Sevilla and Sierra de Huelva, in the interior of Granada. Those lands are reverting to the market because they are subsidised and helped by the CAP and they are not available to access (...). 43
The difference between the period of the 1930s to the 1970s and nowadays is that back in time, 80% of your earnings would go to your pocket and the key element was the amount of your capital invested for exploitation. Since the CAP enforced the Single Payment Scheme and established a value for land property; land has become a rent acquisition element, independently from its productive use’ (interview with Manuel González de Molina, lecturer in contemporary agrarian history at the University Pablo Olavide in Seville, 2012).

Several studies have shown qualitative and quantitative changes in Spanish agricultural production in the 26 years since the CAP has been implemented in the country (see, for example, CEIGRAM, 2010; Lamo de Espinosa, 2011). They note that the ‘decoupling’ of aid from the beneficiaries’ production due to the 2003 reform and the introduction of the SPS has accelerated the decline in the amount of land under cultivation.

Since the disappearance of almost all the aid received before the 2003 reform, the production of durum wheat, beetroot, potato, tobacco and cotton has significantly decreased, and cane sugar and hops are disappearing (with serious consequences for employment) (Lamo de Espinosa, 2011).

There was also a loss of bio-diversity between 1995 and 2008, accompanied by a slight shift towards monoculture of cereals (a sector highly regulated by the CAP interventions from the outset) and oil-seeds. In particular, there has been increased production of wheat (the area under cultivation and its production increased by 134% and 269% respectively), barley and maize, due to the increased demand for bio-fuels (Lamo de Espinosa, 2011).

It should be noted that the Spanish State is the only member of the EU which cultivates genetically modified organisms (GMOs) on a large scale, with 116,306 ha of maize MON810 in 2012, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, which has serious socio-environmental impacts. In 2012 the European Commission halved (from 10% to 5%) the of use of bio-fuels across the EU in view of the direct impact the predicted rise in their adoption had already had in terms of increasing food prices, not only in Europe but also in many other regions.

Under the CAP, olive monoculture has extended (the area under cultivation and its production increased by 18% and 60% respectively), while vine and almond tree monoculture significantly declined. On the other hand, there has been a significant expansion in the production of vegetables and certain fruits, which receive little or no CAP subsidies. The total area dedicated to their production decreased (-29%), but their volume increased. They currently represent 64% of Spanish vegetable production and 41% of food exports, and employ 400,000 people – half of all those in agricultural employment.

The CAP reform scheduled for 2014–2020 is intended to ‘secure food supply, protect the environment and ensure rural areas are developed sustainably’. It may involve an annual cut of over €1 billion for Spain and €7 billion for the whole period. This would imply ‘a failure for Spain in a sector defined as strategic’, according to the Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos (COAG) (Coordination of Farmers’ and Ranchers’ Organisations). As COAG stated, ‘it can endanger the Spanish agricultural sector, as well as aggravate the food crisis.”
The cap defended by Vía Campesina

The ECVC organisations have defined the following priorities for a fair, sustainable and legitimate agricultural policy, in particular:

- Access to land, water, seeds, and credit should become a right. That includes the farmer’s rights to save their seeds and to improve plant varieties. Farmers’ income should come first from selling their products. For farm prices reflecting the real value of the products, the two following conditions are necessary:
  - Supply management instruments should be implemented to avoid surpluses or shortages.
  - Any dumping at export (sale at prices below the production costs) must be forbidden, and instead the EU and the other countries must have the right to protect themselves from imports at too low prices.

- To maintain a vibrant countryside in all regions,
  - Sustainable family farming should be maintained and developed: European funds are necessary, especially for small farms and less favored areas.
  - The process of concentration of the agricultural production has to be stopped and the production better distributed between the regions and between the farms.
  - Public services should be maintained and improved in all regions.


Legal framework for access to land

1.1 National normative context for the struggle against concentration of land ownership and for land reform

The Spanish Political Constitution of 1978 does not include in any of its articles the concepts of the concentration of land ownership or of agrarian reform. The only reference to agriculture is in Article 130, which states that: ‘the public authorities will attend to the modernisation and development of all economic and, in particular, of agriculture, farming, fisheries and craft, with the purpose of equalising living standards for all of the Spanish population’. This is at least a reference to the ‘agrarian issue’ or the special difficulties facing the survival and development of rural workers.

Without a doubt, the best example of a constitution that engaged with agrarian reform was the Portuguese Political Constitution of 1976. It is obvious that the changes introduced as Portugal joined the EU in 1986 would fundamentally affect measures regarding agricultural distribution. So, before the reforms introduced in 1982 and 1989, the section dealing with economic organisation established that ‘it is primarily incumbent on the State in the economic and social context: h) to implement Agrarian Reform’; in Article 96, moreover, it specified that the objectives of the Agrarian Reform include ‘c) to create the necessary conditions to obtain the effective equality of all the persons engaged in agriculture (…); d) ensure the use and rational management of the soil and the remaining natural resources, as well as the maintenance of its regeneration capacity’. It also set down the conditions for expropriating latifundia and transferring them and the means of production to people able to work them (Article 97.1), among other provisions.
The fact that the Spanish constitution did not remotely resemble the progressive Portuguese constitution on these issues underlines the profound differences in their respective transitions to democracy. In the case of the Spanish State, there was no rupture with the dictatorial regime, but a process of consensual reform that chose to avoid the most contentious issues, among them land redistribution.

