

THE EMERGING ECONOMIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE

A CASE STUDY OF
THE BASIC GROUPING

PRAFUL BIDWAI



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Among the most dramatic and far-reaching geopolitical developments of the post-Cold War era is the shift in the locus of global power away from the West with the simultaneous emergence as major powers of former colonies and other countries in the South, which were long on the periphery of international capitalism. As they clock rapid GDP growth, these “emerging economies” are trying to assert their new identities and interests in a variety of ways. These include a demand for reforming the structures of global governance and the United Nations system (especially the Security Council) and the formation of new plurilateral blocs and associations among nations which seek to challenge or counterbalance existing patterns of dominance in world economic and political affairs.

BASIC, made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, which acts as a bloc in the negotiations under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is perhaps the most sharply focused of all these groupings. Beginning with the Copenhagen climate summit of 2009, BASIC has played a major role in shaping the negotiations which were meant to, but have failed to, reach an agreement on cooperative climate actions and obligations on the part of different countries and country-groups to limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions, warn scientists, are dangerously warming up the Earth and causing irreversible changes in the world’s climate system.

Long, complex and tortuous, the climate talks – termed the most important negotiations ever to take place in world history – could determine the survival and well-being of humanity for centuries to come. Already, BASIC has clearly altered the UNFCCC negotiations field and the relative weights of its major players. How it deals with the substantive issues at stake, and how its climate diplomacy develops, will have historic consequences for the success or failure of the climate talks, and in the long term, our planet.

BASIC’s DUAL AGENDA

The BASIC countries are four disparate entities, obviously dissimilar in many respects in their domestic characteristics and priorities. Even their international negotiating agenda is, bluntly put, Janus-faced, with contradictory features. The “positive” aspect of the agenda – interpreted charitably, but rarely stated in such explicit terms by BASIC itself – is to act as a bridge between the industrialised North and the developing South in the climate negotiations; defend equity in climate actions and burden-sharing against Northern pressure; and demand a legally binding global climate agreement. Until recently, this last took the form of demanding an extension beyond 2012 of the Kyoto Protocol, which despite its flaws and limitations, has been the world’s sole legally-enforceable agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The “negative” or conservative and “inward-looking” aspect of the agenda aims at resisting binding climate obligations or quantitative caps on the BASIC countries even at the cost of promoting an ineffectual climate agreement – so as to maintain their present, unsustainable, domestic pattern of elite overconsumption and continue with their emissions-intensive high GDP-growth path. One could argue that the positive aspect is merely a cover for the negative one.

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There are many uncertainties over the unity and future course of BASIC and its negotiating priorities and strategies. As we see below, two of its key members, China and India, are already trying out a parallel or “outreach” approach based on the newly set up Like-Minded Developing Countries group, which includes some important oil-producing countries, but excludes Brazil and South Africa. Will this succeed in strengthening and broadening the BASIC agenda and reuniting the G77? Or will it weaken it and sow discord and disunity within the BASIC bloc? There are no clear answers to these questions, but they need to be asked in ways which allow an informed debate and at least intelligent speculation.

The BASIC countries derive their strength and political leadership in part from the legacy of the G77, originally set up in the mid-1960s as part of an agenda to promote equality between the South and the North and a New International Economic Order. The group was founded at the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Its strength has since grown to 133, a majority of the world’s nations.

The G77 – or more accurately, G77 plus China, which is formally not a member but a close associate and always works in coordination with the members proper – has acted as the main negotiating group for the South on environment and development issues in all major UN forums, including the Stockholm Conference of 1972 on the Human Environment, processes leading to the Rio de Janeiro summit of 1992, the creation of the UNFCCC, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.

PRINCIPLE OF DIFFERENTIATION

The G77 has played, with other sub-groups and regional alliances, a significant role in various multilateral negotiations, including those on trade, development, social issues such as gender, population and race, and United Nations reform. Over the years, it successfully introduced in the founding principles and operational practices of these organisations and forums the right to development as an indisputable right and the notion of differential responsibility between the North and the South, arising from their disparate starting points and levels of development.

The G77 also played a pivotal role in drawing up the ground rules of climate negotiations under the UNFCCC and these notions and concepts became enshrined in the Convention as the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR). This demarcates the North’s climate obligations from the South’s and casts a heavier burden of responsibility on the industrially developed countries, called Annex 1¹ under the Convention, in keeping with their higher contribution to global warming and climate change.

When the BASIC group was formed in 2009, the four countries claimed to have anchored themselves within the G77, and saw themselves as part of it. Even before the bloc’s formal establishment, they had acted as an informal component or subgroup inside the G77. However, the very creation of the BASIC bloc soon triggered complications for the G77, on which more below.

The G77 legacy allowed the BASIC countries to claim a special relationship with the South’s developing nations. However, three of the BASIC countries – China, India and Brazil – are unique in terms of their size and clout compared to other developing nations: together they represent about two-fifths of the globe’s population, and almost one-fifth of its GDP.² For more than two decades, they recorded much higher rates of growth than the rest of the world. The Great Recession, which began in 2008, has significantly slowed their economies, but taken as a collective, their growth remains more robust than that of the US, the European Union or Japan. This is especially true of China, whose GDP growth hovered around 10 per cent throughout the 2000s and is presently around eight per cent.³

REGIONAL GIANTS, GLOBAL PLAYERS

Individually, each BASIC country is a major regional power. China, Brazil and South Africa all account for over 30 per cent of their respective region's total GDP. In China's case, the proportion is 35 per cent, a significant slice in a region that comprises all of East Asia and the Pacific, including Japan. India's share in South Asia's GDP is even higher, at 80 per cent.⁴

Yet, BASIC members all claim to be developing countries and assert their right to economic development as incontrovertible and of paramount importance, especially as regards to eradicating domestic poverty, which is significant to high in all of them. But, their large and fast-growing economies, ever-increasing rates of energy consumption, and relatively high current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (which are rising much faster than the global average) set them apart. They also have a greater financial and technological capacity for climate actions than the vast majority of G77 members.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the BASIC countries collectively accounted for 32 per cent of the global total of carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in 2010.²

According to the IEA, Brazil's estimated emissions for 2010 were about 390 million tonnes, up 100 per cent over 1990; South Africa's were close to 350 million tonnes, up 38 per cent over 1990. BASIC's two biggest players registered even more rapid growth between 1990 and 2010: Chinese emissions more than tripled, spurring by 224 per cent to over 7,200 million tonnes, and India's emissions rose by 179 per cent to over 1,620 million tonnes. By contrast, the world's overall CO₂ emissions growth in 1990–2010 was a more modest, but still dangerous, 44 per cent.

