The Global Land Grab

A primer
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This is TNI’s second draft of our popular primer on land grabbing, first produced in October 2012. If you have suggestions, comments or other questions you want answered in any future editions, please email agrarianjustice@tni.org
What is land grabbing?

The term ‘land grabbing’ re-emerged on the international stage in the context of a spike in global food prices in 2007-2008. The media spotlight was initially focused on new players like Saudi Arabia and South Korea potentially acquiring vast areas of land in developing nations like Madagascar and Ethiopia to grow food for their own people amidst a fear of food scarcity. Prominent international development think-tanks helped to reinforce this framing.1

Today, however, several years down the road, it is clear that this framing of land grabbing has obscured more than it was able to illuminate. It is important to unpack what land grabbing really involves if we are to understand what is really happening.

A better way to start to understand land grabbing is through the lens of political economy. From this perspective, land grabbing is essentially control grabbing. It refers to the capturing of power to control land and other associated resources like water, minerals or forests, in order to control the benefits of its use. That is, the project “to fix or consolidate forms of access to land-based wealth.”2 This can include ‘virtual land grabs’ where “behind a façade of land acquisition for a stated purpose, there lies an agenda to appropriate subsidies, obtain bank loans using land permits as collateral, or to speculate on future increases in land values.”3 Whether ‘virtual’ or ‘real’, land grabbing is inherently political, since what is at stake is the power to decide how and for what purposes the land and water can be used now and in the future. From this perspective, land grabs that are made more transparent are, in the end, still land grabs.

Land grabbing needs to be seen in the context of the power of national and transnational capital and their desire for profit, which overrides existing meanings, uses and systems of management of the land that are rooted in local communities. The global land grab is therefore an epitome of an ongoing and accelerating change in the
meaning and use of the land and its associated resources (like water) from small-scale, labour-intensive uses like peasant farming for household consumption and local markets, toward large-scale, capital-intensive, resource-depleting uses such as industrial monocultures, raw material extraction, and large-scale hydropower generation – integrated into a growing infrastructure that link extractive frontiers to metropolitan areas and foreign markets.4

The irony is that focusing too much on the land itself risks overlooking the key driver of the global land grab which is the underlying logic and operation of capital and the biophysical requirements of capital accumulation.

### Problems of current definitions of land grabbing

There are many problems with current definitions of land grabbing, which usually take the following forms:

**Focus on exchange of land ownership rather than who controls the land and how it is used:** Land grabbing is usually portrayed as an illegitimate seizure of land from a person or people that leads to their expulsion from the land. Yet in some cases peasants remain on the land that is seized even though they have effectively lost control of it. In another example, some governments have seized land for redistribution to others, often as a result of popular demands for fairer sharing of national resources. Is this land grabbing? It is better to talk about control of land, and look at who is benefiting and isn’t from land deals than just talk about ‘grabbing’ per se.

**Focus on scale rather than impact.** The description of the new wave of land grabbing often refers to large-scale grabs, of thousands, and even tens of thousands, of hectares for example, but how is the threshold set and what about the many grabs that are less than 1,000 hectares?

**Focus on process, emphasising how land grabs violate principles of transparency and accountability.** Coalitions such as the International Land Coalition have defined land grabbing as deals that lack free, prior and informed consent by land-users, do not include socio-environmental impact assessments, and are carried out corruptly and without proper democratic participation. But if companies or governments claim that the desirable formal principles and technical procedures were upheld, which many do, then is it no longer a land grab? Given that assessing adherence to principles is a matter of degree and perception, how are we to judge the threshold between an illegitimate land acquisition and a proper one?
What ideological myths sustain large-scale land investments?

The first myth that underpins land grabbing is that there is an availability of excess land which with investment can be turned into income and jobs for developing countries. Worldwide the areas being targeted for this kind of large-scale investment are being portrayed on paper as ‘empty’, ‘marginal’, ‘idle’ or ‘degraded’ land, largely unpopulated, unused, unproductive, and unlikely to compete with local food production. The World Bank has been key to sustaining this myth, declaring the existence of a vast ‘reserve’ of potentially ‘suitable’ land – to the tune of between 445 million and 1.7 billion hectares worldwide. This of course sent a loud positive signal to potential investors that the world’s resources are up for grabs. Yet the reality is that the land is not empty, idle, or unused; and many investors are going for prime — not marginal or degraded — land.

The second myth is that agriculture needs investment, particularly foreign investment. Juergen Voegele, director of the Agricultural and Rural Development Department of the World Bank argues this saying: “[W]hen done right, larger-scale farming can provide opportunities for poor countries with large agricultural sectors and ample endowments of land. To make the most of these opportunities, however, countries will need to better secure local land rights and improve land governance. Adopting an open and proactive approach to dealing with investors is also needed to ensure that investment contributes to broader development objectives.”

The assumption is that the ongoing rural crisis of persistent chronic poverty and widespread hunger is at base a crisis of lack of investment. Therefore the current upswing of big-investor interest in land is portrayed as a must-seize opportunity. Moreover, advocates have said that the investment will need to be large-scale and corporate controlled in order to be capable of achieving higher international competitive abilities in the increasingly integrated value chains of global agricultural production.

The reality of world food provision and agricultural investment, however is that the bulk of investment in agriculture is undertaken by farmers themselves, with smallholder farmers producing most of the food consumed locally in many developing regions. In Zimbabwe for example, small-scale farmers are using their own savings to invest in on-farm buildings, farm equipment, cattle and transport. In Latin America, the agro-ecology movement is sharing the benefits of this low-external input agriculture through a farmer-to-farmer process of knowledge exchange and innovation. In the EU and US, food re-localisation strategies connect producers, retailers, and consumers in the exchange of healthy, nutritious, locally sourced food, outside the reach of transnational
supermarket chains. These are just a few examples of positive investment alternatives to the large-scale, capital intensive, corporate controlled agricultural model, which presents itself as the only solution to world hunger and rural poverty.

The third powerful myth is that large-scale land deals are necessary to deal with scarcity – first food-scarcity and then oil-scarcity - which exploits environmental protection concerns in the context of climate change and debates over climate change mitigation. Advocates stressed the need to develop alternative non-fossil fuel-derived, renewable energy sources that could overcome the problem of ‘peak oil’ to achieve higher levels of energy security, while still, at the same time, combat climate change through ‘greener’ fuels.