The 1978 constitution does, however, contain some articles that could support agrarian reform. Apart from Article 130.1, mentioned above, Article 9.2 obliges the public authorities to remove all obstacles hampering real and effective equality and freedom; Article 40.1 encourages the public authorities to promote ‘favourable conditions … for a rent distribution … (to be) more equitable…’: Further, the main constitutional anchor for addressing land redistribution is found in Article 33, where the right to property is recognised and delimited by its social function, as well as the possibility of forcible expropriation to meet demands of public use of social interest (Article 33.3).

In the case of Andalusia, the current autonomous statute, reformed in 2007, maintains references to the Agrarian Reform in Article 10.3, where it establishes as basic goals of the Autonomous Community: ‘13º the modernisation, planning and integrative development of the rural environment in the framework of a policy of Agrarian Reform, fostering growth, full employment, development of agriculture infrastructure and the correction of regional imbalances, in the frame of a communitarian agricultural policy encouraging competitiveness in Europe and rest of the world’.

Given this statutory provision, the Andalusian Law of Agrarian Reform (LARA) (Law 8/1984, 3 July) was approved in 1984. Even after a recent modification that rescinds an important section of articles, the main objective of LARA has been to make large-scale agriculture more profitable rather than to redistribute land to landless agricultural workers. It could be argued that LARA does not open the way to a genuinely redistributive agrarian reform because it does not seek to dismantle the latifundia structure.

It is likely that such limitations arose from the context of LARA’s approval, very close to the approval of the constitution itself. That implied choosing to avoid breaking with Franco’s legislation regarding property in general and agricultural property in particular. In this sense, during the parliamentary debate, the Communist Party, through the intervention of its representative Romero Ruiz, proposed a bill to raise the number of farms that could be subject to expropriation, including all those that could not reach a productive capacity of at least 75% of the average for the region, and not the finally approved 50% productive capacity performance.

LARA is one of the few attempts to regulate the mechanisms that would allow progress regarding the social function of the land. Specifically it deals with three main measures:

a) Tax on underused lands for farms whose whole performance is situated between the average and below 80% of the optimal performance for the region (Article 36.4).

b) The obligation to prepare production plans and improvements, where performance is situated between 50% of the average performance and the average performance (Article 19.2b).

c) The expropriation of land or of its use for farm holdings whose productive capacity cannot reach a minimum level of 50% of average performance (Article 19a).

As pointed out above, LARA has been recently stripped of its more relevant articles. In the context of the crisis derived from financial speculation, the Andalusian Government approved Decree 5/2010, of 27 July, dealing with emergency measures to re-organise public sector. The budget cuts in public services have affected the agricultural sector through the closure of the Instituto Andaluz de Reforma Agraria (IARA), which had existed since the establishment of the LARA in
1984. At the same time, all of the articles in the LARA referring to the settlement regime in publicly owned lands were repealed. Lands formerly owned by IARA, which are not currently occupied by third parties, ‘will be destined to maximise value enhancement measures, through their assignment to public entities for general purposes or alienation to public entities or natural and legal persons of private character’. This provision underlines how far it differs from the institutional and normative idea of agrarian reform, the eternal unfulfilled promise for Andalusia.


Our examination of the principles and framework policies embodied in the Tenure Guidelines sought to identify some critical points in order to determine if and how the people, communities and others considered in this report (see sections 5 and 6) could in fact acquire rights and associated responsibilities to use and control land, fisheries and forests.

The ‘Voluntary Guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of national food security’ tackle the issue of transferring tenure rights within the framework of redistributive reforms, proposing several safeguards that could be used at the local and national levels to organise resistance to land grabs: 1) States may consider allocation of public land, voluntary and market-based mechanisms as well as expropriation of private land, fisheries or forests for a public purpose (Article 15.1); 2) redistributive reforms may be considered for social, economic and environmental reasons, among others, where a high degree of ownership concentration is combined with a significant level of rural poverty attributable to lack of access to land, and should guarantee equal access of men and women to land, fisheries and forests (Article 15.3); States should ensure that redistributive land reform programmes provide the full measure of support required by beneficiaries (Article 15.8). It has to be noted, however, that the concept of redistributive reforms was modified to include market-based mechanisms such as ‘willing seller – willing buyer’ schemes, which have singly failed to achieve any land reform (Guffens and Kroff, 2012).

