


# HERE TO STAY:

## WATER REMUNICIPALISATION AS A GLOBAL TREND



**180** Cases in 2014


**3** Cases in 2000

# REMUNICIPALISATION GLOBAL TREND 2000-2014

Number of cities that have remunicipalised water and sanitation services between 2000 and 2014

## BY YEAR:

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014



**180**

Total cases worldwide

**136**

Total cases on High income countries

**44**

Total cases on Low and middle-income countries



## BY COUNTRY:

Sources: PSIRU, Food & Water Watch, Corporate Accountability International, Remunicipalisation Tracker

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# HERE TO STAY:

## WATER REMUNICIPALISATION AS A GLOBAL TREND

### INTRODUCTION

Cities, regions and countries worldwide are increasingly choosing to close the book on water privatisation and to “remunicipalise” services by taking back public control over water and sanitation management. In many cases, this is a response to the false promises of private operators and their failure to put the needs of communities before profit. This paper looks at the growing remunicipalisation of water supply and sanitation services as an emerging global trend and presents the most complete overview of cases so far. In the last 15 years there have been at least 180 cases of water remunicipalisation in 35 countries, both in the global North and South, including high profile cases in Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa. Major cities that have remunicipalised include Accra (Ghana), Berlin (Germany), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Budapest (Hungary), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), La Paz (Bolivia), Maputo (Mozambique), and Paris (France). By contrast, in this same period there have been very few cases of privatisation in the world’s large cities: for example Nagpur (India), which has seen great opposition and criticism, and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia). Despite more than three decades of relentless promotion of privatisation and public-private partnerships (PPPs) by international financial institutions and national governments, it now appears that *water remunicipalisation is a policy option that is here to stay*. Direct experience with common problems of private water management – from lack of infrastructure investments, to tariff hikes to environmental hazards – has persuaded communities and policy makers that the public sector

is better placed to provide quality services to citizens and promote the human right to water. Remunicipalisation refers to the return of previously privatised water supply and sanitation services to local authorities or to public control more broadly speaking. This typically occurs after the termination of private contracts by local governments or their non-renewal, but the process is not always (or only) on a municipal scale. Regional and national authorities have considerable influence over services funding and policy, and in some cases act directly as water operators, so the process unfolds within this broader context.

Whatever its form and scale, remunicipalisation is generally a collective reaction against the unsustainability of water privatisation and PPPs. Because of the unpopularity of privatisation, private water companies have used their marketing propaganda to encourage people to believe that concessions, lease contracts and other PPPs are quite distinct from privatisation; they are not. In fact, all these terms refer to the transfer of services management control to the private sector. Policy makers must be aware of the high costs and risks of water privatisation, and as such they have a lot to learn from the experiences of public authorities who have chosen remunicipalisation and are working to develop democratically accountable and effective public water operations.

# KEY FINDINGS

## 1 *Water remunicipalisation is an emerging global trend*

As of October 2014, the global list of known water remunicipalisations that occurred from 2000 to 2014 features 180 cases. As the mapping of this process is still in its early days, we expect many more cases to come to light as work progresses. This strong remunicipalisation trend is observable both in the global North and the global South: 136 cases were found in high income countries – where local authorities benefit from greater administrative resources and are less subject to the lending conditionality of multilateral banks – whereas 44 cases were from low- and middle-income countries. In the global North, the list of cities that have remunicipalised their water services includes capitals such as Paris, France and Berlin, Germany and major US cities such as Atlanta and Indianapolis. Beyond the symbolically powerful cases of cities like Paris, many smaller municipalities are opting for public control as well: for example, in France alone more than 50 municipalities have terminated their private management contracts or decided not to renew them. In the global South, remunicipalisation also involves former flagships of water privatisation, including Buenos Aires (Argentina), La Paz (Bolivia), Johannesburg (South Africa), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). In Jakarta (Indonesia), there is also a strong ongoing campaign to remunicipalise the city's water services.

## 2 *Remunicipalisation is accelerating dramatically*

The number of cases in high income countries shows a marked acceleration: 81 took place between 2010-2014, while only 41 had occurred between 2005-2009. Thus the pace of remunicipalisation has doubled over the last five years. This trend is even stronger in some countries such as France: eight cases between 2005-2009 compared to 33 cases since 2010. The high-profile 2010 remunicipalisation in Paris in particular has influenced many other municipalities in and outside France such as Spain.

## 3 *Reasons to remunicipalise are universal*

As illustrated by the cases discussed in the section below, the factors leading to water remunicipalisation are similar worldwide. The false promises of water privatisation that have led to remunicipalisation include: poor performance of private companies (e.g. in Dar es Salaam, Accra, Maputo), under-investment (e.g. Berlin, Buenos Aires), disputes over operational costs and price increases (e.g. Almaty, Maputo, Indianapolis), soaring water bills (e.g. Berlin, Kuala Lumpur), difficulties in monitoring private operators (e.g. Atlanta), lack of financial transparency (e.g. Grenoble, Paris, Berlin), workforce cuts and poor service quality (e.g. Atlanta, Indianapolis).