But both of these scarcity arguments oversimplify complex realities. They conveniently reduce the problem to mere supply, in order to make the ‘solution’ of increasing production through investment in unsustainable methods seem more acceptable.

‘Food-scarcity’ arguments in favour of large-scale land grabs fail under close examination. They fail to acknowledge that there is already more than enough food in the system to feed everyone, and that food security is undermined by costs, loss of harvests, waste and the diversion of land to production of non-food industrial products, such as feed and fuel (agrofuel), fibre, flowers and ‘forests’ – e.g., industrial tree plantations for pulp, timber, woodchips and rubber.

‘Oil-scarcity’ arguments likewise fail on two counts. First, they do not acknowledge serious inefficiencies in how the world’s finite supply of fossil fuel is currently being used – such as a huge and growing global commercial transport sector that moves industrial food and non-food products over long distances across the globe. Second, they ignore the fact that industrial agriculture and industrial livestock production are major emitters of key greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane).

The fourth myth is that property rights are the best solution to greater land tenure security, which has sustained the argument that land deals could be beneficial as long as they based on secure property rights. It is based on a simple assumption: people are dispossessed because they do not have formal property rights over their land; and so, the policy response should be to provide land tenure security to these people. Yet here too a critical historical perspective on land issues and land policy frameworks is needed. In the land policy literature ‘security’ means providing, promoting and/or protecting the property rights of the exclusive owners and/or users of land; it usually means individual and private rights; the commodification of land, and transforming it into something marketable. Titles are the chief expression of this so-called security.
These interpretations reinforce the conservative view of land as a ‘thing’ with only economic use-value, which undermines many other values associated with land for communities worldwide.

But an even deeper problem with the notion of ‘security’ is that it can mean anything – whether legitimate or not, whether truly pro-poor or not. Land tenure security can mean the property security of big landlords living in the capital city and relying on tenants or farm workers to make the land productive. It can also mean security of the banks that are selling capital for profit, and need collateral in case of payment default. In the current context of global land-grabbing ‘security’ more often than not refers to the security of transnational capital invested in land.

Further reading:


How does land grabbing take place?

Land grabbing today is marked by variation across different agro-ecological contexts and property rights regimes. It is affecting contexts as diverse as peri-urban corridors, highly productive floodplains, forested uplands, and remote rural outposts. It is unfolding in diverse land rights regimes, including private, public, and community land and land reform settlements, and regardless of whether existing rights and arrangements are recognised by state law or not. And actual reallocation processes are taking place under diverse political-legal conditions, with some illegal and others ‘perfectly legal’, and still others somewhere in between the two. In many instances the pre-existing formal-legal frameworks are being bent, altered, or redefined and reinterpreted to accommodate land grabbing in a way that gives the appearance of legality. Some of the most prominent cases involve physical harassment, intimidation and violence; but others do not. Finally, it is worth noting that a good deal of these recent land investments have remained dormant, and thus are more related to land value speculation than to productive ventures.  

Acquisitions where formal state laws are skirted are clearly ‘grabs’. But then what about cases where the deals don’t break formal rules and laws? This is the case in many African countries, where, as independent scholar Liz Alden Wily points out, “the current land rush amply demonstrates the use of perfectly legal means of dispossession or reallocation of lands involving significant loss of access for rural poor and not a little physical displacement in practice.” ‘Perfectly legal’ land grabs in the narrowest sense are apparent elsewhere too.

Guatemala’s Polochic Valley case study: legal, but not legitimate

Guatemala has been experiencing a wave of legal land (re)concentration in recent years, aided and abetted by the national government’s neoliberal land policies of private individual land titling and market-led agrarian reform (MLAR). These policies do not value nor prioritise the land-based social identities and livelihoods of indigenous landless families. Colonos (tenant farmer) families in Guatemala’s traditional estate and hacienda lands have been especially vulnerable to land grabbing. In exchange for the right to live and harvest their own crops, they traditionally provided labour or payments to the landlord (patron), known as a colonato labour regime. But land grabs have led many to being expelled from the land ‘legally.’
Research in 2011 revealed that one family, the Widdmans, acquired 5,400 hectares from several traditional estates land in the Polochic Valley for the ‘Chabil Utzaj’ sugar mill financed through a US$ 32 million loan by the Central American Bank of Economic Integration. But the area was populated by Maya-Q’eqchi’ families in well-established tenant relationships with the estate owners, who were already negotiating the sale of the land to the tenants through the government’s MLAR program, due to economic difficulties after the 2001-2002 international coffee price crisis. Although the negotiations had dragged on, slowed down by the government Land Fund’s bureaucratic procedures, they suddenly came to an abrupt halt with the arrival of the Chabil Utzaj sugar mill in the Valley. The higher prices offered by the sugar mill to the traditional estate owners put an end to the negotiations between the latter and the tenant farmers families. In exchange for a higher price, the Chabil Utzaj demanded that the land be registered in the National Property Register and that all labor liabilities be settled, which meant the colono families could be expelled through ‘perfectly legal’ means. The company initially tried to soften the blow through enticements such as promises of employment, but these came to nought. Facing expulsion, hundreds of landless (and jobless) Maya-Q’eqchi’ families occupied fourteen of the estates in November 2010. In March 2011, 1,500 police and army forces (together with Chabil Utzaj’s ‘private security’ according to local human rights observers) violently evicted some 700 families. Houses and crops were burned and one tenant farmer was killed by the police. Two more would be assassinated by paramilitaries later on. In June 2011, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission called on the Guatemalan state to secure the life and food security of evicted families. By November 2012, negotiations with the government were focused on reallocating the evicted families to another land.


Further reading:

Website/blog about the Polochic case: http://valledepolochic.wordpress.com/documentos/
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/indigenas/proteccion/cautelares.asp#121/11
What is the history of land grabbing?

Land grabbing is not new, tracing back through centuries of human history in the North, South, East and West and encompassing many episodes and innumerable examples, including pre-colonial land seizures associated with territorial wars, European enclosures in the North, and dispossession of native peoples in North America and Australasia. “In many regions of the global South, land was first grabbed by pre-colonial rulers in chronic territorial wars with each other, then by colonial governments and increasingly by foreign or domestic corporations”. But tracing the history of land grabbing reveals much more than just the fact that the phenomenon is not new.