The Guidelines should be interpreted principally in relation to the main objective set out in Article 1.1, to prioritise essential support to vulnerable and marginalised people, such as small-scale producers, keeping in mind the goals of food security, the realisation of the right to adequate food, poverty eradication, environmental protection and sustainable social and economic development. In this regard, governments are obliged to protect local communities and marginalised groups from land speculation and concentration of ownership, as well as to regulate land markets through policies and laws and to protect the tenure and human rights of local communities in the case of investments that imply the transfer of tenure rights.

Furthermore, all of the relevant actors should be able to participate in decision-making processes. States should ensure that there is wide public participation in the development of planning proposals and the review of draft spatial plans (Article 20.4), and are encouraged to set up multi-stakeholder platforms and frameworks at local, national and regional levels (Article 26.2).

The Guidelines also highlight the importance of small-scale producers to national food security and social stability (Articles 11.8 and 12.2), calling on States to give special attention to protecting their rights when facilitating market-based tenure transactions. A notable achievement is the recognition of women’s key role and the strengthening of their rights (Articles 3B4, 4.6, 4.7, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 7.1 and 25.5).
Finally, States are encouraged to establish or facilitate the creation of land banks as readjustment approaches (13.2 and 13.3), for example, by establishing tax and financial incentives to transfer long-term land management and ownership to public bodies and land trusts’ (Guffens and Kroff, 2012).

Struggles and alternatives in Andalusia

The historic struggle for land was recognised and made visible by everyone we surveyed in our field visits, from academics to government institutions. The accumulation of capital stock and the empowerment of peasant farmers’ struggle for access to land have given rise to a variety of social movements, all sharing the common aim of guaranteeing access to resources, generating employment and protecting the right to food.

Agro-ecology has become one axis of resistance to the dominant agro-industrial model in Andalusia. Its agenda includes access to land as guarantor of primary production, the promotion of community life as a means to ensure social cohesion (Rodrigo Mora, 2011), and equal access to land and resources by women and men.

The struggles for land have achieved some success. The peasant farmers’ movement has occupied and cultivated lands, planning and following a model of ecological production that continues to expand. According to the Spanish Ministry of Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs (MARM), between 1991 and 2011 the number of organic operators increased from 396 to 32,837 and the area of land under ecological cultivation nationwide expanded from 4,235 ha to 1,845,039 ha (MARM, 2010). In 2011, organic food consumption was worth €965 million, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment (Magrama, 2012). In addition, organic farming contributes significantly both to agricultural employment – it generated 50,000 jobs in 2010 – and to the agri-food trade, making it ‘attractive to future prospects’ (Magrama, 2012).

In 2010, Spain was the European leader and the fifth country worldwide in terms of the area being farmed organically, with the tenth largest number of organic producers and the tenth largest domestic market for organic food (FiBL-IFOAM, 2012).

In 2011, 52.75% of the land under organic cultivation, 60.64% of the organic livestock farms, 32.5% of the operators and 26.16% of the industrial farming activities related to plant and animal production, were located in Andalusia, making it country’s most important region for such production (MARM, 2010).

The economic crisis and the cult of individualism have sparked the interest of Andalusia’s urban youth in developing new collective production and responsible consumption projects, creating urban–rural bridges, through eco-villages, village revival or consumer cooperatives. Organisational platforms such as the one emerging from the 15M movement have given these initiatives continuity as a means to create the social network needed for its promotion and recognition.

‘There are production and consumer cooperatives in every province; the association network continues its expansion, as well as a direct relationship between producer and consumer; associations of producers try to perform their sales through short marketing channels. In a nutshell, an agro-ecological network is being formed, emerging from the social capital accumulation generated from the peasantry movement since the beginning of the 80s’ (interview with Manuel González de Molina, lecturer in contemporary agrarian history at the University Pablo Olavide in Seville, 2012).

The study area in Andalusia has a number of interesting agro-ecological processes and projects. In particular, the Unitary Cooperative of Production and Consumption La Acequia, the Mutual Support
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Network and the Network of Producers and Consumers of Córdoba are examples of attempts to synthesise a number of assumptions based on the theory of agro-ecology.

There appears to be a revival, at least at the discursive level, of rural and agricultural patterns, developed by many individuals and collectives that are returning to the field, currently expanding and very likely to continue to do so.

The SAT is an example of struggle against the concentration of land ownership and the abandonment of farms, and for the creation of employment in Andalusia.

In some cases the political context has facilitated projects based on organic production as opposed to the prevailing agro-intensive and agro-export model. For example, the promotion and implementation of a programme to serve organic food in school cafeterias – the first in the Spanish State – is based on a network of small producers supplying their village schools and neighbourhoods with organic food.

