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“Sons and daughters of the Earth”: Indigenous communities and land grabs in Guatemala

By Alberto Alonso-Fradejas

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About the series:

The Land & Sovereignty in the Americas series pulls together research and analysis from activists and scholars working to understand and halt the alarming trend in "land grabbing"—from rural Brazil and Central America to US cities like Oakland and Detroit— and to support rural and urban communities in their efforts to protect their lands as the basis for self-determination, food justice and food sovereignty. The series is a project of the Land & Sovereignty in the Americas (LSA) activist-researcher collective, coordinated by Food First. For media inquiries about this series, or to arrange an interview with an author, please contact land@foodfirst.org or call (510) 654-4400, ext. 235.

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Introduction

In the last ten years, the expansion of corporate sugarcane and oil palm plantations in northern Guatemala has increasingly encroached on the lands of Maya Q'eqchi' indigenous people—many of whom fled to this region during the country's 36-year genocidal war. These plantations have already displaced hundreds of families—even entire communities—leading to increased poverty, hunger, unemployment and landlessness in the region. While most Q'eqchi' families received payment for their lands, the amount they received generally was not enough to support non-farm livelihoods or to regain access to land. The companies grabbing land are controlled by European-descendent Guatemalan oligarchs who are benefitting from rising global commodity prices for food, animal feed and fuel. They are also supported by heavy investments from international lending institutions like the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). In the face of violent dispossession and incorporation into an exploitative labor regime, many peasant families are struggling to access land and defend their resources as the basis of their collective identity as Q'eqchi' peoples or R'al Ch'och ("sons and daughters of the earth").

Background: Counter-Revolutionary Land Settlement and Civil War

After the CIA-assisted military coup that ousted Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954—the president who attempted to redistribute lands controlled by US companies such as United Fruit—the Guatemalan government came under tight military control. Successive military governments carried out a war against rural guerrilla groups in which thousands of innocent indigenous civilians were also massacred. By the time the 1996 Peace Agreements officially put an end to the 36-year conflict, 200,000 were reported dead or missing, over 80 percent of whom were rural Maya people.¹ Parallel to this brutal violence, military regimes carried out counter-revolutionary land policies in compliance with the US-sponsored "Alliance for Progress" initiative established at the Punta del Este Conference in 1961. These policies involved settling landless families in the agrarian frontier (uncultivated forest) of the northern lowlands (See Figure 1). Since then, thousands of landless and near-landless families from all over the country—but especially Maya-Q'eqchi'² families from the highlands of the department of Alta Verapaz—fled from bonded labor and the genocidal violence of the armed conflict in search of land and livelihoods in the northern lowlands.

QUICK FACTS

WHAT?

Rapidly expanding oil palm and sugarcane plantations on indigenous, food-producing lands and forests

WHERE?

Northern lowlands of Guatemala in the departments of Alta Verapaz, Izabal, Quiché and Petén

WHO?

The Land Grabbers: Mainly Guatemalan companies owned by powerful, European-descendent oligarchical families who control nearly 100% of the sugarcane and palm oil industries. The Nicaraguan sugar-producing Pellas family—maker of Flor de Caña rum—is also an important player.

The Resistance: Maya-Q'eqchi indigenous families who fled to the northern lowlands from bonded labor on large plantations and from genocidal violence during Guatemala's 36-year civil war.

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Peace, Neoliberalism and Land Privatization

Following the 1996 Peace Accords, the World Bank provided advice and funding for a program of Market Assisted Land Reform (MALR) to “advocate for voluntary transactions between ‘willing buyers’ and ‘willing sellers’ and the removal of various ‘distortions’ from land and agricultural markets.”³ The program helped establish a government land fund (FONTIERRAS) with the goals of providing credit, financial support and technical assistance to landless and near-landless families; and managing the task of land regularization and titling.⁴ Between 1997 and 2008, the fund redistributed a scant 4 percent of the country’s arable land to less than 5 percent of the country’s landless families. Beginning in 2009, FONTIERRAS credits were no longer granted for purchasing land, but only for leasing it on a yearly basis. Moreover, many of the families who accessed land through FONTIERRAS credit have since sold their titles. Those who retain their lands are struggling to cope with crippling (and growing) debt. Two of the main reasons for the MALR’s negative outcomes in Guatemala are 1) the low quality of the lands peasants were sold and 2) the economic conditions created by neoliberal structural adjustment policies, which dismantled state support for small farmers and placed peasant food producers at a severe disadvantage in the market.