Past land grabbing has mattered for the political processes and precedents that were established and which are still shaping how and where land grabbing is happening today. It is in the very long history of land grabbing that one can find, according to Liz Alden Wily, the establishment of “the legal manipulations which continue to make [land] rushes possible”. Many of the same core ideas that are justifying and facilitating land grabbing today were established in past episodes of land grabbing. For instance, to name just a few, ideas such as: (i) the efficiency of seizing land and securing it as exclusive ‘property’ through legal means (ii) the utility of justifying which lands ‘can’ be grabbed using the discursive device of ‘vacant’ or ‘empty’ land and (iii) the value of establishing an overriding legitimacy in taking over someone’s land for reasons of ‘public purpose’ or ‘public interest’.

Meanwhile, a more recent past not of land grabbing, but of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), privatisation of public services (including family farming support-services), investment de-regulation and trade liberalisation, is what underpins and has helped to make possible the cycle of land grabbing we see today.

What is new about the current wave of land grabbing?

There is general consensus that a number of factors distinguish the most recent wave of land grabbing from the past. First, the trend is unfolding at a relatively fast pace, set by changing dynamics in the global food regime, in energy security responses to ‘peak oil’, in environmental protection in the context of climate change, and in the international flow of finance capital searching for safe investments after the collapse of housing markets in the North.
Collaboration between Thai and Myanmar governments and Italian-Thai investors has led to a massive land grab in Tanintharyi Division, which borders Mon State to the North, and Thailand to the East. Tens of thousands of people are at risk of being displaced for the Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which, with a total estimated investment of over USD $50 billion, hopes to be Southeast Asia’s largest industrial complex, complete with a deep seaport, industrial estate (including a large petrochemical industrial complex), and a road/pipeline/rail link that will extend 350 kilometres to Bangkok. The land grab that has resulted does not just encompass the land directly associated with the SEZ project (according to official figures 32,274 people in at least nineteen villages will ultimately be displaced); but also a wave of additional land grabbing that has resulted from the speculation and large-scale financial investment in the region. This has caused a surge of land grabbing by local and foreign elites and a speculative spike in land prices that is squeezing out (primarily) Dawei and Karen farmers and rural dwellers.


Second, the trend is towards large-scale acquisitions of land. These include 30,000 hectares acquired in Nigeria by US company Dominion Farms in 2011 for rice; 60,000 hectares acquired in Cambodia by local businessman-politician Ly Yong Phat in 2006 for sugarcane; and 900,000 hectares acquired in Argentina by the Italian company Benetton in 2002 for wool, cereals and fast growth industrial trees.

Third, the trend is also towards long-term leases, purchase or other economic arrangements (contract growing and supermarket contracts, for example). The basic land transactions typically range from 30 to 50 or even 99 years at a time, often with the option to renew too.

Fourth, the trend has become global in scope, reaching farther inside and outside the global South than initially reported. While Africa is certainly a hotspot, research shows it happening virtually everywhere: throughout South and Central America, throughout South and Southeast Asia, and in many parts of the global North, particularly the former Soviet Eurasia.

This combination of factors led civil society groups and transnational networks to alert the world to the global land grab underway and its considerable negative impacts on
communities and fragile ecosystems. When protests erupted in Madagascar against the government for agreeing behind closed doors to lease 3.2 million hectares of land to Daewoo Logistics for 99 years, the concerns reached media attention and land grabbing was suddenly on the television screens.

**On what scale is land grabbing taking place?**

Large-scale land deals have risen 20 million hectares between 2005 and 2009 according to the International Food Policy Research Institute/IFPRI (2009); 45 million hectares since 2007-2008 according to the World Bank (2010); and 227 million hectares since 2000 according to Oxfam (2011).

Ultimately though it is virtually impossible to know how much land grabbing is taking place. One problem is that many land deals are simply not reported; they take place in secret and are not covered by the media. But even if each and every land deal was reported, it would still be impossible to pin down the numbers for a variety of reasons. First, the projects involved in reported large-scale land acquisitions can be at widely different stages of planning and operationalisation – some just initial, others more advanced. Second, the financing behind the projects is fluid and can change abruptly, as happened in the Procana sugarcane plantation project in Mozambique, for which 30,000 hectares was reallocated in 2007. Yet the project was abruptly ended in 2009 after some key investors backed out, but not before thousands of villagers were expelled and nearly a thousand hectares had been cleared and planted to sugar cane. Two years on, though, it seems the project is now back on track (in theory at least) with a new set of investors, this time from South Africa. Third, there is the problem of unreliable and corrupt recording of measurable data about land and land use, a problem which goes back further than the current wave of land grabbing and has to do with both technical and political factors. In the end, measuring land grabbing is like trying to pin a wave to the sand.

**How is land grabbing tied to water grabbing?**

The current dynamics of global capital around energy, food and environmental questions have coalesced to bring water into sharper focus as a commercial asset too. Water is a critical factor in land grabbing, shaping which lands are attractive and which are not. But water is extremely time and space specific. It can be very scarce on a seasonal basis, even if abundant during other parts of the year. Local water management
arrangements are often the result of complex, socially constructed agreements amongst diverse users that are well attuned to dynamic ecological and hydrological conditions. Land converted to the production of water intensive food, feed and fuel crop monocultures requires secure and stable supply of large volumes of water over time, usually through large-scale irrigation. The diversion, depletion and pollution of local water sources that often follows can thus undermine pre-existing arrangements and form a direct threat to a wide range of local livelihoods.

Land grabbing and water grabbing are deeply intertwined. Investors in large scale agricultural projects are unlikely to grab the land needed for planting crops, without also ensuring that the large volume of water that will be needed to guarantee high yields is stable and secure. Some research has shown how this water factor is often part of the land lease or purchase contracts between the investors and governments.\(^\text{16}\)

Water grabbing also appears in cases where water is the main target of the grab – as in hydropower development, or in relation to mining enterprises. Infamous examples – Narmada Dam in India, Belo Horizonte Dam in Brazil, and the Mekong River dams (the latter also raising controversy over transboundary water issues) have typically involved the massive expulsion of people and flooding of farm and grazing land, fields and forests. Similarly, the case of mining as an instance of water grabbing, due to the pollution of streams and rivers with mine tailings, also illustrates how mining affects the local political economy and can even destroy it altogether.\(^\text{17}\)

Further reading:
What is ‘Green Grabbing’?