According to Manuel González de Molina, who promoted the initiative while he was General Director of Ecological Agriculture at the Secretary of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Andalusian Government (2004–2007): ‘We intended to promote a model change. While we were in office we supported the creation of short commercialisation channels, more focused on the internal market, although, after we left office due to political struggles, export-oriented production was promoted, with all kinds of incentives. They won’t give you one euro if you want to sell in the country, they will give you anything you need if you are going to sell your produce out of Spain, causing a reduction in sustainability’ (interview with Manuel González de Molina, lecturer in contemporary agrarian history at the University Pablo Olavide in Seville, 2012).

Other pioneering initiatives highlighted during the surveys are still in development, for example, ecological certifications through a participatory guarantee system, with three pilots being managed in Sierra del Segura, Ronda and in the north of the province of Granada.

Experiences of peasant resistance in Andalusia: the struggle of SOC-SAT

The struggle for land regained strength in Andalusia in the 1970s through the Andalusian peasant resistance movement, which has thrived since the end of Franco’s dictatorship. It was mainly in the Guadalquivir Valley and the Sierra Sur of Seville where the Sindicato de Obreros del Campo (SOC) (Farm Workers’ Union, referred to hereafter as the Union) was founded in 1976, harking back to many of the demands of the peasant movement during the early the twentieth century, including – and always prominent – the struggle for land. The end of the 1970s and early 1980s saw a number of protests by the farm workers’ movement: hunger strikes, lockouts and road blocks, rallies where other social sectors joined in solidarity, symbolic farm occupations aimed at achieving an Agrarian Reform that would reduce or eliminate the large estates in Andalusia. Compared to the situation in the 1930s, the struggle for land had lost its strength because of the massive rural–urban migration during the 1970s and because of the social stigma attached to agricultural work. The Union’s strategy therefore became more oriented towards running small town councils, where they have been winning elections since 1979.

‘I joined the Union because my family has always been struggling to avoid being separated due to the lack of work. My younger brother was the first one to join the Union, looking for a job. We are eight siblings, all of us labourers. If the Andalusian land is so rich, why do families have to leave, looking for work?’ (interview with Lola Álvarez, leader of SAT-Córdoba, 2012).
The rise to power of the PSOE both nationally and in Andalusia in 1982, brought new hopes that the Agrarian Reform law would be put into practice. Instead, the new administration implemented a subsidy policy for unemployed agricultural labourers. This profoundly changed the direction of the peasant movement’s struggle because it fostered a dependence on subsidies rather than keeping the focus on the struggle for land. From 1984, there was a decline in the incidence of rural conflicts, and there appeared to be a significant cultural shift as protests began to revolve around wage issues. At the same time, a section of the labour movement was organised in farms owned by the SOC, which was moving towards the principles of agro-ecology, helped by members of the Instituto de Sociologia y Estudios Campesinos (ISEC) (Institute of Sociology and Peasant Movements) at the University of Córdoba, in turn inspired by social and peasant movements in Latin America (Sevilla, 2006).

The 1980s witnessed several farm occupations by Union members, leading to the creation of agricultural workers’ cooperatives, some of them very well known and focused mainly on increasing production, whose main purpose was to create employment in the villages, such as in Humoso in Marinaleda. In contrast, other cooperatives, closer to the principles of agro-ecology, such as La Verde in Villamartín in the province of Cádiz, or Romeral in the province of Málaga, started to establish alternative models of production and consumption (Sevilla, 2006: 20). Both have been successful examples of SOC cooperatives, which opted to purchase auctioned land. These agro-ecological production initiatives emerged from the Union’s struggle for access to land and remain key examples of productivity in the region. The cooperatives participated in the school cafeterias mentioned earlier, and work as promoters of conservation programmes of genetic varieties and seed exchange.

In 2007, the SOC’s need to connect with urban movements gave rise to the Sindicato Andaluz de Trabajadores (SAT) (Andalusian Trade Union), which was formally founded in Seville in that same year as the SOC-SAT.

SOC-SAT is still making the news and mobilising across the Spanish State. It has made it clear that the struggle for agrarian justice continues. Rallies of 400 women demonstrated, calling for a Rural Employment Plan. There have also been demands that bridge rural and urban issues, such as the campaign for a basic income and an end to evictions. In summer 2012, the Marcha Obrera Andalusia en pie (Workers March’ – Andalusia Arise) mobilised over 10,000 people through the streets of Andalusia, expressing their disagreement with the government’s economic and social policies. In interviews, the public authorities also referred to symbolic actions such as the occupation of bank branches and universities.
One of the most noteworthy media stunts was the ‘appropriation’ of goods from the Mercadona supermarket, to be distributed among the neighbours of an entire block evicted in Seville, which provoked a very interesting public debate. “Food was distributed in order to denounce the fact that there are lots of people going hungry, with families without any income, while these big companies are throwing food into the bin. Why don’t they distribute the food among the people?” (interview with Lola Álvarez, labourer and leader of SAT–Córdoba, 2012).

The repressive actions taken against SOC-SAT in recent decades, with fines of up to 400,000 €, prison sentences of over 50 years, and nearly 500 unionists under indictment, make the SAT one of the most repressed social movements in Europe today.