But while FONTIERRAS failed miserably at *redistributing* land, it was quite successful in *titling* land. In keeping with the World Bank’s discourse, FONTIERRAS narrowly interpreted the historic demands for land rights by peasants and indigenous peoples as a mandate for granting *individual titles*. Consequently, many village common lands that were once collectively farmed according to community needs were split up, privatized and titled as individual property. In a political and economic context that is sharply averse to peasant farming, this resulted in the widespread stress-sales of peasant lands. According to the World Bank, this constitutes a situation in which “safe property rights allow for markets to transfer land towards more efficient uses and producers.”⁵ In practice, it has amounted to the legally sanctioned dispossession of indigenous peasant families.

In 2003, at the onset of the new rush on land by sugarcane and oil palm agribusiness, Guatemalan

land ownership was already extremely unequal, with 78 percent of the country’s arable land controlled by only 8 percent of the country’s landholders.⁶ Today the growing corporate control over land and resources in the northern lowlands has reached crisis proportions.⁷

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Guatemala’s “Flex Crop” Boom: Sugarcane and Oil Palm

The convergence of multiple global crises—financial, energy, food and environmental—in recent years has triggered a rush of corporate investments in land-based resources such as food, feed, agrofuels, timber, oil and minerals. These land-based resources have (re-)gained momentum as “global hubs of capital accumulation.”⁸ In Guatemala a mix of agrarian, financial and industrial oligarchy-controlled corporations, occasionally allied with transnational investors or financiers, have been aggressively grabbing control over land for sugarcane and especially oil palm plantations. These “flex-crops”—crops that can be diverted towards many uses depending on changing market conditions—are rapidly expanding. The politics of contemporary corporate land deals in Guatemala, marked by the growth of flex crop plantations, provides meaningful insights into this global trend.

Sugarcane and especially oil palm plantations are expanding rapidly throughout Guatemala’s northern lowlands (See Figure 1)—a region covering 47 percent of the national territory across four departments: Alta Verapaz, Izabal, Quiché and Petén.⁹ In 2010, Guatemala produced 248,000 hectares (612,821 acres) of sugarcane and 102,000 hectares (252,047 acres) of oil palm. According to the government, the country has a total of 1,101,604 hectares (2,722,122 acres) that are suitable for sugarcane and oil palm, representing 57 percent of Guatemala’s arable land.¹⁰ As of 2010, 70 percent of the sugar and crude palm oil produced in the country was exported; and 90 percent of the sugarcane ethanol was exported. Between 2000 and 2010, export revenues from sugar and palm oil shot up dramatically, increasing by 108 percent and

587 percent, respectively. Ethanol export revenues increased by 67 percent between 2006 and 2010. Crude palm oil is exported primarily to the European Union (EU), United States (US) and Mexico. The EU is also the main export destination for Guatemalan ethanol,¹¹ while the US, Canada, Russia, South Korea, China, Malaysia and Indonesia are the main destinations for Guatemalan sugar.

Figure 1. Administrative map of Guatemala. The outer circle represents the northern lowlands region; the smaller circle indicates the research area for this study



Source: Government of Guatemala 2009.

The benefits of this export boom are highly concentrated. Only 14 companies—owned by 14 oligarchic families—make up the powerful Sugar Producers' Guild (ASAZGUA), with control over 80 percent of the country's sugar plantations and 100 percent of the sugar mills. Just five companies control all of the country's ethanol production, producing 250 million liters (66 million gallons) annually.¹² Similarly, eight families form the influential Oil Palm Growers' Guild (GREPALMA), which controls 98 percent of the harvested oil palm and 100 percent of the palm oil mills. Both ASAZGUA and GREPALMA are members of the powerful Coordinating Committee of Financial, Industrial, Commercial and Agricultural Guilds (CACIF) of Guatemala. Along with domestic capital, international financial capital also plays an

important role in these industries. In 2011, sugarcane agribusinesses in Guatemala got up to 93 percent of their operating credit in US dollars.¹³