Guardian journalist, John Vidal perhaps first coined the term ‘Green grabbing’, which has been described as “the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends”, such as conservation enclosures and carbon sequestration and trading programmes. It includes schemes which give you a certificate of ‘protected savannah’ for a donation to an environmental charity or programmes that promise to ‘offset’ your climate emissions, through planting biochar feedstock plantations on “under-used marginal” lands in Africa, for example. This idea that you need to ‘sell nature to save it’ has gained added momentum since the UN Rio+20 conference, when the United Nations Environmental Programme promoted pricing mechanisms of natural assets as part of its vision for a Green Economy. The commodification of nature, and its appropriation by a wide group of players, for a range of uses – current future and speculative – in the name of “sustainability”, “conservation” or “green” values is accelerating.

The experience of the UN’s Reducing Emissions through Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) proto-type projects, that are predicated on the idea of offsetting emissions in the industrialised North by protecting forests in the South, has raised concerns due to its social and environmental impacts. Academic and activist research has revealed how many actual carbon sequestration and trading projects can become ‘footholds’ for various forms of dispossession. Expulsion from the land is just one trajectory. Others may include curtailing of customary or community access rights to forest or water resources, or shifting of smallholder labour from subsistence and cash crop production to carbon sequestration, resulting in the loss of important use-benefits of access to common land and waterways, such as hunting, gathering forest products, fishing, and grazing.

Further reading

Green grabbing, the social costs of putting a price on nature, Interview with Melissa Leach http://www.tni.org/interview/green-grabbing


What impacts does land grabbing have?

Many proponents of large-scale land acquisitions insist that they can benefit local people, mainly through employment in the new economic arrangements and through new social and economic infrastructure. However, it is important to point out that so far there is precious little concrete evidence to back up such claims, and instead history is littered with bad examples. So the burden of proof still lies heavily on those who claim much good can come from land grabbing.

There is growing evidence from academic and activist research so far that suggests that the impacts of land grabbing on rural poor communities and ecosystems have been largely negative so far. Local people are being expelled when their land is needed, but their labour is not, and what often follows if promises have been made, is a trail of broken agreements around such issues as payment for damages, resettlement in improved conditions, and compensation. In cases of expulsion, the loss of land that at least provided a minimum subsistence is one of the biggest losses possible for people living at the margins.

When peoples’ land and labour are needed, they are being incorporated into the emerging new enterprises. Not all instances of incorporation – through wage labour or growers’ contracts, for example – turns out negatively. But more frequently it does turn out badly, precisely because the critical conditions that could potentially enable local people to achieve a truly powerful presence at the negotiating table tend not to be present in the areas targeted by investors. As a result, those who have been incorporated are generally left to struggle, often alone and in isolation and against many odds, to achieve even the minimum threshold of decency in wages and working conditions or to improve the terms of their lease and labour contracts.

It is worth noting that land grabbing is leading to a wide range of political reactions too, within and across local communities. Communities themselves are differentiated in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, generation and so forth, and thus not everyone in the same village shares the same social history, or the same power to decide about the terms of each land deal. When a land deal hits a community it impacts differently on different social groups. A single case of land grabbing can involve some people experiencing expulsion, while others are incorporated into the new economic enterprise as contract growers, and still others as wage laborers. This diversity of experience largely shapes the political reactions to land grabbing which are likely to vary over time even within the same community, adding a further degree of complexity to the problem of how to respond to land grabbing as it occurs.
**Bittersweet: Sugar plantations, land seizures and human rights in Cambodia**

In August 2006, two adjoining economic land concessions were granted of approximately 20,000 hectares in Botumsakor and Sre Ambel districts of Koh Kong. The concessions were granted to two companies – Koh Kong Plantation Co. Ltd. and Koh Kong Sugar Industry Co. Ltd – in an apparent attempt to circumvent restrictions on the size of economic land concessions stipulated by the Cambodian Land Law. Since then there have been reports of serious human rights violations connected to these concessions. According to a Cambodian legal aid organisation and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, as of 2007, thousands of villagers have reported complaints about the companies’ encroachment on their land. Villagers have lost both residential land and farmland that they legally possess and depend upon to sustain their families. Villagers are now reported to be facing difficulties in repaying loans taken out under micro-credit schemes, due to the loss of sources of income. During one forced eviction, two villagers received non-fatal gunshot wounds, while other community members were beaten with rifle butts as they tried to protect their homes from demolition. There are also documented instances of company staff confiscating villagers’ livestock and demanding payment for their return. Community members also report intimidation by company staff and security forces.


**Tree plantations and insecure labour in Mozambique**

In the Niassa province of Mozambique, Chikweti Forests, a subsidiary of a Swedish investment fund, acquired a lease of 140,000 hectares, in part with the promise that it would provide 3000 jobs. By 2012, Chikweti held titles for 51,000 hectares, however, only 900 people were being employed. Of those who had jobs, many of the contracts turned out to be short-term, seasonal work coinciding with the agricultural season so that workers had to neglect their fields during this important time of the year. The work in the plantations is highly intense, with long working hours and limited to the minimum wage for the agricultural sector, which is currently 2,300 Meticais, about 66 Euro per month. Workers do not receive any benefits other than their salary and there have been repeated conflicts about non-payment of workers in case of absence due to health reasons and of delayed payments. The World Bank’s report on Land Grabbing states that the Mozambican minimum wage is “insufficient to compensate for lost livelihoods.”

Who or what are the main drivers of the recent wave of land grabbing?