Three examples of resistance

We now present three emblematic cases of land occupation for production carried out by the SAT: Marinaleda, Las Turquillas and Somonte.

Marinaleda

Marinaleda is the best-known case and a reference point for the Union in Andalusia. During the 1980s, there was an occupation of land owned by the Duke of the Infantado on the Humoso estate of around 1,200 ha. Using a legal loophole to force the occupation of farms that had benefited from public irrigation, it was initially agreed that water would be channelled to the whole farm. After that, the land was expropriated by the Andalusian Government and assigned to the people of Marinaleda, who created an agricultural cooperative called HUMAR, which grew and packaged vegetables. In accordance with the Union’s guidelines for land struggles, the cooperative is reluctant to take ownership of the farm.

“We don’t want the ownership of the land, but its usufruct. Why? Because you cannot give the land to someone if the struggle was carried out by so many people. We cannot give the property to 10, 15 or 20 people. Besides, by distributing the land you wouldn’t solve any problems. Only a few families would benefit from it and the rest would continue as before” (interview with Gloria Prieto, Marinaleda Councillor, 2012).

Figure 7. Marinaleda’s emblem: ‘Marinaleda: Utopia Towards Peace’
In accordance with this idea, a large proportion of the people worked voluntarily to maintain the farm, make it profitable and generate jobs in a village that has been characterised by unemployment and by youth migration:

“We have a cooperative called HUMAR; during the campaign there are 200 people working between the factory and the fields. Apart from the land, we have the industry, because we consider that the people of the land are the worst paid for performing the hardest work, because our products used to be taken to Barcelona and to the north, while here there was no employment. So we decided to create industry, packaging peppers and beans and using our oil mill” (interview with Gloria Prieto, Marinaleda Councillor, 2012).

Currently Eroski, a big food chain, is the largest purchaser of HUMAR’S packaged products. These must meet the corporation’s quality requirements, which means intensifying production beyond the desirable level. On the other hand, the oil is currently being exported to different places (for instance, in recent years the cooperative has started to export to Venezuela). In the current crisis, in which many are unemployed due to the slump in the construction sector, people are returning to the countryside in search of work. HUMAR’s aim to create jobs is thus seen as more vital than ever. In addition, the self-build housing project has been very successful. The Junta de Andalucía (Government of Andalusia) provides housing materials and the workforce is the responsibility of the prospective tenants, who may work on the construction site or hire other villagers. The tenant has to pay 25 € a month to defray the loan to the Andalusian Government.

Las Turquillas

Situated between the municipalities of Osuna and Écija, near to Marinaleda, peasant farmers from this village and from the nearby village of Lantejuela have been claiming the right to this 1,123 ha farm for 15 years. The farm is a military horse-breeding centre, owned by the Ministry of Defence and the formal property of the Spanish Army. It is currently exploited by a sub-contractor who does not cultivate the land and uses only 20 ha to keep a hundred horses and donkeys. The Ministry also owns another farm of 410 ha of irrigated land, Las Islas, 5 km from Écija. All of the mainly symbolic occupations carried out by the villagers have been repressed:

“We have occupied this farm several times, four in total. Last time we stayed for 18 days. There is 37% unemployment in our village, while this farm was 80% unproductive last year, yielding absolutely nothing. It’s not simply – as we have stated before – that they only cultivate sunflower and wheat – crops that don’t create jobs – but rather that they are leaving 80% of the land uncultivated” (interview with Juan, labourer from Lantejuela and a SAT member, 2012).

Thanks to the three previous occupations, the municipality of Osuna obtained 300 ha of this farm in 2009, which now manages it, allocating 80 ha to organic farming, creating a green corridor and rehabilitating the three lakes in the area as a tourist attraction. The first agricultural labourers began to work on the farm in 2011 thanks to a 600,000 € grant from the Government of Andalusia and the Instituto Nacional de Empleo (INEM) (National Employment Institute) enabling them to hire 198 workers.

The rest of the farm’s agricultural land remains idle, making very clear the failure to exploit its agricultural potential. As the peasant farmers from Lantejuela village, inspired in the Marinaleda model, have pointed out:
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Figure 8. View of the uncultivated fields of Las Turquillas

‘The land cannot be in the hands of a few people, like it happens in Andalusia, to serve as hunting reserve (...) many of the owners come here to hunt for two or three months a year and nobody has raised their voice to talk about jobs for the working class. (...) If the land were assigned to the labourers we would get support from Manuela Guardia to make this farm profitable. It is not profitable to pay a man aged 52 unemployment benefit of 426 € when his entire family is without work’ (interview with Juan, labourer from Lantejuela and SAT member, 2012).