## 4 *Remunicipalisation is more often initiated through termination of private contracts*

Most cases of remunicipalisation around the world have occurred following the termination of private contracts before they were due to expire, with the exception of France where most local governments have waited until the renewal date to end water privatisation. At the global level, 92 cases of remunicipalisation followed contractual termination, while 69 cases were non-renewals of private contracts after expiry. This means that in the great majority of cases, private contracts proved so unsustainable that local governments opted to remunicipalise even though they knew that they may have to pay compensation. While the best way to avoid the costs of remunicipalisation is not to privatize in the first place, this also suggests that terminating a private contract is feasible and often less costly than continuing with privatisation in the long run.

## 5 *Leading the remunicipalisation trend are countries with long experience of private water management*

It is no accident that France, the country with the longest history of water privatisation and the home to the leading water multinationals, presents so many cases of remunicipalisation. French local authorities and citizens have experienced first-hand the “private management model” that Veolia and Suez have exported around the world. In the past few years, many French cities have decided to follow in the footsteps of Grenoble and Paris and take back control of their water services. An even larger number of contracts are coming up for renewal in the next few years and it is expected that many more French cities will remunicipalise.

## 6 *Remunicipalisation tends to improve access and quality of water services*

By eliminating the profit maximisation imperative of the private sector, water remunicipalisation often leads to enhanced access and quality of services. The equal or greater efficiency of public water services and lower prices can be observed in cases as diverse as Paris (France), Arenys de Munt (Spain), and Almaty (Kazakhstan). In some cases the new public operators also dramatically increased investments in the water systems, such as in Grenoble (France), Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Arenys de Munt (Spain). The social benefits of water remunicipalisation have been visible in Arenys de Munt (Spain), where the local government and the new public operator restructured the tariff system to guarantee access to water for low-income households. In Buenos Aires, Argentina, achieving universal access to water has become a top priority for the new public operator AySA and increased investment in infrastructure dramatically. Since remunicipalisation, AySA has extended training programmes for employees who work with poor neighbourhood residents to expand service access.

## 7 *Remunicipalisation offers opportunities to build democratic governance*

Remunicipalisation allows for strengthening accountability and transparency. In Paris and Grenoble (France), the new public water operators have introduced advanced forms of public participation. First, civil society representatives sit on the Board of Directors together with local government representatives, and have equal voting rights. This allows civil society to partake in decisions on the management of this most essential public service, and to make operations responsive to the interests of local communities. Second, citizen observatories have been established to open spaces for citizens to engage in strategic decisions on investment, technology options and tariff setting. Both cities consider that full information disclosure is a fundamental condition for accountability, transparency and participation.

## 8 *Remunicipalisation carries external risks including possible litigation*

Successful remunicipalisation requires careful planning and assessment of external risks, even more so for countries of the South which are under the grips of pro-private multilateral agencies. Decision-makers need to be aware that transaction costs of remunicipalisation may include paying compensation to private operators for their foregone profits. When a private contract is terminated before its expiry date, private companies can sue local governments to receive payment of the full profits granted under the contract. A private concessionaire in Arenys de Munt, Spain obstructed fiercely the remunicipalisation process by filing complaints against the city council. The city of Indianapolis, USA was forced to pay a \$29-million fee to French multinational Veolia to terminate the 20-year contract over a decade early. Berlin residents have had to accept very high costs to buy back the shares held by two private operators. Private concessionaires sued Tucuman and Buenos Aires, Argentina before an international arbitration tribunal to obtain compensation. The risk of having to pay hefty compensation can distort the decision making process of local governments who are

considering termination and remunicipalisation (e.g. Jakarta, Indonesia; Szeged, Hungary; Arezzo, Italy). But in other cases the potential benefits are so clear that local authorities are ready to face such risks.

## 9 *Public- public partnerships can support remunicipalisation efforts*

Public water operators and national or regional associations are increasingly helping each other through the remunicipalisation process. In Spain, the regional public company Aguas del Huesna (Andalusia) facilitated remunicipalisation for 22 municipalities. The remunicipalised water operators from Paris and Grenoble played a key role in helping other local authorities in France and elsewhere to

remunicipalise and improve their water services. French local authorities and public water operators have benefited from the exchange of experience and knowledge on remunicipalisation that has been facilitated by associations of local governments and public enterprises. The regional institution CONGIAC in Catalonia also played a key role in Arenys de Munt's remunicipalisation process from decision making to implementation. There are other such examples across boundaries: After failed PPP experiments, the Mozambican government entered into a not-for-profit partnership with a Dutch public water company focusing on local capacity building. Cooperation between public water companies as part of public-public partnerships is a viable alternative to costly PPPs and the most effective way to assist public water authorities in improving services.

# MESSAGES FOR POLICY MAKERS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES

This report is the first extensive global mapping of water remunicipalisation cases over the last 15 years. Results from this exercise send the following strong messages to policy makers in the global North and South:

## 1 *Avoid privatising water services or entering PPPs.*

Policy makers and public officials who are considering transferring the management of water services to the private sector should consider the risks and learn from the mistakes of other local authorities. Rather than bringing the promised private sector efficiency and innovation, water privatisation and PPPs almost systematically produce negative long-term consequences for local communities and their governments. Terminating unsatisfactory private contracts before their expiry is not easy due to the risk of paying multi-million compensations.