The initially flagged culprits for land grabbing were food-importing countries such as the Gulf States and South Korea. It is certainly true that they did fuel a renewed push to land grabbing, driven by their perception that they could no longer rely, as they had in the past, on market-sourcing of food, and thus looked for avenues of more direct control of food supply, resulting in their efforts to gain direct control of off-shore land and food production. This dynamic describes the case of Libya in Mali; of South Korea in Madagascar; and of Saudi Arabia in Sudan.19

North Atlantic states also fuelled foreign government-driven land control grabs through the enforcement of rules allowing for a greater financialisation of capital that increased speculation in food markets, and through key policies, such as those related to mandatory agrofuel blending in petrol and diesel fuels, such as US’s American Clean Energy and Security Act and the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive. Agrofuels were justified on environmental terms, as ‘carbon-neutral’ fuels. However the claims that agrofuels are carbon neutral and renewable has been increasingly questioned as it ignores the emissions that result from collecting, transporting, processing and burning the biomass as fuel as well as the impacts of removing plants, trees and related biomass that would otherwise have continued to absorb carbon.20 Similarly when wood is burnt for energy it releases carbon emissions that may take 35-50 years and more to be captured by the re-growth of the forest.

Yet even as the touted environmental benefits failed to live up to scrutiny, the biofuel mania had by then infected governments and businesses in the South who joined in the land rush in anticipation of increased demand for agrofuel feedstocks.

Beyond the specific driver of agrofuels in fuelling land grabbing lies the emergence of a powerful agro-industrial complex which combines corporate food, animal feedstock, agrofuels, timber, minerals, oil and general biomass complexes. The expanding volume and changing diet and consumption patterns of fast-growing, large economies -- such as China and India -- have further strengthened this complex and led to major shifts in how much and what kind of food crops are produced, and how. The “meatification of diets”,21 for example has had a profound impact on the industrial feed complex (soya, corn, and so on) with direct consequences for land use.

The emergence of ‘flex crops’ has also had a major impact. Flex crops are crops that have multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, industrial material) that can be easily and flexibly inter-changed: soya (feed, food, biodiesel), sugarcane (food, ethanol), oil palm (food,
biodiesel, commercial/industrial uses), corn (food, feed, ethanol). Hence, in a single crop sector we find multiple contexts of land grabs: food, feed, energy/fuel and climate change mitigation strategies. These are articulated through increasingly entangled global commodity value chains, making it impossible to reduce all these heterogeneous dynamics to a single driver of land grabbing.

Another important driver of land grabbing today that is often overlooked is the expansion of fast-growth industrial tree plantations (ITPs), especially eucalyptus and pine that are commonly used in pulp-making, and which are also a key part of the emerging so-called ‘bio-' or ‘green’ economy. Here one likewise is seeing the emergence of ‘flex trees’ that have multiple uses, whether for pulp (paper and packaging), wood-energy (pellets), and wood-fuel (biodiesel). Key actors in this area are Northern paper companies such as International Paper (US) and Stora Enso (Finland-Sweden) and Southern pulp companies such as Fibria (Brazil) and APP (Singapore).

**‘Flextree’ society**

Flextrees are the consequence of merging different industry interests in the emerging so-called green/bio-economy. Biomass from the same tree plantations can be used for pulp or energy. Pulp demand continues to drive use of biomass. In the case of Brazil (Fearnside 1998), pulp prices have soared in the past 15 years, causing a mill construction boom with one 1.5 megaton pulp mill projected to open each year until 2020.

However energy use is growing fast. Companies and governments are increasingly setting up very fast-growth (2-year rotating) plantations in the Global South to export pellets for growing wood-energy markets and plants in the North. New pulp mills are becoming also major energy producers. Wood-based second-generation biodiesel plants are also being erected, with high hopes in the industry that wood-fuel would become the next oil.

Other plantations are being expanded for carbon sequestering in schemes such as the UN-run REDD+ schemes. These are driven by polluting industries and consumers such as air travellers keen to buy carbon credits or offset impacts through tree growth.

Finally a myriad of GM [genetically modified] and nanotechnology paper applications are being developed based on the capitalisation of specially engineered trees. The machinery development is still largely controlled by Northern companies, but fast-growth and flex plantation techniques, including GM trees, are an area of innovation where Southern ‘National Champions’ (e.g., Brazil) are gaining a strong foothold. It is likely these strands will unite even more tightly into a global flex-forestry cluster.

**Source:** M. Kroger (2012) “Global tree plantation expansion: a review”, ICAS Review Paper Series No.3., p.5.
Contemporary land grabbing dynamics are thus multi-centric, since the grabbers are coming from all hemispheres and continents.

Further reading:
J. Franco, D. Fig, L. Mendonca et al (2010), Agrofuel crops.
http://www.tni.org/report/agrofuel-crops
M. Kroger (2012), Global tree plantation expansion: a review.
http://www.tni.org/paper/global-tree-plantation-expansion
What is the role of the EU in landgrabbing?

The European Union is heavily implicated in land grabbing, both directly through the involvement of EU capital and corporations in the takeover of land, and indirectly through the suite of EU policies which are transforming land into a global commodity.24 A remarkable feature has been the involvement of new financial actors and institutional investors – such as European pension funds – in the acquisition of farmland.

Amongst the EU policies driving land grabbing, the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) has played a prominent role. The prospect of a long-term, lucrative European market for agrofuels has been an important trigger in the oil palm boom in Southeast Asia for example.25 Trade policies and free trade agreements can also generate strong incentives for land grabbing. In 2001 the EU adopted the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement in which imports into the EU from the world’s least developed countries would be free from any duties or restrictions – except for arms and ammunitions. While such an agreement may sound benign it has helped to fuel global land grabbing in Cambodia and elsewhere.

Europe itself is also a target of land grabbing. In the past few years, Western European companies from Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and France have been accumulating land in Eastern Europe, concentrating in particular on the ‘Black Earth’ area of Russia and the Ukraine.26 Studies are underway about land grabbing in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary, as well as Spain, France and Italy too.27

Further reading:

Hands off the Land (2012), The European Union and the Global Land Grab
http://www.tni.org/briefing/european-union-and-global-land-grab


http://www.boycottbloodsugar.net/
What solutions have been proposed to address land grabbing?

Everyone who acknowledges the existence of land grabbing wants to manage, or govern, it in one way or another. Governance has become the key word; accountability and transparency tools have become important items in the policy agenda. It is worth noting that the idea of having UN-sanctioned voluntary guidelines on land tenure predates the 2007-2008 food (price) crisis, and the formal processes of planning and consultations were already under way when the current cycle of land grabbing began making international headlines. As a result, the official negotiations in mid-2011 ended up taking place in this new context – a twist of fate which made (or re-made) them into an especially charged site of debate and struggle.