China currently accounts for 24 per cent of global emissions (compared to the United States' 18 per cent), while India is responsible for a little over 5 per cent. The IEA expects China's emissions to rise annually by 1.4 per cent till 2035, reaching 40 per cent higher levels than at present. India's emissions are projected to grow at a much faster 3.5 per cent a year. By 2035, EIA expects energy consumption by 2035 to increase 84 percent in nations such as China and India that sit outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

At the same time, however, the BASIC nations are markedly different in economic structure, consumption patterns and emissions profiles from the industrialised countries of the North. The differences are particularly glaring if historical or cumulative emissions are considered. The North accounts for about three-fourths of the carbon dioxide accumulated in the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution. The US alone accounts for 29 per cent of the world total, and the European Union's 25 members are responsible for 26.5 per cent. By contrast, taken together, the BASIC states account for just 12 per cent of cumulative historical emissions.⁶

Yet, because of their economic strength and rapid growth, and particularly because of their current and likely future GHG emissions, as well as the urgent need to make global emissions peak by the end of this decade, the BASIC countries have been under rising pressure to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. This pressure comes both from the industrialised North and from some countries of the South, especially those more vulnerable to climate change such as the small island states.

The pressure grew especially after 2007, when China surpassed the United States as the world's biggest GHG emitter, and India overtook Japan to become the world's fourth largest emitter.⁷

GROWING PRESSURE FROM THE NORTH

Another source of pressure was the launch of a series of summit-level plurilateral meetings of the major and emerging powers at the initiative of the G8. Thus began the G8 plus Five Dialogue on Climate and

Energy in 2005, attended by China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. In 2007, then US president, George W. Bush convened the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change, which was soon converted into the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.

The meetings of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate treated all their participants more or less equally as major emitters, without much differentiation in their contribution to climate change and certainly with no acceptance of principles such as CBDR. In this forum, the BASIC countries felt the heat as terms such as “advanced developing countries” and “major economies” were bandied about. Principles like CBDR, their US interlocutors told them bluntly, would no longer apply to their category of countries. According to Indian diplomats, the G8, including Russia – now recovering from a long slump, buoyed up by a commodities boom – were fairly united in mounting pressure on the Five for ambitious climate actions.

External pressure was among the main factors that catalysed the four countries to coordinate their climate negotiations policies and activities more closely in the lead-up to the Copenhagen conference of December 2009, officially called the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-15). But it was not the sole factor. The commonalities and overlapping of mutual concerns highlighted during these meetings and the UNFCCC climate talks, and their ambitions to play a greater role in world affairs, also impelled the four governments towards forming a bloc.

Another major factor that facilitated this process was a political thaw between China and India since the late 1980s, and particularly from mid-1996, which not only resulted in agreements on peace and tranquillity along the (disputed) border and increased trade, but greater coordination in the climate negotiations. Ministerial visits were exchanged in 2009, which produced the “Sino-Indian Memorandum on Climate Change” in October that year, only weeks before the Copenhagen conference. The would-be BASIC countries were also apprehensive that the Danish Chair could start a parallel negotiation at Copenhagen at the behest of the Northern countries, with a view to “ambushing” them.⁸

All these factors, bolstered by the mutual trust generated within the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) group⁹ through prolonged interaction and consultation on a range of issues since 2003, clinched the decision to set up BASIC.

The BASIC countries were keen that they should not be seen as having broken ranks with the G77. Their environment ministers started meeting every quarter and also during UNFCCC conferences to share information and exchange views. After the Cancun climate conference of 2010, they invited to the meetings the Chair of the G77, and a representative each from the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) or the Africa Group. The joint statements issued by BASIC environment ministers usually signal common points of relevance for immediate negotiations and input/orientation to discussions within G77 as well as to developing-country negotiating partners.¹⁰ However, BASIC-G77 interactions have tended to be more symbolic than substantive, as the Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban and Doha climate conferences showed.

Why did the four countries that were to form BASIC not try to rope in Russia, which shares within the BRICS framework their concern to limit US, and in general Western, dominance in the world? To start with, unlike BASIC, Russia is an Annex I country under the UNFCCC, and hence on the other side of the climate divide. Nor does it share with the BASIC group the developing-country G77 legacy or their commitment to CBDR. The history of Russia’s negotiating positions in the UNFCCC is also markedly different from theirs.

Russia’s stiffening opposition to the Kyoto Protocol sets it apart from BASIC. Russia stands to gain from the first phase (called “commitment period” in the legalese) of the Protocol, which ended in December 2012. It has no effective emissions reduction obligations under this, and in fact stands to profit from the surplus emission (known as “hot air”) permits it has gained because of the severe contraction of its economy following the collapse of the Soviet Union economy around the time the Climate Convention was negotiated.

But Russia could lose a good deal if the effectiveness of the Protocol is extended through a second “commitment period” (KP-CP2) under which it is asked to accept significant emissions reduction obligations. So Russia opposes a KP-CP2 while BASIC strongly support and canvass for it.

COLLUSION WITH THE US AT COPENHAGEN

However, it would be a mistake to assume that a great deal of deep deliberation and policy analysis leading to a tight consensus went into the formation of BASIC. It developed its common positions on an *ad hoc*, rather than a principled and well-considered basis both before and at the Copenhagen climate conference and indeed, to a large extent, beyond it.

The principal rationale underlying these positions was, first, to resist any dilution of the CBDR principle, and second, to refuse and avert any legally binding quantitative commitments to reduce their own GHG emissions in the foreseeable future, even if this would result in a weak and ineffectual climate regime falling far short of what is necessary to stabilise the climate. In this second objective, the four found an ally in the US, which also does not want legally binding emissions obligations.