## 2 *Remunicipalisation is a feasible remedy to the broken promises of water privatisation and PPPs.*

There is much that can be learned from other public authorities and communities on how to remunicipalise and promote quality public water services. Policy makers who are considering terminating unsatisfactory contracts with private operators can learn precious lessons from the example of more than 180 cities in the global North and South that have successfully remunicipalised their water services. Moreover, remunicipalisation is a chance to reinvent public water services and make them more effective and accountable to the local community. Public operators, regional and national public water associations, as well as civic organisations are increasingly prepared to provide concrete support for remunicipalisation. Solidarity, cooperation and partnerships between public authorities can unlock the way to more democratic, inclusive, and sustainable water services.

# CASES OF WATER REMUNICIPALISATION

The following 13 cases capture some of the recurrent issues related to water remunicipalisation in the global North and South. These include the process of remunicipalisation, its determinants and outcomes.

## Grenoble, France

A controversial lease contract that had been awarded to a Suez subsidiary in 1989 as a result of corruption was criticised by the regional audit body for being economically flawed. The operating contract was renegotiated into a joint venture with the municipal government in 1996, but the renegotiated contract also proved controversial. The renegotiated contract provided for the operator to subcontract management and other services to Suez, and guaranteed the increasing remuneration of the operator even in the absence of additional operating risks. In addition, court rulings nullified municipal decisions and contracts. The decision to remunicipalise water supply was adopted in March 2000, and implemented in 2001 after the termination of the private contract with the Suez subsidiary on the grounds of corruption, lack of transparency and excessive pricing. The municipal operator Régie des Eaux de Grenoble (REG) has increased investments in maintenance and infrastructure renewal threefold as compared to the previous private operator, while keeping tariffs at a lower and more stable level. An advanced form of public participation in decision making was adopted by the new public enterprise, with a third of voting members of the Board of Directors being civil society representatives and the remaining two-thirds being city councillors (Lobina and Hall, 2007).

In 1984, two 25-year lease contracts for water supply in Paris were awarded to Veolia and Suez (each company covering half of the city). In

## Paris, France

2000, the contracts were criticised by the regional audit body for lack of financial transparency and in 2002 an audit commissioned by the city of Paris found that the prices charged by the lease operators were between 25% and 30% higher

than the economically justified costs. In 2003, the national audit body found a huge and increasing gap between the financial reserves constituted by the operators for network maintenance and the works effectively conducted. This tactic had the effect of inflating prices and postponing infrastructure maintenance. In addition, the parent companies of the operators received payment for various "know-how" fees. The two lease operators subcontracted works and maintenance to subsidiaries of the same groups, so that the parent companies could realise additional profits. Because this situation persisted for years despite the renegotiation of the contracts in 2003, the city of Paris decided to take back control of its water supply. Remunicipalisation took place in January 2010 after the expiry of the two private contracts with Suez and Veolia. The private contracts were not renewed due to the lack of financial transparency and accountability, which had been repeatedly criticised by the public audit body.

In the first year of operations, the new municipal operator Eau de Paris realized efficiency savings of €35 million, which allowed for an 8% drop in tariffs. Till today the price of water and sanitation in Paris remains well below French average despite the specific technical difficulties of ensuring safe drinking water supply in a large metropolis. Eau de Paris also engaged in solidarity actions: it increased its contribution to the city's housing solidarity fund (from €175,000 to €500,000), paid a water solidarity allocation to 44,000 poor households in the city, launched a water saving campaign, and systematically avoided cutting off water supply in squats (Pigeon et al, 2012). Transparency and accountability have been strengthened in the new Eau de Paris governance (Sinaï, 2013). The city set up a City Water Observatory to promote citizen engagement in Eau de Paris. As regards public participation in decision making, 11 members of the governing council of Eau de Paris are city councillors, two members are worker representatives and five are civil society representatives (one from the Observatory, water and sanitation experts, an environmental NGO, and a consumer organization). The former CEO of Eau de Paris, Anne Le Strat, said that "the Observatory model is a new experiment for the public water company to hear direct feedback from citizens and for citizens to engage in the strategic management of Eau de Paris."

## Berlin, Germany

In 1999, 49.9% of the shares of Berlinwasser Holding AG (BWH) – the owner of Berlin’s water operator Berliner Wasserbetriebe Anstalt öffentlichen Rechts (BWB) – were sold to a consortium including RWE and Veolia. The secretive agreement provided for the private consortium to control BWB’s management through the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer. The contract with RWE and Veolia guaranteed that the return on equity for the private shareholders would be 8%, and this level of profitability would be guaranteed by the state of Berlin for 28 years. The contract was highly controversial as it led to severe under-investment and soaring prices, a situation that triggered a popular referendum in 2011 for the publication of the terms of the contract. The private contract was so unpopular that, in the city elections of September 2011, remunicipalisation was part of the platforms of three of the four major political parties. The contract was terminated when the state of Berlin bought back the shares owned by RWE in April 2012, and the shares owned by Veolia in September 2013. This process completed the remunicipalisation, costing taxpayers €1.3 billion to buy back the shares, which will be paid for through higher water bills over the next 30 years. This financial burden casts doubt on the sustainability of water operations despite remunicipalisation.