In the meantime, the dominant activist storyline of ‘land grabbing’ had seen since 2009 increasing challenges from more mainstream currents in calls for a ‘code of conduct’ for ‘large-scale land acquisitions.’ By 2010, the World Bank and others were actively promoting a new storyline – that of the new land deals as a potential opportunity for rural development under certain conditions that minimised or avoided possible negative social and environmental effects. This new storyline – captured in the phrase ‘making a virtue out of necessity’ — eventually crystallised in the World Bank-led advocacy for ‘Principles for Responsible Investment of Agriculture’ (or PRAI), a set of seven principles, which if adhered to by multiple ‘stakeholders’ including companies and governments, would promote ‘win-win’ outcomes for all.

It is in this context that the final negotiations over the FAO Tenure Guidelines for Land, Fisheries, and Forests became a central arena of interaction between different state and non-state actors to try to influence the way land grabs are to be governed. The result was that the negotiations slowed considerably amidst heated debates; and the eventual document of more than 50 pages contained a contradictory mix of philosophical and political positions. These range from a conservative ‘market-based mechanisms’ perspective to a radical human rights and social justice perspective. Consequently, whether and to what extent the Guidelines can be used to stop land grabbing will depend on how they get interpreted by competing forces embedded in actually existing power structures and concrete situations.

In this context, three tendencies have emerged in the global land grab debate. The first argues for regulation essentially to facilitate land investment. It is premised on the belief that interest in large-scale land deals is a desirable phenomenon where states and the corporate sector have become interested in land (again). It says good
governance is guaranteed through strengthened property rights, environmental and labour standards, greater community consultation, and the use of some international governance instruments such as transparency mechanisms in land deals in order to facilitate capital accumulation within an efficient institutional context. This position is probably closest to that of the World Bank.

The second tendency proposes regulation to mitigate negative impacts and maximize opportunities. It is premised on the twin assumption of ‘inevitability’ of large-scale land deals and the ‘impossibility’ of redistributive land and rural development policies to promote small-scale farming-based development. It also proposes a number of international governance instruments to support its position: strengthened property rights to protect the land rights of people, environmental and labour standards, greater community consultation, and particularly the use of transparency instruments such as free, prior, informed consent (FPIC). It usually asks the basic question: given that they are happening how can large-scale land deals be made more accountable and transparent in order to benefit poor people? This position is supported by some in FAO, some governments and some parts of civil society.

The third tendency calls for regulation to stop and roll back land grabbing. It is premised on the belief that the contemporary expansion of production for food, agrofuels, feed and others are not really meant to solve world’s hunger, poverty and environmental degradation, but to further capital accumulation for the insatiable corporate hunger for profits. This process of capital accumulation advances a development model based on large-scale, industrial, monocrop plantations that expel

Land grabbing is a global phenomenon initiated by local and transnational elites, governments and multinational companies in order to control the most precious resources in the world… [It] exceeds the traditional North-South split that characterizes imperialist structures.

Land grabbing displaces and dislocates communities, destroys local economies, cultures and the social fabric. It endangers the identity of communities be they peasants, small-scale farmers, pastoralists, fisherfolk, workers, indigenous peoples…

Or land and identities are not for sale…

There is no way to attenuate the impact of this economic model and of the power structures that defend it.

Those who dare stand up to defend their legitimate rights and survival of their families and communities are beaten, imprisoned and killed…

The struggle against land grabbing is a struggle against capitalism…

Via Campesina 2012: 21-22.
people from their land and degrade the environment. This third current proposes similar international governance instruments: property rights for the people (although not limited to western private property ideas, to include communal and community property regimes), environmental standards, community consultations, and transparency instruments but with the view to use these to stop and roll back land grabbing. This position is maintained by various social movements and peasant groups, notably the peasant farmer association, La Via Campesina, which in November 2011 during an international conference in Nyeleni, Mali, called for and launched a global alliance against land grabbing, known as the ‘Nyeleni Plan of Action’.

The three tendencies are more or less stable, but key state and non-state actors and their political stands are dynamic and constantly changing, often straddling two or three tendencies depending on the particular configuration of issues and alliances and context.

Further reading:
Why are guidelines and transparency not sufficient to tackle land grabbing?

Neither the formulation nor implementation of laws and policies takes place in a vacuum, and very often the results of both kinds of processes are mixed. While some laws and policies can be passed to respond to land grabbing, they do not self-interpret nor self-implement. Even the best laws and policies are not automatically implemented in favour of those who should be prioritised from a social justice perspective. Experience shows that good results require enough social pressure from below to shift the balance of power in their favour – and just how much social pressure from below will be enough depends on many situational factors. There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the scourge of land grabbing. It is the context-specific political interactions of various state and non-state actors that will ultimately shape how any law or policy, including guidelines – whether voluntary or not – will eventually be interpreted and implemented, from one setting to another.

Much has been made of the need for more accountability to address land grabbing, yet most advocates of ‘responsible’ land investment fail to critically analyse the nature of local power relations among social actors in general, and the extremely long and difficult challenge of rural democratisation in particular. Instead, and often out of a real sense of urgency, there is a tendency to call for accountability mechanisms in a short-term and reactive way, but usually in response to land grabbing already underway. If this is the only space given to questions of accountability, then the result is most likely the facilitation of land grabbing and a consolidation of the state-capital alliance that initiated it to begin with.

Effective accountability would rather start by addressing challenges of democratising the decision-making around rural development issues before projects hit the ground. This involves supporting the long and difficult struggle to build and maintain autonomous social organisations capable of democratically representing the interests of rural working poor classes, and of demanding state accountability. These conditions and processes cannot be simply manufactured suddenly, once a large-scale land grab hits the ground. They are struggled for and built over time by real people embedded in complex power structures, and in relation to many issues, including land issues.