Their common interests became evident at the Copenhagen conference. BASIC played a decisive role in forging its outcome, the Copenhagen Accord, drafted jointly with the US in closed-door talks in the last hours of the conference, when President Obama famously walked into a small informal meeting where BASIC's top leaders were present. The five states –representing some of the world's biggest historical, current and future emitters –hammered out the Accord.

It was not only the G77 that was excluded from the talks, but also the European Union and other Annex 1 countries. Despite this, the EU lined up behind the Accord. Also excluded were the least developed countries (LDCs) and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and all the regional groupings. The Accord was accepted by another 20-odd states of the 193 present at Copenhagen. However, because of the objections of a number of states, it was not formally adopted by the COP, but in the months following more than 120 countries “associated” themselves with the Copenhagen Accord.

The Accord was a radical departure from the science- and equity-based approach followed earlier, including the Bali Action Plan of 2007, to arrive at differential obligations in keeping with the CBDR principle. Although the Accord recognised “the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius”, it specified no date on the critical issue of when GHG concentrations must peak. Nor did it set global, country- or group-specific emissions quotas in keeping with the requirements of climate science.

Instead, the Accord adopted a voluntary approach, paving the way for individual states to write their own mitigation pledges in future UNFCCC documents and conferences in keeping with considerations of expediency and the least possible burden. The only condition was that progress in meeting individual country pledges would be monitored – a version of the US-advocated “pledge and review” approach. Ultimately, the Annex 1 countries, as we see below, wrote far weaker pledges than developing countries. And the BASIC countries ended up accepting far more onerous commitments than their industrialised counterparts.

BULLYING AND BRIBING THE VULNERABLE

By co-sponsoring the Copenhagen Accord, the BASIC countries contradicted their own stated position as part of the G77 bloc, which had explicitly demanded in a resolution an equitable top-down agreement that would impose differential obligations upon different countries, including deep emissions cuts on Annex 1 countries “in line with what the science requires”. The G77 demanded that the Annex 1 “stand

firmly in the [Kyoto Protocol]” and “engage seriously in negotiations for a second commitment period” for it. The G77 warned that it would “consider the Copenhagen COP meeting to be a disastrous failure” if there is no agreement on this. BASIC broke ranks with the G77, effectively splintering the group, although it continued to pay lip service to South-South solidarity.

WikiLeaks disclosures, released in December 2010 while the next UNFCCC conference was in progress, at Cancun, showed that the US used “strong-arm” tactics and bribery in 2009 to win a series of concessions in the run-up to Copenhagen and beyond, especially from vulnerable Southern countries, such as AOSIS and the LDCs.

The US sought and obtained damaging intelligence on Southern diplomats so as to discredit or blackmail them. Some cables from the US Embassy in Brussels described meetings between US Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economic Affairs Michael Froman and top EU officials as they plotted to influence Southern governments and cynically exploited the financial needs of the AOSIS countries in particular. Michael Froman told his European colleagues that the Western countries “needed to work much more closely” together to counter the increasing influence of India and China and “avoid future train wrecks on climate, Doha [trade talks] or financial regulatory reform”. A cable from the US Embassy in Brussels in February 2010 said EU officials welcomed Froman’s call to “push back against coordinated opposition of BASIC countries ... It is remarkable how closely coordinated the BASIC group of countries have become in international fora, taking turns to impede US/EU initiatives and playing the US and EU off against each other”, the cable quoted Froman as saying in talks with EU officials. “The US and EU need to learn from this coordination... to better handle third-country obstructionism and avoid future train wrecks...”¹¹

THE GIGATONNE GAP

The pressure and blackmailing tactics helped shift the climate agenda in favour of industrialised nations. The developing countries caved in and accepted in principle that they would submit their voluntary mitigation actions to “international consultations and analysis”. By the time of Cancun, formally stated legal opposition to the framework of the Copenhagen Accord had been reduced to one sole dissenting voice, that of Bolivia. A weak but at least binding international regime had been replaced by an empty voluntary statement of intentions.

Moreover “international consultation and analysis” (ICA) requirements on developing nations had been increased. Even though it is not as stringent as the Measurement Reporting and Verification (MRV) requirements for developing countries that are financially supported by the North, ICA allows Northern governments to scrutinise and comment upon Southern governments’ mitigation actions even when they are not financially supporting these.¹² The Northern countries’ climate actions are subject to a different, weaker, process, of scrutiny from ICA, called International Assessment and Review (IAR). Given the unequal technical capacities of the developed and developing countries, this further increased North-South climate inequity and emboldened some Annex 1 countries to adopt more aggressive postures in the climate talks.

This became evident as different countries wrote out their voluntary pledges at Cancun and after. These fall grossly short of what is needed to avert a climate catastrophe. If the world is to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century, which is the highest climate scientists say the Earth can tolerate, global GHG emissions must peak by 2013 or so and decline thereafter.^{13 14}

However, thanks to the failures of the UNFCCC process, including the Copenhagen Accord, the mitigation pledges of the world’s nations do not remotely measure up to this. A huge “gigatonne gap” stares the world in the face. This is the difference between the likely global emissions total after the cuts pledged by various governments, and what is necessary to cap atmospheric GHG concentrations and keep global

warming at *relatively* safe levels. The major nations lack the political will to get out of their fossil fuel addiction and embrace low-carbon development.

As of now, total voluntary emissions reduction pledges add up to only about 60 per cent of the cuts needed by 2020 to limit global warming over the 21st century to 2° C. Even these pledges are ambivalent, or hedged with all manner of conditions and varying degrees of leniency in the application of accounting rules. Since the pledges are voluntary, there is no assurance that they will be translated into action. The past record in this respect is dismal, even where, as in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, legally binding commitments were involved.¹⁵

Even assuming the best scenario, in which all the pledges made after the Copenhagen summit are implemented, there will still be a substantial deficit of the order of eight gigatonnes (Gt) in relation to the critical threshold. In worse scenarios – where countries follow their lowest ambitions, and accounting rules are lax – the gap would rise to 13 Gt. In the extreme case, the pledges could even permit emissions to *exceed* the business-as-usual (BAU) projections, with frightful consequences.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PLEDGE MORE THAN DEVELOPED COUNTERPARTS

An odious feature of the emissions reduction pledges is the gross disparity between rich and poor countries that further entrenches climate injustice. The Annex I countries' pledges range from almost nothing to a collective maximum of 3.8 Gt by 2020, depending on the level of ambition expressed, the conditions included (for example, a new legally binding deal which includes China and India), and the leniency or strictness with which accounting rules are applied.