## Atlanta, USA

Just six months after taking office Atlanta’s former Mayor Shirley Franklin terminated United Water’s 20-year concession contract with the city 16 years early citing the company’s mismanagement. United Water, a subsidiary of Suez is one of the largest private water companies operating in USA. In the four years United Water operated Atlanta’s water system (1999-2003), it halved the workforce and tariffs continued to increase each year. Water quality declined so markedly that on some occasions city residents were forced to boil their water because insufficient treatment by United Water led to orange and brown spewing from residential taps. Eventually, the city had to hire its inspectors to audit United Water’s work costing the city an additional US\$1 million (Lobina and Corporate Accountability International, 2014).

## Indianapolis, USA

Although Veolia continues to boast about its performance in Indianapolis, its public relations materials do not tell the full story. During its tenure with the city’s water services starting in 2002, lack of proper safeguards led to a boil water alert for over a million people and lost school days; non-unionized employees lost their pensions; and by 2005, a federal grand jury was investigating Veolia’s alleged falsified water quality reports. Several years into the contract, Veolia renegotiated far from the public eye and without the oversight of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission. Veolia threatened to pull out and cornered the city into agreeing to make additional annual payments of US\$1.9 million to make up for the profits Veolia was losing. Veolia also systematically overbilled residents by calculating an estimated rate based on the summer water usage, unbeknownst to the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission. Peter Kovacs, a local lawyer who brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of 250,000 local residents recalls the immediate support he received from hundreds more and how media attention forced local government to tackle the problem. Ultimately, the city was forced to pay a \$29 million fee to Veolia to terminate the 20-year contract over a decade early (Lobina and Corporate Accountability International, 2014).

## Buenos Aires, Argentina

In May 1993, a consortium led by Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux started operating a 30-year water supply and sanitation concession in Buenos Aires, Argentina. It was only eight months later that the operating company Aguas Argentinas requested an “extraordinary review” of tariffs, due to unexpected operational losses. Despite tariff increases approved in June 1994, the concession agreement was then renegotiated in 1997 and substantially altered so that little remained of the initial covenant. Not only were new charges introduced and tariffs adjusted, but the concessionaire enjoyed eight additional months to implement the projected investments, and various investments originally agreed upon were either cancelled or delayed. From May 1993 to December 1998, Aguas Argentinas failed to realise 57.9% of the originally agreed investments for a total of US\$746.39 million (Lobina, 2005). In 2002 the government entered the contract negotiation process which lasted for years. Finally after

mounting confrontations, the government cancelled the concession contract and create the public company AySA to immediately take responsibility for the provision of water and sanitation services (Azpiazu and Castro, 2012).

A compensation claim by Suez was launched at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Lawsuits against Suez have been filed in front of Argentine courts by individual citizens, civil society organisations and local authorities for the poor level of service.

The new public water company AySA under a participatory ownership scheme (the state owns 90% and the workers' union owns 10%) has brought about positive changes. It is investing in its workforce: the hours of training provided to workers have significantly increased, from 21,874 hours in 2006 to 60,000 hours in 2009. The evidence also suggests that AySA has been diligent in developing better working conditions in terms of safety and hygiene. Expansion of access is a top priority. The federal government pumped millions in infrastructure for universal access from 2009 under the Plan for Poor Neighbourhoods. A creative strategy was also developed: worker cooperatives have been created to involve residents in expanding water access in low-income neighbourhoods, connecting more than 700,000 water users (Azpiazu and Castro, 2012).

### Tucuman, Argentina

This private contract was terminated after consumers stopped paying bills due to serious operational failures. In 2007,

the ICSID tribunal condemned Argentina to pay US\$105 million instead of the US\$375 million claimed by Vivendi (presently Veolia). This suggests that multinationals may inflate their claims for compensation in order to distort the judicial and negotiation processes in their favour.

In 2005, the contract was terminated by the government on grounds of poor performance. UK-based

Biwater filed two compensation claims in front of two different international arbitration tribunals and lost both. It lost the case filed in front of the UK High Court under UNCITRAL rules (on grounds of early termination of the contract) and was condemned to pay £3 million in damages, which Biwater refused to do (Pigeon et al, 2012). It also lost the case filed on grounds of expropriation in front of the ICSID tribunal, which found that while Tanzania's government had violated its bilateral investment treaty with the UK on four separate counts (including

### Dares Salam, Tanzania

the unlawful expropriation of assets from Biwater's local Joint Venture City Water), the company is not entitled to compensation because the value of its investment in City Water was nil at the time of the expropriation.

### Almaty, Kazakhstan

In 1999, French multinational Vivendi (presently Veolia) won a 30-year water supply and sanitation concession in Almaty.

The concession was terminated and remunicipalised in 2003 due to disagreements on the price increases demanded by Veolia, which were double what the government was prepared to accept. Veolia demanded to increase tariffs from US\$0.08 per cubic meter in 1999 to US\$0.12 in 2002 and US\$0.29 in 2005. After remunicipalisation in 2005, state-owned Vodokanal was charging US\$0.15 (Maslyukivska and Sohail, nd).