They do not seek to own the land, but rather to manage it through Union cooperatives; the Union would manage the employment lists to distribute work fairly. Public farms are the primary objective of the Union, given that they are easier to obtain and expropriate, and are more favourable to the creation of public land ‘banks’ to be managed by the municipalities in order to guarantee access to peasant farmers from nearby villages. They intend to work the land as a means to meet the local needs for work and food. As they state, in this context of crisis, ‘we are going hungry’. The peasants from villages near to Las Turquillas intend to come back next February to occupy the land again, until they obtain it.

Somonte

The occupation of Somonte is the result of the reaction of the farmworkers’ movement to the liquidation auction of 20,000 ha of public farms following the demise of the IARA in 2011. SAT members deplored the privatisation of land at a time of record unemployment in the area, with 1,700 people in Palma del Río and more than 4,000 people in the surrounding villages without jobs in 2012.24

SAT members from Guadalquivir Valley districts occupied Somonte, a farm of 400 ha in the province of Córdoba one the day before its auction, scheduled for 5 March 2012. At the time of the occupation more than 12,000 ha had already been sold, and about 8,000 ha were to be auctioned.

In so doing, they demonstrated the Union’s new strategy, abandoning symbolic occupations in favour of permanent occupations:

‘Somonte and the current occupations are not longer of a symbolic character, as we carried them out years ago; faced with the present situation, there’s no option left but to occupy land with the purpose of staying on it, because what we need is work, to live with dignity. If there are public lands that can generate employment and feed families, we, the labourers, will work them by the sweat of our brow, which is what we do’ (interview with Lola Álvarez, labourer and leader of SAT–Córdoba, 2012).
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“We occupied the lands of the Duchess of Alba, the Duke of Infantado and all this bourgeois aristocracy of landlords – always symbolically, trying to get our voices heard, and to restate our claims for the long-promised Agrarian Reform. But now we know there is no political will and everything was deceit and lies: since our occupations were symbolic, they did not care, they just would sign a complaint and that was it. Then we decided that we no longer would occupy lands symbolically, we decided to occupy lands like in Marinaleda, and start working on them, and we would not come back to the farms of the aristocracy to perform parades, but to occupy them for good” (interview with Javier Ballesteros, labourer and SAT member, 2012).

The proposal of the people occupying Somonte pulls together elements related to the principles of agro-ecology, such as their commitment to local markets, production geared to self-sufficiency and reforestation of the farm boundaries. Collective life in the farm buildings is an important feature of the project. They claim that the farm did not generate local employment and that it was managed by a company in agreement with the Government of Andalusia, specifically the Agricultural Management and Fisheries Agency, which had first opted to cultivate bio-fuels and experimental crops – on land that had been uncultivated for months at the time of the occupation.

Figure 9. Members of Somonte working in the pepper field

They propose an alternative model of land management, not only opposed to the production-driven view of the Andalusian Government, but also incorporating the traditional commitment of the Union’s cooperative to adapt agricultural production to meet the local employment needs and wage demands.

The field has 359 ha of dry land and 41 ha of irrigated land. According to Somonte’s members, the latter could soon provide about 50 jobs by setting up vegetable plots of about 3,000 m$^2$ to grow peppers, asparagus, onions and other vegetables, and the plantation of several species of native tree, such as cork oak.

“Our idea is to cultivate first to meet our own needs and the remaining products will be distributed – as we are already doing – in local markets, village markets, knocking on people’s doors and in social markets. For example, we have the social market of La Tejedora in Cordoba, which operates according to
the principles of fair trade and solidarity, far from the capitalist model of distribution. The idea is to work in a communitarian way to eat healthily and live healthily, and have at least a guaranteed access to our food rights’ (interview with Javier Ballesteros, labourer and SAT member, 2012).

The Platform of Support for Somonte, created in a number of Andalusian cities and villages, are based on this experience both materially and in terms of collaboration in selling their products, as in the case of La Tejedora, where a part of Somonte’s production is sold.

As these examples show, the current crisis and the various dynamics and trends of the peasant struggle in Andalusia present a scenario that looks both to the struggle for land and beyond that to the management model to put in place once the land is under peasant control.

Conclusions

Land is still the basic production factor for the Andalusian economy, and the key to building a more inclusive and equitable society. But while it remains a pressing issue, the problem of access to land remains largely ignored in public political debate.

This situation is compounded by the monopolisation of the CAP subsidies by Andalusia’s traditional large landowners, and by several food corporations. This situation leaves control of the land – and key decisions over how it will be used and for what purposes – in the hands of a few, blocking the creation of employment and discouraging food production for local markets. At the same time, farmers continue to abandon their small plots of land because the CAP system works strongly against their interests and they are unable to make their farms profitable.

To make sense of the current economic and social situation, it is necessary to understand the new mechanisms by which ownership of land is becoming more concentrated. After 26 years of the CAP, Andalusia is geared to supplying external markets. Large food corporations, such as Carrefour and Mercadona, are receiving CAP subsidies and also monopolising productive lands and controlling the food-supply chain. The case of the cooperative HUMAR-Marinaleda, a valuable social experiment in employment generation, exemplifies this dynamic: its business model is largely subordinated to the criteria and conditions imposed by the supermarket chains.