By contrast, according to UNEP's estimate, the developing countries' pledges for 2020 range from roughly 3.6 Gt to 5.2 Gt. The developing countries collectively pledge 37 to 220 per cent *deeper* emissions cuts than the developed countries. This is horribly iniquitous.¹⁶

Even the BASIC countries have not succeeded in averting ambitious pledges for themselves. The Stockholm Environment Institute has done a meta-analysis which shows that the non-Annex I top polluters, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico and South Korea have made far higher pledges than the top six polluters of the North, including the US, the European Union, Japan, Russia, Canada and Australia. The differences, depending on ambition levels, conditions imposed, and leniency of accounting, range from about 40 per cent to 300 per cent plus.

At the end of the day, the Annex I countries have totally failed to fulfil their climate obligations in keeping with the Climate Convention. Both the G77 and BASIC rightly pointed this out and demanded more from the Annex I, including a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, after the first phase ran out in 2012.

The Durban and Doha Conference of Parties (COPs) failed to breathe life into the Protocol and instead launched negotiations on an altogether new track, where all countries – irrespective of their level of economic development or contribution to global emissions – will have to undertake climate obligations. In effect, the CBDR principle at the heart of the Climate Convention has been bypassed, if not altogether gutted.

AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC PLANS

In their domestic programmes, the BASIC countries have over the past few years been trying to reduce the energy and carbon intensity of their production, promote renewable energy, and develop clean

technology sectors. Their starting point, of course particularly for China, India and South Africa, is that their economies are deeply wedded to coal and an ideology of rapid economic growth. This explains why they are also the cause of the main current growth in emissions today. Nevertheless, it is significant that China, India and Brazil have become the South's leaders in driving the Renewable Energy Revolution now under way in the world. The South now hosts *53 per cent* of the global generation capacity in "new renewables" such as solar and wind.¹⁷

The South's emergence in wind power is especially strong. It is overtaking Europe, which about a decade ago became the main driver of the world wind market because of favourable domestic policies. By 2009, more than three-quarters of the additional capacity installed globally was outside Europe.

China now has the world's highest capacity in new renewables, and India the fifth largest. China ranked second in the world in new capacity investment in renewables in 2009. India ranked fifth both in total wind power installed and wind power added in 2009. China now produces 40 per cent of the world's solar PV supply, 30 per cent of wind turbines (up from 10 per cent in 2007), and 77 per cent of solar hot-water collectors.¹⁸ China added 37 GW of renewable power capacity, more than any other country in the world, to reach 226 GW of total renewables capacity.¹⁹

Developing countries now account for over half of all countries with some type of renewable energy promotion policy (42 out of 83 countries), and they also make up half of all countries with specific policy targets (45 out of 85 countries).²⁰ This new geography of renewable energy points to a very different energy development model from the past, when the North maintained its dominance for decades, and the South merely followed. It also injects, at least potentially, a new element of equity into the global energy scenario, with hugely interesting possibilities, on which more later.

All the BASIC countries have made voluntary pledges to reduce either the emissions intensity of their production or their emissions in absolute terms by 2020. For instance, China has offered to reduce the emissions intensity of its economy by 40-45 per cent (from its 2005 level by 2020), and India by 20-25 per cent (over the same time-span, barring in agriculture.) Similarly, Brazil and South Africa have made emissions reduction pledges exceeding 30 per cent in relation to business-as-usual scenarios.

These pledges stand in contrast to the North's failures to take climate actions that are proportionate to its responsibility for causing climate change. However like the North's major emitters, these pledges are premised upon certain conditions and in the case of South Africa at least based on a scenario that even government officials admitted was "neither robust nor plausible."²¹ They certainly do not mark a clear departure from the BASIC countries' obsession with GDP growth along a Northern-biased model. They also fall well short of what is needed. To improve on it, they must effect a paradigm change in their model of development, in particular, energy use, such that peoples needs and rights are met in an equitable manner and within ecological boundaries.

BASIC COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS AND INTERNAL DIFFERENCES

The BASIC countries form a negotiating bloc in the UNFCCC and by and large work together. But they are four different countries with divergent characteristics, priorities and strategies. Their economies differ widely in size and sectoral composition, as do their emissions profiles. China is unique as a highly industrialised export-oriented economy, with total emissions rising at almost twice the global rate. South Africa's and Brazil's per capita emissions are of the same order as the EU-15's, and China's are nearing that level, while India's are close to the LDCs' emissions.

Tonnes CO₂e per capita (including land-use, land-use change and deforestation) for 2010

Brazil	10.96
China	7.54
India	1.88
South Africa	11.20
Australia	33.38
France	8.17
Germany	11.33
UK	10.06
US	21.90

Source: CAIT 2.0: WRI climate data explorer. Accessed 28 October 2013.

BRAZIL

Brazil, endowed with rich forests, has a relatively clean energy profile and derives 45 per cent of its primary energy from renewable sources, compared to 13 per cent globally. Three-fourths or more of the country's electricity comes from hydropower, including a growing number of controversial mega-dams. Brazil's energy-related per capita emissions are just about 5 tonnes of CO₂-equivalent, the world's 17th lowest. But if land-use and forestry-related emissions are included, Brazil becomes the world's fourth-highest emitter, with per capita emissions of 12 tonnes, higher than EU-15's.²²

A critical climate issue in Brazil is deforestation, which it pledges to tackle with a plan to reduce GHG emissions by 36 to 39 per cent by 2020 in relation to business-as-usual. At the same time, however, Brazil has embarked on agro-industrial expansion in savannah lands, which is leading to an increase in emissions. Brazil is distinguished from other BASIC states by its emphasis on an agreement on reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), and by its openness to a climate deal with binding targets provided finance and technology are made available by the North. Within BASIC, Brazil is described as "cautious" even the "odd party", in not rejecting binding commitments, as China and India do.