Malaysia is in the process of re-nationalising its water network (Pigeon et

### Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

al, 2012). In Selangor province, which includes Kuala Lumpur, the water concession is held by Syabas, owned by the Malaysian private company Puncak Niaga. Under an agreement with its parent company Puncak Niaga, Syabas has to pay Puncak management fees amounting to MYR 8.4 million annually (roughly US\$2.6 million) and MYR 32 million (US\$9.8 million) since 2005. Syabas awarded 72% of contracts, worth MYR 600 million, without open tender. Tariffs charged by Syabas are more than double the amount charged by the public sector water operator in Penang State. In September 2014 the federal government and the state government signed an agreement to finalize the restructuring of Selangor's water supply. Four out of three concessionaires including Puncak Niaga's Syabas will be taken over by Syarikat Air Selangor, which will be the new state company to treat and distribute most of Selangor's water.

### Jakarta, Indonesia

In 1997, two 25-year water concessions were awarded to two consortia respectively led by subsidiaries of multinationals Suez and UK-based Thames Water. The two concessions have been highly controversial, due to lack of transparency in awarding the contracts and poor performance. Pam Jaya, the public water company, and the government have accumulated at least IDR590 billion (US\$48.38 million) in debt after 16 years of ongoing

operations. This debt intake is due to the disparity in payment mechanisms set out in the agreement between the private companies and the government. The agreement includes a water charge paid by Pam Jaya to the private operators, which is increased every six months, while the water tariff paid by residents to the provincial government cannot be increased because they are already subject to high water bills. This has created a situation where Pam Jaya regularly experiences huge deficits. Water tariffs for individual customers have gone up tenfold in Jakarta, making it the highest water tariff in all of South-East Asia. Social mobilization by citizens and workers against privatisation has been strong. The Coalition of Jakarta Residents Opposing Water Privatisation (KMMSAJ) filed a citizen lawsuit in 2012 demanding that the Central Jakarta District Court pass an injunction that would require the government to terminate the concessions. In 2013 the governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo (now president of Indonesia) announced that the city would buy back Suez's shares. In March 2014, Jakarta's government planned to use publicly owned enterprise JakPro to take over the shares held by Suez in the Jakarta concession. KMMSAJ criticised this plan since the existing private contract would likely remain. The process is in evolution at the time of writing but it is clear that the flagship Jakarta water privatisation proved unsustainable (Jacobson, 2014).

## Mozambique

In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Mozambique privatized state-owned utilities and water management. In 1999 the government entered into a Public Private Partnership (PPP) with Aguas de Mozambique (AdeM), whose major shareholder was Aguas de Portugal (AdP), in the capital city Maputo and the four major provincial cities of Beira, Nampula, Quelimane and Pemba. After heavy rainfall caused the devastating 2000 flood, AdeM wanted to increase tariffs to compensate for losses. While the government was dissatisfied with the unmet contractual targets and obligations of the private partner, the latter claimed that high losses justified tariff increases. The contracts in the four provincial cities expired in 2008 and were not renewed. Maputo had a longer contract, which came to an early end in 2010 when the government, through the public asset holding company FIPAG, bought 73% of shares. Mozambique centralized water management through FIPAG, thereby effectively ending the decade long PPP. In 2005 the

Mozambique Government started a non-profit water operator partnership (WOP) with Vitens Evides International (VEI) in the Netherlands in four small southern cities. The partnership aimed to create autonomous water utilities in these four cities to provide affordable and adequate water services to the public, focusing on enhancing the capacity of local staff and management. While it remains to be seen whether the water utilities have the autonomous capacity to maintain good performance levels in the long run, WOPs have extended to eight other cities in the country and represent a viable approach to strengthening local capacity to provide water services.

A small town in Catalonia illustrates how private concessionaire's will sometimes resort to co-

## Arenys de Munt, Spain

ercive obstruction tactics and the types of changes brought about by remunicipalisation. In 2010, the city council decided not to renew the concession agreement with SOREA, a Suez subsidiary that had operated the city's water services since 1999. During political debates and after the decision, SOREA filed a couple of administrative complaints, which served to intimidate the city council members. For instance, SOREA demanded the liquidation of the unrecovered investments and a compensation for damages and loss of future profits. Despite these tactics, the city of Arenys de Munt began to manage the service directly in 2011, under a division of the municipal corporation GUSAM (Gestión Urbanística y Servicios Arenys de Munt S.A.). In the first year it was an enormous challenge to establish services management. The regional public institution CONGIAC (Integral Water Management of Catalonia Consortium) played a key role in providing training, offering GUSAM the use of its quality control laboratory and offering aggregate purchases of electricity. This public-public partnership helped to improve service provision. A discount on the first 100 litres per person per day was introduced and as a result tariffs in Arenys de Munt are now 31% lower than the average rate in the province of Barcelona. The new public operator Aigües de Arenys also adopted social policies to guarantee access to this vital service for the most vulnerable families (those earning less than the minimum wage). Integration of drinking and sewerage services has enabled the city to increase its investments in the water network. It has also contributed to improving water production efficiency from 57% to 67%. Public management has enhanced service quality and put public interest first.