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has allotted US\$150 million to finance "sugar and bioenergy companies and exporters [especially] in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, El Salvador and northeastern Brazil."¹⁴ The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) provided financing in the amount of US\$20 million for highly controversial land deals for sugarcane agribusiness in Guatemala's Polochic Valley in the northern lowlands region. The loan was approved on the basis of a single socio-environmental impact assessment report developed by the agribusiness itself. These investments facilitate the growth of a "flex crop complex" that requires more and more land for the production of raw material. This is rapidly transforming land use, employment and social relations in the region. Additionally, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group and the IDB financed the biggest Guatemalan sugarcane agribusiness with at least US\$222 million to go "offshore"—buying up land, mills and distilleries in Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador, and developing a joint venture with major Colombian and Brazilian sugarcane agribusinesses to build a distillery-mill complex in Brazil.¹⁵

Legal Land Grabbing?

Corporate sugarcane and oil palm plantations are expanding their control over land-based resources in the northern lowlands through a variety of mechanisms, including 25-year leases, contract-farming agreements, and most commonly, direct land purchases. This has resulted in the expulsion and displacement of hundreds of families and even of entire communities. An estimated 11 percent of the total peasant households from the research area for this study lost their land rights during the last decade. Of these cases, the lands of Q'eqchi' indigenous peasants were seized by agribusinesses in 92.5 percent of the cases, and by cattle ranchers in the remaining cases. Dozens of villages have been reduced to a small cluster of houses; and in at least four cases, entire villages—including houses, schools and churches—were gobbled up completely by plantations.

“Voluntary” Land Sales

It may be shocking to learn that land grabbing in the northern lowlands of Guatemala largely occurs through legal channels. However these “legal” land grabs are accompanied by enticement and coercion of various kinds—from subtle to overt and violent. Most of the land grabbed from Q’eqchi peasants was originally titled by FONTIERRAS. As outlined above, most of the families who accessed land through this land fund quickly found themselves dealing with a mountain of debt, and many were forced to sell. In a survey conducted for this research, half of the male heads-of-household who sold their lands said they did so because the land was “unproductive”; and the other half reportedly sold their lands because they were “highly indebted.” In sharp contrast, 86 percent of the total female heads-of-household openly opposed the land deals.

As many Q’eqchi’ men indicate, debt played a major role in the supposedly voluntary displacement of indigenous peasants. The private, individual property rights promoted by FONTIERRAS may have given peasants’ access to formal credit, but annual interest rates of 18 to 26 percent by the private and non-profit banking sector either prevented peasants from applying for credit altogether or led them to lose the land they had used as collateral. Indebtedness is also linked to the issue of decreasing agricultural productivity. The system of individual land ownership transformed the once-sustainable Q’eqchi’ swidden farming practices, tying them to a small plot of land with declining fertility, making them dependent on external inputs for fertility. In a region with poor, rocky soils with little

organic matter, this usually means buying an increasing amount of expensive chemical fertilizers.

The supposedly voluntary land deals are often accompanied by violent evictions and other physically coercive practices. Peasants who refuse to sell at non-negotiable prices have been harassed; lands have been enclosed within large plantations; and access rights have been closed off, even to visiting government officials.

Contract Farming

In addition to grabbing land through lease or purchase, corporate plantations also expand their *control* over land and labor through contract farming. Such is the case in the government’s Oil Palm Program, launched in 2009, which aims to incorporate indigenous peasants as contract farmers, while converting 4,200 hectares (10,378 acres) of “idle” peasant lands into lucrative oil palm plantations. Peasants receive a \$528 per-hectare credit from the government, which is transferred directly to an agribusiness as a payment for seedlings, transportation and agriculture extension services. The contracts do not include crop insurance—leaving peasants to assume the risks of production—nor do they specify who is to pay the high costs of rehabilitating the soil after 25 years of oil palm production, the average economic life of a plantation.¹⁶ Oil palms absorb a high amount of nutrients from the soil, and also create compaction through the entanglement of their horizontal root systems, making it difficult and costly to convert the land to other uses.