Despite the limitations, the existing legal framework does also open ways to obtain access to land, whereas new international instruments are emerging that seek to strengthen the rights of peasant farmers, such as the FAO Voluntary Guidelines. Land legislation needs to define it as a public resource that should be used for agricultural purposes. On this basis, land regulations should then aim to facilitate, for example, access for young people or groups interested in returning to agriculture, taking into account the social and environmental value of land.

In contrast, the public policies promoted by the Andalusian Government have failed to respond to the growing problem of unemployment. Responding to the demand for land could also address the lack of employment through providing jobs related to food production. However, land ownership is becoming more concentrated as public land is progressively privatised, for instance through the partial auction of more than 20,000 ha, formerly owned by IARA, as reported by the SAT.

Despite the severe repression inflicted on the SAT, its steady and persistent struggle has ensured that many of its development projects are successful. By diversifying its strategies, ranging from symbolic to productive land occupations, the SAT has managed to bring the issue of land back under the local and international spotlight.
It is noteworthy that the SAT’s land claims are not geared towards obtaining ownership but rather to form workers’ cooperatives, organised by the Union. The SAT has promoted these cooperatives by gaining political power and designing development plans for its own mayoralties, as in the case of Marinaleda. The effectiveness of this route depends, of course, on the Union’s ability to stay in power.

In addition, projects have allowed greater autonomy to develop agro-ecological production initiatives, adding to the existing demands for land and employment, the right to healthy food and the revival of local markets. The historical struggles and demand for land by Andalusia’s peasant farmers are now being complemented by new agro-ecological movements, leading to experiments such as consumer and producer cooperatives, rural–urban exchange networks, short marketing channels and participatory certified organic production.

Recommendations

At the local level:

- To strengthen both the role of municipalities in the management of the commons and also the participation of civil society in this process;
- To facilitate the creation of workers’ cooperatives, as well as access to publicly owned land through long-term leases and managed by agricultural trade unions;
- To develop public policies aimed at rethinking the agrarian logic and rural–urban linkages in the direction of food sovereignty, such as local distribution networks, serving organic food in school cafeterias, local seasonal markets, agro-ecology, etc.

At the national level:

- To create mechanisms that allow access to land (e.g. incentives for sale or lease, assignment of use, expropriation);
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• To conduct a census of land distribution, ownership and use;
• To improve the working conditions of day labourers, and promote special employment schemes
  that guarantee both gender equality and employment for at least four months a year.

At the EU level:

• To radically rethink agrarian policy, both within the EU and in its application in the different
  European regions;
• To maintain crop subsidies (e.g. for olive production) with the aim of creating employment and
  sustainable farming methods and rural development policies suited to each area;
• To give priority to subsidising smallholders and cooperatives that are in the common interest;
• To investigate and eliminate subsidies to wealth landowners;
• To design rural development policies appropriate to the local context, respecting environmental,
  social, economic and food security criteria.

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Endnotes

1. European Coordination Via Campesina’s member organisations in Spain are: Plataforma Rural, Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos (COAG), Euskal Herriko Nezakarien Elkartasuna (EHNE), Sindicato Labrego Galego (SLG), Sindicato de Obreros del Campo - Sindicato Andaluz de Trabajadores (SOC-SAT). Details available at: http://www.eurovia.org.


3. The Single Payment Scheme (SPS), introduced by EC Council Regulation 1782/2003, is a key feature of the 2003 reform of the CAP and the principal agricultural subsidy scheme in the EU. Its objectives are to encourage farmers to produce according to market demands and to support their income. This direct aid payment is ‘decoupled’ (i.e. separated) from agricultural production itself. The beneficiaries of the SPS are ‘farmers’ engaged in an ‘agricultural activity’ and having ‘eligible land’ at their ‘disposal’. However, the lack of a precise definition of these terms and the application of the related provisions has allowed persons or entities with only marginal or no agricultural activity to receive SPS payments. In 2009, the SPS was applied in 17 of the 27 EU Member States at a cost of €28.8 bn. The SPS factsheet is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/pdf/factsheet-single-payment-scheme_en.pdf, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:030:0016:0099:en:PDF.

4. The emergence of re-peasantisation is ‘in essence, a modern expression of the fight for autonomy and survival in a context of deprivation and dependency’ (Ploeg, 2008: 6).

5. This has increased significantly since the 1970s.

6. Communal lands are under the direct management of local residents of ancestral personal and real-estate properties. Land under communal management is inalienable and cannot be for the exclusive use of an individual or institution. The communal scheme has existed in Spain since the ninth century as a continuation of the Germanic law, and used to be a key element in the socioeconomic and reproductive dynamics of rural societies. Currently, communal management is reduced to mountains, expanses of forest and livestock pastures. Most are used under an open council system and managed directly by local residents. It differs from the municipal system, under which land management depends on local governments.