# GLOBAL LIST OF REMUNICIPALISATIONS

as of October 2014

The cities that have remunicipalised water and sanitation services between 2000 and 2014 are listed in the two tables below. The first table lists the cities in high-income countries, and the second table lists the cities in low- and middle-income countries. Each table contains information on the cities or the broader geographical areas that have remunicipalised water, the year when this decision was adopted, the private company that operated the service before remunicipalisation, and the status of the remunicipalisation process. This methodology allows us to assess the extent and pace of water remunicipalisation in different countries as well as compare the global North and South.

**T** Terminated   **E** Contract expired and not renewed   **P** Planned termination  
**S** Sold by private operator   **W** Private operator withdrew

[Hyperlinks](http://www.remunicipalisation.org) to navigate to [www.remunicipalisation.org](http://www.remunicipalisation.org)   [Hyperlinks](#) to navigate to other sources

Table 1 High income countries

	Country	City	Date	Company	Status
1	Belgium	Regional (Aquafin)	2004	Severn Trent	T S
2	Canada	<a href="#">Hamilton</a>	2004	American Water	E
3	Canada	<a href="#">Hamilton</a>	2006	Enron	
4	France	Briançon	2000	SAUR	T
5	France	<a href="#">Grenoble</a>	2000	Suez	T
6	France	<a href="#">Neufchâteau</a>	2001	Veolia	T
7	France	<a href="#">Venelles</a>	2001	SAUR	E
8	France	<a href="#">Cherbourg</a>	2002	Veolia	E
9	France	Lanvollon-Plouha	2002	Veolia/Suez	E
10	France	<a href="#">Castres</a>	2003	Suez	T
11	France	<a href="#">Varages</a>	2003	Suez	E
12	France	Embrun	2006	Veolia	E
13	France	<a href="#">Saint-Paul (La Réunion)</a>	2006	Veolia	T
14	France	<a href="#">Châtelleraut/ Naintré</a>	2007	Veolia	E
15	France	La Fillière	2007	Suez	E
16	France	Tournon-sur-Rhône	2007	SAUR	E
17	France	Belley	2008	Alteau	E
18	France	<a href="#">Digne-les-Bains</a>	2009	Suez	E
19	France	Greater Rouen	2009	Veolia, Suez	E
20	France	Albi	2010	Suez	E
21	France	<a href="#">Annonay</a>	2010	SAUR	E
22	France	<a href="#">Lacs de l'Essonne</a>	2010	Veolia/Suez	E
23	France	Barousse Comminges Save	2010	SEM Pyrénées	T
24	France	<a href="#">Paris</a>	2010	Veolia/Suez	E
25	France	<a href="#">Saint-Jean-de-Braye</a>	2010	SAUR	E
26	France	Tarnos, Ondres, Boucau and St-Martin-de-Seignaux	2010	Suez	E

27	France	Bordeaux	2011	Suez	E
28	France	Évry Centre Essonne	2011	Suez	E
29	France	Jonzac	2011	Veolia	E
30	France	Montbéliard	2011	Veolia	T
31	France	Greater Nantes	2011	Veolia/Suez	E
32	France	Brest	2012	Veolia	E
33	France	Gâtine	2012	Suez	T
34	France	Muret	2012	Veolia	E
35	France	Saint-Malo	2012	Veolia	E
36	France	Saint-Pierre des Corps	2012	Veolia	E
37	France	Argenton-sur-Creuse	2013	Veolia	E
38	France	Capbreton	2013	Suez	E
39	France	Fleury les Aubrais	2013	SAUR	E
40	France	Nice	2013	Veolia	E
41	France	Rennes	2013	Veolia	E
42	France	Valence	2013	Veolia	E
43	France	Vernon	2013	Veolia	E
44	France	Aubagne / La Penne-sur-Huveaune	2014	Veolia	E
45	France	Blois	2014	Veolia	E
46	France	Capesterre-Belle-Eau (Guadeloupe)	2014	Veolia	E
47	France	Castelsarrasin	2014	SAUR	E
48	France	Courgent	2014	Suez	T
49	France	Fort de France - Lamentin - Saint Joseph - Schoelcher (Martinique)	2014	Suez/Veolia	E
50	France	Montpellier	2014	Veolia	E
51	France	Pays de Nay	2014	SAUR	E
52	France	Troyes	2014	Veolia	E
53	Germany	Krefeld	2005	RWE	T
54	Germany	Stuttgart	2010	EnBW	E
55	Germany	Solingen	2012	MVV Energie AG	T
56	Germany	Bielefeld	2012	Stadtwerke Bremen/Essent	T
57	Germany	Oranienburg	2012	Gelsenwasser	T
58	Germany	Berlin	2013	Veolia/RWE	T
59	Germany	Burg (Sachsen-Anhalt)	2014	Veolia	E
60	Germany	Rostock	2014	Remondis	P
61	Hungary	Kaposvar	2007	Suez	E
62	Hungary	Pecs	2011	Suez	T
63	Hungary	Budapest	2012	Suez	T
64	Italy	Reggio Emilia	2012	IREN	E
65	Italy	Varese	2012	a2a	T
66	Spain	Medina Sidonia	2003	Aqualia	T
67	Spain	Huesna (Alanís de la Sierra, Alcolea del Río, Almadén de la Plata, Brenes, Las Cabezas, Cantillana, Carmona, Cañada Rosal, Constantina, El Coronil, El Cuervo, El Madroño, Los Molares, Lebrija, Los Palacios y Vfca., El Pedroso, El Real de la Jara, Tocina, Vva. Del Río y Minas, El Viso del Alcor, San Nicolás del Puerto, Utrera)	2007	ACS	T