In the absence or weakness of such organisations capable of demanding accountability from the state, the focus on making land grabs more transparent is unlikely to produce anything more than just more transparent land grabs at least in the short-run. Although the deals may become more transparent, they will not necessarily or automatically
become more legitimate in the eyes of those who lose their land and livelihoods – and they may even become more *illegitimate* once those most adversely affected learn the real score. And even legitimate deals will need mobilisation by strong and autonomous social organizations to ensure that affected peoples’ land and human rights are guaranteed at every point. Here, there are important insights and lessons to be gathered from past land conflicts and struggles since, after all, land grabbing is indeed not new.

Moving beyond the limitations of ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions means taking stock that real state accountability should begin long before land grabs ever come onto the scene, by addressing the rural working poor classes and how can their already existing, meaningful investments in the land be augmented and sustained in order to ensure truly pro-poor outcomes.

**What systemic changes are needed to end land grabbing?**

Land grabbing is an expression of the dominant development model based on sustained, increased and unequal consumption of both finite and ‘renewable’ natural resources. The social and ecological limitations of this development path, as well as its extreme inequalities, are widely known and experienced daily, especially by the most vulnerable populations. Dealing with this underlying, multi-faceted and structural problem requires going beyond narrow and partial regulatory takes, in order to address the politico-economic structures where land-grabbing dynamics are rooted, i.e., the existing industrial pattern of agro-commodities (flex crops and flex trees) and energy production and consumption controlled by Transnational Corporations under a world trade and investment system where financial capital reigns.

In the current global debate over land grabbing, investment tends to be equated with corporate investment that is skewed towards large scale, petrol-based and capital intensive/labor expelling ventures. As neoliberal policies were implemented worldwide, state-driven investments in agriculture dried up, while investments by small-scale farmers were made invisible. Orthodox trade liberalisation schemes have wiped out millions of small-scale farming ventures without resulting in increased levels of food security, i.e, through the foreseen augmented capabilities to buy food in the market claimed by free trade promoters.

A fundamental starting point when talking about systemic change to end land grabbing are these two other types of investment, namely public investment and investments
by small-scale farmers. The urgent task is to revive state investment while making investments by small-scale farmers visible. It is the combination of state and small farmers’ investments that make any systemic change to end land grabbing possible. Additionally, it is urgent to decouple food (and agriculture in general) from dominant corporate-orchestrated trade systems at multilateral (WTO) and regional scales (Free Trade Agreements), as La Vía Campesina has widely called for.

The food sovereignty paradigm encompasses this alternative view. As the Forum for Food Sovereignty, held in Mali in 2007, argued: food sovereignty entails “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations” (Declaration of Nyéléni 2007). The food sovereignty paradigm links strategically with the call for land sovereignty in the realms of peoples’ land and natural resources access and control rights.

Underpinning this alternative view on food and land sovereignty, agro-ecology captures the need for social equity and ecological sustainability in the previously mentioned joint investment framework. As the High Level Panel of Experts from the FAO-based World Committee on Food Security recommends “governments should prioritize investment in the small farm sector and in alternative food systems that are socially inclusive and just as well as environmentally sustainable, using agro-ecological principles”.

**What is agro-ecology?**

“The core principles of agro-ecology include recycling nutrients and energy on the farm, rather than introducing external inputs; enhancing soil organic matter and soil biological activity; diversifying plant species and genetic resources in agro-ecosystems over time and space; integrating crops and livestock and optimizing interactions and productivity of the total farming system, rather than the yields of individual species’....

‘Agro-ecology is highly knowledge-intensive, and is based on techniques that are not delivered top-down but developed on the basis of farmers’ knowledge and experimentation. For this reason agro-ecology emphasizes the capability of local communities to experiment, evaluate, and scale-up innovations through farmer-to-farmer research and grassroots extension approaches.”

Further reading:


What does the concept of land sovereignty have to offer?

Land sovereignty is the right of working peoples to have effective access to, use of, and control over, land and the benefits of its use and occupation, where land is understood as resource, territory, and landscape. Simply put, land sovereignty is the realisation of the working peoples’ human right to land. It looks to build on the strengths – yet also address the weaknesses in the current context - of traditional calls for ‘land security’ and ‘land reform’, allying itself and intrinsically linked with the growing global movement for ‘food sovereignty.’

The demand for land sovereignty is, first of all, a call to action to bring the state back in and hold it accountable to citizens amidst a renewed corporate and transnational global assault on the agrarian front in the form of transnational enclosures. And second it is an affirmation for working peoples and their human right to exercise control over land as resources, territory and landscapes. It has the potential to unite very diverse sectors: peasants from Mali, forest dwellers from Indonesia, indigenous landless labourers and peasants from Guatemala, a part-time small family farm in France, and an urban gardener in Detroit.

The term ‘land sovereignty’ reminds us that individual and collective plots of land are part of larger socially constructed landscapes and waterscapes, which in turn reflect the kind of relationship between human societies and the environment that has emerged over time in a given place, whether balanced or not, and should push us to always strive for an ecologically healthy relationship with our environment.

Further reading:
What resistance is being undertaken against land grabbing?

There are two broad types of resistance linked to contemporary land grabbing. The first type is a defensive struggle to resist expulsion of people from the land, or resistance against the appropriation of their water resources or community forest. The second type is a pro-active struggle where local communities occupy and enclose their land, water or forest and develop alternative livelihoods and production systems such as agro-ecology that challenge the dominant model of industrial development. Both types are life-and-death struggles for many people.

The most successful struggles often use a multiple range of tactics including direct action, mass mobilisation and legal strategies and work hard at linking with other sectors and putting pressure at all the key points in the ‘chain’ of dispossession/adverse incorporation.

Example 1. Building alliances to break out of isolation and ‘leap frog’ resistance against sugarcane expansion in Cambodia

A rapid expansion of the sugar industry in Cambodia in recent years has affected some 12,000 people in over 75,000 hectares of land concessions granted to private investors in three provinces of Koh Kong, Kampong Speu, and Oddar Meanchey. In response, the affected peasant farmer communities in all three provinces joined forces to file a complaint in the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, given that one of the investors is a Thai company (KSL). Thai farmers, through the Thai Contract Farmer Network, are supporting their Cambodian counterparts in this action, calling on the Thai company and the Thai government to address the human rights violations that are occurring as a result of this land grab. As a result of this public pressure in both countries, in 2010, another Thai company (DSW) divested from the KSL.