Brazil's participation in BASIC "appears to be propelled by a growing awareness that it may well have to negotiate concrete targets and commitments soon, and thus it may be better off joining forces with those in a similar situation to develop a joint agenda and shared priorities." However, given its "particular climate change priorities", Brazil could be "interested in joining other groupings if that served its purposes better."²³

Brazil hosted the 1992 Rio summit and also the Rio+20 conference in June 2012, which have given it a positive independent profile, but also made for a less activist role within BASIC. Contradictions in its domestic policies may also be inhibiting its capacity to take a leading role in climate negotiations, given the enthusiasm with which Petrobras, the state-owned oil company, is seeking and finding massive new oil reserves, and the environmentally destructive and emissions-producing expansion of agro-industry and agro-fuels.²⁴

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa, which hosted the COP 17 in Durban in 2011, is marked by high energy-related emissions (almost 80 per cent of the total), with heavy dependence on coal for three-fourths of its primary energy

supply. According to the International Energy Association (IEA), unless South Africa makes radically new energy choices its emissions will quadruple between 2003 and 2050.

South Africa's per capita emissions (2005) are about nine tonnes of CO₂-equivalent, in the same order as those of the EU-27 and almost double the BASIC average. This is not only attributable to the energy-intensive character of the country's industry, but also its dependence on exports and its high levels of elite overconsumption in one of the most unequal societies in the world. South Africa drew up a National Climate Change Response Green Paper and is considering the levying of an economy-wide carbon tax. At Copenhagen, South Africa pledged a 34 per cent reduction in its emissions below business-as-usual in 2020 and 42 per cent by 2025 provided financial, technological and capacity-building support is made available.

South Africa sees its participation in BASIC as "a vehicle for international recognition and clout". The country "has been eager to portray itself as a strong and stable economy, and a partner for African investment. A 'developing country identity' does not always suit this purpose, whereas cooperation with major emerging economies sends a signal to foreign investors that South Africa is in a different league."²⁵

At the 2011 Durban conference which South Africa hosted, it together with Brazil broke ranks with the formal BASIC position to say it would be willing to accept mandatory cuts. In late 2013, South Africa formally stated that the new global agreement on climate change (to start in 2020) should be in the form of a protocol with targets, commitments and actions for all parties – Annex I and developing countries.

Nevertheless, the South Africa government has a long way to convince its own civil society groups that it is paying more than lip service to climate concerns. Climate Justice Network South Africa were particularly scathing of South Africa's record in the run-up to the Cancun conference:

"South Africa is a prime example of what countries across the globe are doing. Talking green and attempting to co-opt the language of climate justice, but whose investment decisions are overwhelmingly in the fossil fuel industry; South Africa's own energy plan (IRP2) for the next 30 years involves an expansion of coal-fired power stations, both publicly and privately owned. Follow the money; the road to environmental collapse is paved with state money for cheap power for multinational corporations."

INDIA

India has the largest number of absolutely poor people of any country of the world, estimated at 40 per cent-plus of its population of 1.2 billion. But they account for a tiny proportion both of India's total GHG emissions and of the 58 per cent increase in its emissions that occurred between 1994 and 2007.²⁶ Because of its 7,500 kilometre-long coastline, vulnerability to cyclones on the East Coast, the dependence of its major river systems on the Himalayan glaciers (which are melting rapidly), and loss of forests and wetlands, India is especially vulnerable to climate change.

India's annual per capita emissions are low at 1.9 tonnes and only about one-third of the world average. This number reflects not so much the efficiency of the economy or frugal use of energy, as the prevalence of huge rich-poor disparities and lack of access to electricity for two-fifths of the population.²⁷

More than half of India's emissions are accounted for by the energy sector. Sixty-eight per cent of India's electricity comes from coal, and another 12 per cent from gas. Although renewable energy generation, especially from wind turbines, is growing, it still remains small in comparison to energy from fossil fuels.

India's GHG emissions are projected to grow at a high 3.5 per cent a year, and the country will double its share of total global emissions by 2035 from 5 per cent (in 2010).

India drew up a National Action Plan on Climate Change in 2008, with eight “missions” dealing with different categories, from promoting solar power and energy efficiency, to agriculture, water and the Himalayan ecosystem. This was done in haste, and driven by an anxiety to ward off international pressure for a more proactive climate policy. Some of these “missions” have not yet been finalised or fully fleshed out. The most significant are the solar and energy efficiency missions.

India is a strong advocate of multilateralism in climate matters and boasts of a leadership role in the G77, although this has been weakened by BASIC’s formation and evolution. India categorically refuses binding climate obligations, strongly insists on equity and the CBDR principle, and demands equal per capita entitlement for every person to global natural resources. The only constraint India accepts on its emissions is that they will never exceed those of the North in per capita terms.

India is credited with having played a proactive role in brokering the Copenhagen Accord and in breaking an impasse at the Cancun conference over international verification of the South’s actions by agreeing to ICA, discussed above. At Cancun, India also worked with non-BASIC countries to insert the phrase “equitable access to sustainable development” in the Shared Vision text – a milder formulation than “equitable access to carbon space”, which invokes rights and entitlements.

CHINA

China, the world’s second largest economy and its most populous country, and its largest exporter, is in a special category of its own, and will have a make or break impact on the climate. Sixty-seven per cent of China’s energy consumption comes from coal and 17 per cent from gas. The world’s fastest growing economy for more than 20 years, China is scouring the world for natural resources, including land, oil and gas.

China is also investing heavily in renewable energy. It is the world’s top producer of solar-photovoltaic cells and modules. At present, the majority is exported however the domestic market is anticipated to grow under current energy plans. Lately, China became the world’s greatest installer of wind turbines with a capacity reaching 62,733 megawatts in 2011.