7. The number of livestock differ vastly between the regions of La Rioja and Andalusia.


9. It reached 71% of EU expenditure in 1984, since when it has been decreasing as other common policies have been developed, and is now down to approximately 40%. In 2013, direct aid and market aid will account for 32% and rural development 7.3%.
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10. The agricultural expenditure is financed by two funds, which form part of the EU’s general budget: the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) finances direct payments to farmers and measures to regulate agricultural markets such as intervention and export refunds, while the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) finances the rural development programmes of the Member States. See: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fin/index_en.htm.

11. For more information on the CAP in Spain, see the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment webpage, at: http://www.fega.es/PwFgcp/es/.


15. For example, in financial year 2008, the Duchess of Alba and her children received more than €2 million through their businesses such as Euroexpplotaciones Agrarias and Eurotécnicas Agrarias (Guerra, 2009).

16. As shown by VSF (2012), in 2010, the main recipients were: Azucarera Ebro (sugar: €61 million), Tereos Syrial (derivatives of cereal, sweeteners and agro-fuels obtained from sugar cane and cereal: €30 million), Zumo Valencianos (€19 million), Euroexplotaciones Agrarias and Eurotécnicas Agrarias (€9 million), Freixenet (wine: €5 million), Central Lechera Asturiana (milk: 1,743,937.02 €), Néstlé Spain (259,437.39 €) and Kraft (11,427.62 €).


18. Caja de Ahorros Municipal de Burgos (121,117.80 €), Caja Rural de Navarra (146,956.08 €), Caja Rural de Aragón (96,135.52 €), Caja General de Ahorros de Canarias (66,880.75 €), Caja Castilla La Mancha (54,625.13 €), Caja Rural de Extremadura Ssd. Coop. (16,183.38 €) and Caja Rural del Sur (10,214.08 €).

19. Agroinmobiliaria La Mancha S.A. (715,235.31 €), Compañía Andaluza de Renta Inmobiliaria (217,414.78 €), Compañía Agrícola Inmobiliaria Zaragozana S.L. (240,693.02 €), Caja Inmobiliaria Provincial de Toledo (24,941.50 €), and Caja de Arquitectura y Urbanismo (8,023.65 €).


21. With respect to the impact of the introduction of genetically modified maize in Spain, see for example the study: http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/IMG/pdf_Informe_implicaciones_socioeconomicas_transgenicos.pdf.


24. See: http://foropac.es/content/coag-subraya-que-la-reforma-de-la-pac-refleja-el-fracaso-del-gobierno-espa%9Btol.


26. In Spain, the autonomous communities have wide legislative and executive autonomy, with their own parliaments and regional governments, in accordance with the Spanish constitution of 1978, with the aim of guaranteeing the autonomy of nationalities and regions. The distribution of competences is different for each community, expressed in the ‘autonomy statute (estatuto de autonomía). There is a de facto distinction between ‘historic’ communities (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia) and the rest. The former initially received more functions, including the ability of the regional presidents to choose the timing of the regional elections (provided they are at least four years apart).

27. The agro-ecology movement broadly includes all the movements of peasants, workers, consumers and producers, ecological experiments, land struggles etc., that aim to redress the social, economic and ecological injustices of the current food system.

28. The term operators refers to agricultural, livestock and aquaculture producers, manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, importers, exporters.

29. Over the last decade, the area of land being farmed organically has grown by 25% in Spain, compared to 12% average growth in the EU, according to the European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development. See: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/index_en.htm.

30. On May 15, 2011 around 200,000 people of all ages, ideologies, genders and social classes participated to massive spontaneous protests in 58 Spanish cities. They were protesting against the economic system and austerity measures, demanding a radical change in Spanish politics and supporting basic rights: home, work, culture, health and education. The demonstrations were organised by a group called ‘Real Democracy Now’ (see their manifesto at: http://europeancitizens-network.eu/civil-en/spip.php?article42). At the end of the protests, camps were set up in main squares across the country, by thousands of people, mainly young people, called “los indignados” (the indignant). This signalled the birth of a movement referred to as the 15M Movement or the Spanish Revolution.
3. Andalusia


32. There are no data confirming that this farm has received CAP subsidies in the past two years, but according to the Fondo Español de Garantía Agraria (FEGA) (Spanish Agricultural Guarantee Fund), the military centre–horse-breeding farm owned by the Ministry of Defence in Jerez de la Frontera (in Cádiz province) received 676,477 € in 2010 and 667,034 € in 2011. See: http://www.fega.es/.


34. By the end of 2012, 1,442,600 people were unemployed in Andalusia. See: http://www.ine.es/jaxiBD/menu.do?L=0&divi=EPA&his=0&type=db.

35. On 5 March 2012, a 500-strong assembly decided to occupy the farm. At present, about 20 unemployed peasant farmers are living on the farm and working collectively.