That same year the affected farming communities in Cambodia, together with national and international NGOs, launched the Clean Sugar Campaign (www.cleansugarcampaign.net), which aims to raise awareness among European consumers, and to target the buyers of ‘blood sugar’ in Europe as well as the EU trade policy called ‘Everything But Arms’ that are driving the expansion of sugarcane plantations in Cambodia. The campaign holds foreign (especially EU) actors as partly responsible for the land
grabbing and its impacts of loss of land and livelihoods and violations of human rights, and demanding the European Commission to address and remedy the situation.

This ‘leap-frog’ strategy, which links local struggles with international actors, aims to bring additional pressure from the outside to bear where Cambodian farmers’ efforts alone may not be enough to halt and roll back the expanding sugar-driven land grab.

**Example 2. Building Maya–Q’eqchi identity and agro-ecology in resistance to land grabbing by sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses in the northern lowlands of Guatemala**

Since the mid-2000s Maya-Q’eqchi peoples in northern Guatemala have been affected by a new wave of land grabbing, mainly by domestic business elites for production of sugarcane and oil palm.

This is happening in several ways. One way is through long-term leases, purchases and contract-farming agreements with large estate owners and ranchers. Another way is through land purchases from economically distressed and vulnerable small and medium peasant-farmers; often these transactions are reinforced by coercion or the threat of coercion. Still another way is via a contract-farming programme that brings together peasants, the oil palm industry and the government. Taken together, these various types of land deals have concentrated land ownership while transforming vast tracts of land from forest and food production for household and local and national markets, into large islands of industrial sugarcane and oil palm production. In the process, most of the dispossessed indigenous-peasant and tenant farmer families received payment for their land or their labor duties that was well below what they needed either to boost their non-farm livelihoods, or to regain access to land elsewhere.

Facing largely insufficient and precarious employment in the plantations and an open dismissal and attack by the agribusinesses on their well-established practices of governing land, natural resources and population, many Maya-Q’eqchi’ groups and communities have emphasised their shared identity as R’al Ch’och (‘Sons and Daughters of the Earth’) in their resistance to corporate land deals and to assert their control over their territories. This has resulted, on the one hand, in contentious collective political action i.e., sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses have been criticised and labeled as ‘unwelcome’ by different Q’eqchi’ community and municipal level governance
institutions. On the other hand, facing a weakened (and usually unwilling) state to support their peasant farming livelihoods, ‘Campesino a Campesino’ (Peasant to Peasant) agro-ecological knowledge exchanges are carried out with a view to secure livelihoods and prevent further dispossession. Emphasis on agro-ecological production is complemented with a drive to increase control over local food markets: Two regional self-organized ‘peasant markets’ (where non-peasant merchants are not allowed) are running twice a week in the towns of Chisec and Raxruhá.

Non-compliant Q’eqchi’ people are censored as anti-development by mainstream media and have been prosecuted. However, they have gained support from militant rural social movements, NGOs, the social pastoral wing of the Catholic Church, some scholars and even some (local) state officials. The struggle goes on.


Example 3. Building redes against paramilitaries and banana businessmen

The case study of Banacol and the Lower Atrato region of Chocó, Colombia

Afro-Colombian and Mestizo communities in Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó, in the Lower Atrato region of Choco, have resisted invasion and land grabbing for generations. The communities, dependent for their livelihoods on shifting food production and livestock grazing, as well as for hunting and fishing, have suffered from counter-insurgency, paramilitary violence, and encroachment on their territories by banana and oil palm agribusinesses, logging and mining companies, cattle ranchers, and drug-traffickers. Some of the groups are linked to the banana transnational Banacol, which markets its products in Europe through different Dutch and Belgian firms. To counter this complex nexus of domestic and international capital, paramilitary and state violence the Afro-Colombian and Mestizo populations organised themselves into ‘redes’ (assemblages, more than networks32) linking diverse entities such as social movement organisations, local radio networks, women’s associations, and international solidarity movements. They did this not only to defend their land but also to foster the construction of ‘new existential territories’. They also declared their communities ‘Humanitarian Zones’ and parts of their territory as ‘Biodiversity Zones’, with the aim of defending themselves and more pro-actively developing alternative land use plans, low external input agriculture and culturally appropriate educational systems. The redes had some success, with
legal victories supporting their claims to land in the Constitutional Court and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; and the State Council order in 2010 to evict some of the bad-faith invaders. Even so, the material land restitution has not been yet been fully achieved. Afro-Colombian and Mestizo peoples keep on struggling in redes for dignity and life to blossom again in their territories.


**Further reading:**


Endnotes

1 “Food-importing countries with land and water constraints but rich in capital, such as the Gulf States, are at the forefront of new investments in farmland abroad. In addition, countries with large populations and food security concerns such as China, South Korea, and India are seeking opportunities to produce food overseas. These investments are targeted toward developing countries where production costs are much lower and where land and water are more abundant” (IFPRI Policy Brief 13, April 2009).


8 World Bank (2010). p. 36.


19 White et al. (2012), pp. 627-628.
27 The Hands Off the Land alliance is currently preparing a report about land grabbing in Europe, undertaken with the European Coordination of Via Campesina, which is due for release in April 2013.
31 http://terra0nullius.wordpress.com/resources/2012-resources/2012-07-cambodia-nmg-statement-on-koh-kong-trial/
AGRARIAN JUSTICE PROGRAMME

In recent years, various actors, from big foreign and domestic corporate business and finance to governments, have initiated a large-scale worldwide enclosure of agricultural lands, mostly in the Global South but also elsewhere. This is done for large-scale industrial and industrial agriculture ventures and often packaged as large-scale investment for rural development. But rather than being investment that is going to benefit the majority of rural people, especially the poorest and most vulnerable, this process constitutes a new wave of land and water ‘grabbing’. It is a global phenomenon whereby the access, use and right to land and other closely associated natural resources is being taken over - on a large-scale and/or by large-scale capital – resulting in a cascade of negative impacts on rural livelihoods and ecologies, human rights, and local food security.

In this context TNI aims to contribute to strengthening the campaigns by agrarian social movements in order to make them more effective in resisting land and water grabbing; and in developing and advancing alternatives such as land/food/water sovereignty and agro-ecological farming systems.

http://www.tni.org/work-area/agrarian-justice
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