China launched its *Medium to Long-Term Renewable Energy Plan* in 2007 mandating an enlargement of the share of renewables in the total energy mix from 5 per cent in 2005 to 15 per cent in 2020. This has already been exceeded: in 2012, 25 per cent of China’s generated electricity came from “renewable” sources, although hydro provided more than 20 per cent while wind and solar combined contributed less than 5 per cent.²⁸ Post-Copenhagen, in early 2010, China announced its UNFCCC pledges to reduce carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40–45 per cent by 2020 compared to 2005 levels, raise the level of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 15 per cent, and increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares.²⁹

China has been under growing pressure to take a more proactive and “responsible” stand in the UNFCCC negotiations as an economic superpower, but continues to see itself as a developing country, which must, as Deng Xiaoping decreed in the early 1990s, “bide our time and build our capabilities”.³⁰ China tries to reduce its vulnerability on the climate change issue by seeking support and cover from its BASIC colleagues on resisting stringent climate action commitments.

BASIC’S LIMITATIONS & RELATIONS WITH THE G77

The BASIC grouping only emerged recently and has not yet fully evolved its cohering principles, structures, procedures and positions. It is not easy to divine from BASIC ministerial statements what the group considers to be the critical fault-lines in the negotiations, and how its individual members will act. For instance, what galvanised the deal at Cancun in December 2010 was not only an agreement on continuing with the

Copenhagen voluntary pledges, but also on the International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) process of scrutiny of the South's climate actions. BASIC and many G77 members had earlier resisted ICA, but caved-in at Cancun.

Certainly BASIC nations can no longer count on full support from the G77. The South's smaller countries, especially the LDCs and SIDS, no longer feel the sense of solidarity with the big emerging countries as they earlier did. They know that BASIC has graduated to another league and they expect its members to take on climate-related obligations. India has four LDCs in its neighbourhood – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal – and feels the heat from them on the climate issue. The smaller, poorer countries of Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America have rising climate-related expectations from China, South Africa and Brazil.

The result has been that G77 has splintered and spawned other smaller blocs and groupings such as the Least Developed Countries group (LDCs), AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) and SIDS (Small Island Developing States), besides BASIC.

EU SHIFTS THE DURBAN GOALPOSTS TO CORNER BASIC

Some Northern countries, not least the US, have also been pushing the smaller of the G77 states to demand more from BASIC than from the Annex I countries. This became starkly evident at Durban and Doha, where a concerted effort was made to isolate BASIC and sideline the CBDR issue. At Durban, the EU deviously shifted the goalposts by dropping its earlier demand for Kyoto's unconditional extension post-2012, to making the extension conditional upon an agreement under which all countries would accept climate obligations under a new deal to be signed by 2015. The EU effectively abandoned its earlier alliance with G77 states and its emphasis on deep emissions cuts. It managed to mobilise AOSIS and the LDCs behind itself and to form a numerically strong group to corner the BASIC countries and push them into making commitments that will effectively dilute CBDR. This helped the North delay urgently needed climate actions.

A peculiar, albeit transient, convergence of interests, lubricated by money and coercion, emerged at Durban between these two disparate groupings. Scarcely disguised offers of “financial assistance” were made if the vulnerable island states fell in line, opposed a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, and targeted BASIC. Japan even announced a special workshop on concessional finance for the LDCs.

At Durban, intra-BASIC differences widened. South Africa and Brazil were willing to accept binding commitments, but not China and India. South Africa, the conference host, was keen to declare it a success by supporting the EU-led bloc. At the last moment, China indicated “flexibility” by offering to accept binding commitments on certain conditions, which were most unlikely to be fulfilled. But China's move highlighted its differences with “inflexible” India, which got isolated the most of all.

BASIC did not split or disintegrate at Durban, but its lack of internal cohesion and policy coherence became evident. The BASIC Expert Forum, set up to provide decision-makers critical policy and technical inputs, has not risen to the task. At Durban in 2011, it released a joint document but this revealed that sharp differences remain, for example, between India and South Africa on the “burden-sharing” and carbon space “entitlement” approaches to equity in climate matters.

The key outcome of the conference, “The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action”, will delay all serious climate change mitigation actions beyond 2020, and ensure 3 to 5 degree Celsius global warming, instead of the 1.5-to-2 degree threshold (over preindustrial temperatures) that the earth can tolerate. Durban was a big setback and continued the retrogression begun at Copenhagen. BASIC is right to criticise the Durban Platform as lacking in emphasis on equity and CBDR.

Ironically, however it is the BASIC countries that paved the way for this outcome through a serious weakening and splintering of the G77 with whom they first broke ranks at Copenhagen and Cancun for narrow self-serving reasons. At Durban, and later, once the consequences became obvious, BASIC tried to limit the damage. The most important initiative on their part was an effort to rebuild the G77 as a consulting and negotiating forum. In this effort too, there seems to be no unanimity within BASIC.

The most recent climate talks in Warsaw in 2013 did not lead to any significant changes or new positions by BASIC. The talks have essentially been stuck in a 'holding pattern' for the last three years with less than substantive promises to negotiate a new deal in 2015 that would be operational from 2020. The Warsaw COP final agreement stuck to a familiar compromise that rejected calls for "legally binding treaty under international law" in favour of "contributions" and also kicks the profound difference on the issue of common but differentiated responsibilities down the road. The hard-fought for Warsaw Agreement Mechanism on Loss and Damage for Climate Change Impacts also has little of substance in terms of funding and rejects the idea of compensation, a red line for the US. These look likely to be ongoing sticking points, and no doubt will cause more conflict and division at future COPs in Lima in 2014 and Paris in 2015.

The likely conduct of the different members of BASIC in the near future will be influenced by disparate factors, the most important being their recent economic slowdown, which strengthens climate nation-alism or conservatism. South Africa will probably continue to play a conservative role, as it did earlier as the chair of the 2011 Durban climate conference. Brazil is reportedly in the process of qualifying or diluting its reductions offer and is unlikely to bring a proactive agenda to the table.

China recently approved its 12th Five-Year Plan, and has undertaken extensive leadership overhaul. Whether this will lead to a change in climate policy and China's relations with the rest of BASIC remains unclear. India now has a new more Right-wing, government, whose climate policy remains a subject of speculation. Domestic opinion is deeply divided on the stand that India should adopt at UNFCCC conferences, the overwhelming concern being that it must not compromise on "the right to development".