Employment and Working Conditions

Oil palm and sugarcane plantations in Guatemala’s northern lowlands generate far fewer jobs than peasant farming systems. Oil palm, for instance, requires 52 working days per hectare per year, as opposed to maize, which requires 112 working days.¹⁷ Furthermore, jobs in the oil palm sector are largely casual, temporary and demand a high level of worker flexibility. Plantation work is also highly demanding, placing a tremendous burden on families: many plantation workers are assisted by their children to be able to meet their daily work requirements. As a result, female heads-of-household increasingly struggle to grow food, meet their household responsibilities and mobilize against land-based resource grabs. In fact,



Photo by Caracol Producciones

Q'eqchi' women from the northern lowlands spend 10 to 15 percent less time tending to their personal needs—such as sleeping, eating and bathing—than their male counterparts in order to cope with the activities of their *triple* workday.¹⁸

Even without social security benefits and earning 35 percent less on average, most rural workers in the region would rather work for other peasants than for agribusiness. On peasant farms, lunch is normally provided, foremen do not harass the workers, and the workday is generally shorter—up to half the number of hours required by corporate plantations. This allows peasants to earn some cash while still having time left in the day for community work and, most importantly, for growing food for themselves (whether it is on land that they own, borrow or lease). Not surprisingly, in 2010, average corn yields were 8 percent higher and food expenditures 21 percent lower in homes where the male head-of-household did not work for agribusiness.

Finally, peasant-farmed crops generate up to 10 times more “local wealth” than corporate sugarcane and oil palm. While peasant farming-generated wealth remains in the region, agribusinesses redirect profits made from the local land, labor and resources towards distant, non-farming classes (national oligarchy and international financial hubs).

Land Use Changes

The expansion of corporate plantations in the northern lowlands has caused dramatic direct and indirect land use changes, with serious implications for peasant food security, livelihoods and ecological balance. As Figure 2 shows, a large share of lands currently used for oil palm production were previously used by peasant farmers to grow staple foods.¹⁹ While the region still produces a food surplus, paradoxically food insecurity is growing, a trend amplified by local speculators—traders and middlemen who buy up and hoard local corn, for instance. Additionally, the promotion of individual land ownership and input-intensive farming has transformed the agroecologically efficient swidden farming system. The increased commodification of land, especially by making it available to non-local buyers, has also been accompanied by a commodification of traditional social relations. For instance, non-family

labor which was once exchanged through traditional forms of reciprocity is now to be paid in cash. All of these factors deepen market dependence and promote unsustainable land use.


The expansion of corporate sugarcane and oil palm is also triggering *indirect* land use changes. Many of the cattle ranchers who leased or sold their land to agribusiness are now grabbing peasant farms as well as forested lands beyond the legal agrarian frontier. For example, these ranchers often hire Q'eqchi' people and other workers to cut down the forest and grab land inside the Mayan Biosphere Reserve in the department of Petén. Along with the cattle ranchers, many dispossessed peasants are encroaching in this and other protected areas in the region in search of farmland for subsistence.

These dynamics—in which indigenous peasants are dispossessed and/or pushed to pursue environmentally destructive practices—have led national elites, landed upper classes and some large international conservation NGOs to condemn “Q'eqchi people as bad environmentalists.”²⁰ Meanwhile, sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses in Guatemala are receiving payments in the millions for “environmental services” through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and are also receiving “green” certification under schemes like the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and the Better Sugarcane Initiative.



Photo by Manuel Morillo

Figure 2. Land use in Guatemala's northern lowlands in 2005, on lands that by 2010 were converted to oil palm plantations²¹



Conflict and Resistance

Struggles against dispossession, for reclaiming grabbed lands, and for accessing new lands, are on the rise in northern Guatemala. Q'eqchi' women have raised a particularly important voice against corporate land grabbing. Q'eqchi' youth, elders, men and women in various sectors are organizing in a variety of rural social movements to challenge the dominant model of plantation agriculture. These struggles often converge on the need to strengthen family and community-controlled models of agroecological and/or low-external-input food production. With little political will from the state to support this approach, "campesino a campesino" (farmer to farmer) knowledge-sharing networks are growing, with support from social movements, NGOs, the Social Pastoral of the Catholic Church and some scholars and local officials. Two regional, self-organized "peasant markets" (where non-peasant merchants are not allowed) are now operating twice a week in the towns of Chisec and Raxruhá. Securing a market for peasant products is considered fundamental to protecting peasant lands from dispossession.