68	Spain	Figaró Montmany	2009	CASSA Group	T
69	Spain	<a href="#">Arenys de Munt</a>	2011	SOREA (AGBAR)	T
70	Spain	Arteixo	2013	Aqualia (FCC)	T
71	Spain	<a href="#">La Línea de la Concepción</a>	2013	Aqualia (FCC)	T
73	Spain	Alfes	2014	Aigües de Catalunya	W
74	Spain	Ermua	2014	Suez	T
75	Spain	Estella del Marqués	2014	Aqualia	T
76	Spain	Guadalcaçín	2014	Aqualia	T
76	Spain	Montornés del Vallès	2014	Familiar privada	P
77	Spain	Torreçera	2014	Aqualia	T
78	USA	<a href="#">Atlanta, GA</a>	2003	Suez	T
79	USA	<a href="#">Angleton, TX (link)</a>	2004	Veolia	T
80	USA	<a href="#">Plainfield, IN (link)</a>	2004	United Water	T
81	USA	<a href="#">Laredo, TX</a>	2005	United Water (Suez)	T
82	USA	<a href="#">Coxsackie, NY</a>	2005	Veolia	T
83	USA	<a href="#">Jackson, AL</a>	2005	Veolia	
84	USA	<a href="#">Pekin, IL (link)</a>	2005	United Water	E
85	USA	<a href="#">East Aurora, NY</a>	2005	Veolia	E
86	USA	<a href="#">Conroe, TX</a>	2005	Veolia	T
87	USA	<a href="#">Demopolis, AL</a>	2006	Veolia	E
88	USA	<a href="#">Five Star Water Supply District, AL</a>	2006	Veolia	T
89	USA	<a href="#">Southern Water &amp; Sewer District, KY</a>	2006	Veolia	T
90	USA	<a href="#">North Brunswick, NJ</a>	2006	United Water	T
91	USA	<a href="#">Logan, WV</a>	2006	Veolia	E
92	USA	<a href="#">Petaluma (wastewater treatment), CA</a>	2007	Veolia	E
93	USA	<a href="#">Houston (water treatment), TX (link)</a>	2007	United Water (Suez)	T
94	USA	<a href="#">Karnes City, TX</a>	2007	Veolia	E
95	USA	<a href="#">Winchester, NH</a>	2008	United Water	T
96	USA	<a href="#">Stockton, CA (link, link)</a>	2008	OMI-Thames Water	T
97	USA	<a href="#">Fairfield-Suisun (wastewater treatment) CA (link)</a>	2008	United Water (Suez)	T
98	USA	<a href="#">Central Elmore Water &amp; Sewer Authority, AL</a>	2008	Veolia	
99	USA	<a href="#">Cave Creek, AZ</a>	2008	American Water	E
100	USA	<a href="#">Horn Lake, MS</a>	2008	Southwest Water	T
101	USA	<a href="#">Odem, TX</a>	2008	Veolia	T
102	USA	<a href="#">Hayden, ID (link)</a>	2009	Veolia	T
103	USA	<a href="#">Durham County, NC (link)</a>	2009	United Water	T
104	USA	<a href="#">Burley (wastewater treatment), ID (link)</a>	2009	Veolia	T
105	USA	<a href="#">Surprise, AZ</a>	2009	American Water	E
106	USA	<a href="#">Biddeford, ME (link)</a>	2009	CH2M Hill OMI	E
107	USA	<a href="#">O'Fallon, MO</a>	2009	Alliance Water Resources	E
108	USA	<a href="#">Kline, PA (link)</a>	2009	United Water	W
109	USA	<a href="#">North Adams, MA (link)</a>	2010	United Water	T
110	USA	<a href="#">Overton, TX (link)</a>	2010	Veolia	T
111	USA	<a href="#">Indianapolis, IN (link)</a>	2010	Veolia	T
112	USA	<a href="#">Freeport, IL</a>	2010	United Water	E
113	USA	<a href="#">Evansville, IN (link)</a>	2010	American Water	E