LIKE-MINDED GROUP

A new development just before Doha was the formation of what has been called the group of Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) on Climate Change in September 2012. The LMDC group held its first meeting in Beijing. The group is basically an alliance between China and India, and oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, with a few climate "radicals" like Bolivia and Ecuador, fast-growing economies like Malaysia and Thailand, and sundry others such as Egypt, Nicaragua, Pakistan and the Philippines thrown in. Significantly, the list of 12 countries at the first meeting did not contain the names of Brazil and South Africa.

The LMDC statement emphasised the "goals of environmental sustainability, social and economic development, and equity" and stressed that "this grouping is part of and is anchored firmly in the G77 & China (the group of 133 developing countries). They agreed to continue to work together to strengthen the unity of G77 & China and play a constructive and meaningful role in the negotiations." It identified the "top priority" of the Doha conference as "the adoption of an agreement for a second period of legally binding emission reduction targets for developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol which start on 1 January 2013. [KP-CP2] In order to be meaningful, the emission reduction targets must be sufficiently deep and in line with the requirements of actions to curb rising temperatures." ³¹

Although Brazil and South Africa were not part of the LMDC group, their recent statements, and the last pre-Doha communiqué issued at the conclusion of the 13th BASIC Ministerial meeting on Climate Change, held in Beijing on November 19-20, 2012, reiterated the same points. The ministers'

communiqué reaffirmed that the Kyoto Protocol remains a key component of the international climate regime and that its second commitment period (CP2), which must be “effective and legally binding”, is the key deliverable. They “called upon developed country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to raise their level of ambition in their quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) in Doha, consistent with what is required by science and their historical responsibility.”

The LMDC countries carry a fair amount of economic and political clout and could possibly pull a lot of weight in future climate talks. Whether and to what extent they succeed in revitalising the G77, pushing through a KP-CP2 without a gap, with ambitious targets for Annex I emissions reduction, and achieving progress in completing the pending issues of adaptation, finance, technology, review, etc. in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA), remains to be seen. But the prospect for this seems poor. Most Annex I countries want to shut down the LCA and start negotiating a new agreement binding all countries. Rather than reunite the G77, the LMDC could end up further splintering or wrecking it.

The LMDC group did not manage to influence the Doha or Warsaw climate conference strongly.

In fact, the 2013 Warsaw COP is considered by many an even greater failure than the more recent failures at Durban and Doha. Not only did it not break the climate talks deadlock, and carried forward and reinforced the dismal legacy of the past, but it also became known as the most “corporate-captured COP in history” with major polluting companies playing a more visible and blatant role than ever before.³²

BASIC is unlikely to be able to extend its influence through groups like LMDC. However, one thing is clear. If BASIC wants to survive and remain a player in the climate negotiations, it will have to do much more than blandly reaffirm CBDR, negotiated in 1992. Gradations and nuances must be added to it in keeping with contemporary realities. China is now an industrial giant. Most developing countries are way behind even the less affluent Northern nations in living standards, emissions, and capacity for climate action. But they together now account for 55 per cent of global emissions. BASIC and other big emerging economies are under growing pressure to accept binding obligations, albeit less stringent than the North’s.

BASIC should support the G77’s effort to defend the gains of past UNFCCC negotiations, and promote cooperative action based on international solidarity. BASIC should categorically declare that they want a strong, fair, ambitious and binding climate deal and are prepared, in the world’s long-term interests, to sacrifice their short-term gains from a low-ambition deal.

Second, they must show they accept their share of climate responsibility regardless of whether the North does or not, by launching significant voluntary domestic efforts at mitigation, adaptation and clean technology development without external support. These must have a strong equity component and improve the living standards of the poor. Their leaders must show that they have moved away from their obsession with emission-intensive unsustainable rapid growth.

Third, BASIC should offer generous, unconditional financial and technological support for adaptation and mitigation in the LDCs and small developing countries with low capacity. That might eventually contribute to a just and ambitious climate deal.

However, none of this is likely to happen without progressive domestic change within the BASIC countries, which can only be brought about by social and political movements for equity and justice. Unless these movements grow and become more powerful, they will not succeed in compelling the BASIC governments to radically alter their development approaches and climate policies. BASIC cannot change the world for the better unless it changes itself radically.

Appendix: Pledges in Tables

Table 1. Comparison of National Mitigation Pledges: I

	MtCO ₂ e in 2020	
	low pledges strict rules	high pledges strict rules
United States	0	1407
EU-27	972	1529
Japan	0	358
Russia	0	0
Canada	0	200
Australia	185	280
Annex 1	1157	3773
China	1010	1730
India	523	523
Indonesia	733	1156
Brazil	974	1051
Mexico	51	265
South Korea	244	244
South Africa	88	238
non-Annex 1	3623	5207

Quantities in millions of tonnes of CO₂. Derived from Sivan Kartha and Peter Erickson, 'Comparison of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 pledges under the Cancun Agreements', Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, 11 June 2011, p 15; based on UN Environment Programme *The Emissions Gap Report*: UNEP, November 2010.

Table 2. Comparison of National Mitigation Pledges: II

	MtCO ₂ e in 2020	
	low pledges	high pledges
United States	1289	1289
Europe	973	1535
Japan	379	379
Canada	297	297
Australia	28	138
New Zealand	19	28
Russia	0	0
Other Eastern Europe	7	7
Annex 1	2991	3673

	MtCO ₂ e in 2020	
	low pledges	high pledges
China	1392	2500
India	0	149
Brazil	975	1052
Mexico	183	183
South Africa	158	158
Indonesia	653	1029
South Korea	162	162
All Other Developing Countries	99	99
non-Annex 1	3622	5332

Quantities in millions of tonnes of CO₂. Derived from Sivan Kartha and Peter Erickson, 'Comparison of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 pledges under the Cancun Agreements', Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, 11 June 2011, p 16; based on estimates by McKinsey and others

Table 3. Comparison of National Mitigation Pledges: III

	MtCO ₂ e in 2020			
	low pledges low growth	high pledges low growth	low pledges high growth	high pledges high growth
United States	800	800	3100	3100
EU-27	250	750	1800	2340
Japan	300	300	700	700
Russia	0	0	175	450
Canada	200	200	500	500
Australia	55	145	249	351
Annex 1	1605	2195	6524	7441
China	2720	3840	6364	7636
India	0	0	0	250
Indonesia	500	500	700	700
Brazil	960	1040	1248	1352
Mexico	200	200	300	300
South Korea	100	100	300	300
South Africa	100	100	200	200
non-Annex 1	4580	5780	9112	10738