The struggles are rooted in diverse experiences and perspectives, which vary according to age, gender, etc. Q'eqchi' male youth, for instance, are often drawn to the "fast money" and consumption status

"Before, the rich people killed us with guns; today they allow us to starve to death."

offered by agribusinesses as a way to escape from their parent's "backwardness." Even so, many young people resist the extractive development model and mobilize for a future as autonomous peasants or workers living in greater harmony with their environment. Q'eqchi' women young and old are the most active group mobilizing against their partners', fathers' or community's participation in land deals with agribusinesses or ranchers. In some cases, individual women have hidden land titles from their partners to prevent them from selling their lands. But normally, women act as a collective subject: they join forces to subvert gendered hierarchies in community government institutions, where they are often the clearest and loudest voices against corporate middlemen and extractive development.

With the expansion of agribusiness, it has become increasingly difficult for communities to meet their "subsistence minimum"—a category that varies by age, gender and other differences. Q'eqchi' women, for instance, tend to include housing, culturally appropriate education and land in their subsistence minimum. Q'eqchi' young people, on the other hand, may include more urbanized consumption needs. But generally speaking, under the new corporate flex-crop complexes, communities have less and less space and capacity to negotiate even their minimum requirements for survival and subsistence. As one Q'eqchi' peasant stated: "Before, the rich people killed us with guns; today they allow us to starve to death."²²

Many Q'eqchi' (but also non-indigenous) peasant communities are resisting legal dispossession mechanisms by overruling state-endorsed individual land ownership through the community prohibition of land deals with ranchers or corporate agents. In some cases community governance institutions attempt to regulate the ongoing process of legalized dispossession by preventing community members from borrowing or leasing land to those who sold their land against community norms and interests. Similar practices include not accepting anyone known to have voluntarily sold his or her land previously as a new community member; and expelling anyone from the community who violates the communal agreement against selling land.

Notably, all of these struggles against corporate land

grabbing are underpinned by the collective identity of the Q'eqchi' peoples as R'al Ch'och or "sons and daughters of the earth" who live from and care for Mother Earth. While these struggles employ non-violent strategies (litigation, peaceful demonstrations and land occupations), they are routinely criminalized and violently repressed. Non-compliant Q'eqchi's are condemned as "anti-development" agitators and prosecuted under the pretext of enforcing the "rule of law." Grassroots organizations and groups in the region increasingly resist through dynamic engagement with militant rural social movements and allies.



Photo by Manuel Morillo

Conclusion

The expansion of corporate sugarcane and oil palm plantations in Guatemala's northern lowlands is leading to drastic transformations in the region's environment, social relations, labor conditions and ability of its people to feed themselves. Controlled by white oligarchs, powerful oil palm and sugarcane agribusinesses are grabbing lands farmed by Q'eqchi indigenous peasants who narrowly escaped the genocidal violence of the country's brutal civil war and bonded labor on large traditional estates. Companies are also incorporating peasants into the palm oil value chain through contract farming agreements. As such, the new wave of land grabs represents a tragic continuation in Guatemala's colonial and post-colonial history of subordination of the (indigenous) rural poor. International financial institutions also play an important role by providing financing to these companies and helping to create enabling policy conditions for land grabs to take place. In the face of threats to their lands and livelihoods, rural peasants of all ages in Guatemala's northern lowlands are building increasingly well-organized grassroots movements in defense of their territories in which class, culture and identity are seamlessly intertwined. While their immediate aim is to defend, reclaim or gain access to land and resources, this is embedded in a demand for territorial self-determination for Guatemala's R'al Ch'och or "sons and daughters of the earth."

Additional Resources:

Peasant Union Committee (Comité de Unidad Campesina, CUC): www.cuc.org.gt

Website/blog about the case of Guatemala's Polochic Valley: <http://valledelpolochic.wordpress.com/documentos/>

The Global Land Grab: A Primer by The Transnational Institute (2013) Available at: <http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/landgrabbing-primer-feb2013.pdf>

Documentary films:

"Aj Ral Ch'och: Sons of the Earth" (Spanish and Q'eqchi' with English subtitles) by IDEAR-CONGCOOP and Caracol Producciones:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgpEvC94OM0>

"Evictions in the Polochic Valley" (Spanish and Q'eqchi' with English subtitles) by IDEAR-CONGCOOP and Caracol Producciones:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUfbH0kSVOs>