114	USA	Gary, IN	2010	United Water	T*
115	USA	Liberty, MO	2010	CH2M Hill OMI	T
116	USA	Webb City, MO	2010	CH2M Hill OMI	E
117	USA	Skaneateles, NY	2010	Severn Trent	T
118	USA	Lampasas, TX	2010	CH2M Hill OMI	T
119	USA	Leander, TX	2010	Southwest Water	
120	USA	Whitesburg (water and wastewater), KY	2011	Veolia	T
121	USA	Brunswick -Glynn County, GA	2011	United Water	T
122	USA	Tama, IA (link)	2011	Veolia	T
123	USA	Schenectady (wastewater treatment), NY	2011	Veolia	T
124	USA	Plymouth (water and wastewater), NC (link)	2011	Veolia	E
125	USA	Manchester Township, NJ	2011	United Water	
126	USA	Summit City, NJ	2011	United Water	T
127	USA	New Albany (wastewater treatment), IN	2012	American Water	E
128	USA	Gladewater, TX	2012	Veolia	T
129	USA	Lanett AL	2012	Veolia	
130	USA	Barstow, CA	2012	United Water	E
131	USA	Coeburn, VA	2013	Veolia	T
132	USA	Weslaco, TX (link)	2013	CH2M Hill	T
133	USA	Cameron, TX	2013	Severn Trent	T
134	USA	Storm Lake, IA (link)	2013	Veolia	T
135	USA	Reidsville, NC	2014	United Water	T
136	USA	Oakland County, MI	2014	United Water	T

\*City voted to terminate but then negotiated a "transition agreement" with the company to avoid paying \$450,000 in termination fees. So United Water could say the deal was not officially 'terminated'.

Table 2 Low and middle-income countries

137	Albania	Albania	2007	Berlinwasser International	T
138	Argentina	Buenos Aires	2006	Suez	T
139	Argentina	Buenos Aires Province (74 cities)	2002	Enron	T
140	Argentina	Buenos Aires Province (Gran)	2006	Impregilo	T
141	Argentina	Santa Fe and Rosario	2006	Suez	T
142	Bolivia	Cochabamba	2000	Bechtel	T
143	Bolivia	La Paz/El Alto	2007	Suez	T
144	Cape Verde	National	2005	Aguas de Portugal	T S
145	Central African Republic	Bangui	2001	SAUR	T
146	China	Da Chang (Shanghai)	2004	Thames	W
147	China	Shenyang	2002	Suez	T
148	Colombia	Bogota (treatment plant)	2004	Suez	T
149	Colombia	Bogota (water supply)	2010	Gas Capital	T
150	Ghana	National	2011	Vitens, Rand Water	E
151	Guinea	Conakry and 16 other smaller urban centres	2003	SAUR and Veolia	W
152	India	Latur	2012	SPML (Shubash Projects and Marketing Ltd)	T
153	Jordan	Amman	2007	Suez	E

154	Kazakhstan	Ust-Kamenogorsk	2007	IR-Group	T
155	Kazakhstan	Almaty	2003	Veolia	T
156	Kazakhstan	Astana (bulk water supply)	2003	Veolia	W
157	Indonesia	Badung Bali	2013	Mahasara Buana, Intan Dyandra Mulya, Dewata Artha Kharisma	E
158	Lebanon	Tripoli	2007	Suez	E
159	Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur (Selangor state)	2014	Syabas, PNSB, SPLASH, ABASS	P
160	Malaysia	Indah Water Consortium (sanitation)	2001	Prime Utilities	S
161	Mali	Bamako	2005	SAUR	T
162	Morocco	Rabat-Salé region	2014	Redal (Veolia)	S
163	Morocco	Tanger-Tétouan	2014	Amendis (Veolia)	S
164	Mozambique	Beira, Nampula, Quelimane and Pemba	2008	Aguas de Mozambique (SAUR and Aguas de Portugal)	E
165	Mozambique	Maputo	2010	Aguas de Portugal	T
166	South Africa	Amahthali (Stutterheim)	2005	Suez	T
167	South Africa	Johannesburg	2006	Suez	E
168	South Africa	Nkonkobe (Fort Beaufort)	2002	Suez	T
169	Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	2005	Biwater	T
170	Turkey	Antalya	2002	Suez	T
171	Uganda	Kampala	2004	ONDEO	E
172	Ukraine	Lugansk	2012	Rosvodokoanal	T
173	Ukraine	Kirovograd	2008	Water Services, LLC	T
174	Uruguay	Maldonado Department	2006	Suez	T
175	Uruguay	Maldonado Department	2005	Aguas de Bilbao	T
176	Uzbekistan	Bukhara	2007	Veolia	T
177	Uzbekistan	Samarkand	2007	Veolia	T
178	Venezuela	Monagas State	2001	FCC	E
179	Venezuela	National	2002	Aguas de Valencia	T
180	Vietnam	Thu Duc	2003	Suez	T

Sources: PSIRU, Food & Water Watch, Corporate Accountability International, Remunicipalisation Tracker



Illustrations from the video:  
 Remunicipalisation: Putting Water Back into Public Hands  
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BISM1TPm\\_k8](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BISM1TPm_k8)  
 Credits: dentdecuir.com

# RESOURCES

- Book: *Remunicipalisation: Putting Water Back into Public Hands* (English, Spanish, Italian) edited by M. Pigeon, D.A. McDonald, O. Hoedeman, and S. Kishimoto. In-depth case studies (Paris, Hamilton, Buenos Aires, Dar es Salaam and Malaysia) are available at: <http://www.tni.org/briefing/remunicipalisation?context=599>
- 5-minute video animation (English, Spanish, French, Italian, Portuguese, German, Turkish, Greek) [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BISM1TPm\\_k8](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BISM1TPm_k8)
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