Quantities in millions of tonnes of CO₂. Derived from Sivan Kartha and Peter Erickson, 'Comparison of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 pledges under the Cancun Agreements', Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, 11 June 2011, p 17; based on estimates by Jotzo

Endnotes

- 1 The definition and composition of Annex 1 is somewhat arbitrary, and not based on clear and consistent criteria. Thus, some of the less developed countries of the former Eastern Bloc (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania), as well as Turkey, sometimes called an “emerging power”, are included in Annex 1. But oil-rich high-GDP states like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are put in the non-Annex category, which also includes OECD members South Korea, Israel and Chile, besides relatively developed Singapore.
- 2 The World Bank World Development Indicators 2012 <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2012>
- 3 Statista and International Monetary Fund, 2013, accesses 26 October <http://www.statista.com/statistics/263616/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-china/>
- 4 Stockholm Environment Institute, “Together Alone: BASIC countries and the climate change conundrum”, accessed 25 October 2013 at <http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2011-530>
- 5 IEA CO₂ Emission from Fuel Combustion Highlights 2012 Edition, available at www.iea.org These figures are lower than those for total emissions from all sources, but strongly indicate the general trend.
- 6 Baumert, K., Herzog, T., Pershing, J. (2005), *Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy*, World Resources Institute
- 7 World Resources Institute, CAIT 2.0, available at <http://cait2.wri.org/wri/Country%20GHG%20Emissions?indicator=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Excluding%20LUCF&indicator=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Including%20LUCF&year=2010&sortIdx=&sortDir=&chartType=#>
- 8 See Farhana Yamin “Pathways and Partnerships for Progress for Durban and Beyond” in *A Future for International Climate Politics Durban and Beyond*, Heinrich Boell Foundation, accessed 25 October 2013, available at http://www.tr.boell.org/downloads/A_Future_for_International_Climate_Politics_Durban_and_Beyond.pdf
- 9 IBSA Dialogue Forum was set up by Brazil, South Africa and India in 2003 as a South-South grouping “of like-minded countries, committed to inclusive sustainable development” <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org>
- 10 Farhana Yamin, *ibid*
- 11 The Guardian, London, December 3, 2010; The Hindu, New Delhi, December 6, 2010; Mail Today, New Delhi, December 8, 2010, among other sources.
- 12 Each climate action taken by the South, when supported financially by the North, is subjected to stringent forms of detailed measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) to show that it averts/avoids or reduces emissions. This needs highly specialised technologies to estimate existing levels of emissions from different sectors and activities, which the Southern countries don’t possess.
- 13 Atmospheric CO₂ levels in September 2013 were 391.31 ppm, see <http://co2now.org/> accessed 27 October 2013
- 14 A 350 ppm of CO₂ pathway, now favoured by a growing number of climatologists and governments, is safer. But it implies a more stringent CO₂ budget (cumulative emissions of 750 Gt for 2000–2050). This means that global emissions must peak in 2011–12 or so and start decreasing immediately and rapidly after that, reaching their maximum rate of decline of about 10 per cent a year by 2016. This is a tall order. On the 350 ppm pathway, global emissions would fall by 40 per cent below their 1990 levels by 2020, and 100 per cent below them by 2050. As evident from the latest figures, the 350ppm limit has been well passed.
- 15 UNFCCC, National greenhouse gas inventory data for the period, 1990–2008, November 2010 <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/sbi/eng/18.pdf>
- 16 UNEP Emissions Gap Report (2010). <http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/> accessed 1 August, 2014
- 17 Mitigation, C. C. (2011). IPCC special report on renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation. <http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report> accessed 1 August 2014
- 18 El-Ashry, M. (2010). Renewables 2010 global status report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat. Copyright Deutsche (GTZ) GmbH, 2010. http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/activities/gsr/REN21_GSR_2010_full_revised%20Sept2010.pdf accessed 1 August 2014
- 19 *ibid*.
- 20 *ibid*
- 21 Earthlife Press Release: Copenhagen, the end days. Accessible at <http://www.earthlife.org.za/?p=743>
- 22 “Together Alone: BASIC countries and the climate change conundrum”. Accessible at <http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2011-530>, accessed 28 October 2013.
- 23 *Ibid*.
- 24 “Brazil oil find may be one of world’s largest”, See <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/13/oil-brazil-idUSN1320841820100913>, accessed 28 October 2013

- 25 "Together Alone: BASIC countries and the climate change conundrum". Accessible at <http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2011-530>, accessed 28 October 2013.
- 26 SciDev.net, (2010, May 12). India's greenhouse gas emissions rise by 58%. The Guardian. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/may/12/india-greenhouse-gas-emissions-rise>
- 27 Bidwai, P. (2012). *The politics of climate change and the global crisis: mortgaging our future*. Orient BlackSwan.
- 28 See "Transforming China's Grid: Sustaining the Renewable Energy Push," <http://theenergycollective.com/michael-davidson/279091/transforming-china-s-grid-sustaining-renewable-energy-push>, accessed 11 December 2013
- 29 See China's Copenhagen Pledges, <http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/post/chinas-copenhagen-pledges/>, accessed 11 December 2013
- 30 See Report on Zhang Qingmin's Address "Chinese Foreign Policy: Taoguang Yanghui or Not?" <http://www.china-files.com/thinkin/china/sixth.html>, accessed 11 December 2013
- 31 See <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20121005.htm>
- 32 Tansey, R. (2013). The COP19 Guide to Corporate Lobbying Climate crooks and the Polish government's partners in crime. Corporate Europe Observatory Transnational Institute <http://corporateeurope.org/blog/cop19-guide-corporate-lobbying> accessed 1 August 2014

The economic rise of China, India, Brazil and others has been met by most analysts in the North with a mixture of breathless excitement or fear. But what does the rise of these nations mean for local and international social movements committed to economic, social and environmental justice?

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