Also available at: www.caracolproducciones.org

Notes

1. CEH (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico). 1999. *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations*. <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html>
2. The Maya-Q'eqchi' is one of the largest and arguably most traditional of the 22 Maya peoples in Guatemala (hereafter referred to as Q'eqchi')
3. Lahiff, E., S.M. Borras Jr., and C. Kay. 2007. "Market-Led Agrarian Reform: Policies, Performance and Prospects." *Third World Quarterly* 28(8), p. 1417.
4. Beginning in 2005, this was carried out in partnership with the National Cadastral Registry.
5. World Bank. 2007. *World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 38
6. INE. 2003. *Censo Nacional Agropecuario*. Guatemala: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
7. Through land acquisitions, long-term land leases and contract-farming schemes.
8. Borras, S. Jr, J.C. Franco, S. Gómez, C. Kay, and M. Spoor. 2012. "Land Grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3-4): 845-872.
9. This report is based on research conducted between 2006 and 2011 in twenty villages from six different municipalities in the region: Chisec, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas and Panzós (Alta Verapaz) El Estor (Izabal), Ixcán (Quiché) and Sayaxché (Petén). Research methods included policy analysis; a geographic information system analysis of land use changes; a gender-divided household survey; focus groups; interviews with a wide range of actors; and participatory observation. For a discussion of the methodology used in this study, see Alonso-Fradejas, A., F. Alonzo, and J. Dürr. 2008. *Caña de Azúcar y Palma Africana: Combustibles para un Nuevo Ciclo de Acumulación y Dominio en Guatemala*. Guatemala: IDEAR-CONGCOOP.
10. 20 percent for sugarcane and 37 percent for oil palm.
11. In fact, Guatemala is the leading ethanol exporter to the EU, under preferential trade concessions (GSP and GSP+).
12. Alonso-Fradejas, A., S. Mingorría, and G. Gamboa. 2010. "Los Agrocombustibles y la Profundización del Capitalismo Agrario Flexible en Territorios Campesinos e Indígenas de Guatemala." Paper presented at Working Group 12, VIII Conference of the Latin American Rural Sociology Association (ALASRU), November 15-19, Porto de Galinhas, Pernambuco, Brazil.
13. <http://encentralamericadata.com> (accessed April 19, 2012)
14. IDB. January 16, 2009. <http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2009-01-16/idb-backs-150-million-regional-financing-facility-for-sugar-and-bioenergy,5102.html>
15. Alonso-Fradejas, Alonzo and Dürr 2008 (Op Cit.); Alonso-Fradejas, A., J.L. Caal Hub, and T. Miranda Chinchilla. 2011. *Plantaciones Agroindustriales, Dominación y Despojo Indígena-campesino en la Guatemala del Siglo XXI*. Guatemala: IDEARCONGCOOP; Solano, L. 2009. *Estudio del Destino de la Producción de Caña de Azúcar y Palma Africana y la Situación de la Producción y el Mercado de Agrocombustibles en Guatemala*. Guatemala: Action Aid.
16. After twenty-five years or so, the palms become so tall that the fruit bunches cannot be harvested.
17. Figures for other crops (working days per hectare per year) include 4 for cattle, 36 for sugarcane, 56 for beans, 78 for corn and rice, 88 for root crops and 114 for citrus.
18. Alonso-Fradejas, Mingorría and Gamboa 2010, Op Cit.
19. Geo-referenced data are not available for sugarcane-related land use changes but field observations over the last six years point to similar trends.
20. Ybarra, M., 2011. "Privatizing the Tzuultaq'a? Private property and spiritual reproduction in post-war Guatemala." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(4), pp. 793-810
21. Alonso-Fradejas, Alberto, J. L. Caal Hub and T. Miranda Chinchilla. 2011. *Plantaciones Agroindustriales, Dominación y Despojo Indígena-campesino en la Guatemala del Siglo XXI*. Guatemala: IDEARCONGCOOP.
- http://www.congcoop.org.gt/images/stories/pdfs-congcoop/Plantaciones_y_despojo-Guatemala-sXXI.pdf
22. Quoted in: Alonso-Fradejas, Alonzo, and J. Dürr. 2008. *Caña de Azúcar y Palma Africana: Combustibles para un Nuevo Ciclo de Acumulación y Dominio en Guatemala*. Guatemala: IDEAR-CONGCOOP, pp. 162.



Photo by Manuel Morillo